










          
  
Learning to Industrialize 
This book proposes a new, pragmatic way of approaching economic develop-
ment which features policy learning based on a comparison of international 
best policy practices. While the important role of government in promoting 
private sector development is being recognized, policy discussion often remains
general without details as to what exactly to do and how to avoid common 
pitfalls. This book ¼lls the gap by showing concrete policy contents, procedures,
and organizations adopted in high-performing East Asian economies. 
Natural resources and foreign aid and investment can take a country to 
a certain income level, but growth stalls when given advantages are exhausted.
Economies will be caught in middle-income traps if growth impetus is not 
internally generated. Meanwhile, countries that have soared to high income 
levels introduced mindset, policies, and institutions that encouraged, or even 
forced, accumulation of human capital – skills, technology, and knowledge. 
How this can be done systematically is the main topic of policy learning. 
However, government should not randomly adopt what Singapore or Taiwan
did in the past. A continued march to prosperity is possible only when policy
makers acquire the capability to formulate policy suitable for local context
after studying a number of international experiences. 
Developing countries wanting to adopt effective industrial strategies but 
not knowing where to start will bene¼t greatly from the ideas and hands-on 
examples presented by the author. Students of development economics will 
¼nd a new methodological perspective which can supplement the ongoing 
industrial policy debate. The book also gives an excellent account of the 
national pride and pragmatism exhibited by of¼cials in East Asia who pro-
duced remarkable economic growth, as well as the serious effort by an African
country to emulate this miracle. 
Kenichi Ohno is Professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy 
Studies, Tokyo. He was born in Kobe, Japan and holds a PhD in Economics
from Stanford University, California. He worked at the International Monetary
Fund and taught at the University of Tsukuba and Saitama University before
assuming his current position. 
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Learning without thinking is useless; thinking without learning is insecure. 
(Confucius, 551–479 bc, chapter on politics, Lun-yu) 
This book proposes a way to learn pragmatic policymaking for developing 
countries that must cope with the strong pressure of market-orientation and 
globalization of our time. It points to a realistic method of overcoming a 
low- or middle-income trap into which many countries seem to have fallen. 
Such a strategy is not only possible but also already practiced in many
parts of the world, especially in East Asia, with different degrees of success. 
Our main focus is the productive sector of the economy which includes 
manufacturing, agriculture, services, and logistics, but the general principle
advanced here should be applicable to all policy making. This study should 
be useful for people who are seriously interested in the practice of development
policy, such as national leaders, economic ministers, directors and of¼cials 
of government ministries and agencies, development experts and consultants,
policy researchers and students, and even ordinary citizens who are yearning 
to know what goes wrong with the policies of their motherland and how 
this can be remedied. 
Industrial policy debate is receiving revived attention. The days of minuscule
government and unfettered markets are over. It is now widely recognized 
that free-market crusaders can do much harm to the global economy, and 
the appropriate involvement of government is essential for sustained growth.
Based on this re-emerging view, economists are arguing whether policy should
lead or follow markets, whether selective intervention is possible in the twenty-
¼rst century, what should be the six steps to compile an industrial strategy, and
so on. However, these arguments are a bit too abstract for the practitioners 
of development policy. I would like to enter the debate from a different angle. 
The discussion here is action-oriented rather than theoretical. Many concrete
cases and policy measures will be presented, mainly from the current and 
historical experiences of East Asia, which feature pragmatism, obsession with
concrete details, and expectation of graduation from aid. The debate on the 
proper role of government, for example, cannot be resolved in the theoretical
 
 










realm alone because theory and practice are intertwined. The answer critically
hinges on the policy capability of government and the maturity of the private
sector of the country in question. Many industrial strategies have failed not 
due to the lack of theoretical justi¼cation but largely because of crude and 
inappropriate application. Most promotion measures are globally common 
but performance differs considerably from one country to another. This book
attempts to explain, for instance, why Japan and Taiwan were so successful
in absorbing foreign technology and strengthening their small and medium 
enterprises while most other countries remain ineffective even though their 
policy menus are similar. Not only that, this book also suggests how policy
capability can be built up in pragmatic steps. Early achievers of industrializa-
tion did not have to go to school to learn good policies. They struggled 
through self-study and trial-and-error, and produced spectacular results. But
today’s latecomer countries may bene¼t greatly from more explicit and sys-
tematic learning. Cataloguing, analyzing, and sharing policy know-how 
should be one of the central objectives of policy science. 
A latecomer country often starts to grow when domestic markets are 
liberalized and international integration is initiated, but growth stalls when 
the income level dictated by given advantages—location, natural resources, 
existing labor, and in½ow of foreign funds—is reached. Beyond that point, sus-
tained development to high income will require internal creation of value 
backed by continuous upgrading of skills, technology, and knowledge. To 
realize this, government must install policies and institutions that encourage,
or even force, human capital accumulation. This is a dif¼cult task that only 
a handful of countries have accomplished. The enormity of this dif¼culty is 
the fundamental reason why income tends to polarize across countries under
globalization and also why low- and middle-income traps are so common. 
This book emphasizes policy learning. It considers government as a proper
(but often still potential) initiator of national transformation in mindset, 
technology, and industry in a developing country. Weak policy capability 
does not lead to the conclusion that government should remain inactive but 
to the counsel on policy learning to overcome this weakness. However, 
random adoption of policy measures without knowledge of global practice 
or difference in local contexts is doomed to fail. Policy learning must be 
based on a systematic collection and comparison of international best policy 
practices (and even failures), with the objective of enhancing government 
capability which enables the creation of a policy package most appropriate 
for the country’s unique situation. Three things must be learned: policy 
content, policy procedure, and policy organization. A more advanced question
is what to do with a lazy private sector that fails to respond to good policies 
introduced by government. These are the issues that will be dealt with in 
this volume. It may not give de¼nitive answers, but the materials and ideas 
provided will hopefully be of use to further study. 
This book is written in the same spirit as the Growth Report produced 














with the statement that there is no single recipe for growth policy and
that outsiders can only provide ingredients for a dedicated national team to 
select and combine to cook a suitable dinner for the country (Commission 
on Growth and Development, 2008, p. 16). But I go further by comparing
alternative methods of industrial policy design and implementation across 
countries, hinting at how they can be selected and combined, and showing 
how policy skills can be taught and learned. My perspective is somewhat 
broader than the Growth Report and includes politics, social mindsets, and 
administrative hurdles as backgrounds for development policy formulation 
in each country. Practical cases are drawn mainly from East Asia, which 
constitutes another special feature of this volume. 
The main title of the book, Learning to Industrialize, is the same as that 
of the work by Sanjaya Lall (1987) which surveyed nineteen Indian ¼rms in 
the cement, steel, textiles, and consultation industries. Lall’s main concern 
was the methods by which individual ¼rms acquired technological capability 
while policy environment was treated cursorily as external conditions. In my 
book, government is the learner and I explore the way in which its capability
can be strengthened. I hope the reader will ¼nd my work complementary
to Lall’s as it broadens the scope of learning that must be undertaken for 
economic development. 
The book has two parts. The ¼rst part contains general discussions in four
chapters and the second presents six country studies—¼ve from East Asia 
and one from Africa—that portray serious governmental effort to establish 
policies and institutions that accelerate human capital accumulation, each 
in its own way and with different degrees of success. In-depth case studies 
are an integral part of policy learning because they can show not just technical
aspects of policymaking but, more importantly, the resolve and passion of 
political leaders and public servants that sustain a nationwide industrialization
drive. Development is propelled not by science and technology alone but by 
the spirit of the people. A vivid and detailed description of how a poor 
country rose—or is trying to rise—to the status of an industrial economy
with advanced technology should move the reader at the heart and enrich 
him or her in the brain. 
Chapter 1 argues that globalization in its natural tendency polarizes income
across countries. The crucial factor that divides winners from losers is the 
amount of skills, technology, and knowledge accumulated in their citizens 
rather than the initial endowment of natural resources or the amount of 
foreign funds received. Low or middle income may be attained by economic 
liberalization or external opening, but a continued march to high income 
becomes possible only when the country establishes a national mechanism 
for constant upgrading of human capital. 
Chapter 2 shows that many latecomer countries are already willing to 
learn the nitty-gritty of industrial promotion, but such knowledge is not 
forthcoming from either academia or international organizations. What they











than a theoretical debate on the justi¼cation or desirability of industrial 
policy. Proactive industrial policy is proposed by which latecomers balance 
state and market as well as integration commitments and retention of 
suf¼cient policy tools. A number of frequently asked questions are reviewed, 
and commonly encountered issues such as a weak private sector, problems 
generated by high growth, and politics of development are addressed. 
Chapter 3 discusses ingredients of industrial promotion. The concept of 
policy learning is introduced, policy dialogue with developing countries as 
practiced by Japan and South Korea is explained, and the meaning of “learning
from East Asia” is re-examined. The rest of the chapter is devoted to the 
exposition of standard policy tools for industrial capability building such as 
kaizen, shindan, engineering universities and technical colleges, training-
industry links, industrial parks, and strategic FDI marketing. More complex 
policy packages such as small and medium enterprise promotion, integrated 
export promotion, creation of an entirely new industry, and comprehensive 
regional development with core infrastructure are also discussed. Some of 
these policy tools are globally well known but others are special or uniquely 
developed in East Asia. 
Chapter 4 deals with the procedural and organizational aspects of policy-
making which are often neglected in existing policy studies. After the critical 
importance of leadership is stressed, necessary ingredients in policymaking 
procedure—vision, consensus building, documentation, and stakeholder
participation—are explained. Alternative policy organizations are highlighted
with concrete international examples, including a technocrat team supporting
the top leader, a national council or committee, a super-ministry, a specialized
institute as a policymaking hub, and a strong leader without institutionalization.
Additionally, standard contents of an industrial policy document are illustrated,
and advice on Vietnam’s policy procedure and organization is appended as 
an example. 
Chapters 5 to 10 report six different cases of the state’s effort to upgrade 
human capital. The ¼rst three cases are reviews of outstanding performance 
while the remaining three are stories of contemporary struggle. 
In Chapter 5, Japan in the second half of the nineteenth century, which 
internalized Western technology vigorously and effectively, is analyzed from 
the perspectives of history, politics, and speci¼c policy measures. Chapter 6 
narrates Singapore’s national productivity movement which started with the 
top-down initiative but eventually assimilated widely and continues even 
today. Chapter 7 explains Taiwan’s current innovation drive featuring a 
powerful ministry, technology development projects, research institutes, and 
science parks. In Chapter 8, Malaysia’s intense effort to escape an upper-
middle-income trap is described where highly sophisticated policy mechanisms
are contrasted with a lackluster response from the private sector. In Chapter 
9, Vietnam’s awareness of the lack of quality of growth and internal value 
creation is examined despite its remarkable growth in the last two decades 







10 documents the policy learning process of Ethiopia, a low-income country 
with dif¼cult initial conditions, which is backed by an unwavering political 
resolve and a strong desire to learn from East Asia and not from Washington. 
The sample of countries is far from complete, but even this small selection 
should be enough for the reader to realize the existence of something com-
mon among high performers despite enormous diversity of their experiences.
The inclusion of Ethiopia, in particular, should prove that the type of policy 
learning advocated in this book is not a monopoly of East Asia. It is also 
hoped that their tales will conjure up the same thrill and amazement about 
policymaking in the reader as they did in myself. The number of countries 
included also had to be limited by such practical concerns as the acceptable 
size of the book and my own time constraints. South Korea and Thailand 
were omitted although interesting information was available on their policy 
formulation. China and India, the two giants which remain untouched in 
my study, must be dealt with separately when my research progresses further. 
As the reader will surely notice, the people and organizations that supported
my policy research over the last two decades are too many to be recognized 
individually. Instead of listing them one by one, I would like to thank them 
collectively with the deepest sense of respect and appreciation for their intel-
ligence and dedication to policy making in their respective countries, including
those in East Asia and Africa which are not featured in this book. But one 
person must be specially mentioned. I would like to express my great gratitude
to Azko Hayashida, my most productive assistant who supported the policy 
research during the last ten years. I sincerely hope that her next adventure 
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Centers of Excellence Program, and the Global Centers of Excellence Program
of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. The Japan International 
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Part I 
Ideas and methods 

 
         








1 The developmental trap 
1.1 Income polarization 
The idea that globalization promotes international income convergence through
trade and investment opportunities and technology transfer, and therefore 
helps latecomer countries in their effort to catch up with early achievers, has 
long been advanced by a number of of¼cials and scholars. It is also an idea 
that has been challenged by countless arguments and examples. The controversy
over latecomers’ advantage under globalization did not originate from the 
Washington Consensus, a policy proposition championed by the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund, which argued that economic liberal-
ization, privatization, and opening up are good for all countries. Nor was it
invented by the scathing critiques of the Washington Consensus by such 
proponents as Chang (2002), Stiglitz (2002, 2006), Rodrik (2007), and Cimoli
et al. (2009a). Con½ict of interests over globalization between early achievers
and latecomers is an old issue that goes back at least to the nineteenth century. 
If left to natural forces, globalization tends to polarize income rather than 
equalize it. This is a phenomenon that ¼rst emerged as a result of the Industrial
Revolution in the West. In previous centuries when international trade was 
long-distance exchange of primary commodities and local specialties with 
low technology content, free trade did not produce obvious winners and losers.
When Europe exported silver in exchange for Chinese silk and spices, trade 
was a mutually pro¼table activity between more or less equal partners. How-
ever, production of industrial goods by mechanized factories changed the 
rules of the trading game. Merchandise in large volume, uniform quality, 
and low cost began to invade the global market in which technology and 
production scale were decisive factors. Learning, R&D, and patenting in new
knowledge became crucial. In the new trading game, where winner-take-all 
and technology lock-in for late starters are prominent features, early achiev-
ers are able to continuously improve technology while latecomers are not 
even allowed to enter the race. The only way to catch up for latecomers 
seems to be protection and promotion of domestic industries for a certain 
period, but imposition of free trade effectively removes this option. The 
fundamental nature of globalization that enhances the rich-and-poor gap 
basically remains intact even to this date with a minor modi¼cation that 
 
 
     
 
 










4 Ideas and methods 
knowledge industries and high-value services have been added to manufactur-
ing as leading sectors. 
The developing world liberalized its trade regime rapidly and signi¼cantly 
in the 1980s and 1990s under integration, structural adjustment, and systemic
transition programs sponsored by the three sister international organizations
consisting of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the 
World Trade Organization. However, increased openness did not automatically
stimulate economic growth in developing countries. An UNCTAD report 
on least developed countries (LDCs) in 2004 questioned the supposed bene¼t
of trade expansion on economic growth (proxied by per capita private con-
sumption). Among 66 observations on poorest countries in the ¼ve-year 
period of 1990–1995 and/or 1995–2000, exports grew in 51 of them. In 18 
of these 51 cases, however, per capita private consumption fell as export 
expanded (the “immiserizing trade effect”). Only 22 of the 51 cases showed 
rising per capita private consumption along with export growth, while the 
export–consumption nexus was ambiguous in 11 of the 51 cases. UNCTAD 
concludes that “even when the LDCs have increased their overall export 
growth rate—as many . . . did in the 1990s—better export performance rarely
translates into sustained and substantial poverty reduction” (UNCTAD, 2004,
p. IV). In a similar vein, after reviewing the “voluminous” literature on the 
links between trade policy and economic performance, Rodrik ¼nds that “there
is no convincing evidence that trade liberalization is predictably associated 
with subsequent economic growth” (Rodrik, 2007, pp. 215–216). 
Back in the mid-nineteenth century when Japan re-opened its ports and 
began to trade with the West after more than two centuries of feudal rule 
and severely controlled external trade, Okubo Toshimichi (1830–1878), the ¼rst
home minister of the reformist Meiji government who initiated an industrial 
modernization drive, wrote in his policy proposal: 
If we are to turn the tide around and correct the situation [of slow eco-
nomic progress and trade de¼cits], we have no choice but to encourage
private business and international trade by mobilizing effective policy 
measures to cultivate fundamental strengths of economic activities and 
expand commercial pro¼t. If we do not regard this as the duties of the 
government and leave the matter to people’s own devices and simply 
wait for the results, will the decline ever stop? This is the most pressing 
of all national issues. Even though such policy may not be endorsed by
the orthodox doctrine of political economy, rules must be bent to respond
to the urgent needs of our time. 
(Okubo, 1876, pp. 79–80) 
The orthodox doctrine of political economy to which Okubo referred was 
the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage with the assumption of given
technology in each country. Under this static theory commonly preached by 
the British delegation to Japan, it could be “proved” that free trade bene¼ted
 















The developmental trap 5 
all nations including advanced and backward ones. However, Japanese lead-
ers in the nineteenth century were keenly aware, by instinct and through 
observing situations in Asian neighbors, of the true nature of free trade 
imposed on Japan by unequal commercial treaties with the West.1 They clearly
understood the suppressive effects that free trade with advanced countries 
would have on burgeoning domestic industries, and resulting dominance
of the strong nations over the weak—a situation described as imperialism of 
free trade by economic historians. 
In 1871, Hirobumi Ito (1841–1909), who later drafted the ¼rst Japanese 
constitution and became Japan’s ¼rst prime minister, wrote from the United 
States, where he was staying on an of¼cial mission to study American ¼scal 
and monetary systems, that the free trade advocated by Britain was merely 
an excuse to pursue its own national interest whose adoption would greatly 
harm an underdeveloped country like Japan. The common practice of kicking
away the ladder by early industrial achievers to deprive others of the means 
of climbing after them was eloquently pointed out by the nineteenth-century 
German economist Friedrich List (1841), and was more recently documented
with ample historical evidence by Chang (2002). 
Notwithstanding the strong pressure of imperialism of free trade, Japan in 
the late nineteenth century absorbed Western systems and technology well 
and rapidly developed its industries by employing various policies other than
tariff protection. It joined the “Big Five,” a group of most advanced nations,
by the 1910s and began to attend international conferences that determined 
the fate of the world. How this feat was achieved will be the main topic of 
Chapter 5. However, it is important to stress that Japan was a rare exception
rather than the rule among latecomers. There was no other non-Western 
country that caught up with Western industrial powers until the latter half 
of the twentieth century when Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South 
Korea began to surge. At present, there are a number of “emerging economies,”
such as China, India and Brazil, that seem to be on a track to catch-up 
industrialization. Nonetheless, the rest of the developing world has generally 
and for long remained poor with low industrial capabilities. 
Castaldi et al. (2009) summarize global development experience in historical
perspective as follows. Since the British Industrial Revolution, there emerged
a clear separation of countries between the rich and the poor clubs. Only
a small number of countries made up the former while the vast majority 
belonged to the latter. This was in sharp contrast to the situation in earlier 
centuries when income levels were more equal at least among Europe, China,
and the Arab world. Transition probabilities between the two clubs were not
zero but very small, with only a few countries, already mentioned above, 
rising to join the rich club and even a fewer countries descending from the 
rich to the poor club. Within subgroups of countries, such as within the already
rich OECD members and within the East Asian region, a tendency for collective
catching up was observed. But such local convergence was unable to offset 






6 Ideas and methods 
In short, most countries remained poor while a small number of rich 
countries became and remained rich in the last two centuries, with very limited
switching of members between the two clubs. The view that globalization 
promotes international income convergence through new trade and invest-
ment opportunities and technology transfer is not only naïve but also rejected
by the data. The fact is that an integrated world economy has a natural tendency
to polarize income—a tendency which, however, may be resisted and even 
reversed by well-constructed policies as argued in the chapters to follow. 
1.2 Diversity in catching-up ability 
East Asia is known as a region that achieved remarkable economic growth 
on average, but not all economies in the region have succeeded in develop-
ment. The World Bank’s East Asian Miracle report, which explored the 
policy secrets of this rapidly growing region, implicitly assumed that all of 
the ten economies it studied registered impressive growth and deserved ad-
miration (World Bank, 1993). But statistics reveal that this was not the case. 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 present real income per head of East Asian economies 
relative to the United States, the frontrunner country of our time, for the 
period starting in 1950. Japan began to industrialize very early, in the late 










































Figure 1.1 Per capita income relative to US: East Asia 1 (measured in the 1990 inter-
national Geary-Khamis dollars) 





    
     
      
 
      



















































Figure 1.2 Per capita income relative to US: East Asia 2 (measured in the 1990 inter-
national Geary-Khamis dollars) 
Sources: Angus Maddison (2003), the Central Bank of the Republic of China, and IMF, World 
Economic Outlook Database, April 2010 (for updating). 
East Asia (Ohno, 2006a). Singapore and Hong Kong, two city economies 
inhabited mainly by ethnic Chinese and currently functioning as information,
¼nancial, and transport hubs of the region, rose fast to overtake Japan in 
recent years. These are the highest income achievers in East Asia. 
Other countries in the East Asian region, in Figure 1.2, can be classi¼ed into
four groups according to their income performance in the post-World War 
II period. Taiwan and South Korea (the ¼rst group) soared rapidly to attain 
high income and high industrial capability. Malaysia and Thailand (the 
second group) have risen only to middle income although they started
industrialization at about the same time as Taiwan and South Korea, namely
in the 1960s. Meanwhile, Indonesia and the Philippines (the third group) have
not made any visible long-term catching up relative to the US income. Two
transition economies which initially belonged to the third group deserve
special mention. China, a socialist giant, took off in the 1980s and made
accelerated strides in the 1990s and 2000s. It now belongs to the middle-
income group and continues to ascend. Vietnam, another socialist latecomer 
hampered by prolonged war and economic planning in the past, started to
grow fast in the 1990s driven mainly by large in½ows of foreign aid and capital. 
Figure 1.2 clearly illustrates the fact that different income performance 
among the ¼rst, second, and third groups in East Asia is the result of differ-
ent speeds of ascent rather than delayed starts. Furthermore, the East Asian 









    
 
8 Ideas and methods 
poor and without signi¼cant industrial achievement for various political and 
economic reasons. They are Laos, Cambodia, East Timor, Myanmar, and 
North Korea (the fourth group). 
Yet, despite these disparities in development performance, East Asia is 
the only non-Western region that has had a number of super growth achievers
and therefore shown signi¼cant income growth on average. By contrast, the 
records of catching-up industrialization in other developing regions, presented
in Figures 1.3 to 1.6, are less remarkable and without stellar performers. 
Latin America was part of the relatively rich world in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. In 1820, average per capita income of the region was 
42 percent of that of the United Kingdom, a leading economy at that time,
while the average income of the East Asian region was 34 percent of the UK 
(Maddison, 2003). Rich resource endowments and low population density 
were the main reasons for Latin America’s initial blessing. Over time, how-
ever, as population grew and industrialization effort lagged, the region’s 
average income vis-à-vis advanced economies gradually eroded, and even-
tually fell to 23 percent of the US income by 2001. The post-World War II 
period continued to witness the long-term trend of slipping from middle 
income as shown in Figure 1.3. A large fall of oil-rich Venezuela from
high to low income is particularly striking. It may be said that, over the last
few centuries, wealth generated from land has been squandered in Latin 











































Figure 1.3 Per capita income relative to US: Latin America (measured in the 1990 
international Geary-Khamis dollars) 























Figure 1.4 Per capita income relative to US: Russia and Eastern Europe (measured 




Sources: Angus Maddison (2003) and IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2010 
(for updating). 
Notes: Data for Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia after the break-up are given by aggregating 
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Figure 1.5 Per capita income relative to US: Africa (measured in the 1990 inter-
national Geary-Khamis dollars) 




















































Figure 1.6 Per capita income relative to US: South Asia (measured in the 1990 inter-
national Geary-Khamis dollars) 
Sources: Angus Maddison (2003) and IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2010 
(for updating). 
Russia and Eastern Europe are another group of countries that have ½uctu-
ated in the middle-income range mostly under the socialist regime. Economic
dif¼culties at the time of the disappearance of the USSR are also clearly 
visible in Figure 1.4. 
Africa, in Figure 1.5, and South Asia, in Figure 1.6, are two regions that 
appear to be stuck at low income. In both regions, countries are clustered 
at the bottom of the scale with little movement which gives a highly mono-
tonous tone to the graph. South Africa’s mildly high income in the early 
period and a modest rise of Botswana in recent years are explainable mainly 
by the export of metals and precious stones. In South Asia, recent improve-
ments in Sri Lanka and India, albeit tiny, deserve to be monitored. 
1.3 Knowledge, skills and technology 
Income divergence, as illustrated above, mainly re½ects different amounts of 
knowledge, skills and technology accumulated in each country. Income earned
by human capital, rather than windfall gain from natural resources or lucky 
in½ows of foreign money, is the key determinant of long-term economic 
growth. This should be obvious to most readers, but it is still useful to review
some statistics, assembled by Castaldi et al. (2009), to re-con¼rm the obvious.
In doing so, two caveats should be noted in advance. For one thing, human 
capital (or “innovativeness”) cannot be directly measured and therefore must


















The developmental trap 11 
to income, or vice versa, cannot be directly proved by correlation. Data may 
amply illustrate, but cannot rigorously prove, that innovativeness is the mother
of high income. 
As proxies of innovativeness and technology attainment, Castaldi and 
others look at the number of US patents granted, labor productivity, ¼rm-
level R&D, number of researchers, expenditure on IT, diffusion of ICT, and 
concentration of R&D activities by foreign af¼liates. These data are selectively
presented in Table 1.1. The authors observe that “irrespectively of the chosen
proxy, the picture which emerges is one with innovation highly concentrated 
in a small group of countries” (p. 40). Just as the club of rich countries has been
exclusive, the club of innovating countries has also been small with restricted
entry and a slow pace of change in relative ranking in the last two centuries. 
Again, Japan in the early twentieth century and South Korea and Taiwan 
in the late twentieth century are mentioned as the only new major entrants 
to the innovation club. Since income and innovativeness are closely related, 
overlapping membership in the two clubs is not at all surprising. 
One of the proxies highlighted by Castaldi and others is the number of 
US patents granted to non-US countries since 1883. The authors admit that 
this is a narrow de¼nition of human capital. Upgrading of knowledge, skills, 
and technology can occur not only through inventive discovery and patenting
but also through emulation, reverse engineering, adoption of capital-embodied
innovation, learning by doing, incremental productivity enhancement at factories,
organizational innovation, and so on. Nevertheless, a signi¼cant link exists 
between invention and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita which is 
reasonably robust over different historical periods. The link is particularly 
strong between 1913 and 1970 as well as in the 1980s and 2000s. Correlation 
between the growth of US patents per capita and the growth of GDP per 
capita among 14 OECD countries was 0.05 and statistically insigni¼cant in 
1890–1913 but became large and statistically signi¼cant at 5 percent level
in later periods: 0.67 in 1913–1929, 0.58 in 1929–1950, and 0.71 in 1950–1970.
Then it evaporated in the turbulent oil-shock years of 1970–1977 to 0.16 with
no statistical signi¼cance. A more recent and larger dataset containing 21 OECD
countries basically paints the same picture with the following correlation 
coef¼cients between the growth of US patents per capita and the growth of 
GDP per capita: 0.18 (insigni¼cant) in 1970–1977, 0.82 in 1977–1984, 0.89 
in 1984–1991, 0.30 (statistically insigni¼cant) in 1991–1998, and 0.64 in 
1998–2006. 
If the level of US patents per capita and the level of GDP per capita are 
used instead of growth rates, correlation between them is consistently positive
(ranging from 0.50 to 0.88) and signi¼cant at 5 percent level throughout 
1929–2006 but not in the early years of 1890 or 1913. Similarly, correlation 
between the level of R&D per capita and the level of GDP per capita is 
always positive (ranging from 0.49 to 0.79) during 1963–2006 (no data
are reported before 1963). These mutually supportive results con¼rm the 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
    
  
     
 
The developmental trap 13 
and income per head on the other at least for OECD countries (Castaldi et al.,
2009, pp. 45–47). 
Individual countries that deserve special mention in Table 1.1 include 
Japan which sharply increased its share of US patents granted from 1929 onward,
and Taiwan and South Korea which did the same from 1973 onward. Labor 
productivity relative to the US reveals similar trends with Japan rising greatly
from 1913 and East Asian tigers following suit in more recent decades. It is 
also notable that the four Latin American countries fell signi¼cantly in 
relative labor productivity in recent decades. Thus the stories about innovative-
ness of nations are basically the same as the stories of relative income catch-up
illustrated in Figures 1.1 to 1.6 above. The same countries are repeatedly 
mentioned as outstanding achievers in both human capital and income per 
head because the two are inseparable. 
These historical results lead to the conclusion that knowledge, skills, and 
technology do not ½ow naturally from high-level to low-level countries even 
in a world with low barriers to trade, investment, capital mobility, labor 
migration, and information in printed and electronic media. Globalization 
does not automatically support convergence in the quality or quantity of 
human capital across countries but rather tends to widen and solidify the 
gap between innovative countries and others. 
Knowledge relevant to human capital accumulation cannot be bought 
off-the-shelf because improvement requires internalization of foreign know-
ledge by local residents. A toolkit for ef¼cient factory management or a textbook
on strategic marketing have little impact unless it is effectively put to use in 
the local context. This in turn calls for a complex socio-economic process 
involving a merger of two systems—a foreign system introduced from outside
and an existing local system—which are often initially incompatible (Ohno, 
2000). Friction, hostility, and rejection which arise in a forced systemic merger
must be managed properly by modifying both systems for a better ¼t without
diluting the desired bene¼ts of the imported system. Maegawa (1994, 2000), 
an economic anthropologist who studies the meeting of “civilization” (dominant
technology and systems) and a “culture” (local society), calls this process 
translative adaptation. 
[M]any nations and societies have adopted Western institutions and objects
from without in order to survive (or by their own choice). However, it 
is important to recognize that they did not accept Western inventions in
their original forms. Any item in one culture will change its meaning 
when transplanted to another culture, as seen widely in ethnography 
around the world. Not only cosmology, religious doctrine, rituals, but also
the family system, the institution of exchange, and even socio-economic 
organizations like the ¼rm exhibit the property of adapting to external 
institutions and principles with the existing cultural system maintaining 
its form of structure. The essence of what has been called “modernization”














           
  
14 Ideas and methods 
of the existing culture. That is, actors in the existing system have adapted
to the new system by reinterpreting each element of Western culture 
(i.e., “civilization”) in their own value structure, modifying yet maintain-
ing the existing institutions. I shall call this “translative adaptation.” 
(Maegawa, 1994, English translation pp. 174–175) 
Translative adaptation does not naturally arise from the market mechanism.
To succeed, the process must be managed with careful deliberation and trial-and-
error. Mindsets and institutions that facilitate a smooth systemic merger 
must be designed and installed. The principal coordinator of this change should
be the central government of the latecomer country in question. Individuals 
and private ¼rms who produce and invest are the key actors of economic 
development, but they themselves cannot stand outside the arena to plan, 
implement, monitor, or adjust the process of systemic merger. To establish 
a national innovation mechanism, the government must acquire suf¼cient 
expertise to guide and assist the private sector. Only when this public–private
cooperation reaches a certain critical point, private-sector capabilities begin 
to accumulate in a signi¼cant way. The dif¼culty of this policy learning is the
fundamental cause of the exclusive membership of the innovative country
club as well as the rich country club. 
It must be added that innovation most pertinent to latecomer countries 
at low and lower middle-income levels is the creation of something new in 
the home country and not the creation of something entirely new in the world.
Acquiring and assimilating knowledge, skills, and technology that are already
widely known and practiced in advanced economies is extremely important 
and forms the core of learning that latecomer countries must do. This should
be achieved by importing, digesting and transforming existing bodies of 
industrial knowledge through translative adaptation. It is emulation, not 
innovation in the narrow sense, that is required of latecomer countries in the
process of industrial catching up. Similar caveats apply to the pursuit of ICT,
high-tech, software, bio-tech, nano-tech, new materials, solar technology, 
and other fancy terms that are thrown randomly into the plan documents 
of many developing countries. In order to achieve early industrialization, 
countries should mainly focus on improving discipline and reducing wastes 
in factories (kaizen), better marketing, strategic business planning, building 
enterprise networks, and other ordinary and non-proprietary knowledge to 
raise productivity and competitiveness (Chapter 3) instead of trying to become
a leader in frontline technology. Innovation in the narrow sense will become 
increasingly important for upper-middle and high-income countries but 
emulation should be the key strategy for other countries. 
Emulation is somewhat similar to, though much broader than, what Rodrik
calls self-discovery. 
Diversi¼cation of the productive structure requires “discovery” of an 


















The developmental trap 15 
be produced at low enough cost to be pro¼table. Entrepreneurs must 
experiment with new product lines. They must tinker with technologies
from established producers abroad and adapt them to local conditions. 
This is the process that Ricardo Hausmann and I called “self-discovery.” 
(Rodrik, 2007, pp. 104–105) 
However, emulation is not con¼ned to the introduction of a new product at 
lower cost for diversifying the product mix. As Schumpeter (1934) eloquently
analyzed, it can occur through new products, new production method, new 
markets, new input procurement, and new industrial organization. Emulation
can work miracles when properly applied to the improvement of a factory-½oor
organization or the creation of linkage between farmers and the food process-
ing industry, for example. 
On the other hand, Krugman (1994)’s contention that Asian miracle is a 
myth because its growth has depended heavily on perspiration (accumulation
of factors of production such as labor and capital) rather than inspiration
(growth in total factor productivity) seems to be off the mark. Catch-up 
industrialization of latecomer countries, especially in its early stages, is always
driven more by accumulation of human and non-human capital—education 
and investment—than productivity growth as measured by TFP. That is the 
right way to start development, and the fact that so many East Asian countries
could do this while most other developing countries cannot is a wonder 
worth genuine praise and serious investigation. 
1.4 The curse of natural resources and foreign money 
It may seem that having a large amount of natural resources is an advantage 
for industrialization because the nation can earn foreign exchange for industrial
investment. But history shows that this is not the case. Correlation between 
natural resource abundance and economic stagnation is a well-documented 
fact in development economics. All of the top income achievers in East 
Asia—Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea—are people-
rich and resource-poor. On the other hand, it is rare to see countries endowed
with large deposits of energy, minerals, and other natural resources relative 
to population size—Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Bolivia, Zambia, Angola,
and the Gulf states, for example—to experience a sustained march in national
income or boast globally competitive manufacturing industries. True, there 
are exceptions such as Botswana which manages its diamond wealth reasonably
well and Malaysia which has a large FDI-based electronics industry despite
natural resource abundance (but see Chapter 8 for Malaysia’s malaise). 
Nevertheless, data con¼rm that countries with few natural resources on 
average perform better than resource-rich countries. After controlling for 
past growth trends and geographic factors, Sachs and Warner (2001) conclude
from their regression analysis that linkage between natural resource abundance
and lackluster growth is robust. 
 










16 Ideas and methods 
We must, however, beware of the winners’ bias. Countries that have succeeded
in industrialization look resource-poor ex post facto even if they started with 
the same degree of natural resource dependence as others. For example, 
Japan in the mid-nineteenth century was an exporter of raw silk and dried 
tea leaves, and Taiwan before it established Hsinchu Science Park in 1980 
was a major producer of rice, sugar, and bananas. These economies look less
dependent on natural resources today because their industries grew much 
faster than agriculture or mining. However, this bias can be avoided if we 
compare natural resource dependence of each country at some past point 
with its subsequent growth performance. 
Figure 1.7 plots natural resource endowment in 1970, measured by exports
of fuels, ores, and minerals in percent of GDP, against average per capita 
real growth in the subsequent three decades for all countries for which data 
are available in the World Bank database (81 countries including both
developed and developing). The majority of countries are resource-poor and 
clustered on the left-side of the diagram. They exhibit a wide range of growth
performance from negative to very high. From this diagram, we cannot 
detect any positive association between resource abundance and high growth.
In fact, extremely resource-rich countries, on the right-side of the diagram, 
have been condemned to low or even negative long-term growth. The same 
results were obtained from a similar diagram of Sachs and Warner (2001) 
which compared resource endowment in 1970 and average per capita real 
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Figure 1.7 Growth and natural resource endowment 
Source: Author’s calculation using data from World Bank, World Development Indicators & 
Global Development Finance, April 2010. 
 
            
 






   
 
   
   
     
     
     
      
 
 
              
The developmental trap 17 
Reasons for the curse of natural resources are many. Some point to laziness
and complacency associated with unearned wealth whilst others emphasize 
corruption and political capture spawned by the availability of large rents. 
In the 1970s, unfavorable terms of trade for resource exporters were frequently
cited as the cause of their impoverishment, based on the argument that the 
prices of primary commodities tended to decline relative to the prices of 
industrial goods in the long run. 
However, the most convincing explanation of the curse, at least economically,
is that a rise in the natural resource sector crowds out the manufacturing 
sector. Large export earnings from natural resources inject additional purchas-
ing power into the national economy which pushes up the prices of non-traded
goods and non-traded factors of production such as services, wages, land 
rents, and industrial service costs. Meanwhile, the prices of manufactured 
goods, which are traded internationally and cannot deviate from global norms,
remain the same. As a result, the manufacturing sector loses international 
competitiveness due to high input costs relative to output prices. Moreover, 
the domestic factors of production, such as managers, engineers, workers, 
and capital (if capital mobility is less than perfect), are competed away to 
the expanding resource sector. Faced with a reduced supply and higher costs 
of domestic inputs, the manufacturing sector shrinks as natural resource export
rises. Industrialization is inhibited. 
The loss of industrial competitiveness can occur whether the exchange rate is
¼xed or ½oating. If it is ¼xed, rising domestic demand gradually exerts in½ationary
pressure on the non-tradable sector while the prices of manufactured goods are
anchored globally. The Netherlands discovered off-shore natural gas in the 1960s
when major currencies were ¼xed under the Bretton Woods currency system. As
natural gas was extracted, domestic income and spending expanded, investment
was redirected toward the natural gas sector, and Dutch wages and prices began
to rise. Over time, Dutch industrial products became too costly to compete, and
the manufacturing sector shrunk. This phenomenon, in which the Netherlands
acquired natural gas but lost manufacturing, was called the “Dutch Disease.” 
Under a ½oating exchange-rate regime, the negative impact of resource 
export may come more quickly and dramatically because of the ampli¼cation
effect of market expectations. Soon after the major currencies started to ½oat
in the mid-1970s, the UK discovered and exploited the North Sea oil ¼elds. 
Since the oil price was on a rising trend at the time, people expected the UK 
to earn a large amount of foreign exchange in the future. But even before 
these earnings were realized, currency speculation pushed up the British 
pound suddenly and sharply. The resulting loss of price competitiveness 
severely damaged the British manufacturing sector. From the mid-1970s to 
the early 1980s, the share of North Sea oil and gas in British GDP rose from 
0 to 5 percent while the share of manufacturing in British GDP fell from about
30 percent to 24 percent. In a world with ½oating currencies and free capital 
mobility, natural resource abundance not only damages the manufacturing 














      
18 Ideas and methods 
Economic performance of a country that relies heavily on resource exports
is strongly in½uenced by the gyration of commodity prices. According to 
Hirano (2009), correlation between oil-rich Nigeria’s nominal GDP and the 
price of crude oil, both expressed in US dollars, from 1970 to 2007 was as 
high as 0.942. Among countries whose nominal GDP shows similarly high 
correlation with the oil price are Trinidad and Tobago (0.947), Saudi Arabia 
(0.925), Kuwait (0.914), and Russia (0.891). Figure 1.8 visually presents per 
capita nominal GDP and the price movement of main export commodity of 
Zambia (copper), Côte d’Ivoire (cocoa), Venezuela (oil), and Uganda (coffee).
The high correlation between the two variables is truly remarkable. 
The correlation between the aggregate GDP of Sub-Saharan Africa and 
oil price is also as high as 0.902. The gross regional product of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, which continued to stagnate around US$300 to 350 billion during 1990– 
2002, suddenly began to soar in 2003 to reach nearly US$900 billion by 2007.
Much of this “growth” was explainable by the oil price that jumped 2.8 times
between 2002 and 2007 and in½ation of other extractive commodities. While 
income per head of many African countries made great advances in of¼cial 
statistics at that time, living conditions of subsistence farmers on the continent
were little affected. Growth driven by global commodity markets is fragile 
and unsustainable. Hirano concludes that 
in its post-independence history, Africa’s economic growth was realized
only when the prices of oil or metals increased. Economic growth of 
Sub-Saharan Africa in the 2000s was also brought about by a surge in 
the prices of mineral resources including oil . . . which leads to a suspicion
that this growth will come to an end when resource prices stop rising. 
(Hirano, 2009, p. 209) 
If a large injection of purchasing power into the national economy causes 
de-industrialization and macroeconomic instability, similar problems can 
occur not only with natural resources but also with other large receipts such 
as foreign direct investment (FDI), ¼nancial investment in bonds and stocks,
property investments, big infrastructure projects, and development and military
aid. Problems may be generated even by workers’ remittances, illegal money 
from drugs and other crimes, and the money that foreigners in aid business 
and military operation spend for consumption, housing, transport and personal
security in the country if they are a suf¼ciently large relative to GDP. 
As capital accounts were liberalized in many developing countries in the 
1990s, generalized Dutch Diseases caused by excessive in½ows of foreign 
funds of one kind or another and their subsequent withdrawal became frequent
and globally more synchronous. In½ows such as investment in bonds, stocks, and
property projects are particularly volatile and subject to the whims of mar-
ket psychology. Countries that receive large foreign funds relative to GDP 
experience temporary growth acceleration accompanied by the symptoms of 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20 Ideas and methods 
stock-market bubbles, in½ation, current-account de¼cits, rising international 
reserves, and a loss of international competitiveness. This mix is troublesome
enough, but the real risk is the possibility of post-bubble crisis if this situation
proceeds too far. A severe reversal may occur as commodity prices fall, asset
markets collapse, investors leave the country, the currency plummets, and 
bad debt mounts. The Asian ¼nancial crisis of 1997–1998 was a severe regional
crisis caused by a sudden and massive withdrawal of short-term commercial 
bank loans which had a strong regional contagion effect. Ephemeral foreign 
money also played havoc with Mexico (1994), Russia (1998), Brazil (1998– 
1999), Turkey (2000–2001), and Argentina (2001–2002). 
More recently, around 2007, much of the world experienced economically 
good times. Even Sub-Saharan Africa, which had stagnated for long, enjoyed
a collective growth spurt. The main driver of this boom was global ¼nancial 
glut, and commodity in½ation ignited by it, which stimulated the economies
of the countries that exported energy, minerals, and primary commodities 
such as Russia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, UK, Nigeria, Zambia, South Africa,
Botswana, Mauritania, and Angola. Swollen resource money ½owed into 
global ¼nancial centers which transformed it into other forms of purchasing 
power and spread the boom globally. The ¼nancial markets of the UK, US, and
UAE, which received this resource money, expanded vigorously. Meanwhile,
China and Vietnam, on the receiving end, faced in½ows of foreign funds in 
various forms such as robust export earnings, workers’ remittances, big public and
private projects, and portfolio investment. This global ¼nancial and commodity
bubble came to an end by the Lehman Shock originating in the United States
in 2008 and further de½ated by the European crisis in 2011–2012. 
With all these facts and possibilities in front of us, it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that natural resources and foreign money are hazardous to one’s 
economic health. Growth spurts driven by a discovery of new energy or mineral
resources, large foreign investment in construction or telecom, massive aid 
programs for a fragile state, or a jump in the price of the commodity a country
exports, are not only temporary but also divert the attention of policymakers
and private investors to activities that are not desirable or sustainable. Natural
resources and foreign money may make you rich, at least for a while, but they
do not make you innovative or hardworking. 
This is not to argue that receiving a large amount of foreign exchange is 
always and everywhere a bad thing. But it will easily turn to a negative factor
in development unless proper policy mechanisms are in place to avoid the 
known pitfalls. Additional policy issues for resource-rich countries and large 
receivers of foreign money include: (i) diversi¼cation of export base, (ii) a 
stabilization fund to smooth the ½uctuation of commodity revenue, (iii) ¼scal,
monetary, and exchange-rate management to cope with severe balance-of-
payments shocks, (iv) channeling windfall gains to productive investment in 
line with a consistent long-term development strategy, and (v) when feasible, 
processing of natural resources instead of exporting them in raw form. If 












The developmental trap 21 
of foreign money may even become a positive factor for the development of 
latecomer countries. However, this is hardly a universal proposition as success
requires high additional policy capability. Availability of unearned resources
is neither a suf¼cient nor necessary condition for economic development 
driven by knowledge, skills, and technology. 
1.5 Overcoming middle income (and other) traps 
A developmental trap is a situation where a country is stuck at an income 
level dictated by given resources and initial advantages and cannot rise beyond
that level. The level of income where the trap may occur depends on the size 
of a country’s windfall gain. If unearned income is small relative to population,
the country will be caught in a poverty trap. If the country enjoys abundant 
natural resources or foreign money relative to population, income per head 
will be high without expending any development effort. If the country has 
moderate resources and advantages, it will most likely be caught in a middle-
income trap. 
Determinants of the level of a developmental trap include natural con-
ditions such as soil, climate, topography, water supply, coastal access, forest 
and marine resources, extractive energy and minerals, and frequency of 
natural disasters. Potential income is also in½uenced by external political 
and economic factors such as in½ows of foreign investment and aid, global and
regional trade regimes, colonial legacies, geopolitical positions, and regional 
con½icts and crises. These are more or less given conditions beyond the power
of domestic citizens or the government and de¼ne the starting point of
development for each country. Some countries are naturally rich while
others face poverty and hunger. Lucky people may conjure up envy but not 
necessarily respect or admiration. But even high-income countries endowed 
with large unearned advantages must face the challenge of using them to 
build an internal value-creating mechanism as advantages do not usually last
eternally. 
Growth that depends on unearned advantages will sooner or later come 
to an end. As the government stops suppressing the economy and liberalizes 
it, the country automatically rises to the level corresponding to its given 
factors. But this can hardly be called successful development. Develop-
ment, in the true sense, must come from the upgrading of human capital. A 
continued march to high income is possible only when people improve cap-
abilities and work hard to overcome existing constraints and create new 
value. A country may rise to a certain income level with little effort but will 
eventually get stuck in that income category—or even gradually slips from 
that category—unless it builds a national mindset and institutions that
encourage constant improvement of its human capital. To establish these, 
policy must lead the way because the other two determinants of income 
performance—given advantages and private sector dynamism—cannot be 














22 Ideas and methods 
Geological, geographical, or geopolitical advantages are unevenly dis-
tributed across countries in our unfair world. This is a fact that cannot be 
altered and therefore must be accepted by policymakers. Private-sector
dynamism also differs from one country or one ethnic group to another. 
This includes inherent vitality of private agents in commerce and industry 
as well as effectiveness with which they respond to policies. This point may 
be hard to take for those who believe that all humans are created equal
in their ability to seize economic opportunities and that all farmers and 
merchants are the same in their response to economic incentives. A Western 
economist who visited East Asia for the ¼rst time for a conference strongly 
protested against the statement made there that Korean workers were superior
to Thai workers in their productivity and discipline on the factory ½oor even 
under the same management—a fact too obvious for veteran executives of 
any multi-national corporations operating in East Asia. Whether politically 
correct or not, it is an undeniable fact that people are different in their ability
to create commercial networks or manufacture industrial goods just as they 
are differently competent in football matches or musical composition. Chinese
merchants are all over the world taking risks and opening new frontiers even 
without the aid of their government, but ethnic Malays lack vigor and
ingenuity in business dealings even at home—this is the controversial argument
made by Mahathir bin Mohamad before he became the prime minister of 
Malaysia (Mahathir, 1970). The issue of cultural differences will be discussed
more fully in Chapter 2. 
Although the level of private-sector dynamism is given at any moment in 
any country, it is not immutable. Just as with athletic or musical ability, 
talent and effort both matter. Over time, lazy people can be made more 
hard-working and industrious people even more so. It is well to recall that 
a Japanese government labor survey conducted more than a century ago 
found Japanese workers only half as productive as American workers with 
such lamentable characteristics as low saving, lack of work discipline, dearth
of skill, and frequent job hopping (Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, 
1903). 
Policy capability is also unevenly distributed across countries. Governments
in fragile states are often too occupied with maintaining power and social 
order to be able to seriously discuss long-term economic strategies, let alone 
execute them. On the other hand, there are some countries whose leaders 
seem to have the knack for managing development politics and economics 
and making progress through decisive action and pragmatic trial-and-error. 
To be successful, such leaders must be supported by elite technocrats who 
concretize and implement their visions (Chapter 4). East Asia has abounded 
in such developmental leaders and technocrats, and other regions also have 
seen them occasionally. But the capacity of most countries falls in between; 
they are capable enough to draft ¼ve-year plans and industrial master
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Although economic development must fundamentally be driven by private
producers and investors, just letting markets loose in a country that lacks 
human capital and is struggling with globalization pressure may not see a 
spontaneous rise of private dynamism with innovativeness and international 
competitiveness. In such a case, the ¼rst impetus for growth must come
from the government which stirs up a sleepy and undeveloped private sector 
into investment, risk-taking, and learning. In theory, non-government actors
such as business associations, chambers of commerce and industry, and 
individual business leaders could also become catalysts for industrial develop-
ment. In late-nineteenth-century Japan, these private actors did play key 
roles in industrialization in close cooperation with government policies.
However, in today’s remaining latecomer countries such private initiatives 
may not automatically arise or make strong impact on national development.
Asking a lethargic private sector to discipline itself does not seem a valid 
answer. 
Policy capability can be strengthened if there is a strong political will and 
a systematic cataloguing and learning of relevant facts and policy measures. 
This book argues that such policy learning is possible, and illustrates how 
it can be done—by comparing historical and contemporary best practices 
and extracting common patterns from them, then building capability to create
from these best practices a policy package most stable for each country. 
Well-instructed policy learning should be the entry point for overcoming a 
middle-income trap or any other developmental trap that may occur, rather 
than an ideological debate over the relative size of market failure versus 
government failure. Through such policy learning, a nationwide mechanism 
should be established to encourage constant human capital accumulation. 
This will be the main topic of Chapters 2 to 4. Subsequent Chapters 5 to 10 
will give concrete and remarkable examples in this effort. 
1.6 Summary 
Globalization has a natural tendency to polarize income among countries. 
It helps rich countries to solidify their lead and maximize the bene¼t of their 
industrial strength through free but lopsided trade and investment. Mean-
while, knowledge does not ½ow freely from high-level to low-level countries, 
and latecomers are not given a chance or suf¼cient time to catch up in skills 
and technology. It is foolish to deny the polarizing tendency of globalization 
in our age. But it is also not advisable to attack globalization as the principal
enemy of development. 
The proposition advanced in this book is as follows. Countries that earn 
a high income are those that have succeeded in installing a national mechanism
that encourages constant upgrading of human capital. While production, 
investment, and trade should in principle be carried out by the private sector,
private agents in latecomer countries cannot build such a system without the 
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private dynamism becomes crucial. Since most governments in latecomer 
countries do not initially have knowledge or capability to do this, policy 
must be learned systematically from concrete international experiences with 
appropriate selectivity and adjustment for each country and sector. This is 
a two-step approach to national capacity building; improve the government’s
capability to guide the private sector ¼rst, then improve the capability of private
agents. 
Even in our world of the early twenty-¼rst century where globalization 
has greatly deepened in comparison with the recent past, policy measures 
that can resist or even reverse the tendency of income polarization are available.
They mainly focus on developing industrial human resources in a way that 
does not violate any international rules or regional agreements. Such policy 
measures, which I shall collectively call proactive industrial policy in the follow-
ing chapters, are different from past industrial policies including infant industry
promotion which featured import protection and export subsides. Proactive 
industrial policy is already practiced widely in East Asia and elsewhere and 
producing results. This should be learned and implemented by countries in 
all developing regions. 
The development model that deserves serious attention and research is not
growth based on natural resource abundance or geopolitical advantage but 
an internal mechanism that continuously generates new sources of growth 
within a country. While natural resources may be depleted or become obsolete
over time, human capital never wears out by use. In fact, the more intensively
it is used, the greater capability it will acquire. The construction of a national
mindset and institutions that strengthen human capital is the most important
task of the government in a developing country. It should also be the main 
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2 Industrial policy in the age of
globalization 
Any policy, be it industrial or otherwise, must be crafted and executed in 
the context of a particular age, society, and international relations. The world
of the early twenty-¼rst century in which we live is different from past ones. 
In order to achieve industrialization, some policies frequently employed in 
the nineteenth century or even a few decades ago are no longer permitted 
or effective today. Conversely, public intervention that was unknown
previously may have to be invented and forti¼ed to take advantage of new 
situations. Industrial policy formulation consistent with the needs and con-
straints of a particular place and time must start with the understanding of 
the shifting political, social, and global environment in which such policy 
must operate. 
2.1 Eager to learn 
When I attended an international conference in a low-income African coun-
try, an economic advisor to the prime minister of that country, whom I 
happened to meet in a lunch buffet queue, said to me: “We need action-
oriented policy advice, not purely academic research. Do you have any 
concrete studies from East Asia that are useful for us?” This country already 
had an industrial development strategy for several years, and partially imple-
mented it through self-study, dispatch of young researchers to South Korea, 
and donor support. The country has embraced benchmarking and business 
process re-engineering as key productivity tools, and drafted a few sectoral 
industrial master plans with technical assistance from foreign experts. Follow-
ing the Korean model, a monthly export steering committee presided over 
by the prime minister was set up to monitor progress and solve problems. 
But industrial performance, while visible in a few small sub-sectors, was not 
satisfactory to its leaders. 
On another occasion I was in a conference co-hosted by the World Bank 
and the government of an industrializing country in East Asia with the
attendance of the prime minister. The topic was how this country should 
revise its growth model to generate internal value and secure a strategic 
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Washington, DC explained the general features of a middle-income trap with
ample data and proposed a six-step approach to prevent it. Reaction from 
the policymakers and economists of this country was not very enthusiastic. 
They felt that the presentations by the prominent guests were too general 
and the proposed steps were too crude and mechanical. The country had 
already attained the lower-middle-income status and the government
had begun to study the future risk of growth slowdown. The country was 
desperately looking for concrete industrial measures for the next ten years 
to avoid this fate. At this late stage in policy formulation a general illustra-
tion of what middle-income traps were was no longer very informative. 
Nowadays developing countries seriously considering or actively imple-
menting industrial policies are many. Not only the two countries mentioned 
above but also a large number of countries and regional organizations in 
Asia, Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere have already graduated from an 
ideological debate over state versus market and are struggling to draft and 
execute policies to level up industrial capabilities and strengthen targeted 
sectors. Industrial master plans and numerical targets have multiplied on 
paper. However, the quality of industrial policy is often low and effective 
implementation remains elusive. 
In East Asia where industrial policy has long been accepted and practiced,
the question is not whether industrial policy is valid but how to continuously
improve its design and implementation in order to cope with new global 
trends and compete effectively with China, India, and other rival economies. 
More surprising is the fact that industrial policy is no longer taboo even in 
other developing regions which experienced a forced introduction of economic
liberalization, privatization, and international integration in previous decades.
In Africa, Botswana, Egypt, Ethiopia, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Tunisia,
and Zambia are some of the countries that are keenly interested in learning 
and adopting industrial policy. In Latin America, Brazil has led the industrial
policy drive while other countries, such as El Salvador, are showing willingness
to follow. Global re-focusing on industrial policy and issues is evident. 
The situation is similar with regional development organizations. The 
African Union proclaims that “No country or region in the world has 
achieved prosperity and a decent socio-industrial life for its citizens without 
the development of a robust industrial sector” (African Union, 2008, p. 1). 
Its Strategy for the Implementation of the Plan of Action for the Accelerated
Industrial Development of Africa (AIDA) contains seven program clusters, 
16 programs, and 49 projects to bolster industry in the member countries 
(African Union, 2007). This strategy is comprehensive and covers seven 
areas including policy and institutional frameworks, productivity and trade, 
infrastructure and energy, technical skills, innovation and R&D, ¼nancing, 
and environment. This policy menu, at least on paper, overlaps signi¼cantly 
with what East Asian governments do (Chapter 3). The general policy direction
is already agreed. The challenge, of course, is how to carry out these ambi-
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question of what role a regional organization such as the African Union 
should play when most industrial policies are conducted at the national level 
also remains. 
We can safely declare that the days of ideological debate over the two 
naïve extremes—free markets versus state-led growth—which marked much 
of the 1980s and 1990s are over. While emotional rejection of the term
“industrial policy” still remains in some parts of the world,1 the global
development community seems to have regained balance. A new consensus 
has emerged that the government in a latecomer country has an important 
role to play in supporting private-sector-led development and that the quality
of public policy matters greatly. Acceptance of the market principle and 
globalization should go hand-in-hand with the capacity building of policy-
makers who must handle these trends and retain suf¼cient policy tools
for latecomer industrialization. The World Bank seems to be split between 
entrenched neoclassical believers who loathe the very idea of industrial policy
and those who embrace it under certain conditions. A continued debate with 
the remaining soldiers of the Washington Consensus may be academically 
interesting but it is no longer indispensable for taking the next pragmatic 
step forward in global development strategy. 
The argument for industrial policy cannot be settled through theoretical 
debate alone as its validity depends critically on the accumulation of successes
on the ground. Theory must be supported by practice, and practice must 
inform theory. The two are interrelated and inseparable. The fact is that 
many developing countries have already accepted the idea of industrial policy
and are eager to learn its practical essentials. For such “converts,” what is 
needed is not a theoretical justi¼cation for government intervention, which 
most of us already know (externalities, coordination failures, information
failures, and other various market failures), but concrete and systematic instruc-
tions as to how policy should be constructed and executed and how common
pitfalls could be avoided. This must be done with a deep understanding of local
circumstances to prevent imposition of one-size-¼ts-all solutions. Unfortunately,
development economics does not teach such operational details. There is a
serious discrepancy between policy recommendations provided by development
economists, which are often too naïve, general, and mechanical, and what 
policymakers of latecomer countries really need in terms of intellectual input. 
In the past, countries that have succeeded in industrial catch-up did so 
through self-study, improvisation, and trial-and-error. With no systematic 
instruction from outside, only those countries that happened to possess the 
right policy mindset and a dynamic private sector could launch themselves 
onto a path to high income. The fact that only a small number of countries 
achieved this feat proves the inherent dif¼culty of this self-improvement
approach. By now, all latecomer countries that had these propitious
properties—the United States, France, Germany, Japan, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and the like—have already moved up to join 
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necessary properties at the starting point. Their catching-up is doubly dif¼cult
because globalization has deepened signi¼cantly today and because their 
domestic capabilities in the private and public sectors fall short of those of
the countries that have already graduated from the poor club. 
Collecting micro-level data and running regressions, development economics
may be able to prove the importance of, say, educational achievements of 
company owners or technical training of workers for economic growth. But 
this “discovery” is hardly enough to guide policymakers who need to calibrate
teaching curriculums, design incentives for parents, students, and teachers, 
and establish links between training institutions and hiring ¼rms. Developing
countries eager to introduce effective industrial policy usually face ad hoc 
and fragmented advice from experts and academics. Nowadays the number 
of economists who support industrial policy is increasing, but few teach 
pragmatic details on how key policy components should be designed and 
implemented and in what sequencing. But this is precisely where a developing
country stumbles. What is missing is systemic learning on industrial policy 
formulation backed by international experiences and at the same time tailored
to each country’s policy capability and socio-economic situation. Early
industrializers did not have to go to school, but today’s latecomers may 
bene¼t greatly from such formal instructions. 
When an industrial master plan is drafted for, say, the agro-processing or 
garment industry, formulation of its contents and structure are often left to 
a small group of people who happened to be assigned to the task, which 
may be of¼cials of the ministry in charge, local academics or foreign
consultants (there is a large supply of domestic researchers and foreign-
consultant companies in this particular branch of the aid industry). Oftentimes
the government of a developing country is not actively involved in setting 
visions, roadmaps or action plans but only makes cosmetic comments on 
the policy draft prepared by a few. In this process, expertise in policy design 
and implementation is not internalized and public–private partnership is not 
activated. Such super¼cial and passive policymaking cannot ensure imple-
mentability. It must be replaced by an approach based on strong country 
ownership, systematic research, and active stakeholder participation. 
Moreover, political leaders and policymakers sometimes jump at policy 
advice which happens to be presented to them without serious consideration 
of compatibility with the domestic and external conditions of the country 
or a review of alternative possibilities in solving a particular problem. Partial
knowledge of what Japan or South Korea did in the past, be it postal saving,
export drive or heavy industrialization by huge conglomerates, is insuf¼cient 
as an intellectual input to policy formulation. A more comprehensive study 
of various international best practices is needed because all countries are 
different and one country’s success at a certain point in time cannot be
directly copied and pasted to another context. 
Such casual attempts at industrial policy, which seem to be proliferating 
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because details—policy content, procedures, and organizations—are not set 
up properly. Without swimming lessons or a piano tutor, it may be dif¼cult 
for a child to acquire suf¼cient skills to become a good swimmer or a profes-
sional musician. But this fact should not lead us to the conclusion that the 
child has no talent in these subjects. In the initial stage, well-structured lessons
by an experienced instructor are useful until the child masters basics and 
reaches an intermediate level, at which it can begin to establish its own style. 
Additionally, it should be recognized that mimicking the stylized facts of 
already highly industrialized countries does not lead to the optimal develop-
ment path for latecomer countries. Studying how Mozart composed piano 
concertos does not help ordinary people to improve their musical skills very 
much. For the uninitiated, what early comers did spontaneously and what 
was obvious to them need to be learned more explicitly and systematically. 
2.2 Changing the world or living in it 
There are basically two approaches to an evil world. The one is ¼ghting for 
correction and the other is discovering a way to live in it. According to many
authors, globalization erects barriers to catch-up industrialization by late-
comers and tends to perpetuate income polarization between the rich and 
poor countries (Chapter 1). Should all developing countries of the world 
unite for justice and equal treatment, or should they resign and despair? My 
suggestion for the twenty-¼rst century latecomer countries is to adopt
a two-part strategy: collectively ¼ght for a fundamental change in global 
development architecture but simultaneously adopt policy measures for
industrialization that do not violate existing international rules (this includes
taking full advantages of loopholes and waivers in the World Trade Organ-
ization (WTO), regional integration, and bilateral agreements). Changing 
the world usually takes time. Meanwhile, there are many policy options that 
latecomers can learn and adopt individually and immediately. 
In his book Kicking Away the Ladder (Chang, 2002), Ha-Joon Chang cites
a large number of historical cases to prove, quite convincingly, that the 
policies and institutions currently recommended to developing countries— 
deregulation, privatization, transparent and ef¼cient bureaucracy, protection
of private property rights, and the like—were actually not adopted by the 
developed countries when they themselves were developing. In the past, early
comers actively availed themselves of the so-called infant industry promotion 
policy featuring temporary tariff protection which was supplemented by other
public interventions such as export subsidies, tariff rebates, conferring of 
monopoly rights, cartel arrangements, directed credits, investment planning, 
manpower planning, and R&D supports. According to Chang, current pro-
hibition of (some of) these measures, and the call for small government and 
full acceptance of market forces in an early stage of development, effectively 
removes the means by which latecomers climb up the ladder of industrialization.
He wants a radical change in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
 





30 Ideas and methods 
World Bank loan conditionalities to recognize that “many of the policies 
that are considered ‘bad’ are in fact not so, and that there can be no ‘best 
practice’ policy to which everyone should adhere.” He also demands the 
re-writing of the WTO and other trade rules “in such a way that a more 
active use of infant industry promotion tools (e.g., tariffs and subsidies) is 
allowed” (Chang, 2002, p. 141). 
Dani Rodrik agrees with Chang, saying that “countries dismantle trade 
restrictions as they get richer . . . today’s rich countries, with few exceptions, 
embarked on modern economic growth behind protective barriers, but now 
have low trade barriers” (Rodrik, 2007, p. 217). He criticizes the WTO as 
well as avid integration crusaders for confounding the means (trade liberal-
ization) with the goal (development). He contrasts Vietnam, which grew 
rapidly under restrictive trade in the 1990s, with Haiti, whose economy 
stagnated after undertaking comprehensive trade liberalization in 1994–95. 
With a proper choice of time period for each country, similar contrasting 
examples can be presented between China, India, South Korea, Malaysia, 
etc., which recorded high growth under gradualism of one sort or another, and
Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, El Salvador, Bolivia, etc., which suffered from lack-
luster growth under free trade. Rodrik says that “the bene¼ts of trade openness
are now greatly oversold. Deep trade liberalization cannot be relied on to 
deliver high rates of economic growth and therefore does not deserve the 
high priority it typically receives in the development strategies pushed by 
leading multinational organizations.” He concludes that the world should 
move away from viewing free trade as an end itself, and allow for diversity 
in institutions and standards that support development of each country 
(Rodrik, 2007, pp. 225–228). But, according to him, this privilege should be 
available to “democratic” countries only. 
Similarly, Cimoli et al. (2009c) ¼nd faults with the current WTO regime 
and the TRIPS agreement that bene¼t a subset of industrial interests in the 
developed world at the cost of latecomer countries and global consumers. 
They also criticize bilateral trade agreements, especially ones concluded with 
the United States, as a device to ¼ll remaining loopholes and exceptions in the
WTO and TRIPS rules that give welcoming breathing space for developing 
countries. The authors propose a reform of global economic governance 
consisting of: (i) greater provision of “managed trade” not for protecting 
vested interests of ¼rst-world lame ducks but for nurturing infants in the 
developing world; (ii) removal of anti-developmental bias of agricultural 
trade policies in developing countries; (iii) a reduced use of intellectual property
rights protection; and (iv) a new global labor standards concerning child 
labor, work conditions, the right to unionize, and environmental respect. 
The general direction in which these authors want to go is clear. I also 
happily endorse global effort to regain more policy space for latecomer 
countries. Without negating the value of collective bargaining for global 
justice, however, this book emphasizes another area of action available to 
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measures which are permitted under the current global rules of trade and 
investment but remain largely unexploited due to the lack of knowledge
and experience. For developing countries with a strong will to learn, there 
are many policy measures that can be implemented selectively and quickly 
without waiting for the success of a collective action on global development 
architecture. Many East Asian governments already practice them with good
results, and governments in other developing regions should also study and 
introduce them. 
2.3 Re-visiting industrial policy debates 
In attending policy dialogues and conferences featuring industrial policy all 
over the world, one cannot but notice that the same questions are raised
all the time. Four of such frequently-asked questions, which are interrelated, 
are listed below together with rejoinders from the East Asian perspective. 
FAQ1: Are past experiences of East Asian countries really useful for us? Is it 
not better to create our own policy package than copying the policies of other 
countries? 
The cliché has it that each country is different and times have also changed. 
To my knowledge, there is no government that does not declare that “our 
country is unique” and policies of other countries cannot therefore be copied
directly. We also hear that infant industry promotion (temporary tariff
protection of domestic industries while they grow) widely practiced by early 
industrializing countries is no longer available to developing countries under 
the globalization pressure of the twenty-¼rst century. 
As a general description of the contemporary world, I have no disagree-
ment with any of these statements. No reasonable person would advise that 
what South Korea did in the 1960s be repeated in Tanzania today. Our age 
is unlike the past, and Tanzania is not South Korea. However, there is a 
risk in stressing this obvious fact because insistence on the uniqueness of 
each country may become an excuse to turn a blind eye to the rich policy 
experiences of other latecomer countries without which good policy is dif¼cult
to construct. The very purpose of an in-depth study of international experi-
ences is to craft a realistic and workable industrial policy package appropriate
for the country in question from a broad and practical menu. A policy 
document drafted without such a study is likely to be crude, unimplementable,
and ineffective. 
International experiences from other countries and different times are 
useful building blocks for industrial policy for two reasons. First, the general
contents of good policy are not radically different from one case to another. 
For example, the key ingredients of successful industrial estates, small and 
medium enterprises (SME) consultation systems, or science and engineering 
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modi¼cations must be made in details and at the margin to re½ect the reality
of the host country. Second, a comparative analysis of international experi-
ences will illuminate factors that contribute to successful policymaking as 
well as warn policymakers of pitfalls and mistakes that must be avoided. 
Concrete experiences of other countries in any policy area should thus be 
regarded as raw materials which policymakers can select, modify, combine, 
or improve to create their own policy package. 
FAQ2: Is industrial policy possible at all in our age of globalization? Can 
governments do anything when cross-border private ½ows of goods, services, 
and capital are so huge? 
People who are not trained to face the world with its perpetual diversity and 
con½icts tend to jump from one extreme to the other without staying in the 
middle. The general director of a previously state-owned steel company in an
emerging economy with previously socialist tradition stated, with a sigh of 
grief, that all polices were now futile because global market forces determined
everything and the government nothing. In his opinion, policy was impotent 
in dealing with foreign dumping, bottlenecks in port capacity, or mutual destruc-
tion of steel mills through over-investment and price wars. His pessimism 
cannot be justi¼ed because the end of planning is not the same thing as the 
beginning of unrestrained markets. While the state should get out of produc-
tion and investment in the steel sector, it has an important role to play in 
market management—for example, in projecting demand, setting quality, safety,
and environmental standards, encouraging skill formation and technology
transfer, and avoidance of excess entry, over-investment, and illegal sales. 
The world today is certainly more integrated than the world of the 1950s 
or 1960s, but to argue that industrial policy is no longer possible is a gross 
overstatement. On the contrary, “more interdependent economies are likely 
to require more and more sophisticated measures of policy intervention by 
the weaker economies” (Cimoli et al., 2009c, p. 542) if they are to catch up 
in income and technological capabilities. Raising tariffs, subsidizing exports, 
imposing local content requirements, and free copying of foreign technology 
are no longer permitted of¼cially, so policy space did shrink in comparison 
with yesteryear. But the rest of industrial policy remains intact. Global and 
regional integration does not penalize or prohibit a vast majority of policy 
tools related to, for example, visions and roadmaps, education and training, 
enterprise consultation, logistics and transportation, power supply and energy
ef¼ciency, banking and securities markets, product standards and tests,
industrial cluster formation, business associations, and numerous others 
(Chapter 3). 
As proposed earlier, twenty-¼rst century latecomers should adopt the two-
part strategy in which they collectively lobby international organizations for 
the expansion of policy space and at the same time individually implement 
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none of the policy measures proposed and explained in this book violates 
any of the global, regional, or bilateral economic rules in principle—that is 
to say, unless they are imposed in such a distorted way that intentionally 
discriminates against foreign ¼rms or otherwise damages foreign interests. 
To put it differently, what developing countries should aim at is infant
industry promotion without violating any of the international rules of the 
early twenty-¼rst century. 
FAQ3: Shouldn’t industrial promotion be general rather than sector-speci¼c? 
Governments should not pick winners because they cannot distinguish infants
from zombies and because policies are easily captured by interest groups. 
Anne Krueger, the former World Bank chief economist and champion of 
trade liberalization, once remarked that of¼cial promotion of a speci¼c
industrial sector, be it garment, automotive, or electronics, would most likely
fail due to policy mistake and political capture, which are two perennial 
problems associated with state intervention. In her own words: 
The problem with the [infant industry] argument, as a basis for policy, 
is that it fails to provide any guidance as to how to distinguish between 
an infant that will grow up and a would-be producer seeking protection
because it is privately pro¼table . . . The infant industry argument also 
is an excellent example of a theory that is nonoperational because criteria
for bureaucrats to identify cases have not been put forward. 
(Krueger, 1997, p. 12) 
No matter how careful economists are, special interests always will seize 
their research results in supporting their own objectives. And, no matter 
how sophisticated and careful research ¼ndings are, there always will be 
politicians formulating, and non-economists administering, policies. 
(Ibid., p. 19) 
Today, neoclassical ideology no longer holds sway and few would support 
Krueger’s extreme pessimism over the capacity and intention of the govern-
ment. Furthermore, as mentioned above, industrial promotion in our age 
is—and should be—conducted with an array of WTO-consistent policy
instruments rather than high tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Even so, the risks
highlighted by Krueger are real and should not be dismissed lightly. Where 
I differ from Krueger is policy conclusion. The fact that bureaucrats may 
not know the selection criteria and policy may be hijacked by rent seekers 
should not lead us to abandon sector-speci¼c industrial support. Policy
capability is not given but can be improved over time. With proper instruction,
governments can learn to avoid these obvious risks of selective industrial 
policy. East Asia abounds in such “wise” governments, but their policy 
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The risks associated with selective industrial policies are real when the 
government’s policy capability is low. When of¼cials do not understand what
private ¼rms want or where the industry is headed, they invariably impose 
policies in a top-down manner which are detested or rejected by investors. 
However, this problem melts away as policy learning advances. If effective 
channels of public–private partnership are established, government and pri-
vate ¼rms come to trust each other and can constantly share information 
on global and domestic situations as well as strengths and weaknesses of 
local industries. The ministry of industry comes to know the business strategy
of each company and even con½ict of interest among them. Meanwhile, 
government–business relationship is kept at arm’s length by proper institu-
tional mechanisms. As government and private ¼rms jointly draft sectoral 
master plans, public will and private intention are no longer separable. 
Policymakers can sometimes propose visions and strategies which overcome 
shortsightedness or coordinate different interests that prevail among producers.
Such intervention is readily accepted and even highly welcomed by the private
sector. In political science, such strong, well-informed, and interest-neutral 
government is said to possess embedded autonomy (Evans, 1995). That this 
is not a scienti¼c ¼ction but normal practice in a number of countries is 
demonstrated by studying the policymaking processes of Singapore, South 
Korea, and Malaysia (Chapters 6–8), among others. 
Of¼cial guidance is not necessarily at odds with private-sector develop-
ment. In fact, they complement each other in advanced policy formulation. 
Dispute over “picking winners” becomes irrelevant for proud, impartial, and
competent policymakers striving to become one with the private sector for 
national development. If the business community still rejects of¼cial policy, 
that simply means that government has not perfected its policymaking skill. 
At the practical level, industrial policy instruments overlap greatly with 
instruments to promote the policy purposes supported by all donors and 
researchers—such as private sector development (PSD), technical and voca-
tional education and training (TVET), human resource development (HRD),
investment climate improvement, capacity development, marketing, integra-
tion into global value chains, and building industrial clusters (see Chapter 3 
for concrete industrial policy instruments). This means that many industrial 
policy measures are already accepted and practiced under different labels, 
and the gap between government-led industrialization and private sector-led 
growth is more apparent than real. All are talking about the same policies. 
Moreover, the line between general and selective promotion becomes fuzzy
in actual implementation. Thailand focuses on skill formation in the automotive
sector as a result of private-sector demand backed by a long history of
development of this sector in the country. The Singaporean government 
assisted Binh Duong Province of Vietnam to train electronics workers because
the training center was adjacent to an industrial estate hosting a large number
of foreign electronics manufacturers. Should these actions be condemned as 











Industrial policy in the age of globalization 35 
sectors, not just automotive or electronics? Hardly. Under resource con-
straints that developing countries inevitably face, prioritization and targeting
are common practice recommended by all development partners. 
FAQ4: Should industrial policy in developing countries conform to comparative
advantage or defy it? 
This question, closely related to the previous one, was debated between 
Justin Lin and Ha-Joon Chang, two leading development economists from 
Asia (Lin and Chang, 2009). Both agree that technology upgrading and 
structural change are key to the catching-up of latecomer countries. They 
also recognize the important role of government as a facilitator of private 
investment because hands-off policies are not likely to attain this goal. The 
concept of “comparative advantage” in this debate must be interpreted as a 
dynamic one in which new industries and products are expected to emerge 
in a way consistent with the historical path and existing factor endowments 
of the country in question, not a static one in which technology and endow-
ments of each country are given. 
The two differ in the type of industries that should be supported by the 
government. Lin asserts that policy support—removal of market failures and
provision of basic growth functions such as education and training, infra-
structure, and incentives for pioneer ¼rms—should be given to “encourage 
the emergence of ¼rms, industries, and sectors that, once launched, will make
effective use of the country’s current comparative advantage” (p. 486, italics 
in original) based on existing skills, technology, capital stock, natural
resources, and so on. By contrast, Chang contends that industrial capabilities
are acquired through concrete production processes unique to each industry 
which can be started without past heritage. According to him, con¼ning the 
policy scope to extrapolation of past trends is too narrow and cannot
accelerate technological upgrading or structural transformation. In order to 
catch up in income and technology, a latecomer country must create new 
comparative advantages, not just follow obvious ones. In this way, Lin
cautions against careless choice of industries while Chang stresses creativity 
and risk-taking in policymaking. 
Although the two positions seem far apart, actual differences may not be 
so large and the debate may be more rhetorical than substantial. In reality, 
except for white-elephant projects that “deviate too much from one’s com-
parative advantages” (p. 491), it is dif¼cult to tell whether an industry is 
conforming to a country’s (dynamic) comparative advantage or defying it. 
This is particularly true with manufacturing industries which rely heavily on 
management, skills, technology, large-scale investment, ¼nance, and other 
non-natural factors. In fact, looking at the same global ¼rms such as South 
Korea’s Pohang Steel and Finland’s Nokia, Lin assures that their emergence 
is a natural evolution from existing capabilities in each country while Chang 
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Future industrializing possibilities of a developing country are broad. For 
example, Vietnam has attained initial agglomeration in food processing, 
garment, footwear, electronics, and motorcycles. For this country, possible 
next steps include upgrading and branding of coffee and shrimp exports, a 
fashion-apparel industry with new Asian design, production of consumer 
electronics or eco-car components, a regional center for high-quality die and 
mold, and many others. All require a big jump in management and technology
from their existing industrial base. Ex ante, none of them seems impossible 
if concentrated policy effort and private-sector effort are combined for a 
number of years. But all may not be pursued simultaneously due to limited 
resources and policy capability. It is not meaningful to ask which one of 
these possibilities conforms to Vietnam’s dynamic comparative advantage 
and which one does not. The important question is whether policymakers 
can summon suf¼cient will, knowledge and resources to change any of these 
possibilities into reality. 
Even in industries for which natural conditions dominate, such as Chilean 
salmon or Brazilian Cerrado agriculture, of¼cial support is instrumental 
(Chapter 3). Spectacular success in each case was achieved only after technology,
training, marketing, and production scale necessary for commercialization were
introduced by the hands of government, development partners, and private 
enterprises. Although Chile had labor and natural conditions suitable for salmon
farming, this potential remained unexploited and no salmon was raised until
the semi-of¼cial Chile Foundation and Japanese private and public cooper-
ation and investment provided missing ingredients. “The miraculous development
[of the Chilean salmon industry] was not realized through autonomous private
investment alone” (Hosono, 2010, p. 154). Similarly, vast tropical savanna 
in central Brazil remained barren until the Brazilian government and the 
Cerrado Institute, also backed by Japanese technical and ¼nancial assistance,
turned this land into a new bread basket of the world. 
In sum, industrial potentials of any country, which are many, can become 
reality only when they are accompanied by proper policy actions to eliminate
technical, ¼nancial, or institutional bottlenecks. Whether or not the targeted 
industry is in conformity with dynamic comparative advantage is a theoretical
question that has little policy relevance to a country that has already made 
up a short list of candidate sectors through careful study and private-sector 
consultation. Political will and vision, appropriate policy procedure and or-
ganization, and prioritization and sequencing under resource constraints are 
what are required for turning potentials into reality. It would even be better 
to avoid the term “comparative advantage” entirely in industrial policy debate
as it only adds to confusion and solves no substantive problems.2 
2.4 Proactive industrial policy 
Catch-up industrialization requires a solid combination of private dynamism
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or less given at any moment (the problem of a lethargic private sector
is discussed in the following section) but policy can be improved more
quickly if a government guided by a visionary and well-informed leader
and staffed by reasonably competent of¼cials is in place. Required indus-
trial actions are more aggressive than past policy recommendations of the 
IMF and the World Bank featuring deregulation, privatization, integration, 
good governance, and good business environment. More aggressive ac-
tions are both necessary and possible even in the twenty-¼rst century when 
globalization has deepened and WTO rules and proliferation of regional and
bilateral trade arrangements have narrowed the policy space of latecomer 
countries. 
I propose to use the term proactive industrial policy to denote a collection 
of such policy actions. Proactive industrial policy is different from any of 
the past development strategies including socialist planning, state-led heavy 
industrialization, market-friendly selective intervention, or big-bang liberal-
ization under minimalist government. It is also different from infant industry
promotion practiced by virtually all industrializing countries in the past 
centuries or even FDI-led industrialization of Southeast Asian countries such
as Malaysia and Thailand in the 1980s and 1990s. In the last two strategies, 
tariff barriers and investment restrictions were lifted gradually as domestic 
industrial capabilities were built up. But today’s developing countries are 
asked to do away with them from the beginning. 
Proactive industrial policy must continuously balance state and market 
and reconcile globalization pressure with the need to retain suf¼cient policy 
tools. It obliges government to learn policy in order to help and prod the 
private sector to upgrade technology and management. It calls for establish-
ment of close and productive relationship between government and businesses.
More precisely, proactive industry policy must satisfy all of the seven conditions
below: 
(i) Market-driven development under globalization—production, investment,
and trade must be carried out primarily by the private sector under
an open competitive environment generated by the market mechanism 
and the globalization process. Privatization, WTO rules, and regional 
integration are to be embraced. State-owned production is not adopted 
except in cases where no private agents have yet emerged to take over 
the state’s role and only temporarily. 
(ii) A strong state—the state assumes a strong and active role in guiding and
supporting development despite the fact that all productive activities 
are in principle to be conducted by the private sector. The state will 
mobilize necessary policies to reward value creation and innovation, 
punish unproductive rent seeking and corruption, and lead the private 
sector toward a consistent national vision. A great economic transfor-
mation must be orchestrated by the state because market participants 
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(iii) Retaining suf¼cient policy instruments for latecomer industrialization— 
although globalization is willingly accepted, this does not mean that all 
industrial policy instruments must be given up and replaced by market 
forces. This simply means that the policy toolbox for the twenty-¼rst 
century is different from those of Japan, South Korea, or Singapore in 
the past. It also implies that enlargement of the market sphere must be 
in proper steps to ensure the availability of necessary policy capability 
and instruments, and that international pressure to open up must be 
consistent in scope and speed with the development strategy of the 
latecomer country. 
(iv) Dynamic capacity development—improving policy capability and private
dynamism, both of which are often weak in early stages of development,
must be the central focus. Policy must set concrete goals and aim at 
enhancing potential strengths of the country rather than improving 
governance or capacity in general without speci¼c goals. The policy 
scope and measures should be gradually expanded in accordance with 
the enhancement of policy capability and private dynamism (Ohno and 
Ohno, 2012). The country must eventually graduate from aid. 
(v) Internalizing knowledge, skills, and technology—the principal method 
of attaining industrialization must be internalization of knowledge, 
skills, and technology embodied in the human capital of citizens. This 
must be by far the most important objective of industrial policy. Resource
extraction, FDI, of¼cial development assistance (ODA), big projects, 
and geographic advantages are also important, but they must be given 
secondary positions in support of human capital development (Chapter 1). 
(vi) Effective public–private partnership (PPP)—when a strong state guides 
the private sector, there is a risk of market distortion and suppressed 
entrepreneurship which leads to economic stagnation. To avoid this 
risk, effective cooperation between government and businesses in sub-
stance based on mutual trust and close engagement must be built. 
Holding symposiums and receiving comments on policy drafts are not 
enough. Through effective contacts, state policy and private intention 
merge and strategies initiated by the state should be willingly supported
and implemented by the private sector. 
(vii) Sharing deep knowledge of the industry—to avoid policy mistakes and 
political capture, government must accumulate suf¼cient knowledge of
the industries in which it intends to intervene. Leaders and policy prac-
titioners of the government must go extra miles to acquire latest practical
knowledge and desires of the business community to make intelligent and
well-informed decisions. Knowledge can initially be outsourced from 
consultants, academicians, or foreign experts, but unless it is digested by
policymakers themselves the quality of industrial policy cannot improve. 
These conditions are consistent with and overlap largely with the current 
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recent years. For example, the Growth Report by the Commission on Growth
and Development (2008, pp. 2–7) states that sustained economic growth 
must be supported by: (i) country-speci¼c and dynamically evolving strategies;
(ii) an increasingly capable, credible and committed government staffed with 
suf¼ciently competent public servants; (iii) setting priorities for effective 
implementation under resource constraints; (iv) market-based resource
allocation; (v) full exploitation of the world economy in knowledge and trade
opportunity; and (vi) inclusiveness and coping with inequality, among other 
things. Proactive industrial policy can be regarded as a pragmatic attempt 
to operationalize these widely agreed principles in the area of industrialization.
It studies concrete policy ingredients and suggests a way to select and combine
them in order to create an industrial policy package most suitable for the 
country in question. 
Proactive industry policy is far more complex than simply unleashing 
market forces or planning everything by the state machinery. It aims to strike
a delicate and ever-changing balance between state guidance and market 
orientation, between globalization commitments and policy capability, and 
between strong state leadership and the need to listen to private voices. Some
may consider this to be contradictory, but one needs complex policy formu-
lation to deal with complex reality. Furthermore, proactive industrial policy 
is not a theoretical imagination. East Asia abounds in various cases of 
proactive industrial policy—in Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, 
and Thailand as well as in the long-established industrial support menu of 
Japanese ODA (selective and concrete components of proactive industrial 
policy are explained in Chapter 3). It should also be emphasized again that 
none of the measures proposed by proactive industry policy violates WTO 
rules or regional or bilateral integration commitments. 
Proactive industrial policy requires simultaneous learning by the govern-
ment and the private sector. The logic of such double learning is as follows. 
In countries caught in a developmental trap, technology will not be upgraded
and industrial structure will not be transformed by spontaneous activities of 
free markets alone. The government must assist as a guide and facilitator. 
However, both the government and the private sector are underdeveloped 
in such countries. Under these circumstances, the chicken-and-egg problem 
must be solved by the initiative of the government. Political leaders and 
policy practitioners must ¼rst learn how to conduct industrial policy effec-
tively in order to better lead and serve the private sector. This is a two-step 
approach in which capacity building of the private sector is the end and 
capacity building of the government is the means. This general formula 
should be applicable to any latecomer country whether it is Singapore,
Kazakhstan, or Zambia. 
Proactive industrial policy must be based on the strong policy ownership 
of the national government, which is often missing in countries heavily
dependent on natural resources, FDI, or foreign aid. Every donor, whether 
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SME promotion, agriculture and rural development, and so on, but no 
policy capability is acquired unless these universal measures are envisioned, 
designed, and executed at the hands of a developing country and properly 
integrated into the national development strategy. Passive acceptance of 
foreign aid and investment does not lead to the breakthrough of a develop-
mental trap. For any developing country, installation of proactive industrial 
policy itself should be the ¼rst step toward building strong policy ownership. 
Proactive industrial policy is dynamic for it does not allow a country to 
stand still. Policy measures it recommends are comprehensive (Chapter 3) 
and policy procedure and organization it requires is complex (Chapter 4). 
A latecomer country with primitive policy capability should start with a few 
basics instead of trying to master all items at once. As policy learning pro-
gresses, policy scope and instruments should be expanded accordingly as 
Ethiopia is trying to do (Chapter 10). In building skills and technology, 
low-income countries should mainly focus on emulation of existing general 
knowledge—including such management and factory operation techniques 
as 5S, kaizen, logistics, strategic marketing, etc.—rather than competing 
directly in frontline technology. Innovation, in its narrow sense of bringing 
something entirely new to the world, will become a core issue as income rises
to an upper-middle level and beyond. A country may even graduate from 
proactive industrial policy as high income is attained and the private sector 
matures. Then strong state guidance is no longer needed. Taiwan and South 
Korea have already gone through such a process. 
2.5 Coping with a weak private sector 
The prime minister of a Sub-Saharan African country posed a question to 
a policy delegation from Japan: “I have studied East Asian policies and 
implemented some of them. Our industrial policy has improved in the last 
several years, rewarding value creation and penalizing rent seeking. Why do 
my people continue to pour money into property speculation and not manu-
facturing? Why do they not build more factories?” He wanted to know how 
East Asian governments turned shortsighted private agents into long-term 
producers and investors with technological learning. 
Difference in national character is a sensitive matter that should be treated
carefully. According to the hypothesis of homo economics, all humans behave
rationally regardless of race or nationality. Some assume that all farmers 
and workers respond equally to economic incentives. This leads to the conviction
that any failure of development relative to initial conditions should be blamed
on the government and its policies, not people. While this view may be 
politically correct, it is not borne out by facts.3 In reality, all nations are not 
equal in the vitality and nimbleness with which they pursue economic goals. 
Some people are good at playing football and others excel in philosophy. It 
is also not surprising to see some people better at producing cars and con-
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people are good at different things. Without reference to differences in private-
sector capability, it is dif¼cult to fully explain why some countries attain 
high income quickly while others are stuck at a certain income level. 
Malaysia has come a long way in improving economic administration and 
delivering good policies to their citizens (Chapter 8). In many aspects, including
morale, professionalism, reform mindset, academic achievements, and pre-
sentation skills, Malaysian of¼cials are superior to their Japanese counterparts.
Despite this, Malaysia has reached only (upper) middle income after half a 
century of industrializing effort unlike South Korea and Taiwan which are 
already in the rich country club. This is not because of a late start but because
of slow ascent (Chapter 1). Malaysia’s industrial output and export continue
to rely heavily on Japanese, Korean, and Western brands and multinational 
companies mainly because Malay businesses lack dynamism. At the risk of 
oversimpli¼cation, it may be said that Malaysia has been a country of high-
quality policy combined with a weak private sector. 
In his controversial 1970 book The Malay Dilemma, Mahathir bin Mohamad,
who later became prime minister in 1981–2003, argued that the value system
of the indigenous Malays—fatalism, respect for formality and ritual, and 
abhorrence of hedonism—formed through history and engraved in genes put
them in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis commercially more active
Chinese residents, so much so that they feel dispossessed in their own land. 
The people who left the shores of China to seek their fortune abroad 
were hardened and resourceful . . . The Malays whose own hereditary 
and environmental in½uence had been so debilitating, could do nothing but
retreat before the onslaught of the Chinese immigrants. Whatever the 
Malays could do, the Chinese could do better and more cheaply. Before 
long the industrious and determined immigrants had displaced the Malays
in petty trading and all branches of skilled work. Calling on their pre-
vious experience with of¼cialdom in their own homeland, the Chinese 
immigrants were soon establishing the type of relationship between 
of¼cials and traders which existed in China. 
(Mahathir, 1970, pp. 24–25) 
Mahathir’s proposal was that policy preferences should be given to the 
Malays to effectively compete with the Chinese immigrants because legal 
equality alone was not suf¼cient to reverse the situation. 
In fact, following the 1969 racial riot, Malaysia introduced ethnicity-based
af¼rmative action in favor of Bumiputra (indigenous Malays) against other 
ethnic groups, especially the urban rich Chinese. The New Economic Policy 
of 1970 imposed comprehensive rules in allocating public positions, business 
ownership and management, workforce, and other privileges to Bumiputra. 
When Mahathir became the prime minister in 1981, he introduced a series 
of industrial drives. The Look East policy (learning from Japan and South 
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turned Malaysia into a major electronics exporter by the early 1990s. All 
this happened under the Bumiputra policy still in place (ethnic privileges 
were moderated, but only slightly, in 1986). 
Measures favoring ethnic Malays may have maintained social harmony 
but they did not send Malay ¼rms out invading the global market. Proton, 
Malaysia’s heavily supported national car company established in 1983, did 
produce popular vehicles for the protected domestic market, but it did not 
become competitive enough for export. Malaysia continues to receive foreign
technical assistance to level up its local component industries. The contrast 
with South Korea’s Hyundai is striking. The South Korean car company 
also received strong policy support and foreign technical assistance initially, 
but it was soon able to send Japanese engineers home. In 1975, Hyundai 
Pony, the ¼rst South Korean-developed car, was produced. In 1986, Hyundai
entered the US market with Excel and set the record of selling the largest 
number of cars (126,000) in the ¼rst year of business in the US. South Koreans
are now one of the few independent automobile producers in the world and 
the most formidable rival for Japanese auto makers. Mahathir’s lament on the
lackluster performance of Malay businesses after receiving generous support 
for over three decades is understandable (Mahathir, 2001). 
Only countries that can combine proactive industrial policy with private 
dynamism can soar quickly and break the middle-income trap. Japan, South 
Korea, and Singapore were such cases. Meanwhile, there are active people 
without support from home governments who often go abroad to conduct 
dynamic businesses. Traditionally, Chinese and Indians were such people. 
Although their governments have replaced planning with liberalization in 
recent decades, they have a long way to go before their policies can be called 
proactive. What about a country whose people are not as dynamic or
innovative as these Asians? Good policy helps, but it may not be able to 
cover fully for the lack of energy in its citizens. 
National characters formed through history are slow to change, but they 
are not immutable. The only thing that can be said generally is that both 
genes and effort matter, a maxim that is equally applicable to art, sports, or 
manufacturing. More than a century ago, an of¼cial survey of factory workers
in Japan found that Japanese workers were lazy, unskillful, and unspecialized
with a low propensity to save and high inclination to job hopping (Ministry 
of Agriculture and Commerce, 1903). Their labor productivity was only half 
that of American workers. To accumulate skills and retain workers, Japanese
large manufacturing ¼rms began to introduce internal incentive and pro-
motion mechanisms in the 1910s. Transformation of footloose workers into 
loyal employees was further carried out by government orders during the 
war years (1937–45). After World War II, the Japanese had turned into hard
workers with a high saving propensity and a lifetime dedication to their 
companies. 
More recently, Singapore succeeded in inculcating the spirit of productivity
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the agenda of the Singaporean government. The Productivity Unit was created
in 1964, which was upgraded to the National Productivity Center in 1967 
and to the National Productivity Board in 1972. In 1979, Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew remarked that “Workers here are not as proud of or as
skilled in their jobs compared to the Japanese or the Germans.” In 1981, 
the Productivity Movement was launched and multitudes of programs were
introduced until even taxi drivers talked about productivity. The slogan 
“Together We Work Better” and the mascot character of Teamy Bees were 
adopted, November was designated as the Productivity Month, and the prime
minister delivered his productivity speech for seven consecutive years. Model
companies were scaled up, ¼rm consultancy schemes were established and 
training of workforce was provided. Japan assisted this effort with its ¼rst 
large-scale cooperation in productivity enhancement from 1983 to 1990. 
Strong political will and policy persistence transformed Singapore into a 
very competitive nation with high productivity. By the early 1990s, Singapore
began to teach productivity skills to developing countries in East Asia, Africa,
and Eastern Europe. 
If stalled industrialization is due to the weakness of private-sector response,
policy must go much deeper than just providing infrastructure or unleashing 
the power of markets. The country must engage in a national campaign to 
transform people’s value, mindset, and aspiration as Japan and Singapore 
did with their workers (see Chapter 3 for more discussion). What is required 
is a spiritual revolution in a country where relaxed attitude toward production
and services rules. There is no need to succumb to economic determinism, 
but resolve and patience are required to alter national characters. 
2.6 Coping with high growth 
Proactive industrial policy that cultivates internal sources of value and growth
is only one component of a broader policy system essential for sustainable 
growth. The other two components are coping with growth-generated prob-
lems and enhancing macroeconomic management under integration. These 
policies, though as important as proactive industrial policy, lie beyond the 
scope of this book. However, a passing remark on growth-generated problems
may be made. 
In East Asia, the dominant view is that growth policy and the policy to 
cope with growth-generated problems are in principle separable. The latter 
includes measures to manage income and wealth gaps, internal migration, 
urban and traf¼c planning, environment, cultural shifts, and corruption. 
While both are necessary, growth acceleration and solving growth-spawned 
problems can—and should—be designed and administered separately. While
environmental and other social checks must be in place for every industrial 
project, justi¼cation of industrial projects must be based on industrial objectives.
In the West, on the other hand, the currently popular view is that these two 
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gender and environmental concern must be embedded in every industrial 
policy. According to this view, equality and grassroot participation are
indispensable ingredients of industrial policy formulation instead of waiting 
for the fruits of industrialization to bring these desirable changes in the 
future. 
In East Asia, there are two groups of high-growth economies. The ¼rst 
group includes Japan (in the 1960s and 1970s), South Korea, and Taiwan. 
In these countries, income and wealth gaps narrowed as the economy grew 
rapidly, making every farmer and worker happy and look to the bright future
because their real income, although still low, continued to rise every year. 
Japan had business cycles and land bubbles, but income convergence con-
tinued despite these macroeconomic instabilities. During South Korea’s high
growth, the ratio of per capita incomes between the richest urban area and 
the poorest province remained virtually unchanged at 2.0 from 1971 to 1981 
and subsequently declined to 1.75 by 1991 (Chapter 3). Farmers were not 
left behind in South Korea’s economic miracle. In Taiwan, strong perfor-
mance of SMEs created the social condition in which everyone could rise 
together and share the fruits of growth. 
The second group of countries includes China, Thailand, and the Philip-
pines. These countries also grew relatively fast, and sometimes very fast, but 
their income remains polarized across regions, occupations, and individuals. 
High-growth bene¼ts a small segment of population while the majority of 
farmers and workers feel left behind and frustrated. As long as average 
growth is high, dissatisfaction may not surface immediately. But if polarization
continues for a long time, there is a risk of social schism and explosion. 
Yasusuke Murakami, a Japanese political economist, once wrote that indus-
trialization policy would surely fail if the deprivation of people left behind 
and their emotional discontent were not properly dealt with 
if urban [migrant] workers feel aggrieved that the emotional strain of 
their detachment from home is not adequately rewarded by being able 
to take part in the fruits of industrialization, tension will develop into 
social discontent . . . Similarly, in rural areas, if villagers think that
industrialization only brings poverty and devastated landscapes, support
for industrialization will be lost and protest is likely to erupt. Enraged 
people will become more receptive to calls for social reform through 
violent means . . . If such disturbances gather momentum and develop 
into a powerful political force, the road to industrialization will be effect-
ively closed. 
(Murakami, 1994, ch.6, English translation p. 194) 
Therefore, growth policy and social policy must be promoted in tandem 
although they do not have to be an integrated policy package designed by 
a “democratic” government. Murakami suggests that this perhaps explains 
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in the Philippines and Latin America. In his view, the February 26 Incident 
of 1936, a failed coup attempt in pre-World War II Japan, to replace a
“corrupt” government that bene¼ted only fat capitalists with a military rule 
for the sake of poor farmers and workers, was also incited by military of¼cers
from farming villages who were upset by the deteriorating rural life. More 
recently, popular outrage and the toppling of a few entrenched dictators in 
Middle East in 2011 also arose from similar causes. 
2.7 The making of a developmental state 
For a poor developing country, progress toward high income must begin 
with a transformation of politics because developmental failures occur not 
only from mistaken policies but also, more fundamentally, from political 
shortcomings such as the lack of political will, national unity, and effective 
leaders and coalitions that can promote growth. A predatory, neo-patrimonial
state which regards a nation’s resources as private wealth to be distributed 
among rulers and their friends must be replaced by a developmental state 
that encourages value creation and suppresses unproductive rent seeking. 
Political transition is not easy because the old regime has taken deep root 
through institutional complementarity (mutual dependence of institutions in 
which removal of only one institution hardly changes the system), strategic 
complementarity (strong incentive for individuals to adhere to existing rules 
and play the existing game), and path dependency (dif¼culty of deviating 
from the system which was chosen and subsequently solidi¼ed). It is the 
government that must initiate systemic national transformation because free 
markets alone are unable to overcome formidable structural inertia.4 
To succeed, the state must be not only developmental but also action-
oriented, being able to mobilize resources to targeted sectors decisively and 
respond quickly to changing circumstances. In the early stages of develop-
ment, human and ¼nancial resources are limited. They must be mobilized 
effectively to a small number of key projects and programs for visible results 
instead of spreading over too many goals. Moreover, a late starter country 
must guard itself from fragile social and ethnic balance and external shocks 
arising from globalization. When these shocks occur, remedial action must 
be taken quickly and ½exibly in order for the government, and the country, 
to survive. 
Development is not just an economic process but a highly political one 
(Leftwich, 2000, 2009). It succeeds only when both aspects are fully integrated
in complex interaction. Here, the politics of development refers to what can 
be done under the political landscape and constraints as well as the admin-
istrative capacity of the country, whereas the economics of development 
refers to what should be done in terms of policy content to move the economy
forward given its initial conditions. Simply put, the former is about the 
feasibility of development policy and the latter is about its desirability. Not 
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To be relevant and realistic, a policymaker at any level or in any organization
must rack his or her brains for a narrow and delicate path that satisfy both 
feasibility and desirability. 
The development strategy for any nation must include not only techni-
calities of policy measures (Chapter 3) and policymaking procedure and 
organization (Chapter 4) but also the way non-economic factors such as 
passion, nationalism, and the sense of pride and humiliation are strategically
mobilized under strong leadership to form a driving force of catch-up indus-
trialization. Because all countries are different, no one-size-¼ts-all solution 
can apply. Since the ¼rst best solution from the viewpoint of economics is 
often impossible from the viewpoint of politics, compromise must be made 
and a detour may have to be taken. Policymaking is a complex game, and 
any plan that looks only at one aspect is certain to fail. While this general 
point may seem obvious, it must be stressed because the lack of awareness 
of this obvious fact constitutes a major cause of failure in development 
policy advice. 
Some foreign advisors seem to believe that their job is to ¼nd an eco-
nomically sound solution while implementation is the problem of the host 
government. The fact is that most policymakers already know the pressing 
economic problems of their countries and even their solutions. Re-discovery 
by foreign experts may accentuate their importance but gives little clue as 
to how these solutions should be initiated and carried out. If policy advice 
is meant to be practical rather than academic, counsel not based on (implicit)
feasibility analysis can hardly be useful regardless of whether proposed
actions are a few or many, or whether they are globally common or tailor-
made to a particular country. From this perspective, the shortcomings of 
the IMF’s macroeconomic conditionalities and the World Bank’s good
governance crusade, in which each country is rated by six growth-friendly 
criteria, are clear enough and need no further elaboration. By now, few 
economists defend an international organization that imposes a long list of 
globally common policies on countries struggling with macroeconomic crisis 
or popular discontent. By the same token, growth diagnostics advanced by 
a few Harvard economists (Hausmann et al., 2005, 2006) with a mechanical 
procedure to discover a small number of most binding economic constraints,
can also be faulted for the lack of consideration of political feasibility. 
Rodrik (2006, 2007) asserts that policies and institutions for igniting and 
sustaining economic growth should be diverse across countries but democ-
racy as a political institution must be embraced universally by all countries
regardless of income or development stage. In his words, “I do not subscribe 
to the idea that you need to delay democratization just so that you can 
actually have growth or that you can have democracy only when you
can afford it” (Rodrik, 2006). However, it is dif¼cult to justify such a
dichotomy between economics and politics. Markets and democracy are 
similar in the sense that they need enabling mindsets, rules and institutions 
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and cumulatively in the social context of each country and cannot be imposed
suddenly from outside. 
Historical experiences of successful latecomers, whether Germany and 
Japan in the late nineteenth century or East Asian tigers in the post-World 
War II era, indicate that economic growth based on technology and ¼nance 
is “easer” to realize than political and social reforms which must be sup-
ported by changes in values, attitudes, and social structure at a deeper level 
(Tominaga, 1990). Invariably, industrialization in these countries was initiated
under “outdated” political and social systems. 
In her study of South Korean democratization, N.T.T. Huyen (2004: 74) 
de¼nes the developmental threshold for democracy as “a point in the devel-
opment process when conditions are right for democracy to be installed
and sustained.” This also implies that democracy introduced before this
point would be super¼cial. According to Huyen, economic growth accom-
panied by urbanization, industrialization and modernization generates a new
political culture and a new social structure. The former means emergence in 
people’s minds of a desire for political participation and acceptance of equality,
moderation, and compromise in political processes in place of terror and 
violence. The latter refers to the rise of social strata such as urban workers, 
students, and professionals who support democratization and the shrinkage 
of classes such as military, capitalists, and landlords who favor the old regime.
These changes in popular attitude and population structure increases pres-
sure for political reform until the government succumbs and begins to
introduce democracy. Watanabe (1995) calls this a “successful dissolution” 
of the authoritarian regime as a result of economic development. In South 
Korea, this happened in 1987 when Chun Doo Hwan, the last military
dictator, accepted a presidential election to take place for choosing his suc-
cessor. By that time South Korea’s real income had risen from US$1,105
in 1960 to US$5,670 (measured in the 1990 international Geary-Khamis 
dollars). Transition to democracy was impossible in 1960 when 80 percent 
of South Koreans were poor farmers, but became possible and even
imperative by 1987 when the urban middle class and workers in support of 
democratization formed over 90 percent of the population. 
Besides South Korea, a number of East Asian countries—Taiwan, Singapore,
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, China, and so on—adopted authoritarian develop-
mentalism of various sorts as a temporary regime for accelerating development
in the second half of the twentieth century. A charismatic leader rose to 
assume power, sometimes legally but often by force, to establish a new regime
with the purpose of achieving rapid economic growth to maintain national 
unity and defend the nation from external threat. Such a leader himself 
became the most powerful driving force of development (it was always he, 
not she, who ruled this way in East Asia). He was backed by: (i) a competent 
technocrat team to faithfully concretize his vision; (ii) national ideology that 
glori¼ed material advancement; (iii) unwavering belief in upgrading technology




     




          
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
   
   




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Industrial policy in the age of globalization 49 
support based on industrial results rather than democratic procedure (Watanabe 
1995; Ohno 2008a; Banno and Ohno 2010). Military-like discipline imposed 
from above largely wiped out corruption, nepotism, and incompetence of 
the previous regime. However, growth performance differed signi¼cantly 
among countries adopting authoritarian developmentalism. As income rose, 
some have graduated from this regime and democratized. Others still maintain 
the regime. 
The strategy of generating growth ¼rst and letting the fruits of growth 
bring democracy later is often defended, and even recommended, in East 
Asia as the most realistic sequencing of latecomer development—in sharp 
contrast to the democracy ¼rst principle frequently insisted by the West. 
However, authoritarianism is no longer permitted in our age. In the early 
twenty-¼rst century, all countries regardless of income are obliged to embrace 
some sort of democracy—which usually means multi-party elections and 
minimum guarantee of human rights and freedom—as the prerequisite to 
join the global community and receive favorable trade treatment, investment 
and aid. 
In fact, the majority of developing countries have already introduced 
democracy in form, if not in spirit and substance. Figure 2.2 shows the 
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At civil war Military regime Colony 
Figure 2.2 Political regimes in Africa 
Sources: Created by the author using the following materials: Miyamoto and Matsuda (1997); 
Ndulu et al. (2008); CIA, World Fact Book (various issues); and Japanese Ministry of Finance, 















50 Ideas and methods 
evolution of political regimes on the African continent from the colonial 
years to present. Military regimes and one-party rule proliferated in the Cold
War era when siding with one ideological camp or another was the name of 
the game. Developing countries could receive military and economic aid and 
other strategic bene¼ts from the chosen patron without any conditionalities 
imposed on domestic political reform. However, the collapse of the USSR 
in 2001 completely changed the nature of global development politics. Conver-
gence to “international best practices” (Western-style market and democracy)
became compulsory. As a result, developing countries in Africa and elsewhere
adopted multi-party democracy in droves. This may be regarded as a great 
achievement from the viewpoint of human rights and political modernization.
However, viewed from other angles, all is not well. There are at least three 
issues to be considered here. 
First, democracy which values procedure and participation tends to slow 
down policymaking and restrain government’s hands. Whatever the inherent
merits of democracy may be, which are many, speed and agility are not 
among them. Consensus building takes time, and compromise and unpredict-
ability are inevitable under a democratic rule. This must be weighed against 
the need for a poor developing country to mobilize limited resources effec-
tively and respond to shocks quickly. 
The problem is hardly new. The government of Meiji Japan (1868–1912) 
was split between factions preferring a strong executive branch shielded from
popular pressure to push industrial and military agenda and factions wishing
to strengthen parliament and political parties (Banno and Ohno, 2010). In 
1882, German Emperor Wilhelm I (1797–1888) counseled Hirobumi Ito 
(1841–1909), who was visiting Europe to prepare Japan’s ¼rst constitution 
and who later became the ¼rst prime minister of Japan, to adopt autocracy 
rather than democracy and never to give parliament the authority to approve
budgets. German legal scholars hired by the Meiji government, such as 
Rudolf von Gneist (1816–1895) and Karl Friedrich Hermann Roesler
(1832–1894), were of the same opinion. British sociologist Herbert Spencer 
(1820–1903) also advised the Japanese delegation for conservative gradualism
and against “too large an installment of freedom.” These counsels may no 
longer be acceptable in the twenty-¼rst century, but the dilemma between 
promoting democracy at high speed and retaining suf¼cient room for policy 
maneuver for the government is still with us. 
Second, the substance of politics is slow to change even though its form 
is renewed. This is not surprising because political development is a long 
evolutionary process realized thorough policy effort and transformation
of mindset and structure of the voting public. In many cases, leaders and 
bureaucrats managing the new democracy are the same folks as before
and popular sentiments toward politics also have changed little. The global 
stampede toward democracy in the early 1990s was externally driven. It was 
a strategic response by developing country governments to the shifting global
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economic assistance. While a change in form of politics may become a good 
¼rst step toward a change in substance, we should not expect an instant 
improvement. 
In many developing countries, politics continues to be characterized by 
radicalism and instability even if democracy is formally in place. Based on 
extensive qualitative research, Paul Collier reports that democracy has not 
yet produced accountable and legitimate governments and has rather
increased political violence in many developing countries, especially in the 
societies of the “Bottom Billion” (Collier, 2009). This is because governing 
rules are yet to be institutionalized and authority has not been ¼rmly estab-
lished and accepted in such societies. In countries where there is no consensus
on how democratic principles should be applied in reality, the incumbent 
government can exercise much discretion in managing human rights, budgetary
allocation, and relationship with parliament. Equally, opposition groups can
challenge any action by the government. Under such circumstances, even 
election becomes a political game of confrontation rather than a device to 
legitimize the government through popular opinion. 
Third, democracy has no automatic tendency to enhance the capability of 
government to promote development. In this sense, democracy and develop-
ment are separable. Policy capability for economic development must be 
strengthened additionally and separately—hence the importance of conscious
policy learning. The previous choice between a good dictator who accelerated
development and a bad one who did not has been replaced by the problem 
of how to inspire a slow and mediocre government into developmental
action. Latecomer countries must now solve the same fundamental problems
in economic development—leadership, elite coalitions, alliance with the pri-
vate sector, skills and technology, ¼nance, infrastructure, integration, social 
protection, and the like—under new rules and constraints. Can a democratic 
state be developmental at the same time? Can it be decisive, quick, and ½exible
in policymaking? We do not have the ¼nal answer. 
Both democracy and development are worthy goals, and one should not 
be sacri¼ced for the sake of the other. However, interaction between the two 
is a complex, and sometimes con½icting, process. Promoting one goal may 
accelerate or deter the other, depending on the country’s social fabric and 
stage of development. External environment also matters, and democratic 
developmentalism of our time is no more independent from the prevailing 
world system than authoritarian developmentalism of the 1970s. The only 
thing we can say with con¼dence is that an installation of either Western-
style democracy or traditional dictatorship, detached from each country’s 
social and historical context, will not work. Harder thinking is required for 
a complex problem such as this. A continuous balancing act based on realism
and relativism, rather than sticking to an extreme position with ideological 
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3 Ingredients of proactive 
industrialization 
When asked about the most severe constraint of growth, the most popular 
answer from both government of¼cials and business people in developing 
countries is the lack of ¼nance. In reality, however, what is seriously lacking 
in those countries is often not ¼nancial means but the knowledge and mech-
anism for mobilizing available human and non-human resources toward 
productive purposes. Dropping money onto governments or enterprises that 
have no such knowledge or mechanism is not likely to improve the situation.
The fact is that investors and donors will surely know when a country im-
proves its capability to absorb skills and technology and will happily ¼nance 
investment or learning in such a country. 
As stressed in previous chapters, the key to sustained development toward 
high income is upgrading a nation’s ability to build and use its knowledge, 
skills, and technology. For this, two kinds of learning are required. First, 
the government must learn how to provide policies and institutions that 
encourage and support private dynamism. Second, the private sector, assisted
by policy, must learn to vigorously acquire knowledge, skills, and technology.
Policy learning by the government and acquisition of productive capabilities 
by the private sector must go in tandem to produce visible results. Market 
forces alone are not suf¼cient for igniting industrialization in latecomer 
countries of the twenty-¼rst century because the private sector, without any 
guidance or training, is generally too weak to satisfy demanding market 
needs or compete with global giants. The creation of a wise government is 
undoubtedly a dif¼cult task, but without it there is little hope of catching 
up. While early industrial achievers such as Japan, Singapore, and Korea 
improvised through self-effort and trial-and-error, today’s latecomers may 
need more systematic learning to improve policy capability than their pre-
decessors. 
This and the next chapter will explore the making of a developmental state
from the perspective of policy methodology.1 For any country, there are 
countless studies and reports recommending various policy actions needed 
to accelerate growth. But a “do” list—whether short or long—will not help 
very much unless the government knows how to design and implement 
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research, what is lacking is not advice on what to do, but advice on how it 
should be done. In this chapter, the way to improve policy content is explored.
In the following chapter, policy procedure and organization that can generate
appropriate policy content are examined. The arguments and cases in these 
chapters do not come from academic theories but from a comparison of 
different best policy practices in East Asia and other regions, some of which 
are documented in later chapters. In this sense, they are all proven methods 
which are implementable under certain conditions. To facilitate the learning 
of policymakers in developing countries, these valuable but scattered experi-
ences should be gathered, compared, and presented systematically. 
3.1 Policy learning 
Learning from East Asia should not mean copying policies adopted in some 
East Asian country at some point in time—be it Meiji Japan’s engineering 
education, South Korea’s integrated export promotion, or Taiwan’s science 
parks—to another country without considering the latter’s local context. The
same can be said about learning from the West or any other advanced region
or country. Random copying rarely works because the situation each country
faces is different. 
Studying East Asia or the West should not lead to a ½at rejection of foreign
models as irrelevant because “our country is unique” (I have never been to 
a developing country where this statement is not heard) or a blind acceptance
of what international organizations or foreign economists advise without 
pondering local consequences. Both attitudes shut out the country from the 
possibility of policy improvement. What is critically needed for latecomer 
countries is systematic and pragmatic learning of alternative international 
best practices for the purpose of enhancing the capacity to create their own 
policy packages. 
At the general level, the policy menu for sustained industrial development 
is not very different from one country to another. Presuming reasonable 
political and macroeconomic stability, the importance of education and training,
acquisition of technology, supporting small and medium enterprises, agri-
cultural and rural development, quality and safety standards, and construction
of infrastructure such as power and transportation can hardly be disputed. 
Institutional supports for these policy objectives, such as administrative
capacity, legal framework, and ¼scal and monetary systems, must also be in 
place. For countries rich in natural resources, proper management of export 
revenues for productive investment and smoothing price and demand shocks
should be added to the list. In fast industrializing countries, growth-generated
problems such as inequality, internal migration, urbanization, congestion, 
and environmental damage must also be dealt with. The industrial policy 
menu of any developing country should not deviate greatly from the above 
although weights attached to individual items may differ. This is so even in 
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penetrated virtually every country. Although some measures such as import 
protection and export subsidies are no longer permitted under the WTO 
regime, the validity of all other measures—discussed below—remains intact. 
Furthermore, as far as industrial policy menus are concerned, Africa and 
East Asia are not far apart. The seven program clusters, 16 programs, and 
49 projects envisaged by the African Union to advance industrialization in 
its member countries (African Union, 2007), mentioned in Chapter 2, coincide
largely with policies pursued by the high-performing East Asian economies 
although they may be called somewhat differently. The fact that policies in 
Africa remain mostly on paper while similar policies are actually implemented
and producing results in many East Asian countries cannot be attributed to 
the difference in the policy menu. The success and failure of industrialization
depends not so much on the different choice of policies but mainly on how 
well a country carries out common developmental tasks on the ground. 
While the industrial policy menu itself is universal, local context matters 
greatly in deciding the details of how these common issues are tackled. 
Policy actions must be differentiated in design and implementation to re½ect 
the social, economic, and historical background of each country. Consider 
promotion of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as an example. Japan 
has since 1948 combined technical, managerial, and ¼nancial support under 
the leadership of the SME Agency, with about 20,000 state-certi¼ed SME 
consultants (shindanshi) offering advice to SMEs all over the country and 
connecting them to policy support and commercial bank loans. In South 
Korea, ¼nancial and non-¼nancial SME supports are integrated in one
policy agency (Small and Medium Business Administration) and one imple-
menting organization (Small and Medium Business Corporation) but they 
work only with manufacturing SMEs as non-manufacturing SMEs are
assisted by another mechanism. In Malaysia, the National SME Develop-
ment Council chaired by the prime minister sets policies, the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry is the lead ministry, and SME Corporation
Malaysia offers one-stop service to a wide range of measures provided by 
15 ministries and 60 government agencies. Malaysia promotes manufacturing
and non-manufacturing SMEs alike under the same mechanism. 
Such diversity in policy con¼guration comes partly from historical evolution
and partly from different purposes and capacities of individual countries. 
Some variations enhance policy effectiveness but others are limitations that 
must be overcome. For a latecomer country preparing to install an SME 
policy mechanism from scratch, the scope, speed, sequencing and content of 
the mechanism must be chosen carefully to match the capability of the govern-
ment and the requirements of the domestic business community. Haphazard 
adoption of the Japanese, Korean, Malaysian, or any other model without 
examining local context will surely lead to non-implementation or less-than-
expected results. Systematic preparation is required to reduce this risk. 
Latecomer countries should learn four things which are essential for sus-
tained development: leadership, national mindset, policy content, and policy 
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procedure and organization. Among these, leadership is by far the most
important but the hardest to learn. A shift in national mindset is needed in 
countries where the private sector, when left alone, is not greatly interested 
in long-term investment in knowledge, skills, and technology. Both leadership
and national mindset touch on politics and social ethos which, though not 
immutable, are not readily amenable to quick social engineering. By contrast,
policy content and policy procedure and organization are technical in nature
and easier to learn with good instruction and guidance. 
The best way to learn these lessons is through a comparison of international
best practices. Concrete cases from different countries should be catalogued 
and analyzed not for adopting them hastily or rejecting them as irrelevant 
but for the purpose of acquiring internal capability to create a policy package
suitable for the home country using foreign experiences as references or 
building blocks. Foreign models must be selected, modi¼ed, combined,
or improved before they are applied to any country. International com-
parison will not only provide a large number of raw materials for review but 
also give a good perspective to identify common success factors and pitfalls, 
ways to adjust basic models to local situations, and how to simplify advanced
institutions. Such pragmatic instruction on industrial policymaking is cur-
rently not available. This book can offer some hints only. It would be nice 
if such a program, which would require enormous time, resources, and 
networking, were to be constructed by an international organization through
mobilizing current and retired national leaders and policymakers with ¼rst-
hand experiences. 
Besides comparison of international best practices, policy learning requires
a few other conditions for effectiveness. First, it must be backed by strong 
policy ownership. It is policymakers of the developing country, not foreign 
consultants or international organizations, who must set priorities, decide 
policy content, create necessary institutions, and be directly responsible for 
implementing and monitoring projects. The proper role of foreigners is to 
support a national development strategy from the sideline. In turn, the chal-
lenge for a developing country is to prepare a development strategy worthy 
of such support—which may require initial tutoring as discussed below. 
Strong policy ownership in turn must be driven by a desire for national pride
and global recognition as well as a sense of humiliation over the current 
inability to compete effectively. Such national aspiration must be given con-
crete direction and form by a capable national leader. Industrialization should
not merely be a technical strategy proposed by government of¼cials but an 
obsession that engulfs all entrepreneurs, engineers, and workers. Industrial-
ization in many of the East Asian economies was indeed propelled by a 
collective zeal for assent. 
Second, policy must be learned through concrete industrial projects rather 
than generally and aimlessly. Policy learning is a process that must coincide 
with the industrialization process itself, not a precondition for industrial 
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policy capability through hands-on struggles to attain speci¼c targets rather 
than for raising their ranking in investment climate contests or ful¼lling 
externally imposed conditionalities or governance criteria. Training was con-
ducted, institutions were created, funds were raised, and of¼cials and advisors
were mobilized to execute particular projects stipulated in ¼ve-year plans, 
sectoral master plans, or a blueprint for regional development. This pragmatic
approach has several advantages including concentration of limited human 
and ¼nancial resources on truly needed areas, clear criteria by which to assess
performance, ½exible reshuf½ing of resources and organizations in response 
to initial results and changing circumstances, and the sense of pride and 
achievement that emerges as concrete projects are accomplished one by one. 
In 1997, the World Bank in its World Development Report proposed a 
strategy which may be dubbed as policy-capability matching (World Bank, 
1997). It argued that countries with advanced institutions might try “dif¼cult”
policies such as selective intervention but those without them should ¼rst 
build general institutional capabilities in (i) effective rules and restraints, (ii) 
greater competitive pressure, and (iii) increased citizen voice and partnership.
Countries in elementary stages should content themselves with easy policies 
(“fundamentals”) and leave dif¼cult ones for later when their institutions 
are upgraded.2 This advice, which may look similar to the counsel given in 
the preceding paragraph, is based on the belief that institutions and capa-
bilities can be built up independently from (or before deciding) the particular
development path that the country chooses to tread. However, such unfocused
effort may be too dif¼cult to rally politically and too broad in the light of 
limited funds and administrative capacity. The same problem is encountered 
in the World Bank’s more recent approaches in Good Governance and Ease 
of Doing Business where Western yardsticks are applied to assess each country’s
position vis-à-vis global averages, year by year, without reference to speci¼c 
growth strategy adopted by that country. My advice to low-income countries
is not to worry too much about your annual ranking. 
Third, policy scope and instruments must be expanded as learning pro-
gresses. As with any learning, the novice must start with basics and climb 
up the ladders steadily. Jumping lessons, which is what some countries try 
to do upon hearing East Asian miracle stories, is hardly advisable. Take 
export promotion, for example. Korea’s integrated export drive in the 1960s 
and 1970s employed a large number of policy actions in marketing, technology
imports, export credit system, export association, export insurance, etc. Insti-
tutional support was provided through master plans, trade-promotion agencies,
monthly export steering committee chaired by the president, a special fund 
for export-promotion activities, the Export Information Center, and the 
Export Idea Bank (Lim, 2011; also see below). An average latecomer country, for
which quick installation of all these measures and institutions is impossible,
must start with a simpler mechanism such as export incentives and international
technical assistance targeted to a few selected sectors (see the Ethiopian case 
in Chapter 10). Although such measures unaccompanied by other policy 
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components are not very effective, it is a good place to start. By knowing 
the complexity of working with local producers and foreign customers, the 
country can take a small but meaningful step forward in business support. 
In this regard, policy dialogue with experienced of¼cials and industrial 
experts from advanced countries may prove useful for countries just starting 
to learn industrialization—and this is our fourth point. International assis-
tance in policymaking is being offered via various channels including lectures
and seminars, expert dispatches, training at home and abroad, and tours and
visits. These can provide ample ideas and cases on different policies, but 
industrialization also requires ability to integrate individual policy compon-
ents into a coherent whole which ¼ts the reality of the country in question.
This undertaking is highly complex and dif¼cult to learn through standardized
manuals or technical assistance with narrowly prescribed terms of reference. 
For countries wondering where to start, a private tutor who understands the 
strengths and weaknesses of the pupil, gives clues on what to look for, takes 
any questions, and guides the beginner toward an initial learning path, will 
be a great help. Policy dialogue between a developing country and an advanced
one, held regularly over a few to several years with an open and evolving 
agenda, can ¼ll that role. For any art, sport, or science, a student must learn 
basic techniques from an instructor until he or she is pro¼cient and con¼dent
enough to break new grounds and establish his or her own style. Random 
struggle without assimilating established wisdom is unlikely to produce results.
It is the same with the art of making industrial policies. 
Japan has conducted policy dialogue with many developing countries in 
various modalities with respect to purpose, scale, participants, duration, and 
frequency (Table 3.1). It usually starts with a national leader of a developing 
country requesting Japan to discuss development strategy generally and/or 
teach and transfer the secrets of East Asian development. South Korea offers
the Knowledge Sharing Program to developing countries on a similar request-
base where bilateral policy consultation (joint research, study tours, and 
seminars) and development of policy modules (information kits on particular
policy measures) are the two main pillars (Table 3.2).3 Although South Korea’s
policy teaching is more recent, it aims at more standardized, institutionalized,
and publicized knowledge transfer than Japanese one which conducts pol-
icy dialogue on a more case-by-case basis. Other Asian countries, such as 
Singapore and China, also provide bilateral coaching on industrialization, 
but their programs are more issue- or country-speci¼c (assistance in raising 
productivity, narrating lessons from Chinese industrialization, etc.) and less 
interactive and responsive to the particular needs of a learner country. Besides
this, intellectual cooperation from one developing country to another 
(“South–South cooperation”), such as Malaysia helping Zambia and Vietnam
assisting Mozambique, is now popular though it rarely deals with the issue 
of overall policymaking as Japanese and Korean programs do. 
Policy dialogue is also conducted by Western donors and international
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Table 3.2 Korea: Knowledge Sharing Program (summary) 
Establishment 2004 
Responsible bodies The Ministry of Strategy and Finance is the responsible 
ministry while the Korea Development Institute and the 
Korea EximBank, and subsidiary organizations under them, 
implement the program (however, see also the note below). 
Objective The overarching goal of this technical assistance is to 
enhance national development capacities and institutional 
restructuring efforts of development partner countries by 
sharing Korea’s development experiences. 
Consultation areas Economic development strategy, industrialization and 
export promotion, knowledge-based economy, economic 
crisis management, and human resources development. 
Project cycle and The project cycle consists of (1) demand identi¼cation, (2) 
modality policy research, (3) policy consultation, and (4) monitoring 
and evaluation. There are usually two reporting workshops 
(interim and ¼nal) supplemented by policy practitioners 
workshop, senior policy dialogues, and dissemination 
seminar. Of¼cials of developing countries are also invited 
to visit Korea. The standard cycle is one year with possible 
extension with follow-up consultation projects. 
Output A policy recommendation paper which contains 
consultation ¼ndings. 
Partner countries Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, 
in 2011 Peru, Ghana, Dominican Republic, Laos, Kazakhstan, 
Brazil, Gabong, South Africa, Myanmar, Bolivia, Sri 
Lanka, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Equatorial Guinea, 
Tanzania, Panama, Philippines, United Arab Emirates, 
and Saudi Arabia (25 countries). Until 2010, the 
Knowledge Sharing Program was involved in research 
and consultations with approximately 20 countries. 
Source: extracted by the author from the of¼cial website (www.ksp.go.kr). 
Note: Information in this table relates to the Knowledge Sharing Program conducted by the 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance. There are also similar programs implemented by the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs and Trade with the Korea International Cooperation Agency as an 
implementing agency, which are not called the Knowledge Sharing Program. For the latter 
programs systematic information or an organized website is not available. 
macroeconomic, legal, social, or governance aspects. When industrial subjects
are discussed, they are usually cross-sectoral issues such as ICT, globaliza-
tion, environmental protection, labor rights, and enterprise reform rather 
than sector-speci¼c targeting or planning. Policy dialogue with Japan or 
South Korea is unique in the sense that it aims directly at strengthening the 
state’s role and capacity in industrialization rather than reducing the scope 
of sectoral intervention by government. 
Some economists continue to come up with ready-made answers for
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as rich as yours” or “take the following six steps to overcome a middle
income trap.” I am afraid that this is a new type of “one-size-¼ts-all” advice
that needs to be avoided. Industrial policymaking is such a complex and 
country-speci¼c process that no prescribed formula applies and micromanag-
ing it from the center (say, Washington) is hardly helpful. Economic theories
and historical cases should be treated as raw materials for each developing 
country to choose from and combine. We must recall that East Asian high 
performers industrialized in many different ways. Straitjacket instruction 
should be replaced by an interactive method which allows teacher and student
to understand each other and jointly work toward agreed goals through 
improvisation and adaptation. The process of interactive learning is more 
important than the policy conclusion which is temporary and has to be
revised and updated anyway. Policy dialogue, set up properly, will do the 
work while the rigid policy matrix or ½owchart offered to every developing 
country will not. 
To conclude this section, several “don’ts” are listed. A development strategy
not backed by strong will and clear vision of a national leader will be ineffec-
tive. Policies drafted within a narrow circle of government of¼cials, without
deep involvement of other stakeholders, will not be implemented. Haphazard
adoption of foreign models without examining local context will do more 
harm than good. Outsourcing of entire policymaking to outside consultants 
or academics, with policymakers only making comments and revisions, will 
not enhance policy capability. Bottom-up collection of targets drafted by 
different ministries will end up in unconnected chapters and too many
priorities. Unfortunately, these are frequently observed mistakes in policy 
formulation of developing countries. Refraining from these practices should 
be the ¼rst step toward industrial policy learning. 
3.2 Learning from East Asia 
Although model countries for policy learning can in principle be from any 
region, East Asia presents itself as a particularly interesting case to study for
the following reasons. 
First, it is natural for latecomer countries to want to learn from successful 
cases than from failed ones. While East Asia’s growth performance and 
development strategies are fairly diverse across countries (Chapter 1), it is 
the only developing region that has collectively and signi¼cantly caught up 
with the West with a number of stellar performers such as Japan, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Korea—and giant China is also rising rapidly. 
Second, most East Asian economies have adopted a developmental approach
that emphasizes the essential role of government in industrialization, a
pragmatic and evolving view of state guidance and intervention in the private
sector, and the vision of market and democracy embedded in the culture 
and history of each society. For an average developing country immersed
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privatization, integration, good governance, and democracy, learning from
East Asia can lead to the expansion of policy space in the double sense of 
bringing in a new perspective and enlarging the sphere of public policy. Since
Western advice cannot be said to have produced great results in Africa and 
other remaining developing regions, to put it mildly, this should be a highly 
welcome move so long as the governments of latecomer countries know how 
to combine the two approaches in an effective and complementary manner. 
Third, the guiding principles of East Asia’s development cooperation are 
likely to be more conducive to the industrialization of latecomers than the 
approach derived from the historic experience of the West. While the World 
Bank’s development strategy has shifted drastically from big-push indus-
trialization to basic human needs, macroeconomic balance and structural
adjustment, liberalization and integration, poverty reduction, institution-building
and governance, and renewed interest in infrastructure and growth, Japan’s 
aid strategy has been stubbornly constant ever since its ODA program began
in 1954. As the ¼rst non-Western country to catch up with the West and 
provide a large amount of ODA, Japan strongly believes that aid must support,
rather than discourage, the “self-help” of developing countries to foster 
industries, raise income, and eventually graduate from aid. A large bulk of 
Japanese ODA has been—and continues to be—poured into building infra-
structure and upgrading human capital. It features hands-on pragmatism 
and patience for achieving prescribed targets, profound interest in individual
sectors and concrete projects at gemba (a place where real action takes place 
such as factories and crop ¼elds), and joint work with local of¼cials and 
entrepreneurs for knowledge transfer through “on-the-job” training. Japan’s
aid principles are largely shared by emerging East Asian donors such as 
Singapore, Korea, China, Malaysia, and Thailand. In East Asia, economic 
aid is a means by which old teachers help new students to produce excellence
even at the risk of creating formidable rivals. This dynamic view of mutual 
ascent through cooperation and competition is fundamentally different from
the religion-backed concept of humanitarian aid where a rich man’s obligation
is sharing his fortune with the hungry and poor at the risk of creating aid 
dependency. 
However, there is one aspect of East Asia which is dif¼cult to apply directly
to other developing regions: intra-regional economic dynamism. East Asian 
growth was attained through the very existence of the region as an arena 
for interaction and training among its members. Linked by trade and invest-
ment and supported by aid, international division of labor with clear order 
and structure has emerged. Industries are passed from the ¼rst-tier countries 
to the next and down the line. Since this industrial passing occurs mainly 
through FDI, countries wishing to strengthen their positions court FDI 
vigorously. The term ½ying geese referred to these systematic supply-side 
developments. Japan was the ¼rst bird to transfer its production capacity 
widely in the region, followed by the Asian Tigers (Singapore, Hong Kong, 
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Malaysia and Thailand. For latecomers in East Asia, industrialization is 
tantamount to jumping into this regional production network and becoming 
one crucial link in it. Each country is under competitive pressure from the 
countries moving above as well as behind it, forcing it to continuously climb 
the technological ladders. No other developing region has created such
a dynamic interdependence as East Asia, and lead birds that can activate 
industrialization in neighboring countries are dif¼cult to ¼nd elsewhere. For 
this reason, imitating the ½ying geese pattern should not be the primary 
objective in transferring East Asian experience to Africa or any other devel-
oping region. 
Instead, Japan and East Asia’s emerging donors can provide industrial 
policy support to Africa and other developing regions via the following 
entry points (GRIPS Development Forum, 2008a). First, for countries with 
suf¼ciently strong policy ownership and a reasonable industrialization strategy,
policy instruments commonly used in East Asia, as explained below, can be 
mobilized. In this regard, there should be no distinction between East Asian 
and other latecomer countries. Second, for countries unsure about where to 
start or wishing to learn East Asian methods systematically, policy dialogue 
as discussed in the previous section can be initiated. Third, comprehensive 
regional development can be engineered around core infrastructure such as 
transport and power projects and through close cooperation among central 
and local governments and developing partners (section 3.5.4). Finally,
assistance can be provided to supply missing components required by pro-
posed large-scale foreign manufacturing projects, whether it is training,
connectivity, administrative reform, or quality standards and testing centers.
In fact, these entry points are not new or fundamentally different from the 
ways in which East Asian countries assist each other. 
3.3 Standard policy measures 
As stressed earlier, the policy menu for industrialization does not differ 
greatly across time and place as far as broad categories are concerned. For 
example, SME promotion, technical and vocational education and training, 
and technology transfer can hardly be omitted from the industrial strategy 
of any country. The purpose of this short section is to list up a number of 
standard measures. The list is meant to be introductory and evolving rather 
than ¼nal or complete. Nevertheless, such tabulation may prove useful for 
latecomer countries that hope to get a glimpse of available measures before 
selecting the ones they want to work on initially, just as a diner may want 
to consult the entire menu before placing an order. This should help them 
make an informed choice more quickly than when they do it randomly. 
Terminologies we use here are those frequently used in East Asia. However, 
these measures are hardly monopoly of East Asian countries as measures 
with similar functions, sometimes with different names, exist in virtually 
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Table 3.3 shows an inventory of measures that enhance industrial human 
resource and enterprise capability, an objective that should be at the core
of a nation’s industrialization strategy. In addition, there are also other 
important industrial measures concerning infrastructure, logistics and distri-
bution, social and environmental issues, and regional development which 
are not included in this table. None of the measures shown here violates 
WTO rules or any other international or regional obligations of FTAs and 
EPAs in principle—that is to say, unless they are deliberately and arti¼cially 
misused for cross-border discrimination. What WTO prohibits are trade and
investment measures that discriminate against imports or foreign ¼rms
to the advantage of domestic producers. If these measures are employed 
normally and applied to all ¼rms including domestic and foreign ones, they 
should be fully consistent with globalization rules of the twenty-¼rst century. 
Table 3.3 Standard policy menu for industrial capability enhancement 














Provision of necessary laws and regulations 
Designation or creation of lead ministry/agency for priority policy 
Inter-ministerial coordination mechanism 
Effective public-private partnership (PPP) 
Policy structure consisting of vision, roadmap and action plan 
Monitoring and evaluation mechanism 
National standards for quality, safety, skills, environment, etc. 
Framework for technology transfer and intellectual property rights 
Industrial statistics and database 
Strategic mobilization of international cooperation 
Technology and engineering universities and institutes 
Polytechnics and industrial colleges 
Technical support in specialized skills for engineers 
Technical and vocational training for new and/or current workers 
Subsidies and incentives for worker training 
Skill certi¼cation, competition, and awards 
Introduction of kaizen or productivity tools (5S, QC circles, 
elimination of muri and muda, suggestion box, just-in-time 
system, etc.) 
Benchmarking, business process re-engineering, and other 
management tools 
Management or technical advisory service (by visiting 
consultants, short-term) 
Enterprise diagnostic and advisory system (institutionalized 
shindan or technical extension services) 
Short-term courses and tours for enterpreneurs and managers 
Quality standards and certi¼cation, testing services and centers 
Awards and recognition for business excellence, productivity, 
competitiveness 
Subsidies & incentives for upgrading management, technology, 
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Table 3.3 (cont’d ) 
Objective Policy measure 
(4) Finance Development ¼nancial institutions 
Subsidized commercial bank loans for targeted ¼rms (two-step 
loans) 
Special loans and grants for priority products and activities 
Credit guarantee system 
Equipment leasing 
Enterprise credit information system 
Linking loans with enterprise diagnostic and advisory system 
(see (3) above) 
(5) FDI Clear announcement of preferred investors, sectors, regions, etc. 
attraction Effective investor information package and website 
Investment promotion seminars, missions and of¼ces abroad 
Provision of high-quality infrastructure services (power, transport, 
land, water, waste water and solid waste treatment, etc) 
One-stop investor support service (both before and after 
investment) 
Development and management of industrial estates including 
EPZs, SEZs and special zones for priority sectors, high-tech 
¼rms, etc. 
Rental factories for local and/or foreign SMEs 
Support for labor recruitment, matching, housing, commuting, 
healthcare, etc. 
Negotiation and provision of special incentives for attracting 
targeted anchor ¼rms 
(6) Marketing Support for domestic and export market development 
and business Trade fairs and reverse trade fairs 
linkage Enterprise database (SMEs, supporting industries, sectoral) 
Incentives and subsidies for FDI-local ¼rm linkage and 
technology transfer 
Of¼cial promotion/intermediation of subcontracting 
Establishment and strengthening of industry/business 
associations and local ¼rm networks 
(7) Innovation Business start-up support 
Support for R&D, branding, patenting 
Business incubation centers 
Venture capital market 
Innovation clusters among industry, research institutes and 
government 
Incentives/subsidies for designated activities and products 
Source: Author’s ongoing research. 
Note: These are a subset of industrial support measures aimed at enhancing human and enterprise
capabilities. Measures concerning infrastructure, logistics and distribution, social and environ-
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To successfully implement any one of the measures in Table 3.3 would be 
a big challenge for a latecomer country. It requires solid preparation in 
policy design and organization and well-monitored implementation as well 
as mobilization of suf¼cient human and ¼nancial resources. Each measure 
would warrant a full book detailing technical and procedural issues, support-
ing institutions and common pitfalls distilled from a number of international
best practices and failures. Just as all dishes on the menu cannot be consumed
at once, a latecomer should be realistic and wise in its learning sequence. It 
should start with a small number of measures that are relatively easy to 
adopt and at the same time relatively important for the country. Exercising 
selectivity is an important component of policy learning. 
Measures for stimulating innovation, at the bottom of Table 3.3, are 
particularly important for countries that have reached upper middle to high 
income. As argued in Chapters 1 and 2, however, innovation in the narrow 
sense of bringing something entirely new to the world may be too dif¼cult 
for latecomers at low or lower middle income and therefore should not be 
the top priority at those levels of income. Innovation in this sense is a higher 
objective that will become vital only after a latecomer has mastered all “basics”
and strengthened its general policy capability and private-sector dynamism. 
In the next section, several policy measures will be discussed more con-
cretely to illustrate how East Asian countries typically conduct industrial policy.
The later Chapters 5–10 will give a fuller country-by-country account of 
how industrial policy is carried out in the social and historical context of each
country. 
3.4 Industrial policy measures: selective discussion 
Six measures discussed below are among the most popular policy instruments
for enhancing industrial capability in East Asia. Some may be unheard of 
in other regions, others are vaguely known in their names but not in detailed 
contents, and still others are globally recognized tools which may have
certain East Asian twist. Explanation of these measures in this section is 
hardly suf¼cient for serious policy learning. It is only meant to be a preview 
for those with little exposure to policy formulation in East Asia so they may 
be able to sense differences between the Eastern way and the orthodox 
policy package prescribed by Western donors and international organizations.
Fuller studies of individual measures are being prepared at the GRIPS
Development Forum and the Vietnam Development Forum.4 
3.4.1 Kaizen (quality and productivity improvement at factories) 
Kaizen is a Japanese word for improvement. In Japanese management,
kaizen means continuous and participatory improvement in quality and 
productivity involving the entire company from top management to middle 
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and permanent process of eliminating muda (unnecessary action, time, pro-
cesses, etc.) and maximizing the use of existing human and nonhuman
resources inside the company. It contrasts sharply with methods that stress 
one-time drastic improvement initiated by top management and hired con-
sultants which may require high consultation fees and additional capital 
investment (GRIPS Development Forum, 2009). 
The origin of Japan’s kaizen movement was the statistical quality control 
method imported from the United States in the post-World War II period. 
The management theories and lectures of Professors W.E. Deming and J.M. 
Juran were particularly important. Japan quickly assimilated and modi¼ed 
this technique into its own management practice which became uniquely 
Japanese and began to produce results which even surpassed performance 
of American manufacturers. Compared with the original US model, the 
adapted method emphasized process orientation, worker participation, and 
hands-on pragmatism. This method, which came to be known as kaizen, 
spread rapidly among Japanese companies, large and small, to form a core 
of Japanese monozukuri (making things) spirit. The key to success was the 
dynamic response of Japanese companies to the imported method which led 
to spontaneous internalized learning and adaptation from the outset. This 
private-sector-led effort was assisted by three non-pro¼t organizations 
(NPOs)—the Union of Japan Scientists and Engineers, the Japan Productivity
Center, and the Japan Management Association—which sponsored lectures, 
discussions, foreign tours, productivity and quality awards, and other sup-
porting mechanisms (Kikuchi, 2011). 
Subsequently, kaizen spread overseas as Japanese manufacturing ¼rms 
expanded their production bases to the rest of the world. By now, kaizen 
assistance is one of the standard tools of Japanese industrial support in 
developing countries. Japanese assistance in kaizen, which is often called 
quality and/or productivity projects, is conducted through both private and 
public channels. Many Japanese companies teach their overseas factories 
and local component suppliers through classroom and on-site training,
dispatch of Japanese technicians, training at the mother factory in Japan, 
and organizing skills competition for local engineers and workers. There are 
also fee-based instructions provided by private consulting ¼rms such as the 
Kaizen Institute. Kaizen is also promoted widely by of¼cial organizations 
such as the Japan International Cooperation Agency (Table 3.4), the Japan 
Overseas Development Corporation, the Association for Overseas Technical 
Scholarship, and the Asian Productivity Organization in addition to the
three NPOs mentioned above. While kaizen activities are most popular in 
Southeast Asia where Japanese manufacturing ¼rms have strong presence, 
it is also taught and practiced in other regions including South Asia, Latin 
America, and Eastern Europe. A number of Sub-Saharan African countries 
such as Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia are 
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Table 3.4 JICA’s cooperation for systematic introduction of kaizen 
Country Start End Counterpart organization Estab. Project type 
1 Singapore 1983 1990 National Productivity 1972 Developmental 
Board 
2 Philippines 1991 1994 Productivity 1967 Developmental 
Development Center, 
Development Academy 
of the Philippines 
3 Thailand 1994 2001 Thailand Productivity 1962 Transition 
Institute 
4 Hungary 1995 1999 Hungarian Productivity 1994 Start-up 
Centre 
5 Brazil 1995 2000 Brazilian Institute of 1995 Start-up 
Quality and 
Productivity in Parana 
6 Costa Rica 2001 2006 Technical Instructor and 1992 Developmental 
Personnel Training 
Center for Industrial 
Development for 
Central America 
7 Tunisia 2006 2008 National Quality 2005 Start-up 
Programme Unit 
8 Paraguay 2007 Ongoing Paraguayan Quality and 2005 Start-up 
Productivity Center 
9 Egypt 2007 Ongoing Productivity and 2006 Start-up 
Quality Improvement 
Center 
10 Argentina 2009 Ongoing National Institute of 1957 Developmental 
Industrial Technology 
11 Ethiopia 2009 Ongoing Ethiopian Kaizen 2011 Start-up & 
Institute (upgraded from developmental 
Kaizen Unit in 2011) 
Source: Ueda (2009) with updates and editing by author. 
Note: This table lists projects, conducted by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA),
which are exclusively focused on introducing kaizen and strengthening its executing agency. 
These projects are often called “productivity development” or “quality and productivity” pro-
jects. JICA also provides a large number of kaizen supports as part of other projects or for 
improving targeted companies and organizations without institutionalizing kaizen. Ueda (2009)
classi¼es comprehensive kaizen projects into start-up, developmental and transition stages.
The developmental stage aims to enhance government capability to carry out kaizen while
the transition stage devolves the function to non-state organizations. 
According to Masaaki Imai, chairman of the Kaizen Institute who introduced
the idea to the international audience with his books (Imai, 1986, 1997), 
kaizen is an umbrella concept that encompasses a large number of Japanese 
business practices. It is not just a technique but a philosophy toward life 
and work. It instructs how management and workers can jointly change their
mindset to improve productivity. There are many overlapping tools that 
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circles (QCC), total quality control (TQC), total quality management (TQM),
Toyota Production System (TPS), Just-in-Time (JIT) system, kanban sys-
tem, lean production, and so on. Among these, 5S (“¼ve S”—Seiri, Seiton,
Seiso, Seiketsu, and Shitsuke, which can be translated as Sort, Straighten, 
Shine, Systematize, and Standardize, though other English renditions also 
exist) is considered to be the very basic that must be embraced by all com-
panies as the ¼rst step toward improvement. It is a concise checklist and 
reminder for order, ef¼ciency, and discipline in the workplace rather than a 
sophisticated method requiring high-level education or statistical knowledge 
to understand. It starts with such instructions as “Keep the factory ½oor clean
and free of rubbish,” “Remove all unnecessary tools and materials,” “Place re-
maining things in marked positions for easy pickup,” “Draw lines on the ½oor
to distinguish work area and transport area,” and other seemingly mundane 
suggestions which can nevertheless work wonders in quality and productivity
at any average factory without spending a penny on new investment. 
Kaizen is usually taught by an industrial expert with extensive experience 
who makes weekly visits to the factory in a cycle of three to six months. Class-
room instructions may be organized initially to give basic information and 
select candidate companies. For screening, the general director of the company
is interviewed for his or her business vision and willingness to learn.5 Then 
a team is formed inside an eligible company to implement kaizen in a chosen 
production process which will be expanded to the entire company in steps. 
The team is asked to identify problems and suggest solutions with assistance 
from the kaizen expert. Weekly homework is often given for this purpose. 
Kaizen is considered successful if the company internalizes the process and 
can sustain kaizen activities permanently after the expert leaves. 
Two common questions raised about kaizen in developing countries are 
transferability across cultures and complementarity with Western methods. 
Some question the validity of kaizen in countries where low literacy, short-
terminism, lack of upward mobility, and inattention to details prevail. In 
societies where hierarchical structure is deeply rooted, it may not be easy
to induce workers to contribute ideas to their supervisors. While these
arguments are theoretically plausible, experience of numerous kaizen
experts, including Mr. Imai, shows that there is no country where kaizen 
fails to improve quality and productivity. Improvements are immediate
and clearly visible in pro¼ts or cost saving even though the number of high-
est performers may vary across cultures. As to the compatibility between 
kaizen and other methods such as benchmarking and business process re-
engineering, the two should in principle be complementary because the former
internalizes gradual improvement within a company while the latter aims at 
a jump in performance. However, it is not clear whether bottom-up processes
required by the former can co-exist with top-down decision making assumed 
in the latter. Another practical concern is over-burdening of management


















Ingredients of proactive industrialization 69 
3.4.2 Shindan (enterprise management consultant system) 
Shindan (literally, diagnosis in Japanese) is a state-authorized and supported
system of enterprise diagnostics and advisory services targeted mainly at 
SMEs in both manufacturing and services. Unlike business advice provided by
MBA holders and management consultancy companies on a pro¼t basis,
shindan pursues the public purpose of strengthening a large number of SMEs
to form a solid foundation of a country’s industrialization. For this reason
government initiative is justi¼ed in creating and maintaining the system even 
though most shindan services are offered commercially and subsidies are a
relatively minor part of state intervention. It can be regarded as management
support for SMEs in a highly institutionalized form (Do and Pham, 2010; 
Ohno, 2010). 
Japan’s shindan system has a long history dating back to the early postwar
years. Since the establishment of the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency 
in 1948, shindan (enterprise diagnostics and advice) and shindanshi (enterprise
consultants) have been promoted by legislation, of¼cial assistance, and enhance-
ment of supporting organizations. In 1952, the Minister of International Trade
and Industry began to certify outstanding consultants and actively mobilize 
them in SME promotion policies. In 1954, the Japan Small and Medium 
Enterprise Management Consultants Association (J-SMECA) was founded 
as a nationwide professional association of shindanshi which was headquar-
tered in Tokyo with a branch in every prefecture of the country. 
As the system proved highly successful, it attracted growing interests and 
higher expectations. The scope of shindan activities was expanded from 
public to private domain. The mission of the system gradually shifted to 
private-sector-led development and utilization of management consultants. 
To implement this policy shift, the Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Basic
Act was amended in 1999 and an additional law, the Small and Medium-
sized Enterprise Support Act, was enacted in 2000. In 2004, state support 
organizations were merged into the Organization for Small and Medium 
Enterprises and Regional Innovation, Japan (SMRJ). In 2006, the system 
was revised for further institutional improvements such as giving a more 
½exible time frame for taking exams and renewing registration and placing 
more emphasis on the actual practice of shindan as a condition for renewal. 
As of 2008 Japan had about 19,000 registered shindanshi and the number 
is increasing every year. Many of the Japanese experts that teach kaizen in 
developing countries are registered shindanshi. 
SME Universities under SMRJ are the most important organizations
for shindanshi training. Tokyo SME University, its ½agship campus, was 
founded in 1962 and eight additional campuses were established in various 
regions in the 1980s and 1990s. They provide practical know-how in business
operations as well as courses for updating knowledge, methods, and related 
laws for registered shindanshi. Under the current system, all applicants seeking
certi¼cation as shindanshi must pass the primary exam, then choose to either
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take the secondary exam or study at an SME university. The six-month training
program at an SME university is divided into two parts: Business Consulting
I and II. In Business Consulting I, students study speci¼c management aspects
and acquire related diagnostic and advisory skills. In Business Consulting II,
practical diagnostic and advisory skills covering companywide management 
issues are obtained. To receive a certi¼cate of completion, students must 
attend over 90 percent of the courses with proper attitude and satisfy min-
imum standards set by the university. The certi¼cate of completion at an SME
university automatically entitles the holder to a shindanshi certi¼cate and a 
registration number issued by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry. 
A shindanshi certi¼cate is valid for ¼ve years. In order to renew it, a 
registered shindanshi must complete two requirements within the ¼ve-year 
period of registration: taking at least ¼ve courses organized by J-SMECA 
and engaging at least 30 days in consultancy business. 
J-SMECA currently boasts more than 9,000 shindanshi members. Business
Clinic, a human resource information program on its web (www.j-smeca.jp), 
provides matching service between shindanshi and SMEs free of charge. 
However, consulting fees arising from the contract must separately be decided
by the two parties. 
When shindan advice is combined with loan application, the triple-win 
situation is created among SMEs, shindanshi, and ¼nancial institutions, 
making diagnosis and advice offered by shindanshi truly effective. The fact 
that a ¼rm is receiving or has received analysis, assessment, or advice from 
shindanshi is important information that positively affects the ¼nancial
institution’s decision to grant a loan. The Japan Finance Corporation (JFC),
a government-owned institution created in 2008 by merging four state ¼nancial
organizations, plays a vital role in extending ¼nancial support to SMEs. 
Reports submitted by shindanshi are an important consideration for JFC in 
evaluating projects and offering loans. These reports also function as a credit
guarantee for loans provided by JFC or other ¼nancial institutions. Access 
to commercial bank loans is also greatly facilitated by receiving shindanshi’s 
advice. 
Japan’s shindan system is effective thanks to over 60 years of institutional 
evolution, consistent state backing, a wide array of supporting institutions, 
and a large number of active shindanshi engaged in domestic and inter-
national shindan works. Shindan in its fully developed form is a sophisticated
system requiring long experience and high policy capability to run. Nevertheless,
support for SMEs is a common agenda for all countries. Some Asian countries
try to replicate the Japanese system in a simpli¼ed and modi¼ed form to ¼t 
their socio-economic situations. 
In 1999, in the aftermath of the Asian ¼nancial crisis, the Japanese govern-
ment implemented a ¼ve-year program to introduce a shindan system in 
Thailand and produced about 450 Thai shindanshi. Since then, the Thai 
private sector has taken over to continue to provide various training programs
for shindanshi. In Indonesia, the industrial support program of the Japanese 
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government was initiated in 2003. Consultants were trained and a study was 
conducted in preparation for institutionalizing a training program and a 
state certi¼cation scheme, and responsible of¼ces at local levels were also 
founded. The Indonesian shindan system was of¼cially inaugurated in 2006 
and about 300 shindanshi have been certi¼ed. In Malaysia, as part of technical
cooperation following the Japan–Malaysia Economic Partnership Agreement
signed in 2005, Japanese experts conducted a series of training courses for 
government of¼cials for two and a half years from 2006 and produced
68 “SME counselors.” Meanwhile, when the Japan–Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement was signed in 2006, Japan promised to help the 
Philippines develop a shindan system and pilot projects were launched in 
¼ve of the country’s provinces. Vietnam, a latecomer in comparison with
the above-mentioned countries, has also been working with Japan for
developing its supporting industries (parts and component suppliers) since 
2008. As part of this effort, Japan’s shindan system and similar systems 
adopted in neighboring countries have been reviewed to assess the feasibility 
of transplanting the system to Vietnam. In all cases, Japan directly assisted 
the training of shindanshi or introduction of the shindan system. 
3.4.3 Engineering universities and technical colleges 
The establishment of leading universities and colleges in science and technology
which can teach both theory and practice is absolutely necessary to replace 
foreign experts and engineers by domestic nationals, create more internal 
value, and gain technological ownership. The making of such institutions is 
a long-term endeavor over many decades which usually requires state support
and international cooperation. However, private effort can also play an 
important role as we see in the case of Thailand below. 
After feudal Japan was opened up to the Western world in the middle of 
the nineteenth century, the Meiji government (1868–1912) at ¼rst hired foreign
managers, engineers and workers in turn-key contracts, management contracts,
and technical advice for industrial and infrastructure projects. However, this 
proved very costly and severely strained the state coffer. To import-substitute
foreign experts, the best students were nominated by the government to go 
abroad to study latest technology at ¼rst-rate universities in Europe and 
America on (relatively meager) of¼cial scholarship. To produce competent 
engineers on a large scale at home, the Ministry of Industry established Kobu
Daigakko (Institute of Technology) in central Tokyo in 1871 to function as 
the nation’s top academy for absorbing Western technology. Henry Dyer, a 
British engineer, was appointed as its ¼rst principal, and classes were con-
ducted mainly in English. Courses in civil engineering, mechanical engineering,
shipbuilding, telecom, chemistry, architecture, metallurgy, and mining were 
offered. The six-year program comprised two years each of preparatory study,
specialized study, and internship. Many of its ¼rst graduates were hired
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is now part of the Faculty of Engineering of the University of Tokyo. In
addition, technical high schools were created all over the country to produce 
a cadre of mid-level engineers, greatly contributing to the technical absorptive
and modifying capacity of the nation (Ohno, 2006a; also see Chapter 5). 
Much later in Thailand, the King Mongkut’s Institute of Technology 
Ladkrabang (KMITL), established in 1961 as a small telecom training center
with 23 students, has developed into a leading engineering research and 
education university with special strength in information and comunications 
technology (ICT). Comprehensive Japanese cooperation, both public and 
private, in four phases over 40 years was critical to its creation and growth. 
Japanese cooperation included technical cooperation agreements (1978, 1987,
1992, and 1997), academic exchange agreements (1977, 1992, and 1997), 
scholarship system (1971), practical factory-based training (1977), and con-
struction scholarship system (1989), as well as campus expansion, human 
resource development, research promotion, and bilateral research and education
via satellite. By 2010 KMITL had seven faculties in engineering and a graduate
school with a total of about 22,000 students and 1,000 instructors. KMITL 
actively accepts students from neighboring countries including Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (VDF and Goodwill Consultant, 2011). 
In Thailand, technical training is also provided by non-state initiative. The
Technology Promotion Association (TPA) is a local NPO established in 
Bangkok in 1973 by Thai returnees who studied science and technology
in Japan. It has long offered management and technical education and train-
ing, language courses, and published textbooks. After 34 years of preparation
and saving, TPA realized its original plan of establishing the Thai–Nichi 
Institute of Technology (TNI), a private university to teach Japanese-style 
manufacturing in both theory and practice with a strong emphasis on the 
latter, in 2007. TNI was ¼nanced by TPA’s accumulated pro¼ts and bank 
loans. TNI has three departments in Engineering, IT, and Business Admin-
istration as well as MBA courses in Industrial Management and Executive 
Enterprise Management. In 2011 it reached the full student capacity of 4,000
and produced its ¼rst graduates.6 TNI emphasizes the spirit of monozukuri
(making things), enterprise internship, Japanese language and culture, and 
cooperation with Japanese and local companies. Japan has assisted TPA and
TNI from the sideline via non-¼nancial channels such as dispatching experts,
linking them with Japanese businesses, and providing equipment in kind. 
Management and ¼nancial resources of TPA and TNI remain local with 
strong Thai ownership (Mori, 2010). 
In Singapore, Nanyang Polytechnic (NYP), established in 1992 by merging
various institutes created by German, French, and Japanese cooperation in 
the 1970s and 1980s, has grown into a leading polytechnic in the country 
with about 78,000 current students. It provides both Pre-Employment Training
(PET, for students) and Continuing Education and Training (CET, for workers).
Regarding PET, seven schools of NYP run 47 full-time courses for three-year
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media, design, chemical and life sciences, and health sciences. CET at NYP 
offers formal diploma courses, customized courses, and degree programs 
with overseas universities. The government provides full funding for admin-
istration and operations of NYP (except for the small part covered by tuition
fees). Meanwhile, NYP is free to use its revenue from services provided to 
industry for any activities or investments. Collaboration between industry 
and NYP is solid and extensive. NYP carries out many industrial projects 
on a commercial basis in R&D, product design and development, and
innovative solutions for industry, as well as teaming up with the government 
to support start-up technopreneurs. Such collaboration is “win–win” for 
both industry and NYP because the former can bene¼t from reduced cost 
and risk for R&D and start-up investment and because the latter can have 
ample opportunities for staff capability development and student training in 
frontline technology in addition to earning money. NYP also offers various 
kinds of training for management staff and specialists of TVET institutions 
around the world including China. 
3.4.4 TVET–industry linkage 
The quality of technical and vocational education and training (TVET) is 
gauged not by advanced teaching materials and methods but by the degree 
of matching between the training program and labor demand by targeted 
industries. Since skill requirements for industrial labor change over time and 
vary by sector and even from one enterprise to another within a sector, labor
matching requires constant and customized consultation and adjustments 
between industry and TVET institutions. Mere installation of an imported 
TVET framework will not suf¼ce because strong private initiative and effec-
tive public support with attention to details are crucial. Only those countries 
that can establish a national mechanism to achieve continuous labor matching
will succeed in producing relevant workforce for industrialization. 
In Singapore, the National Manpower Council (NMC) chaired by the 
Minister of Manpower identi¼es the country’s human resource needs in the 
medium to long run and maps out strategies to meet these needs. Numerical 
targets are set for speci¼c skills and the number and type of students to be 
graduated from universities and polytechnics over the next four to ¼ve years.
State funding to educational institutions and industry worker training is 
closely linked to this manpower planning. However, Singapore is a well-
managed city state with a population of ¼ve million. It may be dif¼cult to 
replicate such a sophisticated human-resource strategy in developing countries
with an average policy capability. 
One of Singapore’s international cooperation projects is the Vietnam–
Singapore Industrial Park (VSIP) in Binh Duong Province in Southern Vietnam.
With ef¼cient management and marketing expected of Singaporean assistance,
Phase I of this bilateral national project, started in 1996 with 500 hectares of
land in the suburbs of Hochiminh City, has become one of the most successful
 












Ingredients of proactive industrialization 75 
industrial estates in Vietnam attracting 242 companies with strong represen-
tation of electronics and precision machinery sectors. VSIP continues to expand
to other locations in Vietnam in three more phases. To supply workers to
VSIP Phase I, the Vietnam–Singapore Technical Training Center was built 
near the industrial park to provide training required by tenant companies 
in the industrial estate. Students who completed the 12th grade receive
¼ve-month training before being placed in factories. The center also offers 
three-year training for 9th graders. The curriculum, originally based on the 
Singaporean model, is revised every year by the curriculum committee con-
sisting of tenant companies. For recruitment, a list of graduating students 
is circulated among companies in the industrial estate which will organize 
interviews with desired candidates. All students, except those who wish to 
leave the area, can ¼nd jobs in VSIP Phase I. In 2006, the center was merged 
with the provincial technical school and its ownership and management were
transferred from Singapore to the provincial government of Binh Duong. 
As of March 2007 the merged center had 1,500 full-time students.7 
The State of Penang, a small island in Malaysia, has a large agglomeration
of multi-national semi-conductor ¼rms such as Advanced Micro Devices, 
Intel, Motorola, Fairchild Semiconductor, and Seagate. This industrial cluster
was created by the state government’s strategic FDI marketing in the late 
1980s (Chapter 8). In order to cope with the shortage of skilled labor, wage 
pressure, and job hopping arising from increased labor demand, the Penang 
Skills Development Centre (PSDC) was established in 1989 in unique joint 
effort among industry, government, and academia. While it is a non-pro¼t 
organization reporting to the state government, private initiative has been 
the main driving force in its creation and operation. The management and 
administration of the PSDC are entirely in the hands of its corporate members
while the federal and state government fund and support it without intervention.
Key members of the PSDC’s management council are CEOs of multinational
corporations (MNCs) who contribute their time and knowledge to the improve-
ment of curriculums and fostering of local supplier networks. Strong trust 
and cooperative spirit that exist between industry and the Malaysian government
are the main reason for the enormous success of the PSDC (Mori, 2005; 
Ohno, 2006b). However, when the PSDC model was scaled up to the federal 
level it met with less success due to the lack of strong private initiative in 
other locations in Malaysia.8 
3.4.5 Industrial estates 
Development of industrial clusters, where producers locate and interact in 
geographical proximity, is a popular measure among policymakers around 
the world but it has many different interpretations and approaches. Industrial
clusters can mean trade villages where a large number of micro and small 
businesses produce the same product; a region of a country where relatively 
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works, information, labor, materials, or markets; a vertically integrated pro-
duction hub with many component suppliers surrounding a large assembler 
¼rm; or a city that promotes innovation through policy-guided cooperation 
among local government, businesses, and universities. 
In East Asia, establishment of industrial estates that can attract a large 
number of foreign manufacturers has been a common practice. While a 
country should ideally be able to offer attractive investment climate every-
where, this is practically impossible in latecomer countries where physical 
and institutional impediments to businesses abound. Industrial estates are 
the means to provide exceptionally good business conditions in con¼ned 
areas to attract foreign investors in the early years of industrialization. Kaoh-
siung Export Processing Zone in Taiwan, established in 1966, was the ¼rst 
such successful industrial estate in the world (Chapter 7). Subsequently, all 
high-performing economies in East Asia used industrial estates of various 
kinds as one of the key tools for industrialization. Later, as industrialization 
deepens and the aim of industrial policy shifts from quantitative expansion 
to qualitative improvement, high-tech industrial clusters that can produce 
leading-edge products become increasingly important. 
One of the largest industrial parks in Southeast Asia is AMATA Nakorn 
Industrial Park, a Thai-owned private industrial estate in Chonburi Province
in the southeast suburbs of Bangkok, Thailand. It constitutes a part of 
Eastern Seaboard Development, a gigantic national industrial development 
plan carried out mainly in the 1980s, with easy access via expressway to 
Laem Chabang Deep Seaport and Suvarnabhumi International Airport.
Built in 1989, the industrial park has been operated and expanded by
AMATA Corporation.9 It has grown in nine phases into a complete city 
equipped with full infrastructure services such as condominiums, commercial
areas, logistic support, banking, schools and kindergartens, a medical center,
and a golf course. Major customers of AMATA Nakorn are manufacturing 
¼rms from Japan (60 percent), Thailand (17 percent), and Europe (7 percent)
by nationality, and automotive (33 percent), steel, metal, and plastic (26 
percent), and electronics (14 percent) by sector. It is the largest agglomera-
tion of supporting industries (parts and component suppliers) and a critical 
production hub of the Thai automotive and electronics industries, together 
with ¼nal assembler ¼rms scattered around Bangkok and Eastern Seaboard 
areas. 
Akifumi Kuchiki summarizes the standard procedure for creating suc-
cessful industrial estates in a sequential list of actions and players (Kuchiki,
2005; Kuchiki, 2007; Kuchiki and Tsuji, 2008). In his ½owchart approach 
(Figure 3.2), the ¼rst step is agglomeration, in which an industrial zone with 
essential services and support is established to invite an anchor ¼rm, while the
second step is innovation, in which tripartite cooperation among industry, 
government, and universities and research institutions generates high value. 
Relevant players in these steps are local and central governments, NPOs, 



























Capacity building (I) 
1. Infrastructure 
2. Institutions 
3. Human resources 
4. Living conditions 
Capacity building (II) 
1. Infrastructure 
2. Institutions 
3. Human resources 
4. Living conditions 
Figure 3.2 Kuchiki’s ½owchart approach to industrial clusters 
Source: Kuchiki (2007). 
The ¼rst step proceeds as follows. First, an industrial zone must be created,
if it does not already exist, and a responsible agency is assigned. Second,
essential conditions for smooth production must be provided by appointed 
players, a process which Kuchiki calls “capacity building.” This includes 
physical factors such as power, water, telecom, and transportation as well 
as institutional factors such as taxes and incentives, one-stop investor service,
and good living conditions. Third, an anchor ¼rm (a large foreign manufac-
turer with extensive upstream linkage) must be invited which will automatically
bring a large number of related ¼rms. When these tasks are completed, 
suf¼cient production concentration and linkage will be established in and 
around the industrial estate and policymakers can proceed to the second 
stage. 
Kuchiki (2007) uses his ½owchart to analyze several industrial clusters
in Asia including the printer cluster in Northern Vietnam, the automotive
clusters in Tianjin and Guangzhou, China, the science and technology clus-
ter in Zhongguancun, Beijing, and the (not so successful) automotive cluster 
in Malaysia. Kuchiki’s formula clearly points to the vital importance of 
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supplying necessary conditions and institutions in a well-coordinated manner
to attract foreign investors and create internal value. Designation of land 
plots and announcement of priority sectors and investment incentives, which
is often done in the name of FDI attraction, is hardly enough for successful 
execution of an industrial estate whether it is an export processing zone, a 
special economic zone, or a high-tech park. Although Kuchiki’s ½owchart 
is perhaps too rigidly constructed and may require more ½exible sequencing 
and local adjustments, its basic idea is sound and can form an important 
part of industrial policy. 
3.4.6 Strategic FDI marketing 
Inviting foreign manufacturing ¼rms that offer opportunities for tech-
nology transfer and training, in addition to job and income creation, is of 
critical importance to latecomers’ industrialization strategy. But not many 
countries succeed greatly in this undertaking. For effective FDI marketing, 
abstract theory and standardized manuals must be put aside for aggressive 
customer courting based on hard thinking and practical experience. A com-
plaint such as “Our country has many advantages for foreign investors and 
we have introduced all incentives and one-stop service. Why don’t they come
to us?” is frequently heard from national investment agencies across
the globe. But this only proves ignorance and passivity of such agencies 
regarding the essence of FDI marketing. The world is a battleground for 
two-hundred-plus countries competing to attract best foreign manufacturers.
Provision of fast procedures and ¼nancial incentives, or opening a nice 
website, is hardly enough to put the country on the radar screen of sharp-
eyed foreign investors. 
It must be cautioned that absorbing FDI does not automatically promote 
industrial capability. First, it is manufacturing FDI—not mining companies,
real-estate developers, or big infrastructure projects—that can contribute 
signi¼cantly to the upgrading of a nation’s industrial capability. Gigantic 
investments in power and telecom sectors or extractive concessions, whether 
public or private, can bring hard infrastructure or foreign currency to the 
country, but little can be expected in the accumulation of knowledge, skills, 
and technology in the population at large. Second, even with manufacturing 
FDI, technology transfer is far from spontaneous. In low-income countries, 
foreign manufacturers are often attracted by cheap labor, tax and import 
duty incentives, and various locational advantages, not necessarily by the 
prospect of teaching local managers and workers for productivity. While 
developing countries often covet “high technology,” proprietary knowledge 
is a corporate secret guarded by intellectual property rights and will not be 
transferred to developing country partners freely. What can be learned
effectively from FDI manufacturers are work ethics, factory operation and 
maintenance, marketing, kaizen, and other non-proprietary knowledge that 
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automatically; it requires a combination of proactive policies and serious 
efforts by local managers and workers for a number of years. 
To integrate manufacturing FDI into the national development strategy, 
there must be a coherent industrial strategy with clear vision and con-
crete action plans of which FDI policy is a part. FDI marketing must be
aggressive and target speci¼c sectors and products, countries, or cities within 
countries, or even individual companies. Countries with low policy capability
can improve business conditions generally and create a level playing ¼eld. 
Countries with higher capability will offer ½exible and customer-oriented 
services that attract and support individual investors. Countries with the 
most advanced capability will not even publish their incentive policies; they 
approach foreign companies they want to court directly and negotiate special
incentives individually in exchange for investments that support their national
objectives. 
The Malaysian Investment Development Authority (MIDA) is a highly 
ef¼cient one-stop central service agency that issues investment licenses and 
provides investment incentives (Chapter 8). The main incentive schemes in 
Malaysia are “pioneer status” (corporate income tax exemption), investment
tax allowance, and reinvestment allowances. Import duty and sales tax
exemptions are also available for imported raw materials, components, and 
equipment for manufacturing ¼rms only. The list of eligible products
and activities, which are quite diverse and detailed, and approval procedure 
are constantly updated and electronically accessible in English, Japanese, 
Chinese, Arabic, and Malay. To receive any incentive, activities or products 
must not only be on the list but also individually screened by MIDA’s
sectoral departments and approved by its weekly committee.10 
In Thailand, the Board of Investment (BOI) offers similar centralized 
investor-friendly services and aligns FDI policy to the nation’s develop-
ment strategy. For over a half century, FDI laws and policies have been 
revised every ¼ve years to meet new demands and challenges. Like Malaysia,
investment incentives is differentiated geographically where projects in rural 
areas are given more privileges than those in suburban or urban areas. Also 
like MIDA, policies, incentives, application materials, economic and cost 
data, and so on are conveniently presented in the brochure, website, and 
slides in six languages which are updated frequently. BOI believes that its 
welcoming attitude is the greatest asset that attracts foreign investors. It 
thinks that measures to require technology transfer to foreign corporations 
are “tricky” since overregulation irritates investors and causes them to leave 
the country.11 
In Singapore, the Ministry of Trade and Industry (policymaker) and the 
Economic Development Board (one-stop agency for FDI marketing and 
industrial development) work together to attract FDI, foster “industry
verticals” (suppliers of intermediate inputs), and enhance business environ-
ment. Singapore ranks very high in the ease of doing business. It has the top 
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from 2007 to 2012. In attracting FDI, Singapore uses both broad-based and 
targeted approaches. Besides improving business environment generally, it 
offers targeted, company-speci¼c support and incentives through individual 
negotiations. This is called the “queen bee” approach where inviting the 
queen bee automatically brings a large number of other bees into the country
(equivalent to the “anchor ¼rm” in Kuchiki’s ½owchart approach). A good 
example in this regard is the attraction of world-class aerospace ¼rms such 
as Rolls-Royce, Pratt & Whitney, and ST Aerospace to Seletar Aerospace 
Park with an area of over 300 ha, which prompted the arrival of related 
maintenance and repair services. 
3.5 Comprehensive approaches 
The cases explained above are individual policy measures. Industrialization 
also requires policy packages that encompass a large number of policy measures
that complement each other, which are obviously more dif¼cult to plan and 
implement. Due to the multiplicity of tasks, a well-structured policy procedure
and organization is essential for interaction among different components 
(Chapter 4). For this reason, the pursuit of complex policy packages is a 
good entry point for advanced policy learning. Four examples are brie½y 
discussed below. 
3.5.1 SME promotion 
The development of SMEs is a very popular policy goal around the world 
but its content and performance differ greatly across countries. Required 
policies are comprehensive and largely overlap with the standard policy menu
for enhancing industrial capability shown in Table 3.3 above. Many govern-
ments produce little result because they lack capability to conduct a large 
number of policy components simultaneously and interactively. 
SME promotion has two distinct and separable purposes. One is the
generation of income and job opportunities for the general population
(poverty reduction) and the other is selective creation of excellent SMEs to 
become the drivers of internal value and innovation (competitiveness). Both 
objectives are important and may be pursued in parallel, but the goals, 
strategies, and instruments they require are signi¼cantly different. For poverty
reduction, SMEs in all size and sectors should be supported with simple 
procedure and with no conditionalities attached. For competitiveness, selection
criteria, screening, and monitoring are essential and only those enterprises 
that demonstrate upward mobility should be promoted. As a country moves 
from low income to middle and high income, policy focus usually shifts from
poverty reduction to competitiveness. In high-performing economies in East 
Asia, creation of competitiveness is the primary purpose of SME promotion.
Each country should clearly de¼ne its own objective for SME promotion 
and design policy instruments and mechanisms accordingly. 
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In Japan where both large enterprises and SMEs are well developed, the 
purpose of SME policy in the post-World War II period shifted gradually 
from the protection of SMEs against exploitation by large parent ¼rms to 
the encouragement of innovation by SMEs as a source of global competitiveness.
Japanese policy instruments and mechanisms for SME promotion are highly 
complex, combining public–private partnership, participatory policymaking 
through “deliberation councils,” technical assistance, ¼nancial support,
repeated consultation, and so on. Probably this model is too dif¼cult for 
most developing countries to adopt initially. 
In Malaysia and Thailand, where the economy is highly industrialized but 
still dominated by foreign MNCs in electronics, automobile, and other
machinery industries, the main policy goal is to increase internal value and 
replace foreigners with local managers, engineers, and designers. SME pro-
motion is at the core of this strategy together with R&D, education and 
training, technology transfer, national branding, etc. In particular, Malaysia 
elevates SME policy as one of the key instruments of the New Economic 
Model for overcoming the middle-income trap (Chapter 8). Its formulation 
and execution are directed by the National SME Development Council 
chaired by the prime minister and coordinated by SME Corporation
Malaysia, a one-stop service agency under the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry which harmonizes SME-related activities of 15 ministries
and 60 government agencies. 
In a poor country where local industries remain primitive and absorp-
tion of manufacturing FDI is minuscule, SME promotion covers virtually 
the entire policy space for industrialization because almost all domestic pro-
ducers are micro or small. The term SME promotion may be too broad and 
ambiguous for such a country. Goals, targeted ¼rms, and policy instruments 
must be realistic and selective in light of limited policy capability and ¼nancial
resources, and relevant to the local situation. Its SME policy package must 
be simpler than and quite different from those in more advanced countries. 
3.5.2 Integrated export promotion 
The minister of trade and industry of an African country asked a visiting 
Japanese policy dialogue team of which I was a member how East Asian 
high-performing economies coped with the situation where export incentives 
were given to individual ¼rms but they did not ful¼ll their export targets. 
Our answer was that such a situation never arose in East Asia because export
incentives were not provided in advance or unconditionally and because 
export targets were set for products or markets but not for individual exporting
¼rms. No ¼rm was penalized for not achieving its target or allowed to grab 
the subsidy and run. This exchange shows that some latecomer countries do 
not fully understand the essence of export promotion policy. 
South Korea is a country that succeeded brilliantly in its export drive in 
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discovery and upgrading of comparative advantages, Wonhyuk Lim (2011) 
stresses that export promotion must be an integrated national strategy
encompassing a large number of measures and not just incentives and sub-
sidies. Incentives and subsidies were only a small part of South Korea’s 
export policy and their effects were largely offset by currency overvaluation. 
Studying these measures in isolation does not give a full picture or lead to 
appropriate policy learning. 
In South Korea, export promotion policies included marketing, tech-
nology imports, export credit system, export association, and export
insurance. Moreover, institutional support were provided through visions, 
strategies, and action plans; trade-facilitating agencies such as the Korea Trade
Promotion Corporation and the Small Business Corporation; export pro-
motion meetings chaired by the president; the Export Promotion Special 
Account Fund which generated ¼nancial means for export promotion
activities, the Export Information Center, and the Export Idea Bank. Together
with incentives and subsidies, these instruments collectively enhanced the
effectiveness of the entire policy and institution package. Export incentives 
took the form of readily scalable rewards based on performance in a com-
petitive setting rather than rewards contingent on the accomplishment of 
pre-announced targets (Lim, 2011). 
Among the Korean measures mentioned above, the monthly export pro-
motion meeting is particularly interesting as a tool for imparting activism 
and improving coordination among ministries and between government and 
the private sector. At the request of the minister of commerce and industry, 
President Park Chung Hee agreed to chair this meeting on a trial basis
in 1965 which was institutionalized in the following year. This meeting,
attended by high-ranking of¼cials and business leaders, provided a forum 
to monitor progress and solve problems as they arose under the president’s 
strong leadership. 
At each monthly meeting, the minister of commerce and industry gave a
progress report on export performance by region and product relative to
the targets set out in the annual comprehensive plan for export promo-
tion. The minister of foreign affairs gave a brie¼ng on overseas market 
conditions. Government of¼cials and business representatives then tried to
identify emerging bottlenecks and constraints that impeded export per-
formance and devise solutions to these problems. Subsequent meetings
monitored progress. Export insurance was one of many institutional 
innovations that were introduced as a result of recommendations from 
monthly export promotion meetings. 
(Lim, 2011, p. 195) 
At present, Ethiopia replicates this high-level monthly meeting for export 
promotion as a result of policy learning from Korea (Chapter 10). Prime 
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progress is monitored and problems are solved. Each ministry in Ethiopia 
is required to meet internally twice monthly, once to prepare reports to the 
high-level export meeting and another time to “de-brief” the results and take
action within the ministry. 
3.5.3 Strategic policy intervention to create a new industry 
As argued in Chapter 2, debate over whether the state should be a creator 
or follower of a nation’s comparative advantages carries little practical
relevance as far as manufacturing is concerned. This is because modern
industries depend less on climate or geography and more on the combination
of proactive policy and private dynamism to realize a country’s potential. 
Future manufacturing possibilities are wide and overlapping across many 
developing countries. It is dif¼cult to assign product A to one country and 
product B to another whether we are talking about assembly of new electronic
gadgets, electric car components, brand-name food products, or fashion 
garment. Even for products that depend heavily on natural conditions,
realization of their potential again depends on the effectiveness of public– 
private partnership without which no industry is created. In either case, what
is important is strategic policy intervention for supplying basic growth func-
tions (infrastructure, human capital, supporting institutions, etc.) and avoiding
market failures rather than discovery of a country’s exclusive comparative 
advantage based on its history and natural conditions. 
Chile has a long and complex coastal line, a large supply of labor, and
a ¼shmeal industry, which put the country in a potentially suitable posi-
tion for salmon farming. However, no salmon was raised or exported before 
the 1970s. To create a Chilean salmon industry from scratch, transfer of 
technology in ¼sh raising and processing with local adjustments, training of 
¼shery engineers and managers, and a suf¼cient market size for economies 
of scale and cost reduction were necessary. The involved cost, risk, and 
gestation period were so great that no private ¼rm could undertake the 
enterprise. The Chile Foundation, a semi-of¼cial body that acted as an
incubator of new enterprises through technological and ¼nancial support, 
played a critical role in overcoming these hurdles. Technical support
was also provided by Japanese ODA (through the Chile Foundation) and 
private ¼shery ¼rms from Japan and Norway. Capabilities had to be built 
and technologies had to be transferred for 20 long years before private
¼rms ¼nally began to invest in salmon farming in large scale. By now Chile 
has become a large exporter of salmon competing with Norway for the
top position (Hosono, 2010). 
Cerrado agriculture in Brazil is another case in point. Vast tropical
savanna with an area of 2 million km2 was so unproductive that it was said
that as much as four hectares of land was needed to ¼ll the stomach of one 
cow. Turning this barren land into one of the largest granaries of the world
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intervention through the Cerrado Institute, supported by Japanese cooperation
for over 20 years, was instrumental in achieving this. As Brazil emerged as 
one of the largest exporters of cereals thanks to the success of Cerrado ag-
riculture, overtaking the United States, the structure of the global grain 
market was changed fundamentally. In addition to grain, diversi¼cation into
vegetables and fruits is also underway. The case of Cerrado agriculture 
demonstrates that even a negative factor can be turned into a great advantage
by persistent policy intervention. At present, Brazil and Japan are cooperating
to replicate this miracle in the northern and least developed provinces in 
Mozambique. 
3.5.4 Comprehensive regional development with core infrastructure 
Large-scale infrastructure projects such as transport corridors, deep seaports, or
large power supply can be the core for comprehensive regional development 
provided that they are effectively combined with necessary complements such
as education and training, agricultural and rural development, industrial 
estates, logistic ef¼ciency, environmental technology, and planning capability
of central and local governments. Large infrastructure should always be built
for this purpose and not as a stand-alone project or for serving one large 
industrial customer. 
Examples of comprehensive regional development with core infrastructure
which were supported by Japanese ODA include Eastern Seaboard Develop-
ment in Thailand mentioned above, the Brantas River Basin Development 
Project in Indonesia, and the expansion of La Union Port in El Salvador. 
Among these, the last case offers an interesting contrast between the
Japanese approach and the approach of a group of Harvard economists. In 
one of the earliest exercises in growth diagnostics, Hausmann and Rodrik 
(2005) concluded that El Salvador’s lackluster growth, despite its bold social 
and economic reforms, was caused by “inadequate private returns to self-
discovery by both local and foreign investors” (i.e., insuf¼cient private incentives
to explore and start new businesses). As to hard infrastructure, it was not 
judged as a bottleneck because the country already had fairly good air, sea, 
and land links by Central American standards. However, the Salvadorian 
Foundation for Social and Economic Development (FUSADES), a local 
think tank, countered that the source of national competitiveness should be 
created by improving the already good infrastructure to serve as a logistic 
hub of the region. At the core of this plan was upgrading of La Union Port 
in the country’s eastern region to offer modern container, bulk cargo, and 
passenger facilities with a capacity large enough to handle Post-Panamex 
vessels (ships that can carry 4,800 20-foot containers or more). In the ¼rst 
decade of this century, the Japanese government supported this idea by a 
comprehensive cooperation package whose central pillar was construction 
of new La Union Port. In addition, an old bridge at the Honduras border 
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for La Union City, and a master plan for eastern region development were 
offered. This was further complemented by social and human-resource
development projects such as a training center, primary and math education,
clean water, rural electri¼cation and solid waste control; and support for 
productive sectors such as SME promotion, aquaculture, small-scale agri-
culture and livestock production, and reservoirs and irrigation.12 
Comprehensive regional development planning may cross national borders.
The Greater Mekong Subregion Development is an international project 
strongly supported by Japan and the Asian Development Bank which centers
on construction of international roads and river water management in
Southern China, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. Another
example is the initiative of “industrial corridors” launched recently by the 
Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry which features public– 
private partnership in building infrastructure, logistic ef¼ciency, and the 
creation of new industrial regions. Northern Vietnam, Southern India, and 
the Bangkok-Hochiminh City corridor are some of the regions targeted for 
this initiative. 
3.6 National movement for mindset change 
Finally, let us consider policy in a different dimension, one that addresses 
an intricate problem of less-than-expected response of the private sector to 
policies introduced by the government. This is an issue which is in principle 
separable from enhancing policy capability of the government and can
become a serious obstacle to industrialization—as seen in Malaysia’s limited 
success with Bumiputra policy discussed in Chapter 2 and further explained 
in Chapter 8. 
Some policy areas require a fundamental change in popular mindset before
results are obtained. Good policy alone may not induce dynamic growth if 
the private sector is generally content with passivity, short-terminism, and 
foreign-product worship. An unfettered market may favor real-estate specu-
lation and job hopping instead of long-term investment in technology and 
skills. If mindset change is not forthcoming spontaneously from the private 
sector, the state may have to force it from the top until it becomes part of 
national culture. While permanent state guidance detached from market 
force or popular sentiment is inconsistent with the development of a market 
economy, temporary use of such an approach is not only permissible but 
may even be highly effective in the early stage of economic take-off. Such 
top-down persuasion has produced signi¼cant lasting performance in some 
countries as well as failure in others—as seen in socialist production drive 
with collective farms and state-owned factories. National movement is a 
double-edged sword. If it is to be adopted, systematic policy learning is
essential to avoid mistakes. 
National movement usually aims at elevation of productivity and com-
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Examples include Japan’s Rural Life Improvement Movement (1948–) and 
factory kaizen (quality and productivity) movement (1950s–), Singapore’s 
Productivity Movement (1960s–), Korea’s Saemaul (new village) Movement 
(1970s–), Malaysia’s Look East Policy (learning from Japan and Korea, 
1980s–), Botswana’s Productivity Movement (1990s–), and Rwanda’s ICT 
drive (2000s–). These movements usually evolve from pilot projects to full-
scale mobilization, institutionalization, broadening and shifting of scope, 
and sharing lessons with other countries. Some movements initiated decades 
ago are still practiced and disseminated in advanced forms. For this reason, 
the end point of a successful national movement is more dif¼cult to identify 
than the starting point. 
Mindset change requires a national movement and not just collection of 
individual projects. Policy will bear no fruit if its spirit and goals are shared 
only within a narrow circle of political leaders, government of¼cials, and 
experts and academics. To be successful, a comprehensive and self-sustaining
system of principles, implementing mechanisms, and necessary resources 
backed by the state’s will and popular passion are required. In Singapore’s 
productivity movement, which will be examined in Chapter 6, even taxi 
drivers were made fully aware of importance of improving productivity—and
that is really the way it should be. 
As an example, I take up South Korea’s Saemaul Movement launched in 
1970 as a response to an emerging gap between rapid urban industrialization
and persistent rural poverty and backwardness. It was driven by President 
Park Chung-hee’s strong personal interest in rural development through 
mass campaigns. Its objectives included not just improvement of rural life 
and income but, more fundamentally, achievement of these through a value 
shift of farmers from passivity to activism. In September 1971, President 
Park de¼ned the movement as “a fundamental concept of national develop-
ment, one in which economic development and spiritual enlightenment go 
together hand-in-hand” (Park 1979, pp. 83–84). The three slogans of diligence, 
self-help, and cooperation were hammered into all rural residents. 
The Saemaul Movement, as a goal-oriented top-down rural development 
program, started with an experimental free distribution of 335 bags (13.4 tons)
of cement to every village of the country from October 1970 to June 1971 with
the condition that they should be used only for communal projects. President
Park ordered that government funds be directed toward those who demonstrated
the right spirit. By 1973, all villages were classi¼ed into three categories: 
18,415 basic villages, 13,943 self-helping villages, and 2,307 self-suf¼cient 
villages in ascending order of achievement. Assistance was continued to be 
given mainly to the last two categories while “lazy” villages and villagers 
were repudiated or removed from further assistance (Kim, 2004, pp. 134–35). 
The Saemaul Movement was most vigorously pursued in the 1970s in 
stages. After experimentation with free cement distribution in 1970–71, the 
years 1972–73 were spent on institutionalization and full-scale implemen-
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procedure for project selection and evaluation, and training programs. The 
period from 1974 focused on self-development, enrichment, and broaden-
ing of the movement which included the introduction of Urban Saemaul 
Movement. 
The Saemaul Movement was guided by the Central Consultative Council 
chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs. Under the Council, there were ¼ve 
administrative layers consisting of central government, provinces, counties, 
townships, and villages. Through this vertical mechanism the central government
provided in-kind and ¼nancial aid as well as technical advice on manage-
ment, farming technology, and project preparation and execution to worthy 
villages. At the bottom the Village Development Committee in each village, 
chaired by a Saemaul leader and with 15 elected villagers as members, proposed
communal projects which were to be approved by the general assembly of
the village as well as at the township level. 
For education and training, the Saemaul Leaders Training Institute was 
opened in 1972 providing one- to two-week intensive courses to village leaders.
Eventually 85 such institutes were established across the country with the 
Institute in Suwon assuming the model role. In 1974 the scope of trainee 
was expanded to include those in managerial positions in all sectors such as 
cabinet ministers, religious leaders, university presidents, and media executives.
Its standardized curriculum covered Saemaul philosophy, national security 
and economy, project planning, case studies, ¼eld tours, and group discussion.
All trainees, which numbered 822,900 in the ¼rst ten years of 1972–1981, 
stayed on the premise and slept in the dormitory during the course. In addition,
short-term training without lodging was offered extensively. 
Some criticize the Saemaul Movement as President Park’s political device 
to fortify his dictatorial rule under the so-called Yushin Reform and inculcate
the entire population in support of it. Others argue that the movement bene¼ted
wealthy farmers more than poor ones (Han 1987, p. 48). There was protes-
tation against homogeneous Saemaul leader training which emphasized 
military-like discipline and morning jogging over specialized knowledge (Kim,
2004, p. 136). These are probably all valid criticisms, but the Saemaul Move-
ment should also be judged by the enormous progress that South Korean 
villages made in income and living standards, along with urban residents,
in sharp contrast to the dismal state of North Korea which also adopted 
similar top-down popular movements under Kim Il-sung. As average income
per capita grew 1.7 times from 1971 to 1981 in South Korea, the ratio
of per capita income between the richest urban area and the poorest province
remained almost unchanged at 2.01–2.05 and subsequently declined to 1.75 
by 1991.13 Farmers were not left behind in South Korea’s economic miracle. 
Spectacular economic performance may not completely justify forced national
movement, but to a large degree it does. 
From South Korea’s Saemaul Movement and experiences for productivity
improvement in other countries, the following factors can be distilled for 
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First, the movement must be launched and sustained by strong personal 
interest and commitment of the top leader. Second, the movement must start
with top-down instruction for grassroots participation. This may sound con-
tradictory, but contradiction will later evaporate if the movement “catches” 
and begins to attract genuine interest of private participants because they 
see bene¼ts of the movement instead of their reluctant obedience. While 
elements of coercion cannot be eliminated entirely in national movement, it 
should be regarded as success if intended economic performance is attained 
even with a certain amount of compulsion. Third, performance-based rewards
should be given to villages, ¼rms, or workers that produce good results
according to transparent criteria. Highly visible incentive and recognition 
mechanisms should also be installed at the national and local levels. Fourth, 
supporting institutions must be created. This includes establishment of a 
national council or committee presided by the top leader; a central ministry or
agency as the lead organization and the secretariat to the national council 
or committee; regional-, district-, and community-level of¼ces; and staf¼ng 
and budgetary arrangements. Fifth, authorized and well-designed training 
programs must be created to educate government of¼cials in charge as well 
as private leaders and participants of the movement in the frontline of imple-
mentation. Sixth, the movement must continue for a suf¼ciently long time, 
typically over a decade or more, with evolving emphasis. A project lasting 
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Policy procedure and organization 
Success in industrial policy formulation depends not only on the proper 
choice of policy measures as discussed in the previous chapter but also, more
fundamentally, on policy procedure and organization from which good 
policies are produced and executed. This chapter looks at institutional aspects
of policymaking which are an important object as well as an essential back-
ground for policy learning. The purpose of studying various international 
best practices in policy procedure and organization is basically the same as 
studying alternative policy measures in the previous chapter. Rich foreign 
examples are to be regarded as building blocks from which procedural and 
organizational arrangements most suitable for the country in question should
be created under the principles of selectivity, modi¼cation, combination, and
improvement. As always, haphazard adoption of foreign models without a 
systematic survey of local contexts should be avoided. 
4.1 Leadership 
Our discussion starts with national leaders. High-quality leadership is the most
vital ingredient of national development, a fact that can hardly be over-
emphasized. However, another sad fact is that great developmental leaders 
are few and far between and most countries at most times must manage 
development under mediocre (or worse) leaders. A good leader is crucial 
because he or she is the primary driving force of national development that 
can create all other conditions of industrialization if they are initially missing.
Major reforms are not possible by bottom-up processes alone unless the top 
leader takes up the main responsibility. This principle applies generally to all
organizations including a nation, local governments, ministries and agencies,
political parties, ¼rms, universities, research institutions, and civil society 
organizations. 
There are two aspects of national leadership worthy of attention. The ¼rst 
is the quality of the leader or the leading group, and the second is the dynamics
of coalition formation among contesting leaders and leading groups. 
A national leader must be equipped with a strong will and passion as well as
a genuine belief in productivity and excellence for the whole country instead 
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of being interested in personal in½uence or wealth accumulation. He or she 
must have suf¼cient political savvy and networks, personal integrity and 
discipline, intellectual ability, and pragmatism. A top leader must be personally
committed to a nation’s priority policies and use his or her full power and 
authority to push them to completion. In short, a national leader must be 
developmental, not predatory. I expect that the reader will ¼nd this obvious 
but convincing. 
National leadership comes in different forms including personal leadership
of a charismatic ¼gure, organizational leadership among multiple ministries 
and agencies, and inherited leadership by the only or dominant political party
with changing heads. Government structure may be centralized and suppressive
or “democratic” and pluralistic. Despite these differences in governing style, 
common success factors for great developmental leadership include (i) projection
of clear visions backed by strong personal beliefs; (ii) creation and effective 
use of administrative machinery such as committees, councils, and task forces
that pursue visions with strong mandate and responsibility; (iii) a mechanism
by which a top leader hears, directs, and coordinates problems worked and 
reported by ministries and agencies in charge; (iv) insulation of this mechanism
from political pressure and vested interests; and (v) capacity to communicate
national visions to the general public and rally popular support toward them.
If these conditions are satis¼ed, alternative policy organizations discussed in 
the rest of this chapter will function equally well despite apparently diverse 
structures and divisions of labor. 
An effective developmental leader must be able to mobilize various state 
and non-state developmental actors—elite technocrats and of¼cials, experts 
and academia, business executives and associations, NPOs and civil society, 
etc.—by giving them proper space and suf¼cient authority as well as pride and
satisfaction to serve the nation. A great leader has ample ability to provide 
frameworks, incentives, and recognition that force every actor to do its part and
move collectively toward a common developmental goal. To put it differ-
ently, prime ministers and presidents who stay aloof of key developmental issues,
make sporadic top-down decisions without deep thinking or consultation, or
micromanage everything without trusting their ministers and advisors, are 
unlikely to go down in history as great leaders. 
One evident problem with installing a good national leader is that no one 
can consistently select such a leader in the complex political process of any 
country whether it is democracy or otherwise. Who will be the next prime 
minister or president and how powerful or effective that person will be is 
highly uncertain even among candidates, let alone for individual citizens, of¼cials,
or business persons. Yet there are indirect ways to in½uence the quality of 
national leaders in the long run. These include leadership and elite education,
comparative studies in development politics, systematic analysis of technical 
aspects of effective policymaking (to which I hope this book contributes), well-
calculated cooperation and pressure from foreign governments and aid agencies,
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and publishing biographies of admirable national leaders of the world. Humans
are driven by both reason and emotion. While social sciences should do 
much to reveal the anatomy of wise and effective leadership, intimate knowledge
of works and words of excellent leaders in different countries and periods, 
presented vividly and concretely, is certain to raise consciousness of what is 
wanted among voters and political candidates. 
The second issue that should be examined is coalition forming among 
leaders and leading groups, both formal or informal, which is a crucial
political process that drives development in any political regimes. Coalitions 
here are not con¼ned to the alliance of political parties to form a government
but covers broader cooperation among individuals or organizations such as 
bureaucrats, businesses, labor unions, military, regional and ethnic groups, 
academics, professionals, residents, civil society organizations, and so on. In 
most cases—this includes even dictatorship and one-party dominance—a 
single person or political entity is unable to pursue its aim unless it forms
a coalition with other groups or organizations through negotiation, compromise,
and sharing of bene¼ts (for the case of late-nineteenth-century Japan, see 
Chapter 5). The importance of politics in development has been recognized 
in general but the systematic analysis of how this “black box” works and 
how its operational implications can be used in policy formulation remain 
rudimentary. 
One of such attempts is the Developmental Leadership Program (DLP) 
organized by Adrian Leftwich (York University) and Chris Wheeler (AusAID)
and supported by a number of donors and NPOs (Leftwich, 2009). DLP 
aims to collect and analyze concrete cases of developmental coalition dynamics
from all over the world to extract policy implications and concrete operational
guidelines for development partners and civil society organizations. Its research
stands on the premise that the good governance drive by the World Bank 
has failed to produce any signi¼cant result and a different approach to develop-
ing country politics is required. For bilateral and multilateral aid organizations,
“working politically” in developing countries should not mean conspiring a 
regime change or imposing a Western model in total disregard of local context.
Since any aid action will in½uence power relation and coalition formation 
among political, of¼cial, and civil society organizations in the host country, 
aid providers must fully understand their in½uence and work consciously 
but subtly and quietly to become enabling agents for desired change based 
on deep local knowledge and a judicious choice of entry points and counter-
parts. In the ¼rst phase of the DLP, the importance of context speci¼city, 
brokering and convening functions of donors, and the role of secondary and 
tertiary education, among others, were highlighted from the case studies of 
Botswana, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Mauritius, South Africa, 
Uganda, Yemen, Zimbabwe, and others.1 
Additionally, a balance between agential and structural factors, or relative
weight between producing high-quality leaders and institutionalization of 
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propel the nation toward development for a while but he or she will not stay 
forever. If progress depends solely on personal leadership, the whole thing may
collapse when a next leader of average quality or less arrives. In the worst 
case, the next head of state may revoke whatever the previous one did just 
for political revenge or self-expression. In order to reduce this risk, good policies
started by an excellent leader must be institutionalized. That is to say, staf¼ng,
budgeting, policy procedures, and policy organizations must be cemented as 
much as possible by laws, regulations, and agreed practices among multiple 
stakeholders. On the part of an incumbent national leader, it is necessary to 
delegate suf¼cient authority to various people and organizations and prepare
early on the succession problem. Oftentimes, an “excellent” leader ¼nds it 
dif¼cult to do so because his or her self-con¼dence and desire for continued 
power monopoly outweigh the need for institutionalization of good policy 
practices. 
4.2 Policy procedure 
In policy formulation, procedure by which policy is made is often more 
important than the ¼nal document which is drafted and approved. While all 
policy documents must be revised and updated as time passes, the process 
that governs the drafting and revision can remain and continue to be forti¼ed
as experiences accumulate. This process should not be improvised for each 
occasion or left to a small group of drafters which happen to be assigned to 
the task. The process must be owned and institutionalized by policymakers
even though background studies and drafting can be outsourced as long as 
basic goals and directions are laid out clearly. While concrete procedure 
varies signi¼cantly from one country to another, as we will see below, the 
basic ingredients of successful policymaking are surprisingly common and 
include a leader’s vision, strong participation of state and non-state stake-
holders, an effective consensus building mechanism, and designation of a 
focal organization with clear mandate to coordinate interests and produce 
policy. 
Policy formulation must begin with the vision produced by the top leader. 
This vision, which must come from the deep personal conviction of the top leader,
needs to be communicated to the people and eventually win their approval 
through election or other political means. It is also the vision by which his 
or her government is judged. The existence of a seriously committed policy 
vision is the prerequisite for making any high-priority strategy without which
policy tends to be ad hoc, reactive, and scattered. 
After the leader’s vision is provided, the vision must be given more concrete
forms in terms of goals, time frame, major directions, and key issues to be 
overcome by the discussion and agreement among all stakeholders, both 
government and non-government. When this consensus is formed, drafting 
work follows. In these processes the two crucial procedural requirements are 
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the standard policymaking procedure recommended generally for any country
at any level of development, including those engaged in policy learning. 
Any key industrial policy in developing countries—whether it is small and 
medium enterprise promotion, building industrial human resource, quality 
and productivity movement, or creation of industrial clusters—normally 
covers multi-sectoral issues managed by more than one ministry or agency. 
Thus intra-government coordination becomes imperative if the policy is to 
be effectively designed, budgeted, and implemented. A lead ministry or agency
must be designated and given a clear mandate to formulate the policy. While
the ministry in charge of industry usually takes main responsibility, other 
ministries in charge of national planning, ¼nance, ODA and FDI, education 
and training, science and technology, transportation, infrastructure, agriculture,
urban development, and so on must also be on board. Since one ministry 
or agency is unable to direct or overrule other ministries and agencies horizont-
ally, there should be a higher mechanism that supervises the whole process, 
gives full authority to the lead ministry or agency, and provides a forum in which
multi-sectoral issues are deliberated and solved. Alternative organizational 
arrangements that ensure this will be the topic of the next section. 
Besides cooperation among ministries and agencies, policymaking must 
receive active participation of non-government players. For the purpose of 
industrial policy formulation, by far the most important players are domestic
and foreign ¼rms that carry out investment and production as well as their 
business associations. Without their willing participation, any industrial 
policy is doomed to fail. Since not all ¼rms share the same business interests 
or sectoral goals, a mechanism must also be in place to coordinate various 
voices among them. In addition, domestic and foreign academics, consultants,
and industrial experts should be mobilized for conducting surveys, analysis, and
international comparison, as well as drafting and commenting on policy 
documents as needed. Depending on the issue at hand, local residents, down-
stream user ¼rms, consumers, NPOs, and other stakeholders may also be 
involved. 
It should be stressed that mobilization of non-government stakeholders 
must be substantial with suf¼cient time and opportunities provided for contact
and input. Nominal participation, such as hearings in which of¼cial views are
unilaterally communicated or a large-scale symposium where little time is alloc-
ated for interaction with the ½oor, does not contribute much to the betterment
of policy formulation. Public–private dialogue will become an important policy
mechanism only when it goes beyond setting a formal framework and begins to
incorporate private opinions seriously and effectively into policies. 
Many governments in East Asia succeeded in institutionalizing government– 
business interactions for information sharing and policy coordination (Weiss
and Hobson, 1995; Weiss, 1998; Kondo, 2005). Large ½ows of high-quality 
information between the public and private sector contributed greatly to 
building mutual con¼dence, credible commitments, and predictability. In 
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have evolved over time as the private sector has improved its capability and 
graduated from direct public intervention. 
Through strong inter-ministerial coordination and stakeholder involvement,
all major parties inside and outside the government must participate in 
policy formulation leading to a growing sense of shared ownership and
responsibility as well as willingness to cooperate in implementation. This fact
is far more important than producing documents which may be comprehensive
and theoretically advanced but are not supported by concerned organizations.
In the early stage of policy learning, agreed policy may be relatively simple 
with only a small number of speci¼ed actions (see the Ethiopian case in 
Chapter 10). Even in that case, if the drafting process matches with existing 
policy capability and local context, the resulting policy can be unique, ambitious,
and at the same time feasible for the country in question. Indeed, this is the 
very process in which policymaking is learned. If the process is outsourced 
in its entirety to a group of domestic or foreign consultants, little learning 
will take place within the government. 
This also has an implication for appropriate speed with which policy should
be drafted. Some governments set unreasonably short deadlines for policy 
documents. This compels the ministry in charge to either rush to produce 
the document internally without regards to quality or contract out the drafting
work to outside experts and consultants, which militates against policy learning
described above. While the situation varies across countries, if proper internal
and external consultation is conducted, a realistic amount of time needed to 
revise an existing policy is about one year, and for creating a new policy it 
may take two to three years. This includes lost time due to administrative delays
and political cycles which are inevitable aspects of policy formulation. Quality,
not speed, should be the main objective of policymaking. Quality here means
that, based on suf¼cient information and analysis, all key aspects of the 
policy have been agreed among major stakeholders through persuasion and 
compromise so that the policy, once adopted, will be strongly supported
and willingly implemented. 
An example is given from Thailand. The Thai automotive industry boasts 
the largest production volume in Southeast Asia (1.65 million vehicles in 2010)
and has expanded strongly despite frequent national, regional, and global 
economic crises in 1997–98, 2008–09, and 2011. Its policymaking is com-
petently coordinated by the Thailand Automotive Institute (TAI), one of the
ten sector-speci¼c non-pro¼t organizations established by the Thai govern-
ment which are required to be ¼nancially autonomous from the government
budget (see section 4.3.4). The main content of the Thai automotive policy 
was given succinctly in the Executive Summary of the Automotive Master Plan
2007–2011 which emanates from Vision 20112 and branches out to four 
objectives, ¼ve strategies, and 12 action plans. The most important part of 
the Master Plan is the exposition of the 12 action plans. 
The drafting of the Thai automotive master plan takes about a year, which
is genuinely a joint process between private ¼rms and the Ministry of
 
 
       
 
    
      
 
 







96 Ideas and methods 
Industry. Close-knit networking among all stakeholders is ensured by
TAI. The drafting process begins with the “CEO Forum,” an informal discus-
sion forum among foreign and domestic ¼rms, government of¼cials, and 
academics that agrees on basic directions and identi¼es key areas to be 
worked on (in the 2007–2011 automotive policy, the ¼ve key areas were 
human resources, productivity, marketing, engineering, and investment and 
linkage). Production and export targets are proposed by the industry, not 
the government. After a broad consensus is formed, the Automotive Master 
Plan Steering Committee will commission studies on the above key areas to 
“focus groups.” Finally, the master plan is drafted by TAI staff after all 
major aspects of policy revisions have been agreed among stakeholders and 
detailed studies have been submitted. TAI serves as a secretariat throughout 
the entire process and provides administrative and logistic support. Mr. Vallop
Tiasiri, President of TAI, meets foreign and local producers at least twice a
month formally and meets them more often informally. 
From the perspective of effective policymaking, common mistakes include:
(i) the lack of a clear vision from the leader; (ii) drafting by a few designated 
of¼cials without building consensus or facilitating interaction among all stake-
holders; (iii) outsourcing of the entire policy drafting to outsiders with the 
role of policymakers limited to making comments and revisions; (iv) bottom-up
collection of subdocuments drafted by various ministries which ends up in un-
connected chapters with too many priorities for implementation. These negative
practices must be consciously avoided as a ¼rst step toward policy learning. 
4.3 Policy organization 
What organizational arrangements are necessary to realize inter-ministerial 
coordination and stakeholder involvement discussed above? An international
comparison of policymaking points to different policy organizations that 
can equally attain good policy procedure. The choice should fundamentally 
depend on the unique characteristics and existing policy capability of the 
country in question. Below, ¼ve alternative policy organizations for conducting
high-priority development policies are explained with concrete examples. 
Again, the intention here is to provide raw materials from which policy 
organization for each country can be constructed under the principles of 
selectivity, modi¼cation, combination, and improvement. 
It should be noted that organizational arrangements are not mutually 
exclusive. There are countries that adopt more than one arrangement to 
execute different national strategies. It is also important to recognize that 
high-performing economies in East Asia did not possess strong institutional 
bases at the beginning of their rapid growth. Policy procedure and organization
were strengthened during, and not before, their high-growth periods. State-
building is a dynamic process in which the government has to accumulate 
industrial policy capability through concrete hands-on efforts and trial-and-
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4.3.1 A technocrat team supporting the top leader 
One of the key ingredients of the “East Asian Miracle” was the strong alliance
between the top leader and the technocrat team (Campos and Root, 1996; 
Ohno and Shimamura, 2007). Many countries in East Asia established a 
semi-permanent technocrat group that directly supported the prime minister 
or president in executing his top national programs. Examples include Korea’s
Economic Planning Board (EPB), Malaysia’s Economic Planning Unit (EPU),
Taiwan’s Kuomintang elites, Indonesia’s Berkeley Ma¼a, and Thailand’s 
National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB).3 Among these,
Malaysia’s EPU and Thailand’s NESDB still exist while others have been 
disbanded as income and private-sector dynamism rose and new policy or-
ganization replaced the old. 
These technocrat groups were created by convening well-educated and 
highly experienced of¼cials, scholars, and business leaders as the policymaking
brain of the country. Many of them had high degrees from foreign countries 
or had been summoned from prominent positions in foreign countries. These
elites had full trust of the top leader while ministries were placed under them 
as implementing agencies. Their authority and directives became a central 
coordination mechanism for formulating, implementing, and monitoring 
development policies (Kondo, 2005). 
This policy organization model works best under a strong and wise leader 
who exercises power for a relatively long time. Korea’s EPB and Malaysia’s 
EPU were the supporting arms of their charismatic leaders, namely, President
Park Chung-hee (in power 1961–79) and Prime Minister Mahathir bin
Mohamad (in power 1981–2003). The policy structure of Korea in the 1960s 
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Figure 4.3 South Korea 1960s–1970s: Economic Planning Board 
4.3.2 A national council or committee 
A national council of committee—the precise name does not matter—is a 
less permanent policymaking arrangement that can replicate strong coordinat-
ing functions of the technocrat team in the previous model. This approach 
may be adopted by a strong, long-serving leader but it can also work effect-
ively in a country where no such charismatic leader exists. In this model, the 
task of policy formulation is taken up by a national council or committee 
headed by the top leader himself, a near-top leader such as vice president or 
deputy prime minister, or someone trusted and appointed by the top leader. 
Its members are selected from a broad base including ministers or vice ministers,
business people, scholars, retired of¼cials, civil society leaders, media, and 
so on. The council or committee is supported by a secretariat staffed by 
seconded of¼cials from various ministries which conducts administrative
and logistic works. Working groups (or task forces) prepare studies, reports, and
draft chapters in designated topics. Unlike a technocrat team discussed above,
these councils or committees are normally organized around a speci¼c
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Figure 4.4 National council or committee 
a change of government. Councils and committees can be more than one, 
each working on an assigned issue. 
In this model, concerned ministries and agencies can participate in the 
policy process in three ways: (i) through the minister’s membership in the national
council or committee; (ii) as of¼cial experts in working groups or task forces;
and (iii) as implementing bodies. Compared with the technocrat model, this 
con¼guration may be more acceptable for ministries and agencies wanting 
to participate in policy formulation extensively rather than receiving top-down
instructions from the elite group and being con¼ned to policy implementation. 
The national council or committee approach is used widely with ½exible 
adjustments and variations. Three examples are given below from Singapore,
Malaysia, and South Korea. This approach is adopted to carry out a small 
number—usually up to several—of top-priority programs in each country.4 
In Singapore, productivity has long been a top national agenda (Chapter 6).
In recent years productivity began to receive renewed attention in the con-
text of lagging productivity of aged or foreign migrant workers, the recent
rise of China and India, and the aftermath of global economic crisis. To 
propose basic policy directions, the Economic Strategies Committee (ESC) 
chaired by the ¼nance minister issued a report in January 2010. It recom-
mended a drastic shift from factor-driven to productivity-driven growth
and set an annual productivity growth target of 2–3 percent and an average 
GDP growth target of 3–5 percent in the next ten years. The main thrust of
the ESC Report was endorsed by the prime minister and re½ected in annual 
budgets. 
One of the key recommendations of the ESC Report was establishment 
of the National Productivity and Continuing Education Council (NPCEC). 
The NPCEC was formed in April 2010 as a policymaking body for creating 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































         










Policy procedure and organization 101 
minister with its members coming from government, business community, 
and labor unions. The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) and the Ministry
of Manpower (MOM) act jointly as the secretariat. Under NPCEC, two layers
of organizations are created: (i) the Working Committee for Productivity 
and Continuing Education (WCPCE) led by the permanent secretaries of 
MTI and MOM; and (ii) sectoral working groups and horizontal thematic
working groups. Three ¼nancial mechanisms fund incentives and subsidies 
for ¼rms and individuals that implement productivity-enhancing actions and
training based on their performance. 
NPCEC has selected 12 priority sectors that have large contribution to 
employment and GDP and high potential for productivity gain. Each sector 
group is required to draw up a productivity roadmap for the next ten years. 
They are reviewed by the WCPCE and submitted to the NCPEC for approval. A
ministry or an agency is assigned to oversee each priority sector. In addition,
horizontal working groups work on cross-cutting issues such as low-wage 
workers, research and benchmarking, and infocomm (ICT) and logistics. In 
all of these working groups, tripartite representation of government, businesses,
and labor unions is ensured. 
In Malaysia, the government puts high priority on SME development as 
an instrument to shift the growth engine from large MNCs to autonomous 
and innovative indigenous ¼rms (National SME Development Council of 
Malaysia, 2008, preface). SMEs are to play key roles in job and income 
creation as well as moving the country out of the middle-income trap and 
into high income. The National SME Development Council was established 
in 2004 as a leading body that sets the policy direction for cohesive SME 
development. It is chaired by the prime minister and brings together 15 ministries
and 60 government agencies to work together toward this goal. Initially, Bank
Negara Malaysia (central bank) served as the secretariat of the Council; set three
policy pillars (enabling infrastructure, capacity building, and ¼nancial access),
¼ve-year targets, and common SME de¼nition; and published the Annual 
SME Integrated Plan of Action and the SME Annual Report. The Council 
also improved National SME Database and SME training and marketing and
introduced new ¼nancial products for SMEs (Chapter 8). 
In 2009 the SME Corporation Malaysia (SME Corp.) was created as a 
central coordinating agency at the operational level by upgrading the previ-
ous functions of the Small and Medium Industries Development Corporation
(SMIDEC) which belonged to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI), a lead ministry for SME development (Figure 4.6). As the new secre-
tariat to the Council, SME Corp. serves as a central reference point for all SME
matters and undertakes impact studies on SME policies and programs across
all economic sectors. Malaysia has a large number of SME-related ministries,
agencies, and private-sector partners whose activities are now brought under 
the vertical policy organization consisting of the Council, MITI, and SME Corp. 
In present South Korea, presidential committees serve as a key instrument
for economic policymaking. Upon assuming power, every president establishes
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Ministry of Int’I Trade and Industry 
(lead ministry for SMEs) 
Implementing agencies under MITIMITI’s key departments 






Sectoral Policy & 
Industrial Service 




- SME Corp. Malaysia (lead agency for
 SMEs and secretariat to National SME
 Dev. Council) 
- Malaysian Inv. Dev. Authority (investment) 
- Malaysia Productivity Corp (research,
 training, consultation) 
- SME Bank (finance) 
- Malaysian Ind. Dev. Finance (finance) 
- MATRADE (trade) 
Private sector partners 
Service & training providers 
(private consultants & companies) 
Est. 2004, 
chaired by PM 
Figure 4.6 Malaysia: National SME Development Council 
Note: Bank Negara Malaysia (central bank) served as a secretariat to the National SME Dev. 
Council until the establishment of SME Corp. Malaysia in 2009. 
and monitor the priority agenda during his ¼ve-year term. Each presidential 
committee is headed by a person who has expertise in the chosen subject 
and enjoys the strong con¼dence of the president as well as secretarial support
by staff seconded from various ministries. 
President Lee Myung-bak, who assumed of¼ce in February 2008, established
four presidential committees for Future and Vision, Green Growth, National
Competitiveness, and Nation Branding (Figure 4.7). The most important 
among them was the Presidential Council for Future and Vision (PCFV), 
established in May 2008, which advised the president on designing overall 
national strategies and setting policy priorities. It was chaired by Professor 
Seung Jun-kwak of Korea University, and had 26 members drawn from vice 
ministers, academia, NGOs, legal experts, and business leaders. The Council 
met on a need basis without any ¼xed schedule. PCFV was supported by the
Executive Of¼ce of the Council, a secretariat of about 30 staff comprising
seconded of¼cials from various government ministries and agencies. The 
secretariat is charged with drafting of policy documents, inter-ministerial co-
ordination, and related administrative works. In addition to four presidential
committees mentioned above, a temporary (one-year) presidential committee was
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4.3.3 A super-ministry 
Another way to secure dynamism and consistency in industrial policy is to 
give broad responsibility to one ministry and let this ministry do the design-
ing and implementation of industrial strategies as well as additional works 
such as interface with political parties, interaction with non-government 
stakeholders, preparation of necessary laws and regulations, impact studies, 
and dissemination of policy objectives and outcome. While this ministry is 
just one among many ministries in legal standing, it has suf¼cient authorities 
and policy tools to become a one-stop house for initiating and carrying out 
industrial strategies. As long as the general direction of industrialization is 
agreed, this approach may not even require a strong and wise national leader
to constantly supervise the process since the ministry can internally and autono-
mously produce coherent visions and strategies with its highly motivated
of¼cials and extensive information network. 
Japanese industrial policymaking from the late 1950s to the early 1970s 
was the prime example of this model. The Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI) was created in 1949 by merging the Ministry of Trade and
Industry, the Coal Agency, and the International Trade Agency to become 
the lead ministry for post-World War II industrial catch-up.5 MITI had 
broad authority over creation of visions and strategies; individual sectors 
such as textiles, steel, machinery, and electronics; technology and productiv-
ity; trade promotion and negotiation; product, quality, and safety standards;
intellectual property rights; competition and anti-monopoly policy; SME 
development; policy ¼nance; restructuring of sunset industries; and energy 
and environment. Legal frameworks and policy tools needed to promote 
these policy areas were created during the 1950s. 
According to Okimoto (1989), MITI was the de facto super-ministry for 
Japanese industrial policy. Compared with the fragmented industrial policy-
making mechanism in the United States, MITI was distinctive in having broad
jurisdiction over many industrial sectors and functional issues as described 
above, as well as having both vertical (industry-based) and horizontal (cross-
sectoral) bureaus in its organizational structure (Figure 4.8). 
As the lead ministry for industrialization, MITI worked closely with the 
Economic Planning Agency (EPA) under the Prime Minister’s Of¼ce and 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF). The former was in charge of national economic
planning and assessment and the latter was responsible for budgeting and 
¼nancial issues. MITI, EPA, and MOF collectively assumed the primary role
in formulating and executing medium- and long-term national visions and 
economic plans. In addition, EPA and, subsequently, the Land Agency (es-
tablished in 1974), under the Prime Minister’s Of¼ce, formulated spatial 
plans that included corridors, industrial zones, and land use and regional 
development plans. 
In Japan, deliberation councils functioned as a key instrument for vision 
making, policy consultation and coordination, and information sharing within
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Figure 4.8 Japan: organizational structure of MITI 
Source: Adapted from Okimoto (1989), p. 117, Figure 3.2. 
within MITI. They provided a forum in which government and businesses 
met and discussed policy issues and business trends, and built consensus 
(World Bank, 1993). They were similar to national councils and committees 
discussed above but they were organized and managed by a super-ministry 
rather than the top leader, with MITI itself serving as the secretariat. Members
of any deliberation council included representatives from related ministries, 
business leaders, experts, and academicians. Additionally, the structure of
deliberation councils re½ected both vertical and horizontal bureaus within 
MITI. This contributed to enhancing MITI’s capacity to aggregate diverse 
interests (Okimoto, 1989). 
Among deliberation councils, the Industrial Structure Council, established
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with the participation of representatives from the public and private sectors 
(Johnson, 1982). The Industrial Structure Council drafted a vision for industrial
policies in each decade. It published the vision of heavy and chemical industry
in the 1960s, the vision of knowledge-intensive industries in the 1970s, the 
vision of creativity and knowledge-based industries in the 1980s, and the vision
of better quality of life in the 1990s (Kawakita, 1991). The Industrial Structure
Council also discussed measures to support pioneer industries and ensure 
the transition of sunset industries. 
Japanese policymaking process was bottom-up. It started with MITI’s 
junior of¼cials gathering and analyzing data and conducting intensive hearings
from various stakeholders, especially the business community (Figure 4.9). 
Collected information served as the basic input for subsequent discussions 
in the subcommittee and the deliberation council, each of which drafted and 
¼nalized policy recommendations. Throughout the process, deputy division 
directors (of¼cials in their mid-thirties) were at the center of communication 
½ows both inside MITI and between MITI and the private sector and thus 
had a considerable voice in determining the policy direction (Okimoto, 1989). 
Akira Suehiro, a leading expert on East Asian development, stresses the 
Fiscal Investment Loan Program (FILP) and a close link between technical 
support and ¼nancial support to SMEs as Japan’s two most successful policy
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Figure 4.9 Japan: MITI’s policy formulation (late 1950s–early 1970s) 
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instruments for high growth in the post-World War II period. FILP was a 
mechanism in which funds from postal savings and pension contributions 
from the private sector were mobilized to conduct investment and loans 
having public nature (typically infrastructure construction and business support)
through state institutions and credit mechanisms. Its ¼nancial resource was 
at times as large as half of the central government’s general budget. Part of 
FILP was combined with MITI’s industrial policy, where policy formulation
and technical support to SMEs were provided by MITI and ¼nancial support
for SMEs was provided by the Japan Development Bank under MOF using 
FILP funds. Shindanshi (state-certi¼ed SME management consultants—see 
Chapter 3) played a key role in linking management and technical support 
to SMEs with loans by the Japan Development Bank and commercial banks 
(Do and Pham, 2010; Ohno, 2010). 
During Japan’s high-growth period from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, 
there was no charismatic leader who ruled for a long time. Under the leader-
ship of MITI, key economic ministries and agencies worked in collaboration 
and maintained close contact with political leaders to formulate visions and 
concretize them into various plans and policy measures. 
A policy organization similar to Japan’s MITI in the 1960s and 1970s is 
replicated in Taiwan where the powerful Ministry of Economic Affairs dominates
the making and execution of industrial policy. The functions and organization
of Taiwan’s innovation drive is fully explained in Chapter 7. 
4.3.4 A specialized institute as a policymaking hub 
While industrial visions and broad direction should be set by the govern-
ment, detailed plans, master-plan drafting, and daily contact and consensus
building among stakeholders for any particular sector or issue can be
delegated to a specialized, neutral, and non-pro¼t organization. Thailand 
adopts such an approach, together with other approaches, for industrial 
policy formulation. 
The Asian ¼nancial crisis of 1997–1998 prompted the Thai government
to conduct a comprehensive industry review. The Industrial Restructuring 
Plan (IRP) was quickly formulated for enhancing industrial competitiveness 
with due attention to social conditions (this was conducted by the national 
council approach discussed above). The IRP consisted of the Master Plan, the
Strategic Plan, and the Action Plan for industrial restructuring, and included
as its objectives upgrading labor skills in target industries, supporting SMEs,
relocating high pollution industries, and promoting clean technology. The 
Ministry of Industry (MOI) was the lead ministry which facilitated involve-
ment of various stakeholders such as the public sector, businesses, and
academicians. Although the IRP was formulated and implemented within 
the framework of structural adjustment loans of the World Bank and the 
Asian Development Bank, the Thai government took full initiative in develop-
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Table 4.1 Thailand: specialized institutes 

















Cane & Sugar 
Research Institute 
Institute for SME 
Development 
The Iron & Steel 













Originated from MOI industry promotion 
dept. 20 Board members, 161 staff. 
Financial cooperation from KfW, GDC. 
Technical training (CNC, CAM/CAD, etc.),
12 Board members, 79 staff, 
5 German experts. 
Based on MOI industry promotion dept. 
and industry association. 20 Board 
members, 27 staff. 
Based on MOI industry promotion dept. 
and industry association. 20 Board 
members, 27 staff. 
Originated from Thai Industrial Standard 
Institute (TISI). 14 Board members, 
55 staff. 
Supporting industry development. 
20 Board members, 28 staff. 
Supporting industry development. 
29 Board members, 28 staff. 
Originated from Cane & Sugar Research 
Institute. 13 Board members. 
Modeled on Japan’s SME Univ. Operated
by Thammasat Univ. in cooperation with 
8 local universities. 21 Board members. 
Aimed at joint marketing promotion of 
four steel companies (oversupply). 
Source: Higashi (2000). 
To implement proposed plans, ten specialized institutes were established 
or re-created to design concrete measures for targeted industries and issues 
and to cope with problems arising in the implementation process. They were 
initially operated jointly by the public and private sectors, each with its own 
staff and board. They acted as a hub of information sharing and consultation
between government and businesses and in some cases formulated industry-
speci¼c master plans. Some institutes were created by the Industry Promotion
Department of MOI while others were transformed from existing agencies 
or established with donor assistance. As shown in Table 4.1, they included six
industry-speci¼c institutes (textile, food, automobiles, electrical and electronics,
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(productivity, technical training, management and certi¼cation, and SME 
development). After ¼ve years of establishment, these institutes were required
to become ¼nancially independent from the government budget. 
Performance varied across these institutes. Among them, the previously 
mentioned Thailand Automotive Institute (TAI) has been highly successful 
as a policymaking and implementation hub connecting the Thai tripartite of
government, businesses, and experts. TAI conducts policy study and advice, 
supports clustering of auto parts makers, and promotes export. It provides 
training for factory engineers and workers, runs an automotive testing laboratory,
and serves as the secretariat for consensus building and drafting policy docu-
ments. TAI cooperates with MOI, MOF, the Ministry of Commerce, and 
the Ministry of Science and Technology as well as researchers from ten 
universities in Thailand. It provides research and information services and 
manages a website for automotive part makers supported by Asia-Paci¼c 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), a regional cooperation forum. At the beginning
it was ¼nanced jointly by the government and the private sector. By now it 
has become a self-¼nancing organization. As of November 2009, about half 
of its 91 staff were at the testing laboratory and the remaining half were in 
policy research and training. 
As the secretariat of master plan drafting, TAI supplies not only adminis-
trative support but, more fundamentally, initial ideas for policy direction and
coordination of different interests between government and businesses as 
well as among businesses. The idea of subsidizing Eco-Car production was one
of such ideas emanating from TAI and accepted by government and industry
in the 2007–2011 automotive master plan. The process by which TAI drafts 
the master plan has already been explained in section 4.2. 
Figure 4.10 depicts Thai policymaking for speci¼c policy areas adopted under
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a strong leader who ruled the country 
from 2001 to 2006. The prime minister produced highly vague visions, such 
as becoming the “Detroit of Asia” or the “Hub of Tropical Fashion,” for 
relevant ministries to concretize and implement. A specialized institute func-
tioned as a policy hub among the tripartite at the operational level while an 
industry-speci¼c committee approved and adjusted policies at a higher level. 
The private sector could in½uence policy through these institutes and com-
mittees, and it also had direct access to the prime minister. Even after the strong
leader was removed in 2006, the Thai policy system continues to function 
basically in the same way as before because these specialized institutes are 
already institutionalized. Its operation does not hinge critically on the exist-
ence of a strong leader. 
The institutional hub approach works well in the case of the Thai automo-
tive sector because there is deep trust among all stakeholders, because TAI 
has build solid relations with them, and because Thai policymaking is pragmatic
and ½exible without too many bureaucratic requirements. According to Thai
MOI of¼cials, the Thai automotive sector is already suf¼ciently developed 
and the role of government has shifted from direct support to the industry 
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Prime Minister 
Thailand should become: 
Visions to be - “Detroit of Asia” 
concretized - “Hub of Tropical Fashion” 
- “Kitchen of the World,” etc. 
















High level coordination 
to general policymaking. At present and in the future, managerial, technical, 
and ¼nancial support for managers, engineers, and workers is to be conducted
by private service providers and private ¼nancial institutions. However, in 
a country where the private sector is weak, where mutual trust between 
government and businesses does not exist, or where policymaking is highly 
rigid and hierarchical, assignment of policymaking authority to a neutral 
non-pro¼t organization may not work as effectively as in Thailand. 
4.3.5 A strong leader as policy driver without institutionalization 
A very different type of policymaking is possible with the existence of a 
strong and economically enlightened leader without institutionalization. In 
this case, the head of the state (or a similarly high-level actor) plays an instru-
mental role in all policymaking functions. This includes vision and strategy 
making, coordination among ministries and agencies, implementation and 
monitoring, solving problems and coping with shocks, mobilizing the private
sector, and dealing with foreign investors and development partners. Policies
become action-oriented and coherent if the leader’s mind is lucid and dynamic.
Actions of different ministries become mutually consistent even though ministers
do not talk to each other. The private sector and foreign investors will know 
where the country is headed and international cooperation will be made to align
with the national development plan. All this is possible because the top leader
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This type of policymaking depends heavily on the personal capacity of 
one particular individual and, for that reason, can be quickly realized if such 
a leader assumes power. In the early stage of economic take-off, a leader 
who sets everything right is highly welcome since the nation has no time or 
resource to build strong enough systems for sustainable growth. But the risks
of this approach are also clear. Without institutionalization, the exit of a 
capable leader will stagnate and even reverse economic gain and no learning 
by policymakers will take place. To avoid this fate, the capable leader must 
work even harder not only to conduct good policies but also to create new 
laws, systems, and organizations that cement the way of policymaking which
he or she has started. This is indeed an enormous demand even on the wise 
leader. An example of such policymaking is provided in the Ethiopian policy
formulation discussed in Chapter 10. 
4.4 Policy structure6 
While policy documents such as industrial master plans and strategies do 
not have one “correct” format applicable to all countries, structural variation
must come from conscious choice based on local context and policy purpose 
at hand rather than by chance. If a policy document is produced without serious
consideration of overall design, it may end up re½ecting the whims of par-
ticular drafters—ministerial of¼cials, academics, or foreign consultants—that
happened to be assigned to the task. As argued in section 4.2 above, basic 
visions and policy direction must be established through a consensus-building
process involving major stakeholders before the drafting of a policy docu-
ment is commissioned. Drafting itself is a relatively easy task that can be 
delegated to anyone as long as key contents have been agreed among all. 
The standard components of an industrial master plan are illustrated in 
Figure 4.11 and discussed individually below. Each of these components may
occupy either one chapter or a number of chapters. Selection and order of 
these components are somewhat ½exible. For example, targets may be inserted
after situation analysis and policy issues. However, the vision should most 
properly be stated at the outset and the action plan matrix should come at 
the end (unless speci¼ed in another document or mechanism). Terminology 
is also ½exible and substitutable by other phrases of similar connotations. 
Besides these basic components, there may be additional materials such as 
preface, table of contents, lists of tables and ¼gures, executive summary, 
introduction, drafting procedure and organization, appendices, and so on. 
4.4.1 Vision 
A master plan must clarify the purpose of industrial promotion. This includes
why this particular industry is important in national development, what role 
it should play in stimulating other sectors, what positioning it should take 
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Importance, role, orientation, and positioning of 








Long- and medium-term numerical and/or qualitative 
targets 
Current status, potentials and obstacles of the 
domestic industry in the national, regional and global 
context; tables and graphics for data, surveys, 
international comparisons, etc. 
A small number of selected issues should be 
identified, prioritized, and analyzed in preparation for 
designing policy action 
A large matrix that pre-specifies actions, sub-actions, 
expected output, success criteria, deadlines, and 
responsible organizations; procedure for monitoring 
and reporting should also be specified. 
Alternatively, a monthly high-level committee chaired 
by top leader, or a well-focused and well-coordinated 
budgeting and project approval process may substitute 
the action plan matrix. 
Figure 4.11 Standard ingredients of an industrial master plan 
are already presented in other documents and widely shared among stake-
holders, they can be mentioned brie½y without spilling much ink. On the 
other hand, if these are not yet suf¼ciently expressed, the master plan should 
clearly and concisely state the importance of the sector in question. This 
section should be no more than a few pages. One way to state the vision is 
to present it as part of the introductory chapter. Vision is sometimes stated 
in a layered structure consisting of vision, missions, and objectives. This is 
acceptable but not obligatory. It should also be noted that national policy 
vision is different in nature from vision, missions, and objectives adopted 
routinely by public or private organizations. 
4.4.2 Targets 
Long- and medium-term targets, quantitative or qualitative, should be pre-
sented with a clear time frame, which should normally extend over a few to 
several years.7 These targets should be ambitious but realistic. Numerical 
targets should be higher than simple extrapolation of the present course but 
also reachable with serious exertion of government and business effort and 
cooperation. The appropriate number and levels of these targets, including how
many numerical targets should be set with how much detail, depend critically
on the characteristics of the sector in question as well as the capability of gov-
ernment and the private sector of that country. For this reason, there is no ¼xed
template applicable to all master plans for all countries. Generally speaking, 
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there should be fewer (numerical) targets if the industry is not capital-in-
tensive, markets and prices are unpredictable, the industry produces ¼nal
consumer goods, the domestic private sector is mature, policy capability is 
weak, or the private sector does not trust the government. Targets are useful
if the opposite is true. Before setting any targets, policymakers should have 
a thorough discussion with all stakeholders, including businesses and experts,
and conduct necessary studies for the proper con¼guration of such targets. 
4.4.3 Situation analysis 
The master plan must analyze the current status, potentials, and obstacles 
of the domestic industry in question. Data should be presented in tables and 
graphics, and the results of surveys and benchmarking should be reported 
if relevant. Information should not be thrown in randomly but must be 
inserted with a clear purpose of making certain points. Routinely reviewed 
issues include the past performance of output, capacity, demand, export and 
import, and localization of inputs; product mixes and producer pro¼les; 
regional distribution of production; productivity and competitiveness; demand
forecasts; and global, regional, or domestic market trends that may impinge 
on the development of the industry. The appropriate selection of these analyses
depends on the degree of understanding and consensus among stakeholders. 
If businesses, policymakers, and experts generally agree on the current position
of the domestic industry, situation analysis can be brief or even skipped. If, 
on the other hand, policy formulation is in an early stage and stakeholders 
do not yet share basic information, situation analysis becomes an integral 
part of the master plan. I do not particularly recommend SWOT analysis 
which tabulates strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. Filling 
obligatory cells mechanically does not produce any new information. What 
is important here is provision of basic materials for extracting a few key 
issues (next subsection). 
4.4.4 Policy issues 
After the industry situation is reviewed comprehensively, speci¼c aspects that
need to be forti¼ed by policy action to realize vision (i) and targets (ii) above 
must be identi¼ed and analyzed. These issues may call for removal of negatives
or strengthening of positives. Obviously, which issues need to be included 
cannot be prejudged because this is highly contingent on the circumstances 
of the sector or the country. Here, some of the common focal issues are 
listed by way of examples: skills and technology, cost reduction, quality 
improvement, product design and development, input procurement (localization
and supplier policy), upstream investment, marketing, export promotion, 
infrastructure, ¼nancing, labor supply and quality, and so on. The most 
relevant topics for the industry should be identi¼ed and agreed among stake-
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automotive industry discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3.4 above). It is important
to work on prioritized issues only rather than cover all issues broadly and 
super¼cially. Issues raised here should be given concrete solutions in the 
following action-plan section. 
4.4.5 Action plan or action mechanism 
An action-plan matrix or an action mechanism is essential for ensuring 
implementation. An action-plan matrix is a large table that translates analyses
and proposals conducted in previous chapters into concrete actions. It may 
be included in the master-plan text or prepared in a separate document. 
Either way, it is crucial that its progress is monitored and reported to the 
government at regular intervals and any problems are attended to as they 
arise. The action-plan matrix typically contains the following cells: actions, 
sub-actions, deadlines, expected output, performance criteria (success indica-
tors), main responsible organizations, and other cooperative organizations. 
An extracted sample format from Zambia is given in Table 4.2. The imple-
mentation procedure, such as who will report what to whom by when, must 
also be speci¼ed along with the action plan matrix. 
Alternatively, an action mechanism, such as a high-level monthly committee
chaired by a top leader or minister, or a well-focused budgeting and project 
approval process coordinated by an effective hub organization, can be adopted.
Compared with the action-plan matrix approach which stipulates all actions 
in advance, these process-oriented approaches are more ½exible in coping 
with shifting circumstances. However, their success requires strong and effective
guidance by the leader or the designated hub organization. In cases where 
political support and administrative capability for policy execution are weak,
the action-plan matrix approach may be preferable. 
4.4.6 General remarks 
An industrial master plan must be implemented and supported by all stake-
holders. A policy document, however professionally written, is just paper if 
it is not implementable. To close this section, general features that must be 
satis¼ed throughout a policy document can be reiterated. These can be attained
more easily if proper policy procedure and organization discussed in the 
previous sections are already in place. 
First, relevance and conciseness should be the criteria for including any 
information in policy documents. All text and data should support the main 
arguments and proposals of the master plan. Statistics that have little inform-
ational value, abstract words with no concrete target or mechanism such as 
“improve,” “strengthen,” and “level up,” and general statements applicable to
any industry in any country should be removed as much as possible. If all 
chapters are logically connected, it is possible to summarize relations among 
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Thailand’s supporting industry master plan in 1995 and automotive industry
master plan 2007–2011. Generally speaking, a compact document of less 
than 100 pages is more effective in communicating policy to stakeholders than
a thick volume that no one reads. The above-mentioned Thai supporting 
industry master plan, which is old but still used as a reference material for 
policy action, is only 37 pages long including appendixes. 
Second, ½exibility and adaptability must be ensured across countries, sec-
tors, and time. Since all industries are different and countries face different 
challenges, cookie-cutter molds cannot be applied to the making of industrial
strategies and master plans. Even for the same industry in the same country, 
shifting circumstances will call for policy revisions over time. In particular, the
relative scope of government intervention must be set properly. The optimal
borderline between state and market must continue to be re-drawn for each 
industrial master plan. Industry’s characteristics such as capital intensity, 
gestation period, product type, and market volatility should in½uence the appro-
priate weight of state intervention. In addition, the maturity and dynamism 
of the private sector and government’s policy capability should also be taken
into account. Creativity is needed to ¼t policy documents to the changing 
reality of the industry in question. 
Third, proper balance between ful¼lling committed actions and ½exibility 
in implementation must be pursued. In general, the higher is policy capability,
the more ½exibility should be given to policymakers. In the early stages of 
policy learning, it is a good idea to regularly and strictly monitor the progress
of each pre-agreed action. This will increase the percentage of actions imple-
mented, but at the cost of less agility as situations change and enormous 
energy and time that must be spent on the production and execution of 
policy documents. As implementation is assured and policy response to shocks
is learned, rigid policy matrices should give way to the improvise-as-you-go 
approach. For this reason, low-income countries usually spell out proposed 
actions in large tables while advanced countries prefer to state strategies 
generally or even do away with master plans completely, and leave annual 
project formulation, budgeting, and institutional revisions to a competent 
organization or an ad hoc committee in charge. Similarly, regular overall plan-
ning such as ¼ve-year plans is still practiced in Malaysia, Thailand, China, 
and Vietnam but not in Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, or South Korea. 
Mr. Vallop Tiasiri, the president of the Thailand Automotive Institute 
mentioned above, which drafts the automotive master plan, prefers the process-
oriented approach in ensuring implementation. Although the ¼rst automotive
master plan of Thailand (2002–2006) had a large action-plan matrix, the 
second automotive master plan (2007–2011) has only a small action summary
table and relies heavily on continuous project-based implementation toward
agreed goals. If in any given year greater ¼nancial resources and more projects
are available, policy implementation is accelerated and vice versa. In the case
of the Thai automotive industry, strong leadership and coordination exercised
by Mr. Vallop and his institute and deep trust and information sharing among
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4.5 Suggestions for Vietnam9 
Finally, an example of country-speci¼c advice in policy procedure and
policy organization is presented for the case of Vietnam, a country whose 
policymaking has been studied by the author for nearly two decades. In 
order for Vietnam to carry out industrial policy effectively toward 2020, the 
year by which the country hopes to achieve the goals of modernization and 
industrialization, three concrete suggestions are in order. 
4.5.1 Targeting a small number of priority issues 
While many issues must be tackled in industrialization, Vietnam’s knowledge,
human capital, and ¼nancial resources are limited. For effective implementation,
it is of utmost importance that key policy entry points be limited in num-
ber, perhaps up to four or ¼ve, for industrialization toward 2020. The Socio-
Economic Development Strategy 2011–2020 (the so-called ten-year development
plan) lists too many issues to be dealt with, which prevents proper budgeting,
staf¼ng, and planning. Too many priorities are equivalent to no priority. The
Vietnamese government must select only a few industrial priority areas to be
really worked on. Selectivity must be exercised by the top leaders of the country,
because this is dif¼cult to realize by a participatory bottom-up approach. 
Development partners including Japan, Germany, Singapore, and the 
UNIDO have long supported industrial human-resource development and 
establishment of linkage between industry and training institutions in Vietnam.
The Japan International Cooperation Agency has assisted creation of SME 
policy and training of related of¼cials of the Ministry of Planning and Investment.
Since 2008, Japan has also highlighted supporting industry promotion as one
of the key policy entry points and jointly worked with the Vietnamese author-
ities to design action plans. Vietnam Competitiveness Report 2010, drafted 
jointly by the Central Institute for Economic Management and Singapore’s 
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, proposes industrial cluster development
as another possible policy entry point for industrialization (Ketels et al., 2010)
although no major donor is supporting this effort yet10 and the operational 
concept of industrial clusters needs to be clari¼ed and narrowed down. 
While the ultimate choice rests with the Vietnamese policy leaders, it is hoped
that these areas—industrial human resource, SME promotion, supporting 
industries, and industrial clusters—will be given high attention. This is partly
because they are universally important challenges in any newly industrializing
country and partly because international cooperation is likely to be forth-
coming for these purposes. 
4.5.2 The Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT) and the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment (MPI) 
SME promotion and supporting industry promotion have signi¼cant overlaps
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are under the same ministry in charge of industry. In Vietnam, the former 
is taken up by MPI’s Enterprise Development Agency (formerly the Agency 
for SME Development) and the latter is handled by the Supporting Industry 
Enterprise Development Center (SIDEC) of the Industrial Policy and Strategy
Institute under MOIT. Both are young organizations, especially the latter, 
and their policy capabilities in knowledge, human resource, and ¼nancial means
are not yet strong enough to carry out the designated tasks effectively. 
Given this situation, it is proposed that MPI should continue to be the lead
ministry for SME promotion and MOIT should be the lead ministry for support-
ing industry promotion for the moment. Each organization must be strengthened
through more budgeting and staf¼ng, learning international best practices, 
and additional international cooperation. This arrangement should work in 
the short run as long as each ministry makes a serious effort at improving 
its functions and policy coordination between the two ministries is secured. 
In the long run, when Vietnam’s policy capability rises suf¼ciently and policy
scope needs to be expanded, the two functions should be merged under the same
ministry. MOIT is perhaps the more suitable ministry for this purpose. At the
same time, the internal structure of MOIT must be restructured by reducing 
direct policy intervention while enhancing its capabilities in assisting private-
sector development through technology transfer, human-resource development,
stakeholder coordination, information collection, and shock management. 
4.5.3 Establishment of an inter-ministerial coordination mechanism 
Many of the industrial strategies, including supporting industries, SME pro-
motion, and industrial cluster development, are multi-sectoral issues. One 
lead ministry cannot cover a broad range over industry, trade, investment, 
technology, taxes and tariffs, budgeting, ¼nance, industrial standards, education
and training, labor, environment, logistics and connectivity, regional develop-
ment, FDI and ODA, and so forth. MOIT, MPI, the Ministry of Finance, 
the Ministry of Education and Training, the Ministry of Labor, Invalids and
Social Affairs, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of 
Transport, the State Bank of Vietnam, etc. must be brought in. However, a 
lead ministry cannot direct or intervene in the affairs of other ministries 
horizontally. For multi-sectoral issues, a supervisory mechanism above all 
ministries must be created for facilitating inter-ministerial cooperation and 
solving any problems that may arise. 
In Vietnam, one option is establishment of a national council headed by the
prime minister (or the deputy prime minister in charge of industry) which super-
vises and coordinates several key industrial strategies as shown in Figure 4.12.
Under the strong leadership and vision of the prime minister, policies should
be supervised by the National Competitiveness Council (the precise name 
does not matter) supported by issue- and sector-based working groups. The 
Council and each of the working groups must appoint a responsible ministry
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Direct, give mandate 
Chaired by PM (or DPM) 
Heads of concerned ministries 
Secretariat: Government Office 
Support, report 
TVET 
Secretariat: Secretariat: Secretariat: Secretariat: Secretariat:
 MPI  MOIT  MOIT  MOLISA  MOET 
Ministries, Ministries, Ministries, Ministries, Ministries, 
businesses, businesses, businesses, businesses, businesses, 
experts experts experts experts experts 
Plan 
Ministries and agencies 
Figure 4.12 Vietnam: a proposal for the National Competitiveness Council 
Note: This is a preliminary idea for initiating discussion; listed issues and ministries are sugges-
tions only; everything is subject to addition, subtraction, or change. 
heads of concerned ministries and agencies, business leaders and associations,
and academics and experts. Ministries and agencies participate in this mechanism
in two functions: participation in planning and as implementing agencies. 
Inter-ministerial issues and con½icts will be solved at the level of the Council
with the ultimate decision resting with the prime minister. For example, 
coordination between MOIT and MPI, as discussed above, should be one of
the tasks of this mechanism. 
Five working groups shown in Figure 4.12 are for illustrations only. The 
Vietnamese government should select most appropriate working groups. 
However, the total number of such issue- or sector-speci¼c working groups should
not greatly exceed four or ¼ve. 
In November 2010, a similar idea of the National Competitiveness Council
was proposed for Vietnam by Professor Michael E. Porter of Harvard Univers-
ity in the launching seminar of Vietnam Competitiveness Report 2010 mentioned
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5 Meiji Japan 
From feudalism to industrialization 
5.1 Miracle in the late nineteenth century 
From the late twelfth century to the middle of the nineteenth century, the 
samurai (swordsmen) class ruled Japan. The ¼rst period of samurai rule,
up to the early seventeenth century, was an age of frequent wars among 
samurai lords over in½uence and territories. After the decisive Battle of 
Sekigahara in 1600 and the extinction of the rival Toyotomi Family in 1615, 
Tokugawa Ieyasu emerged as the ¼nal winner unifying and bringing peace 
to the country. Ieyasu and his posterity in the Tokugawa Family, 15 in all, 
ruled the country as shogun (supreme military leader) in the following two-
and-half centuries. Although the emperor, residing in Kyoto, nominally gave
the authority to rule to the head of the Tokugawa Family, who resided in 
Edo (now Tokyo), real power was exercised by the latter and not the former.
The central military government in Edo was called Bakufu and the period 
of Tokugawa shogunate, from 1603 to 1867, was called the Edo period. 
Japan during the Edo period was a feudal class society based on peasant 
agriculture. The samurai ruled the other three classes consisting of farmers, 
craftsmen, and merchants. Below them, there were also outcasts. The samurai
class was organized into complex family standings and functional ranks. At 
the apex was the Tokugawa Family which directly ruled nearly a quarter of 
Japanese land, including principal cities and important mines, and mono-
polized foreign trade which was highly controlled and limited in volume. 
Other samurai lords, called daimyo, were given territorial domains to rule, 
called han, in exchange for total submission to the Tokugawa Family. The 
number of han ½uctuated over time, and stood eventually at about 300 at 
the end of the Edo period. As long as han lords obeyed all orders and 
regulations imposed by the central government,1 they were left free to conduct
affairs within their han including determination of the rice tax rate, promo-
tion of agriculture and industry, issuing local paper currency, education of 
samurai, and other social and economic measures. Under the conservative 
rule of the Bakufu bureaucracy, Japan spent two-and-half centuries of relative
stability, seclusion from the rest of the world, and development of unique 
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However, in the middle of the nineteenth century, gradual internal evolution
of Japanese society suddenly ended with the arrival of the Western powers 
with superior economic and military might. In 1853, an American military 
½eet (the “Black Ships”) led by Commodore Matthew C. Perry appeared in 
the Bay of Edo to demand the opening of Japanese ports with a display of 
cannons. In the following year, the Bakufu was forced to sign “friendship” 
treaties with Western powers which permitted foreign ships to use designated
Japanese ports. From this time onward, Japanese national goals had turned 
outward which included withstanding pressure from the powerful West and 
maintaining political independence, accelerating Westernization and modern-
ization of Japanese society, and ultimately catching up with the West. 
Japan achieved these self-set goals very well. In a period as short as half 
a century after the opening of ports, it vigorously imported Western systems 
and technology; turned itself into a “modern” society with Western-style 
constitution, laws, and government; achieved an industrial revolution around
the 1890s in which mechanized factories became the leading mode of production;
defeated China and Russia in regional wars (1894–95 and 1904–05, respec-
tively); overtook the British textile industry in the global market by the early 
twentieth century; and was counted as one of the “Big Five” nations by the
time World War I ended in 1918. Japan was the ¼rst non-Western country to
modernize and join the club of “¼rst-class” nations by a wide margin in 
comparison with other high-performing Asian economies which began to indus-
trialize only after World War II. It should be added that Japan’s industrialization
in the Meiji period2 (1868–1912) was carried out in the age of ruthless colo-
nialism in which military occupation of “backward” countries was considered
normal, and no grants, loans, and technical assistance were available to late-
comer countries in international cooperation. How could Meiji Japan, an 
agricultural society with backward technology in the Far East, achieve a 
transformation from feudalism to industrial society so early and so quickly? 
I hope to answer this dif¼cult question by introducing three perspectives 
of history, politics, and concrete measures and actions. These perspectives 
are mutually related and should be combined to understand the Japanese 
miracle in the late nineteenth century. Enumeration of policy measures and 
enterprise actions adopted in the Meiji period to enhance domestic capability, as
done in section 5.5, is not enough to explain the economic development of 
Japan unless historical and political backgrounds were simultaneously presented. 
At the outset, it should be stated generally that Japan’s remarkable industrial
achievement in the late nineteenth century, as well as in the post-World War 
II period, was made possible by a happy blend of strong private dynamism 
and (mostly) appropriate industrial policy. In both periods, private dynamism
was the main engine of growth without which rapid industrialization was 
impossible while policy played an important but supporting role. The natural
question is: where did such strong private dynamism and relatively wise 
government come from? That is when the historical and political perspectives
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Meiji period, not just in what the Meiji government did in technology absorp-
tion or human resource development. It will be shown that pre-conditions 
for the Japanese industrial revolution were unique both historically and 
politically. Our analysis will also explain why today’s developing countries, 
lacking what Japan had one-and-half centuries ago, are advised not to directly
copy the policy menu of Meiji Japan—not only because external conditions 
have changed greatly but also because internal capability has not been
fostered in most of the latecomers today. The chapter may also indicate what
Japan in the early twenty-¼rst century has lost in comparison with Japan in 
the late nineteenth century. 
5.2 Japanese history as a continuous merger of domestic and 
foreign systems 
5.2.1 Translative adaptation 
Evolution of any society in any age is interplay of internal and external 
forces. While relative weight of the two forces shifts over time, both are 
always there. Each society has its own logic and structure which do not 
mutate easily, and their internal dynamics drives history during the period 
of limited foreign contact. Except in rare occasions in which accumulated 
domestic tension explodes (i.e., a revolution), internally driven history
is usually slow and continuous. However, once this society is exposed to 
powerful foreign in½uence, whether military, religious, or economic, internal 
equilibrium is broken and the society is thrown off the track on which it has 
been treading. If domestic response to external force is robust and appropriate,
the society will absorb new elements productively and start a new growth 
path. But if domestic response is weak or disorderly, there is a risk of social 
tension and instability, and, in the worse case, disintegration of the society 
due to civil war or foreign intervention. 
What is remarkable in world history after the Industrial Revolution is the 
fact that the term development no longer means socio-economic transformation
produced mainly by gradual maturing of domestic factors as had often been 
seen from time immemorial. It now invariably means an engineered merger 
of two systems, domestic and foreign, which are in principle incompatible 
and with the foreign system always seeming more powerful than the domestic,
through international integration. This merger normally calls for radical 
modi¼cation of domestic culture and institutions. Moreover, in our time, 
each society is advised (or forced) by international groups and organ-
izations, backed by authority, money, and theory, to jump into the global 
system and accept its rules, rather than refusing to be integrated, as the only 
way toward prosperity. No country will be welcomed as a legitimate member
of the international community unless it does so. 
International integration is an extremely adventurous process experienced 
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that the process does not always promise a happy ending. If poorly handled, 
opening of the country will bring economic crisis and civil strife. Only
a small number of countries can manage this dif¼cult process well and
accomplish an economic take-off under the strong pressure of foreign products,
¼rms, ideas, and systems. Although rules and players shift with time, this 
basic problem associated with latecomer integration remains the same. The 
challenge of forced integration experienced by Meiji Japan was fundamentally
the same as what latecomer countries must overcome in the early twenty-¼rst
century (Chapter 1). 
Forced merger of two systems must be managed rather than left to its 
own dynamics. Friction, hostility, and rejection generated by the merger 
must be controlled. That is why government is vital as an administrator of 
integration and protector of social cohesion. Government constitutes a part 
of the domestic society but it must also perform an important duty of deciding
the way to cope with external force and directing its implementation. In 
other words, government is simultaneously the subject and object of social 
transformation, and its policy skill critically determines the destiny of a
nation that goes through globalization. 
As Maegawa (1994, 2000), cited in Chapter 1, notes, integration of
a latecomer country should ideally proceed with the initiative and owner-
ship of the country to be integrated rather than under sheer foreign pressure.
Even if a latecomer country may look small and helpless before the dominant
world, the former should somehow overcome this power imbalance
and determine the terms, scope, and sequence of its integration process. It 
should also maintain social continuity as well as national pride and identity. 
Even though the society changes signi¼cantly as a result of importation of 
foreign elements, direction and speed of change must be set by the people 
and government of that country. Under such integration, foreign ideas and 
technology are accepted with modi¼cations to ¼t the reality of domestic 
society rather than in their original forms. If integration is of this type, which
Maegawa calls translative adaptation, the latecomer country undergoing
social transformation is not really weak or passive. It is bravely and wisely 
using external stimuli to launch a new development path. According
to Maegawa, Meiji Japan was the country that succeeded brilliantly in trans-
lative adaptation, and most observers tend to agree with him. 
However, success must be judged in relative light. Although the achieve-
ments of Meiji Japan look great ex post facto, the people and government 
in the process were not so self-con¼dent or comfortable. Serious debate, 
emotional oscillation, and trial-and-error were the order of the day. In his 
lecture “Development of Modern Japan” delivered in 1911, Natsume Soseki 
(1867–1916), perhaps the most popular Japanese novelist in the Meiji period,
remarked as follows: 
Development in the West is endogenous, while Japan’s development is 
exogenous. Here, endogenous means emerging naturally from within, 
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like a bud blooms into a ½ower in an outward motion, and exogenous 
means being forced to take a certain form because of external in½uences 
. . . Overall, throughout history, Japan was developing more or less en-
dogenously. Then suddenly, after two centuries of isolation, we opened 
up and encountered Western civilization. It was a big shock we never
experienced before. Since then, the Japanese society began to evolve in
a different direction . . . 
Western tides dominate our development. Since we are not Western-
ers, every time a new wave arrives from the West we feel uneasy like a 
person living in someone else’s house. Even before we can grasp the 
nature of the previous wave, a new wave arrives. It is as if too many 
dishes are brought in and soon removed before we can start to eat. In 
such circumstances, people will inevitably become empty, frustrated, and
worried . . . In summary, we can safely conclude that Japanese develop-
ment is a super¼cial one . . . To put it politely, a part, perhaps the 
dominant part, of our development is super¼cial. But I am not saying 
that we should stop developing. The sad fact must be accepted. We must 
swallow our tears and continue to develop super¼cially . . . I have no
good solution to offer to you. The only thing I can say is that we should 
try to develop as internally as possible so long as we can avoid a nervous
breakdown. 
(Soseki’s lecture in 1911 as cited in Miyoshi, 1986,
p. 26 and pp. 33–34) 
Irritation and anxiety in a latecomer country under globalization, as
sarcastically illustrated by Soseki, are common to all countries in similar 
processes of integration. Although Soseki was quite pessimistic in this lecture,
and Japanese people at that time did go through a psychological crackup, we
must still stress the fact that Meiji Japan ended up in successfully marrying 
Japanese spirit with Western technology. Being unsure and upset is common 
to all such nations, but conducting effective integration despite such stress 
is a rare accomplishment. Knowing a large number of developmental experi-
ences of other latecomer countries in the following century, we must but 
marvel at Meiji Japan as the ¼rst achiever of an almost impossible task. 
5.2.2 The Umesao theory 
The next question that must be addressed is how Japan could perform 
translative adaptation as early and as successfully as this. To answer this 
question, at least partially, the ecological theory of history advanced in 1957 
by Umesao Tadao, a scholar in comparative civilization and the founder of 
the National Museum of Ethnology, is introduced (Umesao, 1986, 2003). 
His theory emphasizes a special geographical position shared by both Japan 
and Western Europe. Traditionally, we consider nineteenth-century Japan
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match for the Western powers. However, according to Umesao, this view is
fundamentally ½awed. He sees no mystery in Japan’s emergence as a non-
Western industrial country. 
Japan and Western Europe were situated at an appropriate distance—not 
too far, not too near—from the great civilizations of Eurasia, namely, China,
India, and the Middle East (Islam)—see Figure 5.1. They could absorb the 
achievements of these civilizations while being protected against the ¼erce 
invasion and destruction of nomad people roaming in the central dry areas 
of the Eurasian continent. In particular, Japan and Britain were two island 
nations just across a strait from the continent. Ever since the Japanese
ethnicity was established through migration from south, north, and west, 
Japan has never been invaded by foreign forces (excepting the post World 
War II American occupation in 1945–1951). The water between Japan and 
Korea blocked the Mongolian ½eet twice in the late thirteenth century. As 
for Britain, its old base of the Celtic culture was transformed by a few mild 
interactions with its European brothers (Roman invasion, ¼rst century bc; 
Anglo-Saxon migration, fourth and ¼fth centuries ad; Norman Conquest, 
1066). The delicate distance from the center, offering double advantages in 
absorption of advanced civilization and ease of national defense, permitted 
both societies to evolve cumulatively and organically. They were given enough
time and control to mix domestic culture with foreign impact, without being 
wiped out and having to start over again from scratch. 
The Great Wall of China could not stop the Mongolians from coming. 
Smaller countries on the Eurasian continent also faced the fate of being 
Eurasian Continent 
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plundered and invaded every few centuries. Under such circumstances,
unbroken evolution of political, social, and economic systems was dif¼cult. 
Chinese, Indian, and Islamic civilizations produced great cultural and scienti¼c
achievements, but their social structures were static; only empires and king-
doms (and later, colonialism) ruled. From one dynasty to another, there
was no clear progress from the viewpoint of social, political, and economic 
systems. They adopted different economic, diplomatic, and ethnic policies 
but the pattern was more random than evolutionary. For thousands of years,
emperors and kings looked basically the same although some were wiser and 
more powerful than others. On the other hand, in cultures far from the 
center—the Paci¼c islands, for example—social change tended to be very 
slow because they could not import advanced systems and other foreign 
stimuli to propel history. 
Meanwhile, under similar locational conditions, Japan and Britain (or more
generally, Western Europe) developed independently and in parallel. Their 
societies ¼rst established an ancient kingdom or empire, whose power grad-
ually eroded over time. This was followed by decentralization and the rise of
local powers. The ¼ghting class (samurai or knights) with high spirituality 
emerged to defend land and manors. Feudalism, or the master–servant rela-
tionship based on the give-and-take of land-ruling rights, took root. While 
the word “feudalism” often connotes rigidity and backwardness, especially 
in Japanese language, it played a vital role in fostering local political and 
economic powers which had their own spheres of in½uence, and preparing 
social conditions for building modern industry with mechanized factories in 
the subsequent period. Japan in the nineteenth century was a typical ex-
ample of a society that proceeded from feudalism to an industrial revolution. 
If we look back on Japanese history from this perspective, we must but 
notice that Japanese society has a cumulative multi-layer structure as a result
of frequent absorption of foreign elements and their gradual digestion with-
out ever abandoning the former nature entirely. The original character of 
Japanese people must have been forged by the natural features of the Japan-
ese archipelago situated in the Temperate Zone with four distinct seasons 
laced with both subtlety and violence, as well as complex geography, vegeta-
tion, and creatures. On top of this, imported elements such as rice cultivation
(third century bc?), Buddhism (sixth century), Chinese culture and systems 
(from seventh to the early tenth century), guns and Christianity (sixteenth 
century), re-encounter with the West (mid-nineteenth century), and reforms 
under US occupation (mid-twentieth century), were added in repeated trans-
lative adaptation. Among these, modernization and industrialization of the 
Meiji period, which we are concerned with, was the biggest external shock. 
Throughout constant transformation over the two millennia, the ethnic 
and cultural identity of Japanese people was maintained despite the fact that 
Japan today and Japan in the past are entirely different in their appearances.
We may even say that the process of never-ending translative adaptation has 
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people, old and new elements co-exist ½exibly and surface alternately depending
on the circumstance. Sensitivity to nature, nostalgia for rice cultivation, 
optional allegiance to Shinto, Buddhism, and Christianity, and Western ratio-
nalism and frontline industrial technology are all part of Japanese characters.
To put it positively, Japanese are ½exible, generous, and pragmatic. But to 
put it critically, they are without principle, ¼delity, or devotion. This is a 
unique feature of Japanese people not often seen in other cultures. 
In sum, thanks to the right distance from the center, Japan could manage 
cumulative external shocks reasonably well and used them relatively effectively
for its own transformation and growth throughout history in comparison 
with other non-Western countries. Repeated acceptance and digestion of 
foreign elements strengthened Japan’s capability to respond strongly to such 
shocks. It is not really surprising, then, to see Japan in the mid-nineteenth 
century able to cope adequately with the powerful impact of the West. 
5.3 Preparation for a take-off 
5.3.1 The seven conditions 
We now turn to the question of what concrete conditions were prepared
by the feudalism of the Edo period (1603–1867), under relative seclusion 
from the rest of the world and gradual evolution of domestic society, which
facilitated Japan’s industrialization in the following Meiji period (1868–1912).
Below is a list of seven such conditions, which are the summary of volum-
inous research and academic debates on this period and can be considered 
as the near-consensus view among Japanese economic historians: 
(i) political unity and stability; 
(ii) agricultural development in terms of both area and productivity; 
(iii) development of transportation and the emergence of nationally uni¼ed 
markets; 
(iv) the emergence of commerce, ¼nance, and the wealthy merchant class; 
(v) the broad-based rise of pre-modern manufacturing such as agro pro-
cessing, handicrafts, and metalworking; 
(vi) agricultural and industrial promotion by local (han) governments— 
which was sometimes successful but not always; 
(vii) high level of education for both leaders and ordinary people. 
The fact that political unity and stability (¼rst condition) contributed to 
economic development should not be surprising. The four conditions from 
the second to the ¼fth can be restated as rising output and productivity; 
emergence of institutions, infrastructure, and social structure which supported
it; and the resulting development and diversi¼cation of the private sector. 
The sixth and the seventh can be rephrased respectively as building of policy 
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What is remarkable about these seven conditions of Edo Japan is the fact 
that very few developing countries satisfy them even today. Admittedly, this 
statement suffers from selection bias because societies equipped with these 
conditions have already industrialized and joined the rich country club. Even
so, it is undeniable that many developing countries, receiving for a long time 
economic aid and trade privileges which were not available in the nineteenth 
century, still remain underdeveloped and without these conditions. Even 
among emerging economies in Southeast Asia such as Thailand, Vietnam, 
and Indonesia, few are equipped with all the seven conditions. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, we suspect that some countries even lack all of these conditions.
This shows the high level of socio-economic development attained by Edo 
Japan despite feudalism and pre-modern technology. It also warns us against
transplanting policies adopted by Meiji Japan, as explained in section 5.5, 
to societies that are not in possession of these conditions. 
The Edo society was agrarian, particularly at the beginning, with about 
90 percent of the population being peasants although this ratio subsequently 
declined a little. The basic unit of production was the small family. In the 
previous centuries, one farming household often contained a large number 
of people with many families and their servants. But a series of of¼cial land 
surveys and registration (kenchi) conducted before and after the beginning 
of the Edo period dismantled the big family system into small farming units, 
with each family guaranteed (and obliged to cultivate) its portion of farmland.
Villages were well organized and permitted autonomy as long as they paid 
rice taxes as stipulated by the Bakufu or local government. The rice tax was 
levied on villages, not on individual farmers. Village leaders, who were often 
themselves farmers, allocated the tax burden among villagers. In this sense, 
village leaders played the role of the lowest-level tax administration. 
The agricultural sector grew in two phases. From the mid-¼fteenth century
to the late seventeenth century, which partly overlaps with the previous
warring period, there was an enormous expansion of farmland. Large-scale 
water-management projects were carried out all over Japan by daimyos and 
in½uential farmers to control ½oods and use rivers for irrigation. As a result, 
the plains which had hitherto been uninhabitable marshlands were turned 
into productive paddy ¼elds. The population increased rapidly in a way 
rarely seen in a pre-modern society. Oishi (1977), an Edo historian, calls this 
the “Great Age of Opening Fields.” From the eighteenth century onward 
the area of cultivation and population remained relatively stable, but rice 
output continued to grow thanks to increased productivity.3 Contributing 
factors included double cropping, new species of rice, fertilizer (dried ¼sh 
was especially popular), and the introduction of new farming tools. Many 
guidebooks were published to teach farmers how to produce crops more 
effectively. Miyazaki Yasusada’s Nogyo Zensho [Encyclopedia of Agriculture]
in 11 volumes, published in 1679 and reprinted many times, was one of them. 
At the start of the Edo period, peasants produced mainly for family con-
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surplus was generated, peasants began to sell their rice and other crops to 
the market which was often nationally integrated. Subsistence agriculture 
was gradually replaced by commercial agriculture. As rural income rose, 
many well-to-do farmers enjoyed village theaters and festivals, climbed Mt. 
Fuji, Mt. Tateyama, and other sacred mountains, and made a pilgrimage to 
Ise Shrine and other religious sites, nominally for worship, but actually for 
fun. Tanaka (2000), another Edo historian, argues that Edo farmers were 
dynamic and independent and they often rejected government of¼cials and 
their unreasonable policies. The Bakufu repeatedly issued laws to regulate 
farmers’ lives including prohibition of smoking tobacco and drinking tea 
and sake (rice wine) and an order to divorce a wife who liked trips and 
entertainment. But Kurushima (2003) asserts that these laws should be under-
stood as the Bakufu’s desperate but failed attempt to keep farmers frugal as 
a tax base against the reality of their enrichment, rather than a proof of 
Bakufu’s strict control of their living conditions. 
The Edo tax system was based on the transfer, storage, and cashing of 
rice. The economic size of han was measured and samurai’s salaries were 
paid in physical quantities of rice. For this reason, the existence of a nation-
ally integrated rice market with ef¼cient transportation and settlement systems
was required. The development of cash crops and handicrafts also stimulated
domestic commerce. Osaka was the commercial center with a large number 
of wealthy merchant families, money changers, and lenders, while Edo was 
the political center with great demand for consumer goods. Naturally, a sea 
lane between the two cities was opened and developed. The Bakufu also 
designated ¼ve of¼cial highways and opened other sea lanes. But it was the 
private sector that provided such services as inns, restaurants, shippers, and 
baggage carriers. The obligatory bi-annual commuting of all han lords be-
tween Edo and their domains (see note 1) brought additional prosperity
to service providers along the major highways and sea lanes. 
With the expansion of economic activities, gosho, or rich merchant families,
emerged. They included Konoike, Onogumi, Tennojiya, Hiranoya, Shima-
daya, Kashimaya, and Yoneya. Many of them declined after Meiji, but
two families, Mitsui and Sumitomo, survived the political change and
expanded to form business conglomerates as pre-World War II zaibatsu
and post-World War II keiretsu.4 The Mitsui Family was originally a dealer 
in kimono (Japanese dress) and a money changer while the Sumitomo Family
started as a copper mining and re¼ning business. Development of domestic 
enterprises such as these, with large capital and extensive business networks, 
during the Edo period was a great advantage for Japan whose expertise and 
¼nancial power could later be mobilized to absorb imported technology
and compete with foreigners. In contrast, not many developing countries 
today have local companies that are strong enough to compete globally. 
Another point to be noted is the speed with which large business families 
and groups emerged and disappeared. According to a series of published 
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rate of prominent businesses was fairly low. Among the top 231 business 
families in the list of 1849, only 44 percent also made the list of 1864. The 
same group’s survival rates further fell to 15 percent by 1888 and only 9 
percent by 1902. In this sense, Mitsui and Sumitomo, which have continued 
to thrive until today, were the exception rather than the rule. The rise and 
fall of individual enterprises is a hallmark of a dynamic market economy, 
which existed in Japan toward the end of the Edo period. 
As agriculture and commerce grew, pre-modern manufacturing such as 
handicrafts and food processing also developed. Many specialized local products
emerged and were marketed all over Japan. For example, tea, tobacco, wax, 
indigo, salt, knives, sword, pottery, lacquer ware, silk, cotton, soy sauce, 
sake, paper, cut stone, medicine, and dried ¼sh were traded widely. In order 
to enrich the local population and increase the tax revenue, many han pro-
moted local industries, and some even succeeded (Nishikawa and Amano, 
1989). Tokushima Han’s promotion of indigo farming, Takamatsu Han’s 
sugar production from sugar beets with newly developed technology, Yone-
zawa Han’s saf½ower and lacquer, Akita Han’s silk and silk dress, Hizen 
Han’s pottery and coal, and Higo Han’s lumber and silk, are just a few 
examples. To be objective, however, we should not forget other han govern-
ments which were less successful and fell deeply into debt. They borrowed 
large sums of money from private merchants but never repaid. 
The popularity of education in the Edo period is often cited as the cause 
of fast industrialization in the later periods. Education in the Edo period 
ranged from the recondite study of ancient Chinese philosophy and literature
at public schools to children’s basic education at private schools. Education 
fever was not just in such large cities as Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto but also a 
nationwide phenomenon. 
Bakufu schools mainly taught Confucianism, an ancient Chinese philo-
sophy started by Confucius in the sixth to ¼fth century bc and reinterpreted 
variously in later centuries. It emphasized social order, proper rituals, the 
way of good political leadership, and respect for the elderly and superiors. 
The Edo government promoted Confucianism as an ideology to legitimize 
and maintain the class society. How to modify this old foreign doctrine
to ¼t the Japanese reality was one of the important theoretical questions. 
Han governments also established schools to educate their young samurais. 
The number of han schools were 230 at the end of the Edo period. The
curriculums were basically the same as those of Bakufu schools, with Con-
fucianism at the center of learning. Toward the end of the Edo period, these 
public schools started to teach practical skills such as military training and 
foreign language. 
In the private sector, eminent scholars often set up their own schools and 
recruited students. Depending on the instructor, various subjects were taught
ranging from Confucianism to kokugaku (research on ancient Japanese
literature and history), Western languages (Dutch, later also English), medicine,
science, technology, and so on. These schools accepted both samurai and 
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non-samurai students. In the late Edo period, they often attracted talented 
and passionate young people with the desire to contribute to the country. 
Their eyes were opened to the international situation and Japan’s precarious 
position in it. A large number of national leaders in the late Edo period and 
the early Meiji period came from such professional schools. 
Terakoya (private primary schools) were run by local teachers to teach 
the “3Rs”—reading, writing and arithmetic (abacus)—to small children rang-
ing from 7–8 up to 12–13 in age. It was a pro¼t-making institution charging 
tuition fees, where normally one instructor taught a few dozen children with 
individual assignments. As the public realized the importance of studying 
letters and arithmetic, a large number of terakoya were established all over 
Japan contributing to high literacy among the general public. It is estimated 
that the number of terakoya at the end of the Edo period was in the order 
of 20,000 (Banno and Ohno, 2010). 
This section has given only a glimpse of what Edo Japan achieved (for a 
fuller discussion, see Ohno (2006a) and Banno and Ohno (2010)). While 
Japan at that time was a pre-modern feudal society which discriminated 
people according to lineage and blood connection, its private-sector economy
and supporting policies exhibited a high degree of maturity not often seen 
in developing countries. Would it be too much to say that Japan in the mid-
nineteenth century was ready and even craving for the Western impact in 
order to begin a new growth path? 
5.3.2 Centrifugal politics and centripetal nationalism 
We now come to the two speci¼c factors that emerged around the time of 
opening of ports in the 1850s which enabled Japan to get rid of the Bakufu–Han
System along with its feudalism and class society. The amazing thing about 
this political-cum-social revolution was that it was achieved without splitting
the country into pieces, spilling a large amount of blood, or being colonized 
by the Western powers. Admittedly, these judgments must be taken relatively;
Japan did have divisions and it did experience a civil war between pro- and 
anti-Bakufu forces in 1868–69. But Japan’s divisions and combats were minor
compared with what the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions went through.
As Tokutomi Soho, a renowned journalist in the Meiji period, observed, 
The French people always shift from one extreme to the other as the 
Japanese people do. But on a closer inspection, we must but notice a 
signi¼cant difference between the two peoples. Although both go from 
one extreme to the other, our people do so within certain bounds while 
the French do so outside these bounds. 
(Tokutomi, 1889, p. 2) 
About 10,000 deaths were estimated to have occurred in the Japanese civil 
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Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. Many internal con½icts in the post-
World War II period, for example in Korea, Vietnam, Nigeria, Cambodia, 
Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Sudan, each killed in excess of one million. 
Why was Japan’s transformation so “peaceful”? How could Japan accomplish
a revolution with such a small human cost? 
Two forces were at play in the critical years from 1853 (the arrival of the 
American gun ships) to 1867 (the collapse of the Bakufu). The one was 
centrifugal force unleashed by the decline of legitimacy of the Bakufu as a 
result of poor handling of external and internal affairs. The other was
a spontaneous surge of private nationalism fostered by kokugaku, which 
was greatly stimulated by the appearance of foreign rivals. These two forces 
kept Japan’s policy debates and military con½icts “within certain bounds” 
without exploding into an uncontrollable crisis and blood shedding. Leaders 
and ¼ghters put national interests above the interests of speci¼c han, classes, 
or groups, and were ready to cooperate for pragmatic purposes ½exibly 
without harboring indelible enmity against each other. 
The legitimacy of the Bakufu as a supreme ruler was supposedly derived 
from its capability to maintain internal peace and withstand foreign enemies 
with its military power. However, the appearance of the mighty West in the mid-
nineteenth century destroyed the previously solid authority of the Bakufu. 
Furthermore, diplomatic, political, and economic blunders of the Bakufu in 
handling the foreign pressure, as explained below, created a movement that 
dared to defy the Bakufu’s authority and challenge its policies. The Bakufu’s
legitimacy collapsed quickly during 1858–1863 until it became irreparable.
Criticism against Bakufu leaders, collective demand by in½uential han lords to
take part in national decision making, refusal to obey Bakufu orders, and 
even military action against the Bakufu, all of which were totally unthinkable
before, became widespread. From around 1863, potential leaders contested 
to build a new political order on the premise that the Bakufu’s days were
over (Mitani, 1997). 
When American Commodore Perry and his Black Ships entered deep
into the Bay of Edo and ¼red warning shots from ship-mounted cannons
in the summer of 1853, it became clear to everyone that the Bakufu was
not in possession of military power to repel foreigners. In response, the 
Bakufu government hurriedly built coastal forts, implemented a military 
reform, placed an order to purchase military ships from the West, and tried 
to introduce shipbuilding and navigation training. At the same time, however,
it had no true intention of ¼ghting foreigners. From the beginning, the
Bakufu’s diplomatic stance was acceptance of foreign demand for Japan’s 
international integration and coaxing or forcing various domestic groups 
into agreeing with this policy. While this seriously damaged the value of
the Bakufu as a military government, it must be admitted that Japan
had no other choice given the harsh international environment at that time. 
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First, the commercial treaties concluded with the ¼ve Western powers in 
1858 were defective in the sense that Japan did not have the right to deter-
mine its own tariff rates or judge foreign criminals in Japanese courts. It 
took Japan another half century to recover these rights through excruciating 
negotiations with the West. This was certainly a diplomatic blunder, but it 
must be recalled that such unilateral obligation was considered normal in 
commercial treaties between the West and “backward” countries in the late 
nineteenth century. It was dif¼cult for Japan alone to reject such conditions 
when all other Asian countries, including China, were forced to accept them. 
Second, these commercial treaties were signed at the command of Ii Naosuke
(1815–1860), the supreme minister (tairo) of the Bakufu’s executive of¼ce, 
without receiving the emperor’s consent. As a matter of fact, Emperor
Komei (1831–1866) was strongly opposed to these treaties. This revealed a 
serious schism between the emperor and the Bakufu, the two powers which 
were supposed to be in harmony, with the former willingly conferring the 
authority to rule to the latter. If the emperor and the Bakufu were in fact 
two competing powers with different policy orientations, new political
dynamism could be unleashed in which diverse groups gathered around either
pole to initiate real debates and even combats. Although the Bakufu tried 
to minimize this risk by launching kobu gattai, a strategy to unite the two 
authorities through marrying the emperor’s younger sister to the shogun, pro-
posing to close the Port of Yokohama (which was in reality impossible), and 
other face-saving measures, the effects were unstable and limited. It only 
accumulated dubious commitments between the two parties which wanted 
fundamentally different policy directions. The strategy ¼nally collapsed with 
the passing of Emperor Komei in 1866. 
Third, the Bakufu’s despotic policymaking which ¼rst ignored and then 
cracked down on the opponents of opening ports severely marred its legiti-
macy. In particular, the Great Incarceration of Ansei (1858–1859), which 
punished and executed a large number of challengers to the Bakufu’s authority,
had the contrary effect of accelerating anti-Bakufu movements of all kind. 
The Bakufu’s oppression invited demands from in½uential han lords to con-
vene a feudal assembly for broader policy deliberation, on the one hand, 
and increased terrorist attacks from the “Respect the Emperor and Expel 
Foreigners” hardliners, on the other. Yet, the Bakufu continued to refuse to 
share power with others until the end. It was only in 1866 that the Bakufu 
¼nally acknowledged the power-sharing proposal, but it was after the kobu 
gattai strategy disintegrated completely, the Bakufu suffered a military defeat
in the second campaign to punish rebellious Choshu Han, and Tokugawa 
Yoshinobu (1837–1913) assumed power as the new (and last) shogun. The 
formal return of ruling power to the emperor by Yoshinobu, in October 
1867, was his last-ditch effort to avoid the termination of the Tokugawa 
Family while the anti-Bakufu forces were gathering to attack the Bakufu for 
a ¼nal military showdown. But Yoshinobu’s political survival act failed 
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rule of the emperor without the Bakufu, and the civil war started in Toba 
and Fushimi, near Kyoto, branding the Bakufu as the traitor to be eliminated
by the imperial order. 
Fourth, economic confusion caused by the opening of ports must be cited.
The main problem was in½ation, and its associated effects were shocks to 
existing industries brought by new trade opportunities and relative price 
changes. Around 1858, the prices of export commodities such as silk and 
silk products rose and the prices of import-competing goods such as cotton 
products fell. In 1859 and 1860, different conversion rates between gold and 
silver in Japan and abroad prompted an out½ow of gold and associated 
in½ation. After 1863, the explosion of Bakufu ¼nance with a surge of military
expense and debasement of gold coins accelerated in½ation until it destroyed 
the monetary system of the Bakufu–Han system (Takeda, 2009). In the pro-
cess, producers and merchants of silk and tea expanded strongly and enjoyed
great pro¼ts in response to large foreign demand. As for import-competing 
cotton products, the market of white cloth with no product differentiation 
shrank but the markets of creased, striped, or splash-patterned cotton products
requiring special technique were not hit hard and even expanded. These 
demand ½uctuations were accompanied by the rise and fall of individual 
localities. Many traditional producing regions declined quickly while new 
regions, which had the cooperation of merchants who introduced the use of 
imported ¼ber and new rural markets, emerged. Change of players is an
inevitable phenomenon under globalization, but the speed with which this 
occurred was very fast in the ¼nal years of the Edo period. In any country 
and age, in½ation, bankruptcies, and unemployment make people hostile
to the government. Japanese people at that time must have felt that the days 
of the Bakufu were coming to an end as it was totally incapable of controlling
foreign pressure, domestic opponents, or economic chaos. 
We now turn to the emergence of nationalism in the private sector, which 
was the second force that kept Japanese response to globalization shocks 
and the collapse of the Bakufu “within certain bounds.” It must ¼rst be 
noted that political information traveled quickly and widely in the late Edo 
period and that there was strong demand among intellectuals for such
information. The news that four Black Ships commanded by American Com-
modore Matthew C. Perry appeared at the mouth of the Bay of Edo, in 
1853, spread across Japan instantaneously. This communication speed was 
an important factor that shaped the political development of this period. 
National transport and communication infrastructure of the Edo period 
not only stimulated agriculture and industry and united markets nationally 
but also promoted human and information exchange for various purposes 
including academic, cultural, and political. Samurai from in½uential han 
were dispatched to major cities such as Edo, Kyoto, Osaka, and Nagasaki 
to gather information and make political allies. They communicated fre-
quently through hikyaku (rapid-delivery service on foot or by horse) which 
carried letters, money, and bills of exchange within four to ten days between 
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Edo and Osaka, for example. According to Miyaji (1999), there were 128 
hikyaku dispatchers organized by destinations in Kyoto in the 1830s, and 
180 hikyaku dispatchers existed in Edo in the 1860s. From 1859 to 1868, 
114 letters of Saigo Takamori, a political and military leader of Satsuma 
Han (section 5.4), addressed to his colleague Okubo Toshimichi who was 
serving his lord at home, remain. Given the speed of letter delivery at that 
time, this means that the two were in constant communication whenever 
they were in different locations. Frequent letter exchange was not unique to 
Saigo and Okubo but common among all intellectuals of this period as Banno
and Ohno (2010a) prove. 
Demand for swift and accurate political information rose dramatically 
after the arrival of Commodore Perry. The number of political records and 
newsletters compiled by intellectuals (samurai, rich farmers, doctors, scholars,
etc.) increased, and cultural networks which previously composed Japanese 
and Chinese poems turned political. This was because nationalism which 
was gradually forming and developing through kokugaku and the Respect 
the Emperor ideology was suddenly and greatly activated by a direct contact 
with hostile Western powers. The acute sense of national crisis under foreign 
pressure bolstered the national identity of Japanese people, increased demand
for political information and discussion, and politicized all intellectuals
regardless of their classes. 
The foundation of kokugaku was laid jointly by Keichu (1640–1701) and 
Kadano Azumamaro (1668–1736). The former criticized existing research 
that evaluated Japanese literature by foreign (Chinese) criteria and urged 
the analysis of internal structure of literary works from the perspective of 
ages and cultures that produced them. The latter established a new academic
doctrine to examine Japanese literature, history, and laws independently 
from Confucianism or Buddhism, which were imported from China and 
India, to illuminate the Japanese Way. These ideas were put into practice 
and further developed by Kamono Mabuchi (1697–1769) who studied Man-
yoshu, the ¼rst recorded collection of Japanese poems, and Motoori Norinaga
(1730–1801) who re-interpreted the Tale of Genji (the ¼rst long novel) and 
scrutinized Kojiki (Ancient Chronicle). Finally, Hirata Atsutane (1776–1843)
turned this academic trend into a complex and bizarre theology, which pro-
vided a spiritual support to the “Respect the Emperor and Expel Foreigners”
movement of the late Edo period. 
What is important here is the fact that kokugaku was an evolutionary 
effort arising spontaneously from inside Japanese society to re-discover and 
admire Japan’s spirituality and culture in the original and set it against Budd-
hism and Confucianism which dominated the minds of Japanese intellectuals
for long. In the words of Natsume Soseki, it was an endogenous development
of ideas rather than an exogenous one forced by foreign contact and pressure.
But once established and developed, kokugaku began to change its nature 
from academic research to political ideology against the intention of its 
founders. In the late eighteenth century to the early nineteenth century, 
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kokugaku and its vision spread widely among lower samurai, rich merchants,
and rich farmers all over Japan. This caused popularization of Shinto (Japanese
traditional religion) and, along with it, the trend in which people outside the 
ruling class freely discussed social issues and national policies without instruc-
tion and guidance from above, a situation never permitted previously. In 
Nagoya region, for example, kokugaku of Motoori Norinaga invaded and 
quickly replaced Suika Shinto, a religious doctrine of¼cially sanctioned and 
taught by high-ranking noblemen. 
Nationalism fostered by kokugaku and activated greatly by the arrival of 
the American ½eet was not state-guided nationalism, which is often seen in 
developing countries today, as rulers impose an arti¼cial sense of national 
unity across different ethnicities and regions to create an “imagined com-
munity.” Rather, it was a nationalism born spontaneously from the private 
sector, exciting and infuriating intellectuals and ordinary people alike, and 
sometimes even going to violent extremes to constrain and upset the policies 
of government. Unguided nationalism triggered by external pressure is hardly
unique to Edo Japan as it is a social phenomenon commonly observed in 
virtually all countries. Uncontrollable emotion expressed by Chinese citizens 
in electronic media at any foreign insult and criticism against China is a 
good example of this. 
The last version of kokugaku, advocated by Hirata Atsutane, did instill 
political radicalism into its believers, especially rich farmers. It taught that, 
for example, dedicated service to the emperor even to one’s death would be 
rewarded by Okuninushi no Mikoto, an ancient Japanese god, in the next 
world. It cannot be denied that this peculiar doctrine promoted terrorist acts 
among the “Respect the Emperor and Expel Foreigners” hardliners, and 
contributed also to the formation of other anti-foreigner movements such 
as the Late Mito Doctrine and the radical activism of Yoshida Shoin (1830– 
1859). However, it would be unfair to judge kokugaku only negatively just 
because it stimulated terrorism among some radical sects. We must also note
that kokugaku ¼rmly established the national identity of Japan and its people
in the minds of a larger number of Japanese intellectuals who did not resort 
to terrorism. This nationalism enabled them to put national interests above 
interests of a particular han or class to which they belonged. The social ethos
derived from kokugaku served as a centripetal force that drove Japanese 
leaders to think and act primarily for “Japanese nation” and “all people 
under the heaven” even they were on different sides, at the time of Western 
impact. 
Let me sum up. The previously rock-solid legitimacy of the Tokugawa 
rule was seriously tarnished at the military impotence of the Bakufu by the 
appearance of the powerful West. Additional problems associated with
the content and signing procedure of the commercial treaties with the West, 
despotic and unilateral decision making in coping with the external
crisis, and in½ation and other economic shocks generated by international 








            
 
140 Country studies 
social condition under which the Tokugawa’s rule could be challenged and 
political competition for establishing a new government could be started 
without regard to old convention or class boundaries. However, political 
competition was fought under social psychology anchored by spontaneous 
nationalism which was broadly shared by lower samurai, rich farmers, rich 
merchants, and other intellectuals. This cemented the hearts of all leaders 
and ¼ghters toward achieving the primary goal of maintaining national
independence against foreign pressure. Centrifugal force was balanced by 
centripetal force to keep the movement “within certain bounds,” which pre-
vented a deep internal schism from emerging and gave no excuse for foreigners
to intervene or invade. 
5.4 The ½exible structure of politics5 
5.4.1 Politics of coping with globalization pressure 
From the late Edo period to the early Meiji period—from 1858 to 1881 to 
be more precise—Japanese politics exhibited a pattern which we shall call 
the “½exible structure,” a feature that was very unique in a latecomer country
facing the enormous challenge of global integration. This was a critical period
of Japanese transformation in which the nation had, in response to the 
Western impact, to re-organize the political regime, re-de¼ne national goals, 
and debate and decide on the contents, priorities, roadmaps, and implementers
of these goals. 
The year 1858, four years after the “friendship” treaties, was the year in 
which commercial treaties with the West—Americans, Dutch, Russians, British,
and French—were concluded, and trade with these countries began in the 
following year. It was also the year that saw an embryonic formation of 
political and economic strategies to cope with the Western pressure, called 
kogi yoron (government by public deliberation) and fukoku kyohei (enrich 
the country, strengthen the military).6 Thus, the year 1858 was the starting 
point of transformation from the viewpoint of global integration as well as 
the initiation of domestic response to it. 
On the other hand, the year 1881 was the year of the “Political Incident 
of the Fourteenth Year of Meiji” (the ousting of Okuma Shigenobu (1838– 
1922), who proposed a radical plan to introduce a constitution and parliament,
from the government) which resulted in an imperial edict that promised to 
establish a (conservative) constitution and a national assembly within nine 
years. It was also the year in which the policy of privatizing state-owned 
enterprises was announced, ¼nally abandoning the idea of of¼cial management
of business enterprises. Moreover, these events were followed immediately 
by Matsukata De½ation in which Finance Minister Matsukata Masayoshi 
launched ¼scal austerity measures to end in½ation and began a series of 
monetary and ¼scal reforms that established the Bank of Japan in 1882. 
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private sector to grow—and it did begin to grow strongly from the late 1880s.
Thus, it can be said that the long debate over what must be done for the 
transformation from a feudal to a “modern” society ended in 1881, as
the government set the deadline for establishing a constitutional monarchy 
and industrialization strategy based on state-run industries was replaced by
private-sector driven one. From then on, Japan entered the period of imple-
mentation toward these agreed goals, and indeed succeeded, within a decade 
or so, in promulgating the Meiji Constitution and founding a Western-style
parliament as well as seeing the emergence of private joint-stock companies
which initiated an industrial revolution. 
According to the textbook account of Japanese history, Taisei Hokan (the 
return of governing authority from the Bakufu to the emperor) or subsequent
Ousei Fukko (the restoration of the emperor’s direct rule) in late 1867 divides
the Meiji period from the previous Edo period. However, this is not a very 
meaningful period demarcation for our purpose. What happened from late 
1867 to early 1868 was the exit of the Bakufu (the Tokugawa Family) as the 
leading political player as a result of military confrontation triggered by 
machination and provocation. This was a big event from the viewpoint of 
who ruled the country, but not from the viewpoint of the characteristics
of the political process at that time. The content and pattern of political 
competition did not change appreciably before and after the Meiji Restora-
tion. Moreover, political players other than the Bakufu remained basically 
unchanged. For this reason, from the perspective of the history of a latecomer
country facing the pressure of globalization, it is more logical and convincing
to regard the pre-1858 period as the pre-opening period, the period of 1858– 
1881 as the transformation period in response to the Western impact, and 
the subsequent period as the implementation period. 
According to the popular view, the Meiji period (1868–1912) is regarded 
as the period of a despotic government monopolized by the former samurai 
of strong han (Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Saga) which, elevating the em-
peror as the national symbol, engaged in an all-out effort in economic and 
military modernization while delaying the arrival of constitutional politics 
as much as possible. Some even argue that the Meiji regime was the ¼rst 
model of authoritarian developmentalism which was later adopted by other 
East Asian countries in the post-World War II period. However, our argu-
ment is that this view is at odds with the facts. 
In the post-World War II period, an authoritarian state guided by a
strong leader emerged in many East Asian economies to propel industrialization
and bring the population out of poverty. A series of developmental policies 
were executed by the directives of top leaders to accelerate import substitution,
export promotion, heavy industrialization, technology transfer, education 
and training, and the construction of infrastructure. Meanwhile, the intro-
duction of democracy was signi¼cantly delayed or even denied. The most 
salient cases were the Park Chung-hee government in South Korea (1961–1979)
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the Deng Xiaoping government in China (1976–1997), the Lee Kwan Yew 
government in Singapore (1965–1990), the Mahathir government in Malaysia
(1981–2003), and the Sarit and Thanom governments in Thailand (1958– 
1973) can be cited as such political regimes (Watanabe 1995; Ohno and 
Sakurai 1997). 
These authoritarian developmental states of East Asia exhibited the follow-
ing features: (i) internal or external crisis as a catalyst to set up the regime; 
(ii) a powerful and often charismatic leader (all of whom happened to be 
male); (iii) a loyal and capable technocrat group to support him; (iv)
prioritization of developmental ideology and postponement of political
reform; (v) legitimization through economic performance and not by demo-
cratic procedure; and (vi) continuation of the regime for a few decades and 
internal social transformation caused by the success of its economic policies. 
However, the Meiji Revolution had only one common feature with these, 
namely, crisis as a catalyst for initiating the regime, and shared no other. 
The early Meiji period was not a period when a dictatorial regime with a 
simple, solid, and oppressive political structure lasted for decades. It did not 
have a charismatic leader who gave orders unilaterally, nor did it pursue 
economic modernization at the cost of all other goals. The legitimacy of the 
Meiji government was not derived solely from the authority of the emperor 
or economic performance. Surely, Emperor Meiji played an important
political role as the symbol of national unity, and all Meiji leaders admired 
and respected him as one important source of political legitimacy, but he 
was not a political player with real power. 
The Meiji Revolution was achieved by the ½exible structure of politics, 
which permitted the competition of multiple goals (two goals of fukoku 
kyohei and kogi yoron in the late Edo period, or four goals of industrialization,
foreign expedition, drafting a constitution, and establishing a national
assembly in the early Meiji period) and continuous re-grouping of political 
leaders around these goals (Banno, 2006, 2007, 2008). Policy priorities shifted
over the years, and neither winning coalitions nor losing ones stayed long 
in these positions. Political goals were not sacri¼ced for promoting economic
goals. Despite occasional setbacks, dynamics derived from the ½exible struc-
ture of politics resulted in the steady achievement of political and economic 
reforms in the long run without falling into chaos or national division. This 
was a very complex process with many phase shifts, far from the image of 
an authoritarian developmental state that single-mindedly pursued economic
growth under a simple political structure and its linear evolution. 
5.4.2 Three aspects of the ½exible structure 
The ½exible structure of the Meiji Revolution can be decomposed into three 
aspects: (i) multiplicity and dynamism of national goals; (ii) constant
re-formation of alliances; and (iii) variability and resilience of leaders and 












Meiji Japan: from feudalism to industrialization 143 
The ¼rst aspect of the ½exible structure was the multiplicity and dynamism
of national goals. Japan’s national goals continued to evolve throughout the 
transformation period. The earliest reform goals which gathered support 
among in½uential han after the opening of ports, as noted above, were the 
political goal of kogi yoron (government by public deliberation) and
the economic and military goals of fukoku kyohei (enriching the country, 
strengthening the military). Of these, kogi yoron, which started as the proposal
of alliance among four or ¼ve intelligent han lords, evolved into the idea of 
a conference of all han totaling approximately 300, and even into the creation
of the bicameral system consisting of the Upper House of han lords and the 
Lower House of lower-level samurai. As it turned out, the last plan among 
these which intended a peaceful transition of power was prepared but even-
tually overturned by the Boshin War that erupted in 1868–1869. This military
con½ict was caused partly by the refusal of the Bakufu to be downgraded 
to a minor power in the proposed political scheme and partly as a result of 
provocation by the opponents of the Bakufu. 
After the Meiji government was established in 1868, Kido Takayoshi 
(1833–1877), who formerly belonged to Choshu Han, a number of leaders 
from former Tosa Han, and the students of Fukuzawa Yukichi (1834–1901),
a renowned academic leader who established Keio University, upgraded the 
feudal assembly model based on the class society to the idea of establishing 
a modern constitution and a Western-style parliament. Political reformers 
were then split into the progressive group promoting a British-style party 
cabinet government and the conservative group advocating a German-style 
constitutional monarchy. Despite these differences in form or orientation, 
installation of a government by public deliberation of one sort or another 
was regarded as a key political requirement that would confer legitimacy to 
the Meiji Revolution and the new government established by it. 
On the other hand, the goal of fukoku kyohei in the late Edo period was 
the idea that each han should set up a trading ¼rm as external trade
was resumed; procure highly demanded products from all over Japan for 
export; with proceeds purchase cannons, guns, and military ships from the 
West; and bolster its military capability to compete effectively with other 
han and the Bakufu. In reality, those han that successfully achieved this feat 
became the major powers that eventually toppled the Bakufu and occupied 
central places in the new government. However, after the Meiji Restoration 
in 1868 and especially after the Iwakura Mission to the West by high of¼cials
to study Western systems and technology in 1871–73, Okubo Toshimichi 
(1830–1878), a former Satsuma samurai and a top of¼cial in the Meiji
government, became convinced that fukoku should not mean merely the 
mercantilist principle of buying and selling of local products for the pro¼t 
of han but should be the developmental notion of industrialization, namely, 
building factories equipped with imported modern machinery under the 
central government’s guidance to dramatically raise national output. As to 
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“former samurai with gripes”), which had nothing to do domestically after 
achieving the revolution, began to demand foreign campaigns and the budget
for their execution. Because of this development, fukoku and kyohei became 
two separate goals that competed for the same budgetary resource. In this 
context, what Okubo, the leader of the industrialization group, tried to do 
was to avoid external con½icts by appeasing the foreign expedition group, 
and secure as much ¼scal resource as possible to build factories. 
The second aspect of the ½exible structure of politics was the constant 
regrouping of political coalitions. As noted above, the two goals of kogi 
yoron and fukoku kyohei in the late Edo period split into the four goals of 
industrialization (led by Okubo Toshimichi), foreign expedition (led by Saigo
Takamori, 1827–1877), establishment of a parliament (led by Itagaki Taisuke,
1837–1919), and drafting of a constitution (led by Kido Takayoshi), and 
supporters gathered around these leaders. Figure 5.2 illustrates coalition 
formation and re-formation among these four groups from Meiji Restoration
(1868) to the end of the transformation period (1881).7 What is important 
here is the fact that no one group yielded suf¼cient political power to carry 
out desired policies, and could pursue them only by forming a coalition with 
one or two other groups which entertained other policy objectives. Whether 
advocacy of a foreign expedition, demand for a popularly elected parliament,
or industrial promotion, dominance of one group invited intervention from 
other groups, and the defeat of another group was compensated by assistance
from others. Furthermore, this coalition re-formation with checks and
balances hardly resulted in permanent grudges or vengeance against each 
other. Depending on circumstances, they could alternately become friends 
and enemies without generating irreconcilable hatred for mutual destruction.
This process, which from outside seemed like an endless political battle, was 
surprisingly successful in avoiding chaos and achieving multiple national 
goals in the long run, albeit with many setbacks and through trial-and-error. 
Why did such ½exible re-formation of coalitions continue for decades? One
reason was that, during the decade leading up to Ousei Fukko (restoration 
of the emperor’s direct rule, 1867), interaction among in½uential han for 
pursuing commercial pro¼ts through feudal trading ¼rms and contriving the 
plan to establish a feudal assembly became very active. This interaction 
generated mutual trust across different han and different policy lines, which 
naturally carried over to the post-Meiji Restoration period as continued 
coalition building based on former han groups. Another reason was shared 
ideologies, such as nationalism and the Respect for the Emperor, among 
leaders in the late Edo period as analyzed in section 5.3.2 above. These 
ideologies were suddenly and greatly activated at the contact with the power-
ful West. Such centripetal social ethos kept political ¼ghts within certain 
bounds without exploding into unstoppable mutual destruction. 
The third aspect of the ½exible structure of politics was the variability and 
resilience of leaders and leader groups. In the eyes of the posterity, Saigo is 
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bureaucrat par excellence, and Itagaki as a campaigner for political freedom,
people’s rights, and the establishment of a parliament. However, none of these
leaders pursued their respective goals single-mindedly from the outset. On 
the contrary, sharing goals and shifting allegiance were common among leaders
in the late Edo to the early Meiji period. It could even be said that they all 
understood the importance of the two goals in the late Edo period or the four
goals in the early Meiji period. It was through external stimuli, new inspiration,
or the force of circumstance that they ended up specializing in one of them. 
From this perspective, the fact that Saigo continued to be extremely popular
among the revolution army even after he was expelled from the government 
in 1873, the fact that Okubo’s eyes were opened to modern industry during 
the of¼cial mission to the West (1871–1873), and the unexpectedly great 
success of the Petition for the Establishment of the Popular Parliament (1874)
which Itagaki co-authored after leaving the government, were crucial in 
deciding the path of each leader. Had they not shared the multiple goals at 
the root, it would have been unthinkable that Okubo would write a letter 
to convey his shock and excitement in visiting British factories to Saigo 
waiting in Japan, and it would be dif¼cult to explain why Itagaki vacillated 
between demanding a parliament and proposing a foreign expedition while 
he was in the caretaker government waiting for the return of other ministers 
from the West. For the same reason, Meiji politics required no charismatic 
leader, and the death or downfall of one leader (such as the assassination of 
Okubo in 1878) did not result in the extinction of the group which he had led. 
The ½exible structure of politics exhibited by the Meiji leaders proved 
effective in the simultaneous pursuit of multiple goals, resilience to internal 
and external shocks, and durability of the political regime in comparison 
with the simple hard structure of politics which was the hallmark of develop-
mental dictatorship of East Asia in the post-World War II period. Although 
political institutions were in the early stage of development in the early Meiji 
period, the substance of politics, such as the content of policy competition 
and the process of consensus building, were already highly mature. 
5.4.3 The source of political leaders 
Who were the people that led and executed the Meiji Revolution? In the late 
Edo and the early Meiji period, political leaders predominantly came from the
samurai class. The Meiji Revolution was a revolution staged by samurai, and
the social transformation triggered by the Western contact was carried out 
by the hands of samurai who had been the political leaders and the privileged
class in the Bakufu–Han System of the preceding Edo period. Table 5.1 
shows the dates, ¼eld of achievement, and original class of prominent leaders
in the late Edo and the early Meiji period. They are listed in the order of birth
year. Among the 56 leaders tabulated here, there are 44 han vassals (low-
ranking samurai), six han lords, two hatamoto (samurai belonging to the 
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Table 5.1 Origins of political leaders in late Edo and early Meiji 
Name Years Area of 
achievement 
Original class 
Nakane Sekko 1807–1877 Political Han samurai (Fukui Han) 
scientist 
Shimazu 1809–1858 Han lord Han lord (Satsuma Han) 
Nariakira 
Yokoi Shonan 1809–1869 Confucianist, Han samurai (Higo Han) 
statesman 
Sakuma 1811–1864 Militarist, Han samurai (Matsushiro 
Shozan jurist, Han) 
confucianist 
Nabeshima 1814–1871 Han lord Han lord (Saga Han) 
Naomasa 
Uchida 1815–1893 Bureucrat Han samurai (Satsuma 
Masakaze Han) 
Yoshida Toyo 1816–1862 Statesman Han samura (Tosa Han) 
Shimazu 1817–1887 Han top Han lord in substance 
Hisamitsu leader (Satsuma Han) 
Okubo 1817–1888 Bakufu Bakufu samurai 
Tadahiro of¼cial, 
statesman 
Hasebe Jimbei 1818–1873 Bureaucrat Han samurai (Fukui Han) 
Date Munenari 1818–1892 Han lord, Han lord (Uwajima Han) 
statesman 
Nagai Uta 1819–1863 Advocate for Han samurai (Choshu 
open door Han) 
policy 
Murata Ujihisa 1821–1899 Statesman Han samurai (Fukui Han) 
Katsu Kaishu 1823–1899 Bakufu Bakufu samurai 
militarist, 
statesman 
Iwakura 1825–1883 Statesman Nobleman 
Tomomi 
Yamauchi 1827–1872 Han lord Han lord (Tosa Han) 
Yodo 
Saigo 1827–1877 Statesman Han samurai (Satsuma 
Takamori (1 of 3 Ishin Han) 
Heroes) 
Iwashita 1827–1900 Statesman Han samurai (Satsuma 
Michihira Han) 
Saisho Atsushi 1827–1910 Bureaucrat Han samurai (Satsuma 
Han) 
Ijichi 1828–1886 Militarist Han samurai (Satsuma 
Masaharu Han) 
Matsudaira 1828–1890 Han lord Han lord (Fukui Han) 
Shungaku 
Yoshii 1828–1891 Bureaucrat Han samurai (Satsuma 
Tomozane Han) 
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Table 5.1 (cont’d ) 
























































































































Han samurai (Fukui Han) 
Han samurai (Tosa Han) 
Han samurai (Choshu 
Han) 
Han samurai (Satsuma 
Han) 
Han samurai (Saga Han) 
Han samurai (Satsuma 
Han) 
Han samurai (Choshu 
Han) 
Han samurai (Tosa Han) 
Han samurai (Saga Han) 
Unaf¼liated samurai (Tosa 
Han) 
Han samurai (Nakatsu 
Han) 
Han samurai, absconded 
(Tosa Han) 
Han samurai (Satsuma 
Han) 
Han samurai (Satsuma 
Han) 
Han samurai (Choshu 
Han) 
Han samurai (Tosa Han) 
Han samurai (Satsuma 
Han) 
Han samurai (Satsuma 
Han) 
Nobleman 
Han samurai (Tosa Han) 
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Table 5.1 (cont’d ) 





























































Han samurai (Satsuma 
Han) 
Rural samurai (Tosa Han) 
Han samurai (Tosa Han) 
Han samurai (Saga Han) 
Han samurai (Choshu 
Han) 
Son of a rich merchant 
Han samurai (Satsuma 
Han) 
Son of a rich farmer 
Han samurai (Choshu 
Han, upgraded from 
peasantry) 
Han samurai (Kishu Han) 
Han samurai (Tosa Han) 
Han samurai (Saeki Han) 
which accounted for 79 percent, were the dominant group. Among them, the
four most powerful han of Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Saga produced 35 
leaders. The collective samurai class, which included han lords, han vassals,
and hatamoto, counted 52, or 93 percent of all leaders of this period.9 
Needless to say, the number of leaders was minuscule relative to the total 
population. Their precise number is impossible to pin down because of the 
ambiguity of the de¼nition of leaders. One suggestion comes from Who’s Who
of the Meiji Restoration, compiled in 1981 by mobilizing 800 historians all over
Japan to enumerate all VIPs in the period with which we are concerned, whether
they were politically conservative, gradualist, or radical (Japan Historical 
Academy, 1981). The leaders contained in this volume are approximately 4,300
in number which are again dominated by the samurai class. If we tentatively 
assume this to be the number of active leaders in the late Edo and the early 
Meiji period, the leaders occupied about 1 percent of the samurai population
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A question may arise as to why the samurai class forced a revolution which
would destroy the feudal system and the class system on which their privi-
leged position depended. The answer is that their initial intention was merely
to reorganize the polity within the old regime to cope effectively with the 
foreign pressure rather than a radical transformation of the regime itself. 
For this purpose, samurai performed the assigned role of leadership with a 
sense of duty and pride. However, the movement unexpectedly proceeded 
to the denial of the old system because the establishment and defense of the 
new government required an action far beyond the original plan. This came 
about because of enlightenment by Western thoughts, political con½ict with 
the Bakufu, the necessity of a strong central authority, and resistance from 
the conservative forces (court nobility and han lords) in the early years of 
Meiji. Thus, the movement that started as a political reform ended up in a 
social revolution. 
In the late Edo to the early Meiji period, political contribution of the 
non-samurai groups belonging to the old regime, such as court nobility, 
Bakufu scholars, private scholars, rich merchants, and wealthy farmers, was 
limited although there were some exceptions.10 Similarly, the newly emerging
groups in the period following the opening of ports (1859) or the Meiji 
Restoration (1867), such as farmers and landlords enriched by the export of 
silk and tea, the Yokohama merchants,11seisho (politically connected business-
men) and zaibatsu (business conglomerates), and intellectuals of the Meirokusha
(the Society of the Sixth Year of Meiji) or Fukuzawa’s Keio Academy, were 
not the main political players although some had close contacts with govern-
ment of¼cials. As to the political participation of the general mass, it is hard 
to detect anything in this period. Apart from farmers’ uprisings which carried
little message for national politics and had been observed since the Edo 
period, it can be said that political participation of the general mass began 
with the Hibiya Riot in 1905, in which the urban mass protested against the 
small size of war compensation paid by Russia following Japanese victory 
in the Japan–Russia War (1904–1905). Modern popular movements and 
demonstrations demanding universal (male) suffrage, women’s rights, and the
liberation of the underclass arose in the Taisho Democracy period (from the mid-
1900s to the end of the 1920s), much later than the early Meiji period with 
which we are currently concerned. 
Three additional remarks are in order to supplement the discussion of the 
Meiji Restoration. 
First, the Meiji Revolution was not a revolution by low-ranking samurai 
alone. The lords of the in½uential han were equal or even superior to their 
most capable vassals in knowledge, leadership, and agility. For example, 
Satsuma Han Lord Shimazu Nariakira (1809–1858), and his younger brother
and successor Shimazu Hisamitsu (1817–1887), ordered Saigo Takamori, 
Okubo Toshimichi, Komatsu Tatewaki (1835–1870), Godai Tomoatsu 
(1835–1885), and other vassals to manage the feudal trading ¼rm of the han,
push the idea of a feudal assembly, and build coalitions with other han. 
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These lower samurai frequently reported to the han leader. Thus, the revo-
lutionary movement of Satsuma Han was a joint product of the han leader 
and his samurai. The contribution and in½uence of han lords, who were 
naturally fewer than han vassals in number (Table 5.1), should not be under-
estimated. From another angle, it can also be stated that one peculiar feature
of the Meiji Revolution was active participation of low-ranking samurai, 
who in normal times should be less visible than their lords. 
The second point, related to the ¼rst, is that a clear division of labor 
between a few top leaders and a much greater number of supporting elites 
was not observable in the Meiji Revolution. Many countries in East Asia, 
such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia, in the post-World 
War II period had a strong president or prime minister who led development
effort, on the one hand, and a cohort of elite technocrats, often with PhDs 
from the West, who were mobilized to concretize the leader’s vision, on
the other. However, Japan in the late Edo to the early Meiji period did not 
have such a division. While samurai supplied most leaders, who would
occupy the top position and who would serve him as supporters was not 
pre-determined. Had the “Upper House” of the feudal assembly come into 
being in a peaceful manner, intelligent han lords could have played an
important role in the new political arrangement. But in reality top leaders 
of the Meiji government who emerged from the military con½ict were former
low-ranking samurai and not han lords. Moreover, leaders in the early Meiji 
period did not have to rely on a large number of technocrats or voter sup-
port to run the government, because the parliament and the election system 
had not yet been installed. In this sense, leaders and elites were undifferen-
tiated and political support base for the government was neither present nor 
necessary. 
Third, the role of han was vital as a unit that prepared the conditions for 
the ½exible structure of politics to emerge within the samurai class. Vassals 
in powerful han accumulated domestic and foreign knowledge, negotiation 
skills, and commercial experience through contacts with similar samurai from
other han and Bakufu of¼cials as well as exposure to foreigners and infor-
mation from Europe and America. This in turn led to the sharing of the 
national sense of crisis and nationalism among them. Low-ranking samurai 
of the in½uential han, trained in both theory and practice, continued to form 
and re-form groups into the early Meiji period with the former han as the 
basic unit. In this way, han in the late Edo period served as an incubator of 
human resource and network formation that enabled Japan to cast off the 
class-based feudal system and face squarely with the Western powers. 
5.5 Technology transfer 
Japan was the ¼rst non-Western country to successfully receive, modify, and 
internalize Western technology as early as in the late nineteenth century. 
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period. In so doing it relies heavily on the analysis provided by Uchida 
(1990). The process of technology transfer in this period can be classi¼ed 
into (i) early attempts in the late Edo period, (ii) foreign experts and turnkey 
projects, (iii) engineering education, and (iv) acquiring technology through 
machinery imports and foreign partnership. These modes were adopted
sequentially from (i) to (iv) to gradually replace expensive foreign experts 
by Japanese professionals and engineers although there were signi¼cant overlaps
among their periods. These various methods are examined one by one below.12 
5.5.1 Early attempts 
In 1854, the Bakufu made its ¼rst conscious effort to import pragmatic 
foreign technology when it adopted Western-style armaments for coastal 
defence against possible foreign invasion. Many han also tried to replicate 
foreign technology in the spirit of fukoku kyohei by building furnaces to 
smelt and process metals for casting cannons. Scholars of Dutch studies and 
traditional craftsmen designed and built these furnaces relying solely on 
descriptions in imported Dutch books which, however, were already outdated
by the time they were translated. Haphazard copy production of steel and 
arms such as these generally failed, and there is no evidence that the cannons
or bullets thus produced were effective in the battles that brought an end to 
the Tokugawa shogunate. Some han also test-produced Western-style ships 
and steam engines from Dutch texts, but the technology gap between the 
results and the foreign ships that actually visited Japan was so great that 
this effort had to be abandoned. Realizing the limits to imitating technology 
from books, the Bakufu and some powerful han changed their strategies and
reverted to directly importing ¼rearms manufactured abroad as soon as 
Japan opened its ports in 1859. 
However, the results were not so dismal in some cases where technical 
knowledge was transmitted in the presence of foreign experts and their direct
guidance. The construction of a Western-style wooden sailing ship at Heda 
port in the Izu Peninsula in 1854, where Japanese carpenters worked on 
designs by Russian naval of¼cers and under instructions of Russian ship-
wrights to replace the storm-wrecked vessel to take Russians home, can be 
regarded as the ¼rst successful case of on-site technology transfer. The Japanese
carpenters absorbed the technology so well they later became the ¼rst skilled 
workers at Japanese naval arsenals or privately-owned shipyards. 
Another notable case was the Nagasaki Naval Training Center, established
in 1855, that trained the crew of Japan’s ¼rst Western-style battleship, the 
Kanko-maru, which was a gift from the Dutch government to the Bakufu. 
The center was a joint undertaking of the Dutch navy and the Bakufu with 
daily management entrusted to Dutch instructors. Five Dutch navy personnel
trained 167 samurai who had been competitively selected by the Bakufu and 
various han. Courses focused on operational technologies such as navigation,
artillery training, and the care and maintenance of steam engines, which were
 
 













Meiji Japan: from feudalism to industrialization 153 
the standard curriculum for a battleship crew. The Japanese crew also received
on-the-job training through exercise navigation to Kagoshima. Between 1860
and 1870, the Bakufu and a number of han imported a total of 166 ships 
from the West. It was the graduates of the Nagasaki Naval Training Center 
and other similar centers that the Bakufu subsequently set up in Edo and 
Hyogo who operated them. The importation of different types of ships enabled
the Bakufu and han to compare and enrich their knowledge of warships, 
engines, and gunnery. In a similar way, the Bakufu army acquired technology
both through the artillery it imported and the invitation of foreign military 
advisors to Japan who trained military students. 
In addition, the Bakufu built the Nagasaki Steel Mill and Shipyard
in 1857 and the Yokosuka Steel Mill in 1866 as ancillary facilities for the 
Nagasaki Naval Training Center. These two facilities, which later became 
Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard and Yokosuka Naval Arsenal, replicated 
Western mechanized factory production and transferred technology to
Japanese by the employment of foreign engineers and skilled workers.
Kagoshima Spinning Mill, established in 1867 by Satsuma Han, also adopted
a similar approach. After the Meiji Restoration, these early factories became 
a model for the new government’s program to hire foreign advisors for 
concrete factory operation, as explained in section 5.5.3 below. 
5.5.2 Foreign experts and turnkey projects 
In the early years of Meiji, the new government hired foreign advisors to 
the tune of 300 to 600 in any year on a project contract basis, at consider-
able ¼scal cost, to establish Western-style state-owned enterprises in the ¼elds
of railways, telegraphy, and silk reeling. Some foreign advisors received 
salaries higher than that of the Japanese prime minister. Some of the projects
recruited a large number of foreigners of the same nationality with various 
functions and imported virtually all hardware to create an exact replica of 
a foreign model. These can be considered as turnkey projects with a foreign 
director supervising his fellow countrymen and Japanese workers, with the 
Japanese side eventually overtaking operation after the project completion.13 
Yokosuka Shipyard, the Tokyo–Yokohama Railway, the Imperial Mint, 
and Ikuno Silver Mine were such examples. There was also another type
of foreign advisors hired not as a country team but as individual engineers 
and skilled workers ¼lling speci¼c technological needs of the project under 
Japanese management. Many of¼ces for industry, mining, and agricultural 
businesses run by the Japanese Home Of¼ce as well as some businesses 
under the Hokkaido Settlement Agency were such examples. Comparing 
these two types of projects, the latter naturally required greater ownership 
and involvement on the Japanese side in technology transfer. 
The turnkey projects were managed by foreign directors and advisors with
hired Japanese employees performing only unskilled or auxiliary works. For 
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was dispatched, along with other foreign experts, by the British Oriental 
Bank to manage the mint under a Japanese government contract. Annual 
Reports of the President of the Imperial Mint were published in the name of 
Kinder. In the case of Telegraphic Service of the Ministry of Industry, the 
of¼cial report was written in the name of the Japanese second-in-command. 
In its ¼rst few reports which were published in both English and Japanese, 
the Japanese version stated that the Japanese were working in cooperation 
with foreigners sharing the duties of construction engineers and maintenance
staff, and requesting the foreigners’ support as necessary. The English
version, however, presented an entirely different picture in which the Japanese
worked under the supervision of foreigners as telegraph operators, clerks, 
engineers, inspectors, and labourers. It is suspected that the latter was closer 
to the truth while the former story was made up to please the higher-ups in 
the ministry. 
From the viewpoint of the Japanese government, the primary aim of
establishing a mint, a telegraphic service, railways, and shipyards was to 
rapidly introduce modern industrial infrastructure comparable to Western 
models. Given the speed with which they had to be built, it is not surprising 
that these enterprises were run by a large number of foreigners who managed
them in the same manner as the businesses they had managed at home. These
early businesses did not always consciously aim at transferring technology 
to Japan. 
At the same time, the Western countries which obtained trading rights 
with Japan also considered it highly desirable that Japan build the type of 
infrastructure described above as soon as possible. For the various foreign 
delegations, shipping lines, and merchants, Nagasaki and Yokosuka Steel 
Mills became indispensable facilities for the repair of foreign ships because 
Japan was at the end of long-distance sea routes that linked Europe with 
the Far East. Similarly, repairing foreign ships and replenishing fuel (charcoal)
were the main purposes of creation of Nagasaki Kosuga Dock, managed by 
the trading company of British merchant Thomas B. Glover, and Takashima
Coal Mine. The construction of lighthouses and the telegraph service was 
requested by the British consul general, Harry Smith Parkes, to the Meiji 
government shortly after the government’s formation. By the end of 1874, 
British engineer R. H. Branton, who was commissioned for the task, had 
assembled a large team of British, Chinese, and Filipino workers, 88 men 
strong, who included builders, lighthouse keepers, and boat crews. While 
the Meiji government bore the full cost of building lighthouses, Branton and 
his team undertook both construction and maintenance. The lighthouses 
thus constructed ensured safe passage for foreign and Japanese ships alike. 
In the area of telegraphy, the Bakufu signed an agreement with the French
government to build a telegraph service in 1866. However, this decision was 
overturned by the Meiji government which chose, through the mediation of 
the British consul general, a domestic telegraphic service. Okita Telegraph 
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Behind these developments lay the completion of international telegraphic 
networks that had started from the construction of Anglo-French submarine
transmission cables in 1851. By 1866, one telegraph network stretched from 
Europe to the Far East via an overland route that the Russian government 
had laid, reaching Vladivostok. Between 1869 and 1871, another submarine 
telegraphic network laid by private British companies connected Aden
to Hong Kong and Shanghai via Bombay and Singapore. The Japanese 
telegraphic cables built by Okita Telegraph Company connected these two 
international networks at the end and extended them to Nagasaki and
Yokohama, the two ports with a large foreign settlement. The construction 
of Tokyo–Yokohama and Tokyo–Nagasaki telegraphic lines enabled foreign
delegations and merchants in Japan to have virtually instantaneous contact 
with home. From the beginning, telegraphic service handled messages in the 
Western alphabet as well as in Japanese characters. The fact that 10 percent 
of the initial messages were in the alphabet shows that the telegraph system 
proved useful to foreign residents as well as to the Japanese public and 
private sector. Solid establishment of modern seafaring and telegraphy in 
Japan enabled foreigners in Japan to conduct their diplomatic and com-
mercial affairs ef¼ciently. 
Japan’s heavy reliance on imported machinery, equipment, and materials 
in establishing these businesses brought handsome pro¼ts to foreign mer-
chants, who were also the mediators of technology transfer. Jardine Matheson
& Co. and the Oriental Bank competed over an order to build and equip 
the Imperial Mint. When the latter won the contract, it not only imported 
second-hand equipment from the Hong Kong Mint and sold gold and silver 
for minting but also provided Japan with management expertise by hiring a 
British team headed by Kinder as described earlier. For any such project, 
foreign merchants would act as middlemen for importing management and 
technology, providing Japanese government-run businesses with engineers 
and skilled workers from the home country. 
International migration of Western engineers also re½ected the situation 
on the supply side. It was not just a phenomenon observed in Japan or driven
only by strong Japanese demand for such projects. As British industrial 
infrastructure was nearly completed by the 1850s, the pace of building railways,
ports, and related facilities slowed down and there was a surplus of civil 
engineers in Britain. Needing work, many of them chose to pursue careers 
building railways and cities in the Continent, then in British colonies and 
foreign lands in the less developed world such as Canada, India, Australia, 
South Africa, and South America. Machinery and equipment makers also 
turned their eyes to overseas markets. For British railway contractors, it was 
customary for a supervisor who received an overseas order to ¼rst secure 
the materials needed such as train tracks and locomotives from foundries 
and manufacturers at home, hire subcontractors and a team of skilled workers,
then travel with them to his destination. In the case of Argentina, 160 Britons,
including engineers, came to build its railway in 1857. It is not surprising 
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then to see a similar team coming to Japan 13 years later to lay its ¼rst 
railway between Shimbashi and Yokohama. Japan’s adoption of the narrow 
gauge of 3 feet 6 inches is often thought to be a policy mistake, but all railways
built in Australia and South Africa around 1860 were of the same gauge. 
Hiring foreign experts and workers through turnkey contracts did not 
intend or require systematic technology transfer, but the method did have 
the merit of providing a training ground for Japanese workers in the work 
practices of advanced countries. It created groups of skilled workers that 
were new to Japan including machine operators, steam-engine drivers, steel-
workers, and electricians. They often migrated from state-owned enterprises 
to the private sector or set up their own, spreading Western technology that 
they had acquired and paving the way for the Western-style management of 
industry by the Japanese from the 1880s onwards. 
From around 1875 state-owned enterprises stopped hiring large foreign 
teams, and by 1880 foreign engineers and skilled workers had disappeared 
from all but a few workplaces. Factories and facilities that had been created 
by turnkey projects and management contracts were now permanent busi-
nesses under Japanese management and operation which no longer needed 
foreign supervision. Foreign advisors were retained only in those areas where
technology transfer was considered inadequate. This shift resulted partly 
from a policy change of the Meiji government which could no longer afford 
to hire expensive foreigners. It was also the natural consequence of ¼xed-term
contracts which foreign experts did not expect to renew. But what is truly 
amazing was the fact that the Japanese government and businesses did not 
feel the need for continued foreign help in operating the modern and complex
Western-style machinery and equipment which Japan imported for the ¼rst 
time only a decade or so ago. There were already Japanese managers who 
could take over the role of foreign supervisors and trained Japanese technicians
who were ready to replace foreign engineers. 
5.5.3 Engineering education 
After the departure of foreign advisors, Japanese engineers assumed the role 
of internalizing and diffusing Western technologies in Japan. They understood
the fundamentals of Western technology and could put this knowledge
to practical use. They collected and digested technical information from 
abroad and instructed appropriate technologies to purchasing missions dis-
patched to foreign manufacturers. Once a factory was built, they supervised 
its operation. The smooth transfer of Western technology owed much to the 
fact that Meiji Japan trained a large number of local engineers to an excep-
tionally high standard in a short period. World history tells us that few 
latecomer countries can do this. The deeper reason why this was possible 
was hinted in the sections we have already traversed: political, social, and 
economic conditions engendered in Japan by repeated translative adaptations
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Turnkey projects managed by foreigners, described in the previous section,
were an important channel for industrial human training, but it was not the 
only one. Japanese engineers and skilled workers were also produced by 
sending students to Europe and America as well as through establishing 
institutions for technical education and training at home. 
Early Meiji-era engineers were those who had studied Western technology 
before Japan had established a formal university and technical education 
system. The group can be divided into three types. First, there were the 
scholars of Dutch studies from the late Edo period who had taught themselves
from imported technical books and journals. They worked for Western-style 
businesses owned by the Bakufu or various han, and were later recognized 
as engineers by the Meiji government. Oshima Takato, who built the ¼rst 
blast furnace in Japan, Takeda Ayasaburo, who built the star-shaped fort 
in Hakodate, and Utsunomiya Saburo, who became Japan’s ¼rst cement 
manufacturer, were among them. 
Second, there were graduates from schools and centers managed and taught
by foreigners. They included the Nagasaki Naval Training Center (1855), 
the Yokosuka Shipyard School (1870), the Telegraphic Service Technical 
Training College (1871), the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy’s Institute 
for Maritime Studies (1873), and the Railway Engineer Training Center 
(1877). At these schools, foreign engineers taught Japanese trainees the engi-
neering knowledge required for the functions they performed. The graduates 
later worked as foremen or junior technicians throughout Japan’s modern 
army as well as in the telegraphic service, railways, and shipbuilding during 
their infant stages. The education offered at these institutions was limited to 
foreign-language training and the knowledge necessary to run the business 
at hand. But this was suf¼cient to ensure that these businesses could go on 
normally even after foreign management left. For instance, graduates from the
Railway Engineer Training Center supervised and successfully completed 
the construction of a railway line from Kyoto and Otsu, which included 
tunnelling through Osaka Mountain, in 1878–1880. 
The third group of early Meiji-era engineers were those who were selected 
and sent abroad to study by the government. Normally, the Ministry of 
Education or the military selected best achievers among graduates of Japan-
ese education or training institutions for continued study abroad although 
some engineers chose foreign education by their own will. By the Western 
educational standards of the time, they were extremely good students despite
the meagre stipends provided by the Japanese government. On their return 
to Japan, they usually worked as senior technical experts for the government14 
or for the private sector. The very ¼rst overseas students were seven men 
sent to the Netherlands by the Bakufu to learn Western navigation in 1862. 
Some students even went abroad without of¼cial permission, including
master engineers Yamao Yozo and Inoue Masaru who previously served 
Satsuma and Choshu Han, respectively, and became senior bureaucrats in 
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Meiji, students from all over Japan traveled abroad to study, including Dan 
Takuma who later became the director of Mitsui Mining. The navy also sent 
many trainees from the Yokosuka Shipyard School and the Naval Academy 
abroad to master technologies for shipbuilding and arms manufacture, as 
did Kaisei Gakko, the precursor to the University of Tokyo. By the end
of the 1880s, Japan had sent around 80 students abroad to be trained as 
engineers as far as records remain. 
By the ¼eld of study, 21 Japanese overseas students studied shipbuilding, 
17 studied mechanical engineering, 13 studied civil engineering, ten studied 
mining and metallurgy, six studied arms manufacture, and four studied 
chemistry. By destination, 28 were sent to Britain, 20 to the US, 14 to France,
nine to Germany, and eight to the Netherlands (excluding unknowns, based 
on Uchida 1990). They not only studied at universities but also went to 
various recognized technical schools, received on-the-job training, or had 
private lessons.15 It should be noted that not many Western universities at 
that time acknowledged or offered pragmatic technical education. In Great 
Britain, only universities in Scotland and London established mechanical 
and civil engineering chairs before the 1840s. It was customary for a British 
engineer to be trained on site, ¼rst working as an apprentice and then as
an assistant. Many of the British engineers who migrated abroad had
been trained in this manner. In France, there were some notable technical 
institutions such as École Polytechnique, École d’Application, and École
Centrale. In Germany, each state boasted a number of technical and voca-
tional schools, including the mining school of Freiberg established in 1765. 
In the US, there were few technical education institutions until the ¼rst half 
of the nineteenth century. Boston Tech, which later developed into Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology, was founded in the 1860s, just before the 
Meiji Restoration and at around the same time that Columbia and Cornell 
universities ¼rst offered civil, mechanical, and mining and materials engineering
courses. However, these technical institutions were still considered a rank 
below universities until the end of the nineteenth century. This being said, 
it can be concluded that the ¼rst wave of Japanese overseas students were 
sent to appropriate institutions for the purpose of absorbing pragmatic technical
knowledge and received an education on par with engineers of the ¼rst rank 
in Europe and the US. It is no surprise that on their return, these engineers 
were able to assume the responsibilities and positions previously occupied 
by foreign technical advisors and engineers. 
Japan accepted engineering, along with medicine and law, as one of the 
new subjects to be studied vigorously in order to absorb useful imported 
knowledge. Unlike Western Europe, it did not have the mindset to look 
down on engineering as an inferior subject to be treated with less academic 
respect. The early establishment of faculties of engineering at Japanese uni-
versities became a distinctive feature that contributed greatly to the country’s
technological advance. It may be said that Meiji Japan quickly and selectively
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had just established through a century of trial-and-error and combined them 
for the best results. This new tradition was started with the founding
of Kobu Daigakko (Institute of Technology) in 187116 and the courses in 
applied science and civil and mechanical engineering offered at the University
of Science. 
The Institute of Technology was created by the Ministry of Industry to 
train a cadre of engineers for its bureaus of mining, railways, telegraphy, 
and construction. As the ministry did not possess the technical know-how 
to teach engineering students, it hired a British engineer, Henry Dyer, to run 
the Institute under a management contract. As the principal and professor 
of engineering of the Institute, Dyer was in a fortunate position to be able 
to design an ideal institution from scratch that integrated both theory and 
practice, a feature that British engineering education lacked. The six-year 
program of the Institute included basic education in English and mathematics
in the ¼rst two years, classroom instructions in science and engineering in 
the next two years, and internship at various bureaus of the Ministry of 
Industry under the supervision of foreign engineers in the ¼nal two years. 
On graduating, the engineers were expected to assume positions within the 
Ministry of Industry. On the other hand, a smaller number of students who 
took engineering courses at the University of Science found employment in 
the Home Ministry, the Imperial Mint, and so on. The two institutions were 
merged to become the Faculty of Engineering at Tokyo Imperial University 
in 1885. By the end of the Meiji period, each of the other imperial universities
founded in Kyoto, Tohoku, and Kyushu possessed a faculty of engineering 
from the very beginning. 
These faculties of engineering at Meiji-era imperial universities were
not research-oriented. They were dedicated solely to transmitting Western 
engineering knowledge. The textbooks used were all from abroad, and many 
of the lectures and the examinations were conducted in a foreign language 
(English or German). The journals published by the Societies of Industrial, 
Mechanical, and Electrical Engineering devoted many of their pages to over-
seas mission reports or excerpts from foreign journals. The science education
offered by high schools in preparation for university entrance, too, devoted 
a considerable amount of time to teaching English and German as well as 
mathematics. 
The technical and vocational schools that trained middle-rank engineers 
also contributed greatly to Japan’s industrialization together with the faculties
of engineering at imperial universities. In 1881, the Tokyo Shokko Gakko 
(Tokyo Workers School) was established to train worksite foremen and 
engineers. In 1897 under the Technical Schools Act, it became a technical 
high school along with Osaka Technical High School, which had been
established a few years earlier. By the end of the Meiji period, additional 
technical high schools were created in Nagoya, Kumamoto, Sendai, and 
Kyoto. Subsequently, an even greater number of technical high schools were 
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Table 5.2 Number of engineers by type of education 



















































































86 482 1,565 5,078 14,162 
Source: Uchida (1990), p. 281. 
The education offered at technical high schools was more limited in scope 
than that offered at the faculties of engineering at universities, but the quality
of the students was outstanding. They attracted good students who could 
not afford university education for ¼nancial reasons. While graduates from 
the faculties of engineering at universities usually assumed of¼cial or acade-
mic positions, technical high-school graduates became core engineers on the 
factory ½oor. Early technical high schools also offered special courses on 
how Western technologies could be adapted to upgrade indigenous Japanese
industries like textiles, ceramics, and brewing. In the late Meiji period, technical
high-school graduates overtook university engineering graduates in number 
and began to produce the majority of Japanese engineers with pragmatic 
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Table 5.3 Number of engineers by sector 
Year 
1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 
Private sector 
Railways 34 153 149 496 
Maritime transport 3 15 28 85 
Construction 16 10 23 131 
Commerce 2 34 186 745 
Mining 46 177 513 1,779 
Metallurgy – 8 47 635 
Shipbuilding 16 69 250 1,071 
Machinery 6 38 106 554 
Electric nachinery 23 104 770 
Electric power generation & gas 20 34 231 861 
Ceramics 11 24 90 302 
Chemicals 12 93 570 
Paper 1 14 68 207 
Food – 17 149 180 
Textiles 18 77 300 1,103 
Other 9 123 506 879 
SUBTOTAL: 182 828 2,843 10,368 
Public Sector 
Home Ministry 8 39 64 61 206 
Local government of¼ces 3 33 89 295 624 
Hokkaido Settlement Agency – – 23 160 179 
Ministry of Finance 6 18 43 169 208 
Schools – 53 169 349 594 
Army 6 14 9 98 163 
Navy 14 54 90 248 418 
Ministry of Agriculture & – 31 83 198 400 
Commerce 
Ministry of Communications 49 13 57 120 222 
Japanese National Railways 39 105 514 751 
Other – 6 5 23 29 
SUBTOTAL: 86 300 737 2,235 3,794 
GRAND TOTAL: 86 482 1,565 5,078 14,162 
Source: Uchida (1990), p. 281. 
engineers by type of education and by sector from 1880 to 1920 (Uchida, 
1990). In the early years of Meiji, the total number of engineers was fewer 
than one hundred causing a scarcity of people who could comprehend and 
adopt Western technologies. Subsequently, the number of university-educated
engineers and graduates from technical high schools rose, which greatly
increased the supply of capable domestic engineers. By the turn of the century,
engineers employed in the private sector outnumbered those in government 
of¼ces. The sectoral distribution of engineers indicates the leading industries 
















162 Country studies 
5.5.4 Import of machinery and foreign partnership 
From 1880 onwards, new industries such as cotton spinning, paper, sugar, 
shipbuilding, telephony, electric power generation, and electrical machinery 
grew from technologies transferred from the West. This was initially done 
by analyzing and absorbing the technology embodied in imported machinery
and equipment. From the 1900s, Japan began to employ another method of 
technology transfer by way of technical cooperation agreements with Western
¼rms. Contracts were drawn with foreign companies that offered instructors 
and know-how as well as machinery and equipment. Needless to say, these 
two methods of technology transfer became possible by the existence of a 
growing number of Japanese engineers, described above, who could absorb 
technical information, select technologies, and assimilate them. Concrete 
examples are given below. 
When the Ministry of Communications, which took over the Telegraphic 
Service from the Ministry of Industry, set up a telephone network, a group 
of engineers, including Oi Saitaro, a graduate of the Institute of Technology,
collected publicly available technical information; visited Britain, the US, 
and Germany to study their telephone systems; and negotiated with telephone
equipment makers and selected the kind of system suitable for Japan. Advanced
products and equipment such as telephones and telephone exchanges were 
imported, but Japanese engineers and workers, without any foreign assistance,
laid the lines and managed operations. Compared to the time when Japan 
created a telegraph service (section 5.5.2), its capacity as a receiver of foreign
technology had improved remarkably. 
In the navy, early Meiji-era engineers trained in Britain and France, along 
with shipbuilding and armaments engineers who graduated from naval technical
high schools, were key ¼gures in designing plans to reinforce and expand 
the naval ½eet. Throughout the Meiji period principal battleships were imported
chie½y from Britain. Japanese naval shipbuilding and armaments engineers 
made it a custom to stay in Britain as observers while the ordered state-of-
the-art battleships were being built and readied for delivery. This provided 
them with ample opportunity to learn about ship design and construction 
from the British Navy and shipyards. Their knowledge proved invaluable to 
the domestic production of arms and support vessels by Japanese naval 
arsenals. And with time, Japan became able to build even principal ships. 
Privately-owned shipyards also gradually improved their ability to construct 
steel-hulled ships through importing machinery and equipment. These enter-
prises relied on importing steel materials and parts that could not be produced
domestically. Sometimes they also procured designs from Britain. 
In the textile industry, the government imported ten large-scale sets of 
spinning machinery equipped with 2,000 spindles from Britain. After installing
and test running the equipment at state-owned mills in Aichi, the government sold
these concerns off to the private sector as ten equipped cotton mills. Engineers
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Table 5.4 Machinery imports in the Meiji period (unit: 1,000 yen) 
1878– 1883– 1888– 1893– 1898– 1903– 1908– 
1882 1887 1892 1897 1902 1907 1912 
Telegraphic & 11.8 19.3 35.8 43.1 65.1 113.5 78.0 
telephone 
equipment 
Railway carriages – 29.0 355.8 518.5 1,045.6 1,771.7 2,336.0 
Locomotives – 72.2 408.2 1,505.4 1,963.5 1,705.8 1,156.8 
Steamships 81.9 718.5 841.7 4,744.5 3,562.2 4,692.1 2,215.6 
Steam engines – 81.7 329.1 586.2 759.8 1,208.8 797.2 
Internal combustion – – – – 102.5 262.2 873.9 
engines 
Dynamos & electric – – – – 322.6 1,546.0 2,275.4 
motors 
Machine tools – 3.0 4.5 106.1 649.1 2,404.2 2,687.9 
Spinning machines – 71.9 784.5 3,012.1 1,330.3 1,840.8 3,608.0 
Looms – 25.6 99.0 206.1 199.8 391.5 1,060.8 
TOTAL 1219.2 12,066.4 5,755.0 16,427.7 19,145.1 30,354.8 37,381.6 
Source: Nihon Boeki Seiran (Japanese Statistics of International Trade), Toyo Keizai Shimposha
(1935). 
Note: Import of steam engines for 1883–1887 does not include the value for 1883. 
commercialization of these factories. Meanwhile, graduates of the Institute 
of Technology, employed as master engineers, built and managed Owaribo and
Miebo, the two dominant mills of that early period. In the next phase of 
development, the large-scale private cotton mills of Osakabo, Amagasakibo, 
and Kanebo were built. For this, university-educated engineers designed the 
factory plans and imported the spinning machinery, and travelled to Britain
to purchase machinery and acquire the necessary practical skills and technology. 
As these examples show, technology transfer from the middle of the Meiji 
period onwards occurred mainly through importing machinery or the transfer
of know-how that accompanied imported products. As Table 5.4 shows, the 
value of machinery imported for communications, transport, and automotive
industries as well as for equipping factories increased signi¼cantly throughout
the Meiji period. It may be added that imported machinery entered Japan 
with a uniform low tariff of 5 percent which was imposed by the “unequal” 
commercial treaties with the West until Japan regained tariff rights in 1910. 
Along with machinery imports, domestic production of machinery had also
emerged. Not surprisingly, the design and quality of Japanese machinery in 
the Meiji period were less sophisticated than those of the West. Moreover, 
in design, nearly all of the machinery manufactured in Japan was copied 
from imports. Such copy production, which accompanied increased machinery
imports, was the means by which Japanese producers—gradually, arduously,
and through trial-and-error—acquired technology that could serve as the 
basis for commercially viable domestic production. 
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The early days of electric equipment production provide an example of 
such trial-and-error. Tokyo Light Company, a buyer of imported electrical 
machinery, tried to support the domestic production of dynamos and light 
bulbs which it was procuring. The company’s Senju Power Plant purchased 
dynamos from Ishikawajima Shipyard that were designed and copy produced
from a catalogue under an instruction of a certain professor, but the heat 
they generated distorted their shape. Similarly, Miyoshi Electric Machine, a 
pioneer ¼rm in electrical machinery, supplied dynamos to Kobe Light Company
and tram motors to the Municipality of Kyoto. In both instances the products
were returned as defective. Through such experiences, Japanese industries 
learned that they could not rely on amateurish copy production of domestic 
machine manufacturers. Thus, imports of machinery that embodied latest 
Western technology continued to increase, and technology they contained 
had to be learned more systematically and analytically through repeated 
copy production before Japan could ¼nally absorb and internalize it. 
It is also important to underline the role of the importer who mediated 
technology transfer during the Meiji period. There were two kinds of importers:
foreign traders which acted as agents for foreign machinery manufacturers 
and domestic general trading companies such as Mitsui, Takada, and Okura.
These trading companies were not only middlemen but also providers of 
information and technical services to domestic producers. A large number 
of graduating engineers from technical institutions were employed by private
trading companies. For example, in 1910, Mitsui recruited 42 young engineers,
Takada recruited 36, and Okura recruited 12. Many of these engineers either
were assigned in Europe and the US or traveled there frequently on business.
These engineers interacted with manufacturers in the West to keep abreast 
of new trends, circulated manufacturer catalogues at home, and assisted 
Japanese companies by helping to draw up business plans and selecting and 
installing mechanical equipment. 
In the 1890s, when spinning mills were established in large numbers in 
Japan, Mitsui, as the Japanese agent for Britain’s Platt Bros & Co., provided
most of the equipment. In the case of electrical machinery, Bagnal Hills, an 
American trading company, was the agent in Japan for General Electric, 
and Britain’s Healing & Co. represented British manufacturers. Okura was 
the agent for Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG) and Takada was 
the agent for Westinghouse. Siemens had its own branch of¼ce in Tokyo. 
Mitsui competed with the other agents over electrical equipment sales to the 
Japanese market and eventually became an agent for procurement of Shibaura
Seisakusho (Shibaura Engineering Works). Japanese trading companies also 
facilitated the building of new hydroelectric power plants all over the country
at the end of the Meiji period. Agents actively provided domestic entrepre-
neurs with basic knowledge needed for the electricity generation business, 
helped choose locations, and set up imported machinery and equipment. 
From the 1900s, technical cooperation agreements offered a new model 
for the transfer of relatively new technology between large foreign ¼rms of 
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various nationalities. In some cases, such as Japan Steel Works, Nippon 
Electric Company (NEC), Tokyo Electric, and Shibaura Engineering Works,
these contracts were accompanied by the establishment of joint-stock com-
panies between Japanese owners and the foreign ¼rm. 
Let us ¼rst look at the case of steam turbine technology. The steam turbine
was a new technology invented in Britain in 1884 by Charles Parsons. Within
a decade, this technology had become the basis for ship engines and thermal 
power plants throughout the West. Navy yards and private shipyards in 
Japan were producing their own reciprocating steam engines and boilers. 
However, in 1905 the Japanese navy learned that the British navy planned 
to adopt steam turbines in their principal ships for increased speed. This 
news prompted the Japanese navy to import Curtis turbines from the US 
and install them on the Ibuki and Aki, battleships that were under construction
at the time. Furthermore, the navy acquired the patent for turbine technology
from Curtis and encouraged Mitsubishi Shipyard to acquire the Japanese 
patent for Parson’s turbines. Thereafter, Mitsubishi and the Japanese navy 
began their own turbine production for future ships while continuing to 
import turbines for ships under construction. This was a complex way of 
technology transfer combining learning from imported products, the rights 
to patent execution, and copy production. 
Steelmaking is an area in which the Ministry of Industry had dif¼culties 
in transferring technology to Japan during the 1870s and 1880s. State-owned
steel works at the Kamaishi Iron Mines with the assistance of hired foreign 
engineers, which was later privatized, did produce pig iron and steel but the 
quality was not up to the standards in shipbuilding, arms manufacture, 
railways, and civil engineering projects. By that time, technology in the US 
and Germany had improved greatly; open-hearth furnaces and basic oxygen 
furnace led to the construction of large-scale mills integrating ironmaking, 
steelmaking, and rolling processes. Under the circumstances, strong petitioning
from the Japanese military led the government to import a complete set of 
integrated steel mill. In 1901, the state-owned Yawata Ironworks, with tech-
nology from Germany’s Gutehoffnungshütte, opened for business. This transfer
of technology was a turnkey contract which consisted of con¼dential mill 
design, imported machinery and equipment, and the provision of German 
engineers and skilled workers. However, unlike the turnkey projects in the 
early Meiji period, metallurgy engineers were Japanese. Moreover, the Japanese
side chose the factory location and the type of technology to be adopted, 
and made the decision to procure raw materials from China. When initial 
operations using the German technology failed, it was Japanese engineers 
who adjusted the technology to local conditions and allowed the mill to 
operate successfully. 
The creation in 1907 of Japan Steel Works, a joint-stock company owned 
by Mitsui and two British companies, Armstrong and Vickers, also originated
from a request by the Japanese military for domestic production of armor 
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know-how were entirely British, but the Japanese engineers and skilled workers,
who came mostly from naval munitions factories, quickly learned and
assimilated the technology transferred. 
With regard to electrical machinery, the following historical circumstances
led to the establishment of joint ventures with American ¼rms. On the Japanese
side, the revision of commercial treaties with the West around 1900, based 
on the principle of equal treatment between domestic and foreign nationals, 
for the ¼rst time permitted foreign direct investment in Japan. Furthermore, 
as the modi¼ed Japanese law upheld the patent rights of foreigners, Japanese
manufacturers were no longer allowed to copy-produce the latest imported 
goods for free. On the American side, major electrical machinery manufac-
turers that had invested in technological development adopted a corporate 
strategy of manufacturing new products in overseas subsidiaries. 
In 1896 the Japanese government had decided to adopt the American 
Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) system under its First National Plan to 
Expand Telephony. As the government intended to produce telephone equipment
domestically, Western Electric, which was the manufacturing department of
AT&T, ¼rst tried to form a joint venture in Japan by acquiring the stock
of Oki Electric Industry. However, negotiations with Oki Electric failed, 
which prompted Western Electric to establish Nippon Electric Company 
(NEC) in 1899, which became the ¼rst subsidiary of a foreign ¼rm in Japan, 
by holding 54 percent of the shares. Western Electric and NEC were bound by
a technical cooperation agreement that gave NEC the right of sole agency 
in Japan and a monopoly on the patent re-execution rights in the future. 
Western Electric offered technical guidance to NEC, for which the latter 
paid roughly 2 percent of its sales revenue. NEC initially sold imported 
telephones, then built a manufacturing plant with imported designs and 
equipment from Western Electric and produced telephones by using materials
and processes satisfying international standards under the supervision of an 
American foreman. All internal documents were written in English. Thus, 
the products and production methods of NEC were identical to those in the 
United States. 
In 1905 General Electric (GE), another American electrical machinery 
company, concluded a technical cooperation agreement with Tokyo Electric 
that was similar to the one between Western Electric and NEC, with GE 
acquiring 51 percent of Tokyo Electric’s shares. The latter had evolved from 
Hakunetsusha, a light-bulb manufacturer established in 1890. As the company
was unable to establish a viable production technology or compete with 
imported light bulbs from Germany in terms of quality or price, it sought 
management assistance from GE, a world leader of that industry in scale 
and technology. GE’s policy to allow its subsidiaries to produce light bulbs 
under their own patents was another reason why Tokyo Electric selected GE
as a business partner. Equipment and materials were imported from GE, 
and GE engineers came to Japan to teach manufacturing methods. Under 
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quickly master any new technology developed by GE. Unlike NEC which 
was newly founded, Tokyo Electric was an existing company acquired by 
GE as an overseas factory. But the method of technology transfer of the 
two cases was basically the same. 
Business collaboration between GE and Shibaura Engineering Works in 
1907 was different from the above two cases and was more incremental and 
partial. GE acquired only 24 percent of Shibaura’s shares while the remainder
was held by Mitsui & Co. Technical assistance was conducted through patent-
licensing agreements supplemented by sharing of R&D results, exchange of 
engineers, and access to the blueprints for production equipment. In return, 
Shibaura paid royalties amounting to 1 percent of its sales revenue. Mitsui 
opted for this technical cooperation in order to catch up with rapid technological
advances abroad under the constraint of the Universal Patent Convention 
that now protected the patents of foreign manufacturers in Japan. Through 
this business collaboration, Shibaura was able to design heavy electrical 
equipment by executing its rights on the GE patent and obtain new technical
information through the exchange of engineers. But this did not introduce 
discontinuous and revolutionary technology to Shibaura unlike the cases of 
NEC and Tokyo Electric. GE’s technology was added to the existing tech-
nology of Shibaura without fundamentally changing the character of the latter.
Large-size dynamos continued to be imported from GE which competed 
with the Shibaura products. This was a case of a patent-licensing agreement 
supplemented by a purchase contract of machinery and know-how. 
The ten cases described above were examples of how the latest Western 
technology was introduced to Japan in the late Meiji period. Whether technical
cooperation agreements were accompanied by an acquisition of shares by 
foreigners depended largely on the corporate strategy of the foreign company.
Some transfers of technology were selective and partial while others were guided
by foreigners in every aspect of the project. In this sense, the latter may look 
like a repetition of wholesale purchase of Western technology practiced in
the early Meiji period, but there were important differences. First, at the end 
of the Meiji period, Japan imported frontline technologies which were
simultaneously developed and adopted in the West rather than buying com-
mon and mature technologies as a latecomer country as in the early Meiji 
period. Second, the existence of domestic engineers and skilled workers meant
that Japan was now able to take a signi¼cant lead in selecting, adjusting, and
internalizing imported technologies instead of remaining a passive student. 
Excellence of Japanese workers was one of the reasons why Tokyo Electric 
was chosen by GE as a business partner. As mentioned earlier, Japanese
engineers at Yawata Ironworks were competent enough to adapt German 
technology to local conditions. When the ¼rst steam turbine was developed 
in Britain, Japanese engineers were quick to comprehend its potential from
publicly available information. Based on the reported test results, they could 
select the most appropriate foreign partner and the appropriate timing to 
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5.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter is longer than others because it has explained not only how 
Meiji Japan digested Western industrial technology from the mid-nineteenth 
century to the early twentieth century but also why that was possible. The 
historical perspective given in sections 5.2 and 5.3 and the political perspective
provided by section 5.4 were the necessary background for understanding 
why Japanese engineers, workers, and policymakers were so able, devoted, 
and uni¼ed in learning and assimilating foreign technology and systems. On 
the surface, we can conclude that the private sector of Japan, which was 
already highly dynamic and ½exible, was assisted by mostly appropriate 
policies of the government to produce a miraculous transformation of a 
agriculture-based feudal society into a modern industrialized economy within
a space of half century. The use of foreign experts, turnkey projects, engineer-
ing education, machinery import, and foreign partnership were highlighted 
as principal methods for this feat together with concrete examples. But the 
methods themselves were nothing novel; they were and are adopted by many
other latecomer countries. The true wonder of Meiji Japan was the existence 
of a thick layer of human capital that could mobilize these methods effectively
to a successful completion. 
This naturally leads to a deeper question: can a developing country that 
lacks the historical and political conditions of Meiji Japan accomplish similar
feat in industrialization and modernization? What if short-terminism, depen-
dency culture, and social division ruled instead of high aspiration, penchant 
for learning, and patriotic dedication? This issue is largely beyond the scope 
of this book. The only thing that can safely be said is that there should be 
more than one path to development in response to different initial conditions
of each society as well as shifting global situations. The idea that industrial-
ization will take place only under certain rigid historical conditions and 
nowhere else is hardly credible. There is no need for today’s developing 
countries to imitate Meiji Japan, but laissez-faire policy will not solve the 
problem of unprepared society, either. To identify—and modify—the unique
domestic conditions that hinder the development of any latecomer country 
would require more serious analysis and harder policy learning than com-
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Singapore 
National productivity movement 
6.1 Obsessed with productivity 
Singapore is a city-state on an island situated near the equator with the popula-
tion of ¼ve million including both permanent residents and non-residents. 
Its ethnic composition is dominated by Chinese (74 percent) followed by Malay
(13 percent) and Indians and others (13 percent). It was a former British 
colony which was subsequently occupied by the Japanese military during 
1942–45. After World War II, Singapore reverted to British rule with increasing
self-autonomy. In 1963, Singapore merged with the Federation of Malaya 
to form Malaysia. However, this merger proved unsuccessful leading to 
social unrest and political division between the two parts of the federation. 
In August 1965, Singapore separated from Malaysia and became an independ-
ent republic (Lee, 2000). Ever since, the People’s Action Party has ruled 
Singapore without interruption. Meanwhile, as far as policy capability is 
concerned, the government of Singapore is reputed to be among the most 
able governments in the world. The state machinery is staffed with highly 
competent bureaucrats producing complex policies which normally fail dismally
in other countries. This “wise” government regulates all aspects of civil life, 
including how to walk the streets and who should get married and produce 
children, which to some people is too intrusive. 
Singapore has been extremely successful in economic development. After 
the turmoil of the 1965 separation and independence was overcome, the 
immediate economic challenge was a severe shortage of jobs and housing. 
Singapore embarked on a modernization program featuring labor-intensive 
manufacturing, public-housing projects, and heavy state investment and
involvement in education and training. With no natural resources and without
farmland, the only resource this small city-state could rely on other than
its strategic location was human capital. The government has consistently 
emphasized human-resource development and made serious efforts to enhance
labor productivity and international competitiveness. Since independence, 
the Singaporean economy has grown on average about 9 percent per year. 
Its per capita income rose from US$533 in 1965 to US$40,920 in 2010 (World
Bank GNI data). Industrial structure shifted steadily from labor-intensive 
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innovation-intensive in the 1990s, and to knowledge-intensive in the 2000s 
(Chan, 2008). The country has grown from its traditional role as a regional 
port and distribution center to an international manufacturing and knowledge-
intensive technical services center (Lee et al., 2008). Today Singapore is the 
most business-friendly country (World Bank and IFC, 2010), among the top 
three most competitive countries (World Economic Forum 2010), and one 
of the most prosperous economies in the world. This af½uence is generated 
by skills, knowledge, and technology of Singaporean people rather than a 
lucky endowment of extractive resources or geopolitical advantages. 
Singapore’s obsession with productivity dates back to the early days of 
independence, or even before. The ¼rst step toward this was the creation of the
Productivity Unit within the Economic Development Board, an implementa-
tion agency of state-led development, in 1964 and declaration of the Charter 
for Industrial Progress in 1965. The latter was a joint agreement by employer 
groups and labor unions to work together to increase productivity under the
Productivity Code of Practice, which was witnessed by the Ministers for Finance
and for Labor. The Charter also proposed establishment of the Singapore 
Productivity Center. In 1972, the Center was upgraded to the National Produc-
tivity Board, a state agency. Separately, the Singapore Productivity Association
was set up in 1973 as an af¼liated body of the Board for promoting active involve-
ment of companies and individuals in the productivity movement and spreading
related ideas and techniques among them. The quest for productivity went
into a high gear in the 1980s when a new national productivity movement was 
launched by the strong leadership of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew accom-
panied by Japanese support (section 6.3). After a few years of adjustments
and mutual learning,1 Singapore and Japan cooperated successfully to inter-
nalize, scale up, and institutionalize the productivity movement in Singapore,
contributing signi¼cantly to its economic miracle. By the 1990s Singapore mastered
productivity concepts and techniques so well it started to teach other countries. 
Singapore presents a case of a state-led national productivity movement unlike
Japan’s in the 1950s and 1960s where the private sector-led kaizen movement
was the central force in improving industrial productivity with public policy 
playing second ¼ddle. Singapore’s top-down productivity enhancement, dis-
cussed in detail below, had the following features that contributed to its success.
First, it was pursued as a broad-based national movement for mindset change
rather than a one-time event or project. Second, there was an unwavering 
high-level political commitment by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. Third, 
institutionally, a national productivity organization was set up as a core agency
charged with productivity issues whose authority and functions were adjusted
over time to respond to changing needs and private-sector situations. Political
mechanisms were also there to embrace government, industry, and labor unions
in tripartite cooperation. Fourth, a massive campaign was organized to ¼rst raise
awareness and then promote concrete actions. Fifth, private-sector manage-
ment consultants were produced by mobilizing those trained under Japanese 
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In Singapore, the productivity movement has always been supported by 
mutual commitment and active participation of government, employers, and
labor which comprise the holy trinity of economic development in this
nation.2 All industries and public organizations regardless of size are strongly
encouraged to cooperate for the national goal. According to the National 
Productivity Board, the goal of the productivity movement was to improve 
national welfare through economic progress based on the following three 
guiding principles: (i) improvements in productivity would increase employ-
ment in the long run; (ii) government, employers, and labor must work together
to implement measures to improve productivity; and (iii) fruits of improved 
productivity must be distributed fairly among management, labor, and con-
sumers. It should be added that these guiding principles were drawn from 
those of the Japan Productivity Center in 1955 at the time of its establishment. 
6.2 Policymaking in Singapore 
The Singaporean government is staffed with young, casual, and clean of¼cials
who compete ¼ercely for excellence and rotate frequently across functions 
and sections. Policy formulation is ½exible with good inter-ministerial coordin-
ation. Singapore does not produce national development plans at regular 
intervals (there was only one Five-Year Development Plan in the 1960s which
was discontinued subsequently). Structured planning at regular intervals is 
too rigid and slow for Singaporean leaders and of¼cials. Instead, they do 
long-term vision formation and strategic planning through ad hoc or task-based
committees and councils such as the Economic Strategies Committee and 
the National Productivity and Continuing Education Council which will be 
discussed in detail in section 6.6, and scenario planning by “Future Divisions”
as explained below. Being an open city-state, Singapore considers it vital
to maintain agility in policymaking to respond quickly to changing global 
environment. Flexible strategic planning is possible thanks to high institutional
capacity of civil servants who can translate leaders’ visions and policies into 
actions. The small size of Singapore and its unique politics in the absence 
of rural and farming interests may also facilitate information sharing and 
consensus building among stakeholders without political capture or serious 
con½icts of interest. 
The policy process in Singapore is characterized by a multi-functional 
approach involving all relevant government ministries and agencies in close 
collaboration. Regarding industrial policy, the Singaporean government takes
both broad-based and targeted (sectoral) approaches. General supports available
to all industries and enterprises are supplemented by negotiations and pro-
motion for individual sectors or even speci¼c ¼rms. The government offers 
various incentives and subsidies to encourage enterprises and individuals to 
improve and compete better through (policy-guided) price signals rather than
through quantitative bans, quotas, or legal regulations. Two examples are 
given below to illustrate Singapore’s unique policymaking. 
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The ¼rst example is establishment of Future Divisions in key government 
organs such as the Prime Minister’s Of¼ce, the Ministry of Finance, and the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry. The Future Division (or a similar team of 
of¼cials with a different name) is a unit detached from daily administrative 
works of the ministry to conduct long-term scenario planning from national 
and global perspectives and analyze chances and risks that may affect Singapore’s
future. Exercises and reports it produces go to ministers and national leaders
as inputs to setting broad policy directions and determining Singapore’s 
future positioning. Future Divisions work closely with research institutes, 
universities, and other stakeholders to collect information and facilitate vision-
sharing. In some countries national vision is produced by a top leader and his
personal advisors. In others vision making is outsourced to research institutes
or special committees of experts and business leaders. In Singapore, production
of visions is institutionalized within the government. While external advice 
is sought, at least some government of¼cials are not burdened by daily works
and have time to think about the nation’s future. My team once visited the 
Center for Strategic Futures in the Strategic Policy Of¼ce of the Prime Min-
ister’s Of¼ce. Although our visit was without appointment, 15 minutes before
the lunch break, and just suggested by other of¼cials we met in the same 
building, the head and an economist of the Center were more than happy to
receive us, exchange business cards, and explain what their Center did
succinctly in the staff tea room before adjourning for lunch. In many other 
countries it would require a formal letter of request and a long wait to meet 
of¼cials engaged in strategic planning. Bureaucratic formalism is not a problem
with the Singaporean government. 
Another example is Singapore’s strategic FDI policy which shows how 
the country combines general promotion and targeted attraction. For industrial
development, the Industry Division of the Ministry of Trade and Industry is
responsible for policy formulation while the Economic Development Board 
is in charge of implementation. The two work closely to attract FDI, foster 
“industry verticals” (suppliers of parts and components), and enhance business
environment. The Economic Development Board, despite its solemn name, 
is a business-friendly one-stop agency for domestic and foreign investors. It is
also designated as the hub of industrial development in transport engineering,
electronics, precision engineering, chemicals, biomedical sciences, logistics, 
healthcare services, education services, infocomm and media, professional 
services, and consumer businesses as well as new areas of growth such as clean
energy, environmental technologies, bio-technology, and digital media. In 
attracting FDI in these priority sectors, the Economic Development Board 
uses both broad-based approaches and targeted approaches. It continuously 
improves business environment generally, which is always at or near the top 
of global ranking. For instance, Singapore has consistently held the ¼rst position
among more than 180 countries in the World Bank’s Doing Business Reports
from 2007 to 2011. At the same time, the Board also engages in individual nego-
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support and incentives in what is called the “Queen Bee” approach. It is an 
approach in which inviting the queen bee (an anchor ¼rm with global repu-
tation and large-scale production) automatically brings a large number of 
other bees into the country. A good example is the attraction of world-class
aerospace ¼rms such as Rolls-Royce, Pratt & Whitney, and ST Aerospace 
to Seletar Aerospace Park, an industrial estate with an area of over 300 hectares
which was converted for this purpose from a secondary airport, prompting 
arrival of related maintenance and repair services.3 
6.3 Productivity Movement of the 1980s4 
6.3.1 The beginning 
By the late 1970s, there were signs of strain in the Singaporean labor market. An
increasingly tight labor market had driven up wages. The state of management– 
labor relations was fragile and often confrontational, leading to many
industrial disputes. Companies realized that, to compete successfully, they 
must introduce better management systems with more favorable management– 
labor relations and better teamwork. Despite one and a half decades of effort
to enhance productivity since independence, the leaders of Singapore felt 
that the country remained far behind the rival countries in productivity 
development. “Workers here are not as proud of or as skilled in their jobs 
compared to the Japanese or the Germans” were the words of Prime Minister
Lee Kuan Yew in his speech delivered in 1979. 
Foreign manufacturing companies operating in Singapore served as bench-
marks for assessing Singapore’s productivity level. In early 1981, the prime 
minister met Japanese company executives in Singapore to discuss practices, 
work attitudes, and productivity in Japan. Additionally, the Committee
of Productivity was formed to study Japan’s productivity movement and 
examine related issues. Prime Minister Lee met Mr. Kohei Goshi, chairman 
of the Japan Productivity Center, in June 1981 and was deeply convinced of
the need for a new national productivity movement. The Committee of Pro-
ductivity issued a report which emphasized the importance of “human aspects”
and mindset change, and proposed the establishment of a high-level council 
to review productivity effort and outline future strategy. 
The National Productivity Council was established in September 1981 as an
oversight and policy coordination body for productivity enhancement. The 
Council was chaired by the State Minister of Labor (from 1986, by the State 
Minister of Trade and Industry) with high-level representation from govern-
ment, employer groups, labor unions, and academia. The ¼rst action of the 
Council was to of¼cially launch the Productivity Movement designating
the National Productivity Board, established earlier in 1972, as the primary 
implementing agency. As the new movement is launched, this Board was 
re-structured and expanded to inculcate the concept of productivity in every 
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In parallel, the Singaporean government requested technical cooperation 
from the Japanese government. The Productivity Development Project, a 
program supported by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
mobilizing a large number of Japanese experts, was implemented from 1983 
to 1990 in support of this nationally owned movement. 
6.3.2 The awareness stage, 1981–85 
The Productivity Movement initiated in the 1980s went through three stages 
as shown in Figure 6.1: (i) awareness stage (1981–85); (ii) action stage (1986– 
88); and (iii) ownership stage (1989–90s). 
The awareness stage worked on the mindset of managers and workers to 
create widespread consciousness of the importance of productivity. The main
objectives included promotion of positive attitudes, teamwork spirit, and 
recognition for excellent companies and individuals. Actions taken by the 
National Productivity Board were as follows. 
(i) public education—launching of the Productivity Movement, publication
of productivity data, media support, amendments in the curriculums of 
educational institutions, etc.; 
(ii) information dissemination and training—courses that emphasize human
relations, a library of local case studies on good management practices, 
a registry of courses on productivity and management, etc.; 
(iii) company-level incentives—payment of variable bonuses, awards for 
long-serving employees, house unions, privileged use of support facilities
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Figure 6.1 Evolution of Singapore’s productivity movement 
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(iv) promotion of management–labor consultation—work excellence com-
mittees, quality control circles, etc.; 
(v) public-sector improvements—productivity campaign in the public sector,
work-improvement teams, Productivity Working Committee, etc. 
Throughout the awareness—and subsequent action—stages, strong commitment
and leadership of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew was critical. Productivity 
campaigns were launched at both national and company levels. November 
was designated as “Productivity Month,” as in Japan, in which Lee Kuan Yew
delivered a speech on productivity every year from 1981 to 1987. 
To disseminate the spirit of productivity to the public, the National Produc-
tivity Board created a mascot named Teamy, which was a cute bee character.
Teamy Bee symbolized hard work, teamwork, and ef¼ciency. Slogans and 
posters were created in 1982 around the key message of “Together We Work
Better.” This message had clear political connotations. Productivity improvement
often invites worker resistance because employees fear that ef¼ciency might 
be pursued through shedding labor and cutting wages. Mindful of such resist-
ance, the of¼cial message deliberately highlighted a virtuous cycle formed by
productivity-generated growth leading to more income and demand for products,
which in turn increased employment and bene¼ted all workers. 
Unlike Japan where the productivity drive was driven by and con¼ned to 
the business community, Singapore introduced the Productivity Movement 
to both the business and the public sector. This had a remarkable impact on
popular mindset. As noted above, work-improvement teams were implemented
in the civil service. They were a Singaporean adaptation of the concept of 
Japanese-style quality control circle (QCC) implemented in the public sector 
as part of the civil service reform program. Worker involvement, participation,
and bottom-up management were emphasized, and team members worked 
together to solve problems in their common work areas. The Productivity 
Working Committee was established jointly by management and labor. By 
the mid-1980s, high awareness of productivity among the Singaporeans was 
achieved until even taxi drivers started to talk about productivity. 
6.3.3 The action stage, 1986–88 
In the next stage, the focus shifted from national promotion of the idea of 
productivity to company-level implementation on the ground. The objective 
of this stage was to translate “awareness” into speci¼c action at the workplace
through a participatory program. It aimed at upgrading the skills of management
and workers as well as operational ef¼ciency of companies. In 1986, the 
concept of total approach to productivity (TAP), which emphasized productive
interaction of humans, machines, and systems at the workplace, was introduced
(National Productivity Board and JICA, 1990). 
In 1986, the National Productivity Board established the Management 



















      
176 Country studies 
companies. Programs and activities implemented by the Center were as
follows: 
(i) the model company project; 
(ii) the management consultancy referral scheme; 
(iii) the associate consultants scheme; 
(iv) the industry-based consultancy assistance scheme; 
(v) training of workforce through the Skills Development Fund. 
The model company project was implemented jointly by Japanese experts 
and local counterparts at the National Productivity Board, providing
assistance to companies for productivity improvement. Observing the concrete
work of Japanese experts in factories in effect served as on-the-job train-
ing of Board staff for acquiring relevant consultation skills. Together with 
training sessions, workshops, and other company-related productivity
improvement programs, Japanese experts transferred consultation skills to
local counterparts under the JICA’s Productivity Development Project (see 
below). The management-consultancy referral scheme and the associate
consultants scheme were the systems to mobilize those trained under Japanese
cooperation as quali¼ed private management consultants. The National Pro-
ductivity Board allowed private-sector participation in the training fellowship
in Japan, and such private trainees became National Productivity Board 
associate or referral consultants. A pool of over 200 associate and referral con-
sultants was produced to supplement the Board of¼cials’ effort in reaching 
out to industries (National Productivity Board and JICA, 1990). Furthermore,
the Board introduced the industry-based assistance scheme in 1986. The 
scheme was designed to raise productivity in priority sectors and assist com-
panies on an industry-wide basis for visible impact on national economic 
development. Food manufacturing, restaurant, hotel, retail, textiles and gar-
ment, and ¼nance were the six priority sectors targeted for assistance under 
the scheme. 
Through the Management Guidance Center, the National Productivity 
Board assisted companies, especially small and medium ones, in improving 
their business ef¼ciency and productivity management. Successful companies
were selected to serve as models for others. The Board also promoted the 
growth of management consultancy services for SMEs. More than 100 local 
companies have bene¼ted from assistance rendered by Board consultants 
and Japanese experts, as well as associate and referral consultants (National 
Productivity Board and JICA, 1990). 
Besides consultancy, in-company training was given to equip the workforce
with relevant skills to increase productivity. The National Productivity Board
teamed up with reputable companies such as Singapore Airlines (Service 
Quality Center), Philips Singapore (Industrial Engineering Training Center), 
and Seiko Instruments (OJT Project) to develop national training programs 
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Moreover, extensive training for upgrading workforce skills was conducted
with the support of the Skills Development Fund. The Skills Development 
Fund was founded in 1978 under the Ministry of Labor as an employer-based
funding that provided ¼nancial incentives for staff training. From 1986 it 
came under the responsibility of the National Productivity Board. In Singapore,
all employers must pay a Skills Development Levy for each worker they 
employ for up to the ¼rst S$4,500 of gross monthly remuneration at a levy 
rate of 0.25 percent, or S$2 per worker, whichever is higher. The government
then provides subsidies to employers who invest in upgrading the skills of 
their employees. Currently, employers can receive course fee subsidies of up 
to 90 percent with the amount of subsidies varying with each course. The 
Central Provident Fund, rather than the National Productivity Board, now 
collects the levy on behalf of the Workforce Development Agency which is 
subsequently channeled into the Skills Development Fund. 
6.3.4 The ownership stage, 1989–90s 
By 1989, many companies and individuals had become actively involved in 
the Productivity Movement. Hence, keeping up this enthusiasm became the 
focus of the ownership stage. This was critical to internalize the Productivity
Movement as a permanent and integrated feature of the Singaporean work 
ethic rather than a one-time event orchestrated by the government. Private 
and public organizations as well as individuals were encouraged to actively 
lead the Productivity Movement instead of passively following it. The National
Productivity Board urged the private sector to take initiative and own annual
productivity campaigns. Employer groups were asked to chair the Campaign
Steering Committee. The Singapore Quality Award was introduced in 1994 
and the Productivity Activist Scheme was launched in 1996. The latter scheme
in particular aimed to develop productivity champions among company staff.
Key activists from the public and private sectors were selected to lead, organize,
and in½uence other members of the workforce in various productivity-
enhancing activities. A network was formed to enable members to benchmark
their productivity against partners and improve their skills and techniques. 
Resources were pooled for an effective exchange of information in support 
of productivity improvement. 
These activities certainly had the aspect of “spontaneity imposed from 
above,” but they apparently worked superbly in Singapore, judged from con-
tinued high growth and emergence of a new service industry that teaches 
productivity to other countries. A top-down movement eventually became 
a part of Singaporean culture accepted by all stakeholders. In this regard, 
the following words of Mah Bow Tan, former chairman of the National 
Productivity Board, in 1981, are noteworthy: “To have a successful Productivity
Movement, we must have a critical mass of organizations and individuals 
who know that they will bene¼t from it, are proud to be part of it, and are 
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6.4 The institutional framework 
To implement the Productivity Movement, Singapore established a strong 
organizational structure. As already noted, political alliance was forged among
the public sector, labor unions, and employers to ensure that productivity 
gains were shared among all Singaporeans without creating winners and losers.
A centralized oversight and coordination mechanism was created, and the 
existing national productivity organization was reinforced to implement
public campaigns, training, consulting, research, measurement, and industrial
relations. These institutional factors contributed signi¼cantly to the successful
awareness raising and scaling-up of the Productivity Movement. 
6.4.1 The core organizations 
As noted earlier, the core productivity organization has evolved with the 
stages of development and the shifting needs of the Singaporean economy 
(Table 6.1). In 1964, one year prior to independence, Singapore created a 
small unit specializing in productivity under the Economic Development 
Board. In 1967, the National Productivity Center was established, also under
the Economic Development Board, by building on the existing unit. In 1972, the
Center was upgraded to the National Productivity Board, a statutory body 
which, as discussed above, played a principal role in executing the Productivity
Movement starting from 1981. In 1996, the National Productivity Board
Table 6.1 History of core organizations for productivity improvement 
Period Core organization Events 
1964–1967 Productivity Unit under Economic
Development Board (EDB) 
1967–1972 National Productivity Center, an 
autonomous division under EDB 
1972–1995 National Productivity Board 
(NPB), a statutory body initially 
af¼liated with the Ministry of 
Labor and later with the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry (MTI) 
1996–2001 Productivity Standard Board, 
a statutory body af¼liated
with MTI 
2002–present Standards, Productivity and 
Innovation Board (SPRING), 
a statutory body af¼liated
with MTI 
Charter for Industrial Progress,
and Productivity Code of 
Practice (1965) 
Tripartite Interim Management 
Committee for preparing NPB 
(1971) 
Establishment of Singapore 
Productivity Association (1973) 
Productivity Movement: 
1981–85: Awareness stage 
1986–88: Action stage 
1989–90s: Ownership stage 
Renewed productivity 
movement targeting aged and 
foreign workers (2010–) 
Source: Japan Productivity Center (1990). 
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was merged with the Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial Research
to become the Productivity Standard Board. In 2002, productivity-related 
functions of this Board were transferred to the Standards, Productivity and 
Innovation Board (SPRING). 
Figure 6.2 shows the institutional setup for policy coordination among 
key stakeholders and organizations in the Productivity Movement of the 
1980s. Participation of policymakers, economic groups, professionals, and 
service providers facilitated the initiation and scaling-up of the movement. 
Because Singapore is a city-state, there was no need for a mechanism to 
coordinate central- and local-level decision making. 
In 1981, the National Productivity Council was established as a high-level 
oversight and policy coordination body for the Productivity Movement. The
Council had a tripartite composition, initially chaired by the State Minister 
of Labor and after 1986 by the State Minister of Trade and Industry with 
the participation of about 20 members from government, employer groups, 
labor unions, and academia. The National Productivity Council annually 
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Figure 6.2 Stakeholders of the productivity movement, 1980s 
Source: Information provided by Mr. Lo Hock Meng to the GRIPS Development Forum mission
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The National Productivity Board was the secretariat of the National Pro-
ductivity Council as well as the operational arm in spearheading productivity
campaigns in both the public and private sectors throughout the three stages 
of the Productivity Movement. Under the oversight of the Council, the Board
implemented and coordinated the activities of the Productivity Movement 
as explained above. The Board was also a service provider in such areas as 
training, management consultancy, promoting quality control (QC) circles, 
and disseminating the concept of productivity. Additionally, it administered 
the Skills Development Fund which provided ¼nancial incentives to companies
that sent their staff to productivity-related training. 
The Singapore Productivity Association, established in 1973 as an af¼liated
body of the National Productivity Board, also played an important role in 
broadening the Productivity Movement. It promoted active involvement of 
organizations and individuals in the Movement and expedited its diffusion 
and learning of productivity techniques. It still plays an important role in 
Singapore’s current productivity drive as explained below. The Association 
charges fees to individual and institutional members for participation in 
courses, seminars, company visits, study tours, and so on, which are organized
to enhance and update their knowledge and skills. The members also have 
access to information and networking opportunities. The Association con-
tinues to be af¼liated with SPRING which replaced the Productivity Standard
Board, the successor of the National Productivity Board, in 2002. Additionally,
it conducts international cooperation in collaboration with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, SPRING, the Asia 
Productivity Organization, and the Association for Overseas Technical Scholar-
ship of Japan. Lo Hock Meng, the current Executive Director of the Singapore
Productivity Association, was previously one of the principal counterparts 
of the JICA-supported Productivity Development Project in the 1980s. 
6.4.2 Channels of awareness raising and scaling-up 
The Singaporean government promoted productivity improvement in both 
the public and private sectors and built a partnership between the two sectors
(Sum, 2000). 
In the awareness stage of the 1980s movement, the productivity campaign 
was actively promoted in the public sector as noted above. The government, 
as the largest employer in Singapore, endeavored to set an example for the private
sector in productivity improvement, work attitude, and human-resource 
management. The productivity campaign was linked with civil service reform
and was spearheaded by the Central Productivity Steering Committee. This 
committee was formed following the launch of the Productivity Movement 
to oversee the movement in civil service. Its members also included a repre-
sentative from civil service unions. An annual civil service campaign was 
launched in conjunction with the national productivity campaign. Work-
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from the same work units, were formed in all ministries to make up plans 
to promote teamwork spirit and productivity. This “voluntary” groups met 
regularly to identify improvements that could be achieved and formulate 
ways to attain them (Sum, 2000). 
Particularly noteworthy in this conjunction was the productivity drive 
launched by the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces in 1981. Since 
all young Singaporean males aged 18–21 were obligated to enroll in national
service (which included the Singapore Armed Force, the Singapore Police 
Force, and the Singapore Civil Defense Force) for 24 months, this proved 
to be an excellent way of instilling the concept of productivity into the minds
of young males.5 
Regarding labor unions, the National Trade Union Congress led the pro-
ductivity campaign and created the Productivity Promotion Council. The 
campaign aimed to inculcate productivity and quality consciousness in
the workplace. Regarding employer groups, the Singapore National Em-
ployers’ Federation and the Singapore Manufacturers’ Federation backed 
the Productivity Movement. Both unions and employer groups supported
workforce training with ¼nancial incentives from the aforementioned Skills 
Development Fund. Furthermore, productivity-related programs were pro-
moted at many educational institutions, including polytechnics (see below), 
to raise productivity awareness in future workers. 
6.4.3 Japanese assistance 
The JICA-supported Productivity Development Project was a crucial part of
the Productivity Movement. The project was fully integrated into Singapore’s
national initiative and contributed to (i) upgrading the skills of National 
Productivity Board of¼cials; (ii) developing manuals and promotion materials;
(iii) developing a pool of private-sector management consultants; and (iv) 
raising productivity in key industries. A total of over 200 long-term and 
short-term experts were dispatched from Japan to help improve the capabilities
of the Board and local industries. Furthermore, the project also helped trans-
form the National Productivity Board into an international cooperation 
organization by providing the Board with an opportunity to consolidate 
acquired management consulting skills and share them with other Southeast 
Asian countries through regional training programs. 
Figure 6.3 shows the JICA-supported Productivity Development Project 
which emphasized training of trainers and upgrading of Board staff as two 
major pillars. Various methods were used including practical guidance,
development of training materials, model company and pilot company projects,
seminars and workshops, papers and reports, and training in Japan (PDP 
fellowship). The project emphasized human aspects, transfer of Japanese 
experience, and the importance of quality, cost, and delivery (QCD). 
The Productivity Development Project continued for seven years with
four phases: (i) preparatory phase, from June 1983 to March 1985; (ii)
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restructuring phase, from April 1985 to October 1986; (iii) implementing 
phase, from November 1986 to June 1988; and (iv) follow-up or consolida-
tion phase, from June 1988 to June 1990 (National Productivity Board and 
JICA 1990). 
Because this was the ¼rst experience for Japan to transfer comprehensive 
knowledge and technology of productivity enhancement to another country 
through a technical cooperation scheme, the initial years (preparatory phase)
of the Productivity Development Project encountered some dif¼culties. Japanese
experts, assuming that the same steps should be taken in Singapore as in Japan,
started by instilling basic concepts and principles in their Singaporean counter-
parts. They believed that this step was necessary to form a solid mindset among
students before teaching concrete methods of productivity improvement 
(Ueda, 2009). However, Singaporeans demanded quick and tangible results 
such as the transfer and application of production management techniques 
on the ground. This was partly because the management of the National 
Productivity Board was under strong pressure from the prime minister who 
personally monitored the progress of the project. Based on subsequent dis-
cussions between JICA and the Board, the modality of Japanese assistance 
was modi¼ed. In addition to classroom instructions, on-the-job training was 
provided so that the Singaporean counterparts could learn the works practiced
by Japanese experts and take them over in the future (Ueda, 2009). 
During the restructuring phase, a technology transfer plan was developed 
to build up expertise within the National Productivity Board to directly assist
industries in improving productivity without the help of Japanese experts. 
The implementation phase saw the dispatch of long-term JICA experts 
specializing in management consultancy for SMEs. This was in line with the 
Board’s focus on providing management guidance services for local companies.
During this phase, the experts’ role shifted from that of leaders to advisors 
vis-à-vis the Board staff who by then were suf¼ciently equipped to lead industry
project teams. Also, for the ¼rst time, Japan’s fellowship program which 
provided training in Japan for government of¼cials was extended to private 
sector managers and consultants. Upon their return, several of them were 
appointed as National Productivity Board associate consultants to supplement
the expertise of the Board in providing consultancy services to industry. 
The follow-up or consolidation phase, which lasted two years, was devoted
to upgrading management consultancy skills of the Board staff through 
practical on-the-job training and the launching of a two-month Japan-
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Training Pro-
gram on Management Consultancy where the National Productivity Board 
took prime responsibility for sharing acquired skills with other ASEAN
countries.6 By the end of the Productivity Development Project, fundamental
productivity practices such as 5S and QC circles were ¼rmly entrenched in 
Singaporean manufacturing industries while attention was also given to service















184 Country studies 
6.5 International cooperation 
Singapore was such a good student in productivity that, by the early 1990s, 
it felt con¼dent enough to teach others what it had learned from Japan. In 
1992, the government established the Singapore Technical Cooperation Program
(SCP) to share the country’s development experience and public-sector expertise
with developing countries. SCP is administered by the Technical Cooperation
Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is responsible for plan-
ning and organizing training courses, seminars, workshops, and study visits 
in collaboration with domestic agencies and foreign partners. In FY2009, 
about 300 such activities were organized, and the number of SCP participants
reached a record 6,729. SCP is implemented in various channels including 
(i) bilateral training programs, (ii) joint training programs or third-country 
training programs, (iii) Initiatives for ASEAN Integration (IAI) Centers, and
(iv) small island developing states technical cooperation programs. 
Bilateral training programs in the areas where Singapore has strength are 
offered directly by Singapore to developing countries on a government-to-
government basis. Examples of such training courses during FY2010 included
the private-sector growth and FDI attraction course taught by Civil Service 
College, and technical and vocational education and training (TVET) programs
for principals and instructors executed by ITE Education Services. In addition,
JICA, together with the Singaporean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1997 
organized the Japan–Singapore Partnership Program for the Twenty-¼rst 
Century (JSPP21) which conducted a joint training program on productivity 
management in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
countries in 1997–2004. 
Apart from SCP, which offers assistance to developing countries free of 
charge, the Singapore Cooperation Enterprise (SCE) provides fee-based tech-
nical cooperation. SCE was formed jointly by the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2006 to respond to growing 
foreign demand for Singapore’s development skills and knowledge. It mobi-
lizes expertise accumulated in the country’s public agencies as well as retired 
civil servants and politicians on a project basis. SCE does not receive ¼nancial
support from the government and instead charges fees for technical coopera-
tion on a cost-recovery, non-pro¼t basis. 
The Singaporean government sees complementarity between ODA-
based SCP and commercially-oriented SCE and uses them strategically. On 
a government-to-government basis, SCP is used as an entry point to share 
Singapore’s development experience with developing countries in general, 
which can lead to demand for more speci¼c country-tailored cooperation 
projects conducted by SCE. SCE can work with both government and
non-government clients in developing countries. A good example is the
cooperation with Rwanda, a small landlocked country in Africa. President 
Kagame of Rwanda has a strong desire to learn from Singapore, an equally 
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impressive economic growth by building human capability. Cooperation 
started with SPC-managed bilateral training programs, which subsequently 
developed into various projects supported by SCE such as workforce develop-
ment and public-sector capacity building and social security fund reform. 
At present, SCE has expanded its cooperation projects to China as well as 
the rest of Asia, Middle East, and Africa. 
The Singapore Productivity Association also provided cooperation in pro-
ductivity improvement to Botswana for about ten years from 1991 at the 
request of President Ketumile Masire of Botswana to then Singaporean Prime
Minister Goh Chok Tong. Based on the experience of the JICA-supported 
Productivity Development Project, the Association assisted Botswana with 
(i) promotion of tripartite cooperation among government, labor, and industry,
(ii) staff training for the Botswana National Productivity Center, and (iii) 
implementation of pilot projects for model companies. In the public sector, 
a twinning arrangement was made between the Botswana Institute of
Administration and Commerce and Singapore’s Civil Service Training Institute
which introduced work improvement teams to Botswana’s civil service (World
Bank, 1996). 
6.6 The renewed productivity movement 
6.6.1 The report of the Economic Strategies Committee 
Even though the JICA-supported Productivity Development Project was com-
pleted years ago with impressive results, Singapore continues to work on 
productivity. As Mah Bow Tan, the former Minister of State, Trade and 
Industry, and Communications and Information as well as the Chairman of 
the National Productivity Board, stated, “The Productivity Movement has 
been compared to a marathon with no ¼nish line” (National Productivity 
Board and JICA 1990).7 In recent years, productivity has been resurrected 
as a high-priority national agenda. 
As Singapore came out of the global ¼nancial crisis triggered by the 
Lehman Shock which broke out in 2008, the government saw the need as 
well as an opportunity to restructure the Singaporean economy and maximize
growth capability in the post-crisis era which was characterized by the emergence
of new economic powers such as China and India. The government formed 
the high-level Economic Strategies Committee in May 2009, chaired by Finance
Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam, with 25 members coming from govern-
ment, labor unions, and businesses. This committee was one of the many ad 
hoc mechanisms routinely used by the Singaporean government for solving 
speci¼c problems. Under the committee, eight subcommittees co-chaired by 
representatives of the public and private sectors as well as several working 
groups were formed. 
The Economic Strategies Committee submitted the ¼nal report to Prime 
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grew by an average 5 percent per annum over the past decade, productivity 
gains have declined in recent years. According to the report, the country’s 
productivity levels in manufacturing and services are only 55–65 percent of 
comparable sectors in Japan and the US. In the construction sector, the 
productivity level is only one-third and one-half of Japan and the US,
respectively. This apparent inef¼ciency in a country renowned for well-educated
people and excellent policies can be explained by the existence of low-skill 
foreign workers and the old generation of Singaporeans who received little 
education in their youth, both of whom bring down average productivity. 
In terms of sectors, low productivity is observed in construction, SMEs, and 
a number of services such as retails, restaurants, and tourism. 
Over the past decade, Singapore has become increasingly dependent on 
foreign workers, including both highly skilled professionals and low-skill 
workers, which now account for about one-third (or one million) of the 
entire workforce. Low-skill foreign workers compete with relatively less 
educated Singaporeans in the job market. The report pointed to the need to 
manage (i.e., gradually reduce) the country’s dependence on low-skill foreign
labor and support continuous education and training of low-wage Singaporean
workers. The report also emphasized the importance of productivity growth 
to sustain high wages and high living standards which Singaporeans have 
come to enjoy, and urged the government to encourage enterprise innovation,
investment in technology, and training to create more high-paying jobs. 
Envisioning “high-skilled people, innovative economy, distinctive global 
city,” the report recommended a shift from factor-based growth to productivity-
driven growth with the targeted annual productivity growth of 2–3 percent 
and GDP growth of 3–5 percent on average in the next ten years. It also 
presented seven key strategies to achieve this goal. The main thrust of the 
report was endorsed by the prime minister and re½ected in the budgetary 
allocation for FY2010 (starting from April 1, 2010). 
In Singapore, productivity primarily means labor productivity (value-added
per worker), re½ecting the government’s deep concern with sustaining high 
wages and high living standards for its citizens. As such, it is affected by 
technology, capital accumulation, ef¼ciency and waste reduction, systemic 
innovation, and training adopted by companies. Concerns about Singapore’s
recent slowdown in productivity have been also pointed out in Singapore 
Competitiveness Report 2009 (with a foreword by Michael E. Porter) produced
by the Asia Competitiveness Institute of Lee Kuan Yew School of Public 
Policy. It also recommends the government’s effort to move towards an 
innovation-driven economy. 
6.6.2 The National Productivity and Continuing Education Council 
One of the key strategies proposed by the Economic Strategies Committee 
Report was “growing through skills and innovation.” To implement revived 
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established the National Productivity and Continuing Education Council 
(NPCEC) in April 2010. NPCEC is chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Teo 
Chee Hean, which signi¼es high priority accorded to the productivity issue, 
with members coming from the usual tripartite of government, business 
community, and labor unions. The Ministry of Trade and Industry and the 
Ministry of Manpower jointly act as the secretariat for the Council. Below 
NPCEC are two layers of executing organizations: (i) the Working Committee
for Productivity and Continuing Education (WCPCE) led by the permanent 
secretaries of the two ministries, and (ii) 12 sector working groups and 
horizontal thematic working groups coordinated by various government 
agencies (for the institutional mechanism of the current productivity drive, 
see Figure 4.5 in Chapter 4). 
Twelve priority sectors were selected by the criteria of contribution to 
employment and GDP and high potential for productivity gain. Each working
group must formulate a productivity roadmap (a development plan) for the 
sector for the next ten years which is reviewed by WCPCE and submitted 
to NCPEC for ¼nal approval. A ministry or an agency is assigned to oversee
each priority sector. For example, the Economic Development Board is 
responsible for electronics, precision engineering, transport engineering, and 
logistics and storage; while SPRING is responsible for general manufacturing,
food and beverages, and retail. In addition, horizontal working groups are 
created to cover cross-cutting issues such as low-wage workers, research and 
benchmarking, and infocomm and logistics. Government, businesses, and labor
unions participate in all of the sectoral and thematic working groups. 
6.6.3 Policy measures 
Beginning in FY2010, the government has committed to a total of S$5.5 
billion over the next ten years to support productivity initiatives. This includes
S$3 billion for the Productivity and Innovation Credit and the National 
Productivity Fund and S$2.5 billion for Continuing Education and Training.
The Productivity and Innovation Credit is a broad-based tax bene¼t scheme 
that provides ¼nancial incentive for any enterprise in any sector that invests 
in productivity enhancement or innovation. Speci¼cally, enterprises are entitled
to a deduction of 250 percent of eligible expenditures from their taxable 
income with a cap of S$300,000 per activity. Meanwhile, the National Pro-
ductivity Fund is a targeted support which provides funding for productivity
initiatives in speci¼c industries or enterprises only. Under the priorities and 
guidelines established by NPCEC, sector working groups propose a list of 
productivity initiatives to be supported which is reviewed by WCPCE. 
Regarding Continuing Education and Training, the previous system has 
been expanded to upgrade workforce skills and competitiveness at all levels, 
by providing multiple skills-based progression paths to complement the academic
path, and by reaching out to more professionals, managers, executives, and 
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and train workers, especially low-wage workers and older workers, by in-
troducing the Workfare Training Scheme and enhancing the Workfare Income
Supplement Scheme. Companies can also receive ¼nancial support for employee
training from two additional sources: the Skills Development Fund, mentioned
earlier, and the Lifelong Endowment Fund. Until 2008, the Skills Development
Fund targeted only low-wage workforce, but more recently the Skills Develop-
ment Levy was broadened to cover the entire workforce. The Lifelong
Endowment Fund was established in 2001 with an initial capital of S$500 
million and with the current total capital of S$2 billion. Interest earned from 
this fund can be used to support various lifelong learning initiatives. While 
all workers have access to the Continuing Education and Training scheme, 
subsidies from the Skills Development Fund and the Lifelong Endowment 
Fund are currently limited to Singaporean workers only. 
Another important policy area for the purpose of enhancing productivity 
is SME promotion. There are over 116,000 local SMEs in Singapore account-
ing for 50 percent of value-added and 60 percent of employment of the 
nation.8 Responsibility for SME development rests with the Enterprise Division
of the Ministry of Trade and Industry for policy formulation and SPRING 
for implementation. The Singaporean government adopts both broad-based 
and targeted approaches to SME promotion. Broad-based approaches are 
implemented on a scheme base in collaboration with business chambers and 
associations. There are ¼ve Enterprise Development Centers located at business
associations and chambers, where a team of business advisors give face-to-face
advice to SMEs on government assistance schemes applicable to SMEs, 
¼nance, management, human resources, operations, and so on. As part of this
advisory service, the Financial Facilitator Program has experts composed of 
ex-bankers, ¼nancial consultants, and advisors who help SMEs to gain access
to ¼nancing. Targeted approaches are tailored to individual enterprises which
are usually medium enterprises rather than micro and small ones. Managers 
of SMEs can contact designated SPRING of¼cers to seek advisory services 
and resolve problems. 
Singapore does not have the equivalent of Japan’s Shindan system (SME 
Management Consultants System), an institutionalized and state-backed system
for training, certifying, registering, and renewing certi¼ed SME consultants 
(shindanshi) who advise on management of SMEs and facilitate their ¼nan-
cial access. In Japan, shindanshi reports are regularly used by Japanese banks
to evaluate loan applications submitted by SMEs. In Singapore, banks and 
business consultants work more independently, and banks’ loan of¼cers have
the responsibility to assess and approve loan applications. Instead of the Shindan
system, Singapore has the Practising Management Consultant Certi¼cation 
Scheme, modeled after the British Certi¼ed Management Consultant System,
in which SPRING, the Workforce Development Agency, and International 
Enterprise Singapore give formal endorsement on the quality of management
consultants. As of 2010, about 200 consultants were quali¼ed by the Cer-
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¼nance, laws, and applications for government incentives and less on production
management on the factory ½oor, which is a topic covered by Japan’s shindanshi. 
In Singapore, manpower policy is formulated jointly by concerned of¼cial 
bodies and educational institutions. The National Manpower Council, a 
ministerial council headed by the Minister of Manpower, identi¼es the country’s
human resource needs in the medium to long run and maps out strategies 
to meet these needs. Various government ministries and agencies, including 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Education, and the 
Economic Development Board, participate in the Council. Based on workforce
demand projection and skills mapping, the Council sets numerical targets 
for speci¼c skills required by the country and decides on the number and 
type of students to be graduated from universities and polytechnics over the 
next four to ¼ve years. The Ministry of Education provides funding to edu-
cational institutions for establishing new courses if that is judged necessary. 
The Economic Development Board may also provide additional funds to 
relevant industries for upgrading their workforce. For instance, the aerospace
industry was recently targeted for such sector-speci¼c workforce development. 
Polytechnics have played a signi¼cant role in enhancing the skills of Sing-
aporean workers. There are ¼ve state-run polytechnics in Singapore, among 
which Nanyang Polytechnic is the largest and most prominent. It was established
in 1992 and now boasts about 78,000 students, providing both pre-employment
training for regular students and Continuing Education and Training for 
current workers. Regarding pre-employment training, seven schools of Nanyang
Polytechnic offer 47 full-time courses for three-year diploma in engineering, 
IT, business management, interactive and digital media, design, chemical 
and life sciences, and health sciences. As for Continuing Education and Train-
ing, the polytechnic has formal diploma courses, customized courses, and 
degree programs with overseas universities. The government provides full 
funding for administration and operation of Nanyang Polytechnic (except 
for the part covered by tuition fees). Additional revenues of the school coming
from services rendered to industry, as explained below, can be used freely 
for any purpose by the polytechnic. 
Industry has seats in the Board and Advisory Committees of Nanyang 
Polytechnic and participates in its course development and review. The poly-
technic also has many other channels to work with industry such as (i) education
of suitably trained graduates to meet the manpower needs of industry as 
stipulated by the national policy; (ii) practice- and application-oriented training;
(iii) “industry attachment” (internship) for students; and (iv) collaboration 
with industry and development agencies such as SPRING and Infocomm 
Development Authority. It carries out a large number of industrial projects on
a commercial basis in R&D, product design and development, and innovative
solutions for industry, as well as teaming up with the Economic Development
Board to support start-up “technopreneurs.” Such collaboration creates a 
“win–win” situation for both industry and the polytechnic because the former
can bene¼t from reduced cost and risk for R&D and start-up investment 
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and because the latter can have ample opportunities for staff and student 
training in frontline technology in addition to earning money. Reputation 
of Nanyang Polytechnic is solid and long standing among Singaporean 
manufacturers. It is unable to accept all cooperation proposals from industry
because it receives too many. The school is also active in international co-
operation. Nanyang Polytechnic International provides consultancy services 
to a World Bank project in TVET reform and cooperation with the Suzhou 
Industrial Park Institute of Vocational Technology, both in China. It also 
conducts training programs for management staff and specialists of TVET 
institutions around the world. 
6.7 Concluding remarks 
Singapore’s success with the Productivity Movement can teach many lessons 
to countries that are striving to introduce similar government-led national 
movements to strengthen and invigorate the private sector. In concluding 
this chapter, I will reiterate such lessons. 
First, a nationwide productivity drive requires a paradigm shift and a mindset
change. It is not just a one-time event or a project but a movement with no 
¼nishing line. It requires establishment of an attitude by which all people strive
for and acquire the habit of improvement as well as systems and practices 
that translate such an attitude into action. A new way of thinking, living, and
working must be ¼rmly built in the minds and actions of all leaders and actors. 
Second, in addition to a mindset change, productivity enhancement needs 
political commitment from the top. In Singapore, unwavering concern and 
resolve of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew was critical to making the Productivity
Movement widespread and entrenched in the society. 
Third, productivity enhancement requires strong organizational backup. 
Singapore established a high-level tripartite council for policy coordination 
and a national productivity organization as an implementation body. These 
organizations had to be linked with all key stakeholders such as government,
businesses and its related organizations, labor, and academia enabling them 
to collectively disseminate productivity awareness and translate awareness 
into action in workplaces and training and educational institutions. Linkage 
between workplaces and training and educational institutions was equally 
important for matching graduating engineers and workers with the manpower
needs of industry and promoting collaboration between industry and academia. 
Fourth, the three stages of the Productivity Movement—awareness, action,
and ownership—are a useful reference for national movements. Attitudinal 
change and internalization of productivity actions require time, and they 
must be achieved through proper sequencing to generate understanding, con-
viction, and action. Before introducing QC circles at workplaces in full force,
Singapore spent some years in annual productivity campaigns; public education,
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Fifth, to sustain the Productivity Movement, a cadre of private management
consultants must be fostered to take over the main responsibility in produc-
tivity improvement in the future. The JICA-supported project in Singapore 
trained not only of¼cial counterparts but also private experts. Under the 
Management Consultancy Referral Scheme and the Associate Consultants 
Scheme, trained private experts became National Productivity Board associate
or referral consultants and were mobilized for subsequent productivity pro-
grams. While government of¼cials may teach companies at ¼rst, the task of 
diagnostic and advisory services must eventually be carried out by private 
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7 Taiwan 
Policy drive for innovation 
7.1 From “Banana Republic” to “Silicon Island” 
Taiwan, a small island off mainland China with a total area of approximately
36,000 km2 and a current population of 23 million, started development in 
the post-World War II period from the position of a poor agrarian economy 
exporting rice, sugar, oolong tea, bananas, and pineapples. By the end of 
the twenty century it had attained a high income backed by world-class 
technology-based manufacturing. This chapter examines how today’s Taiwan,
as one of the highly industrialized economies in the world, promotes innova-
tion to continue to climb the technological ladder and secure its place
in global competition. Our focus is not only on what policies are used for 
this purpose but also on how and by whom they are formulated and executed.
We will see that, since 2010, Taiwan’s key industrial policy instruments have 
consisted of a uniformly low corporate tax, competitive and strictly monitored
“technology development programs,” research institutes that support policy 
formulation and implementation, various industrial parks, and promotion 
of SMEs. Taiwan no longer uses a complex set of incentives for targeted 
industries or products or discriminates ¼rms based on their nationalities. 
Looking back, the island was a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945. After 
Japan was defeated in World War II and expelled from Taiwan in 1945, 
¼ghting over the control of Mainland China continued between the Com-
munists and the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party). With the ¼nal victory of 
the Communists and establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949, defeated Kuomintang leaders and supporters, including Chiang Kai 
Shek, his elite followers, and about 1.5 million bureaucrats, military of¼cers, 
entrepreneurs and their families, ½ed to Taiwan. The declared policy
of Communist China to “liberate” Taiwan and escalation of the Cold War 
into hot wars in Korea and Indochina put Taiwan under a strong external 
threat and pervasive sense of crisis. As a matter of top national priority, 
rapid economic growth had to be engineered to secure the material basis of 
national security. To accomplish this, a strong authoritarian developmental 
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Kuomintang leaders realized their policy mistakes that caused the military
loss of the mainland. According to Ezra Vogel, 
In their analysis of why they lost the mainland, Kuomintang leaders 
acknowledged that public support had eroded because of their failure to
stop corruption and to provide for the common people’s livelihood. 
Above all, they concluded, they should have done more to control 
in½ation and implement land reform. They were determined to do better 
on Taiwan. They resolved to be strict with corruption, to expand the role
of government enterprise in a way not susceptible to private in½uence, 
and to create a greater distance between the government and the private 
sector. 
(Vogel, 1991, p. 18) 
The Kuomintang government relocated in Taiwan devoted its skills and 
passion to economic development. A group of able and highly-educated 
technocrats who had practical policy experience on the mainland took charge
of nation-building and economic strategy making. Some of them managed 
state-owned enterprises which laid the foundation of Taiwan’s initial indus-
trialization. Economic construction plans were formulated and executed. 
Land reform was implemented successfully in 1951. As the international 
political support shifted from the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the People’s
Republic of China (mainland) in the 1960s and the 1970s, the authoritarian 
developmental state in Taiwan was further convinced that rapid economic 
development was the only way to survive in international isolation and 
enhance bargaining power against the mainland. Economic growth was sus-
tained by a state-led drive for heavy and chemical industrialization known 
as the “Ten Major Development Projects” as well as strong growth of labor-
intensive exports by competitive local SMEs. 
As a result of over 60 years of continued effort at industrialization, with 
shifting phases, Taiwan’s economic structure has been transformed enor-
mously, creating a miracle island that dominates the world in the manufac-
turing of ICT hardware. Taiwan’s industrial policy goals and key industries 
shifted steadily over the years as follows: 
1950s: Import substitution with a focus on the food industry 
1960s: Export expansion with a focus on the textile and garment industry 
1970s: Enhancement of industrial infrastructure with a focus on the petro-
chemical industry 
1980s: Economic liberalization with a focus on the information technology
(IT) industry 
1990s: Industrial upgrading with a focus on the integrated circuit (IC)
industry 
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In 2010, Taiwan’s per capita GDP was US$19,046, which stood among 
the richest economies of the world. It should be stressed that, as in the case
of Singapore, this income was generated by technology and hard work
rather than a lucky endowment of natural resources or in½ows of external 
capital and aid. Adjusted for differences in price levels, Taiwan’s real income
is now equivalent to Japan’s.1 Taiwan is the leading global supplier of a large
number of parts and components in ICT such as mask ROM (94 percent), 
IC foundry (66 percent), blank optical disk (63 percent), IC package (44 
percent), electronic glass fabric (39 percent), IC design (27 percent), and 
DRAM (22 percent). But this is counting products made in Taiwan only. If 
overseas production by Taiwanese ¼rms is also considered, the list of “made
by Taiwan” products with dominant global shares becomes longer. It includes
such ICT hardware as motherboard (96 percent), notebook computer (95 
percent), server (89 percent), wireless LAN device (81 percent), cable modem
(79 percent), portable navigation device (77 percent), and LCD monitor (72 
percent). The numbers in parentheses are the global market share in 2009 
as reported by the Taiwanese government. 
As industrial structure steadily deepened and the private sector strengthened
competitiveness, the policy mechanism that promoted Taiwan’s industrialization
also changed. Up to the mid-1980s, the remarkable structural transformation
was directed by a powerful bureaucracy, the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(MoEA), and a handful of key elite ¼gures that constituted an authoritarian 
developmental state model which Robert Wade described as “Governing the 
Market” (Wade, 1990). At that time, principal policy instruments included 
SME ¼nance, market entry regulation (to protect SMEs from large ¼rms), 
trade promotion agency, credit facilities and insurance, industrial estates,
and technical assistance by of¼cially created research institutions. SMEs in 
Taiwan were dynamic and could respond strongly to these policy initiatives. 
In those days, SMEs were Taiwan’s main exporters while large corporations 
such as Formosa Plastic (private) and China Steel (state-owned) supplied to 
the domestic market. 
After the mid-1980s, a number of structural shifts occurred. First, the 
private sector became more powerful relative to the government as a result 
of economic development. Second, within the private sector, large local
¼rms emerged while the relative share of SMEs in output, export, and em-
ployment all declined. Third, economic liberalization, increasing economic
interaction with mainland China, and accession to the WTO in 2002 exerted 
international competitive pressure. Currently Taiwan’s largest ¼rms include 
TSMC (semi-conductor), UMC (semi-conductor), AU Optronics (LCD),
Foxconn (electronics manufacturing service), Acer (computer), Asus (com-
puter), Yulon Motor (automotive), San Yang Motors (motorcycle), and 
Kwang Yang Motor (motorcycle). Old giants such as Formosa Plastic
and China Steel are also moving into new ¼elds such as arti¼cial ¼ber in
the case of the former and high-quality steel for auto, electronics, and
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¼rms, Taiwan’s industrialization no longer depends very much on FDI or 
foreign technology. 
Even today, Taiwanese SMEs are highly active by international standards 
and remain more autonomous (not constrained by a hierarchical order like 
Japanese keiretsu or Korean chaebols) and have a high start-up ratio of 7.1 
percent, which shows how many new ¼rms are established every year relative
to the number of existing ¼rms. However, as integration deepens and
corporate size becomes increasingly important in global competition, large 
¼rms have began to dominate even in Taiwan and the relative role of SMEs 
in industrialization has shrunk. Moreover, even large Taiwanese ¼rms feel 
that they are too small compared with Japanese or South Korean giants and 
want to grow more and create brand-name products. Taiwan has succeeded 
greatly in industrialization by specializing in contracted hardware manufac-
turing for foreign brand-name electronic products. However, this type of 
manufacturing, which includes original equipment manufacturing (OEM), 
original design manufacturing (ODM) and electronics manufacturing service
(EMS), does not necessarily capture the highest value-creating segment of 
the value chain. Taiwan feels that contracted hardware manufacturing has 
already reached a plateau and that it needs a new business model to grow 
into the future. 
Given these trends, the industrial policy of the MoEA is also changing. 
In Taiwan, the industrial policy statute is the most important legal document
governing industrialization. The ¼rst such law, the Statute for Encourage-
ment of Investment (effective 1960–1990), and its successor, the Statute for 
Upgrading Industries (effective 1991–2010), guided past industrial policies. 
The Statute for Industrial Innovation, approved by the National Assembly 
in May 2010, is the current law which sets future directions for Taiwan’s 
industries. Three features of the new statute are particularly noteworthy. 
First, it expands policy scope from the previous manufacturing-only focus 
to agro and biotech industries, industrial services, and high-value services 
which would additionally require coordination among a number of ministries
other than the MoEA. Second, it replaces the previous system of multiple 
incentives by a uniform corporate income tax rate of 17 percent (lowered 
from the previous 25 percent)2 and elimination of all tax incentives except 
for R&D. This change was made to simplify the incentive structure while at 
the same time retaining tax advantage against neighboring countries.3 Third, 
it aims to shift Taiwan from a hardware manufacturer to a soft power 
economy with strong national brands and a regional logistic and transport 
hub. Like many other high-income economies, Taiwan wants to become an 
innovation-driven economy as it graduates from the successful factor- and 
ef¼ciency-driven growth of the past. 
Taiwan’s current industrial policy has two pillars: creation of soft power 
and improving cross-strait relations. The soft power drive has three sub-
components: (i) supply of industrial professionals; (ii) promoting emerging 
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and footwear. Regarding emerging industries, the six “major emerging indus-
tries” are biotechnology, precision agriculture, green energy, medical and 
healthcare, tourism, and cultural innovation industries. The four “emerging 
intelligent industries” are invention and patent commercialization, cloud 
computing, electric intelligent cars, and intelligent green construction indus-
tries. Besides these, ten service industries which are outside the mandate of 
the MoEA are also targeted. Even with streamlined tax incentives, the MoEA
can promote targeted sectors and activities through technology development 
projects commissioned by the Department of Industrial Technology and 
other agencies, as explained below. 
Regarding cross-strait relations, restrictions on China-bound investment 
were relaxed in August 2008 when permissible ratios and value ceilings for 
Taiwanese corporate and individual investors in China were raised. Meetings,
seminars, and industrial collaboration with mainland China have also been 
activated. The Taiwanese markets have also been opening to Chinese investors
since June 2009, though gradually and based on careful monitoring of actual
performance. The recently signed cross-strait Economic Cooperation Frame-
work Agreement (ECFA), effective from January 2011, is expected to have 
further impacts on cross-strait relations. ECFA is modeled after the ASEAN– 
China Free Trade Agreement which features “early harvest” trade items in 
goods and services. 
With the exception of carefully watched economic relations with mainland
China, Taiwan does not care about the nationality of investors whether they 
are domestic, foreign, or joint venture. Taiwan accepts FDI in any sector 
except in national defense. As noted above, Taiwan’s FDI attraction policy 
is based on the low and universal corporate income tax and transparent 
incentives for R&D only. Unlike Singapore, Taiwan does not engage
in customized negotiation to attract targeted individual foreign investors. 
Industrial policy is mainly directed to local ¼rms which are the major indus-
trial players in Taiwan. 
7.2 The making of industrial policy 
7.2.1 The Industrial Development Bureau 
The most important policymaking body for Taiwan’s industrialization is the 
Industrial Development Bureau (IDB) of the MoEA. Although its in½uence 
has waned over the decades, it still yields substantial power in guiding the 
private sector. The IDB currently has 240 permanent staff mainly with
engineering backgrounds as recruitment of economists into the IDB is only 
a recent phenomenon. Temporary staff are also hired to cope with its heavy 
work load. Many components of policy drafting and consultations are
outsourced to government-created semi-of¼cial think tanks, especially the 
Taiwan Institute of Economic Research (TIER) and the Chung-Hua Institu-
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Figure 7.1 Organizational structure of the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
“committees” are used for consensus building between ministries and experts,
and “seminars” are organized extensively for interacting with the private 
sector. In Taiwan, think tanks, committees, and seminars are not just means 
of information exchange and policy discussion but integral parts of action-
oriented policy formulation and implementation. Their reputation and funding
depend directly on their contribution to the policy process. 
The IDB has three sectoral divisions (metal and mechanical, IT, and
consumer goods and chemicals) and four functional divisions (industrial
policy, knowledge services, sustainable development, and industrial parks). 
Besides these, a number of task forces and of¼ces for sectoral promotion
are placed under the IDB. Restructuring of the MoEA is expected for the 
implementation of the new industrial statute which has a wider sectoral
scope than the previous one. 
7.2.2 Principal policy instruments 
Taiwan’s industrial policy aims at commercial application of technological 
innovation. Public support is provided on a competitive and conditional 
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Figure 7.2 Organizational structure of the Industrial Development Bureau, MoEA 
commercialize R&D with results being closely monitored and evaluated. At 
present, technology development programs and industrial zones (especially 
science parks) are the two principal instruments for promoting innovation. 
Sector- or activity-speci¼c incentives are no longer a major policy instrument
under the current industrial statute which eliminated all incentive schemes 
except for R&D. 
Regarding technology development projects (TDPs), the Department of 
Industrial Technology (DoIT) of the MoEA is responsible for identifying, 
screening, and ¼nancing projects that directly enhance technology of
the private sector.4 TDPs are classi¼ed into three types: organization TDPs 
that are provided to research institutes for commercializing their R&D
activities and assisting enterprises (since 1979), industrial TDPs that offer 
direct grants to private enterprises engaged in R&D and innovation (since 
1997), and academic TDPs that encourage universities to utilize their R&D 
facilities and resources to develop new industrial technologies (since 2001). 
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far the largest part of DoIT programs occupying 75.3 percent while the
share of industrial TDPs was 20.6 percent and that of academic TDPs
was 4.1 percent. Within organization TDPs, the electronics, information, 
communication, and opto-electronics sector receives the largest amount
(23.7 percent of organization TDP budget) followed by machinery and trans-
portation (20.6 percent), innovative and advanced R&D (15.1 percent),
biotechnology and pharmaceutics (13.2 percent), material and chemical en-
gineering (12.3 percent), and others. How organization TDPs are administered
will be explained in detail below for the case of metal engineering. 
In 2010, the national budget for science and technology totaling NT$94.2 
billion (about US$2.9 billion) was allocated among the National Science 
Council (43.0 percent), the MoEA (30.8 percent), and Academia Sinica (11.0 
percent). The DoIT received NT$19.9 billion which was the lion’s share (69 
percent) of this fund allocated to the MoEA amounting to NT$29.0 billion. 
The DoIT uses this fund to ¼nance three types of TDPs described above by 
research institutes, private organizations, and universities that support national
industrial policy. Funding is allocated competitively by evaluating proposals 
submitted by applicant organizations. The DoIT sometimes works closely 
with them to improve proposals. TDPs aim at industrial application of R&D
and not pure scienti¼c research. The results of these projects are reviewed by
DoIT advisory groups for alignment with national policy and key performance
indicators such as the level of R&D relative to GDP or corporate revenue; 
numbers of patents applied, granted, and ¼led; revenue derived from technology
and patent transfers; and private-sector investments stimulated by TDPs. 
As for industrial estates, there are three types of centrally managed indus-
trial estates with different overseeing authorities: 13 science parks under the 
National Science Council, eight export processing zones under the Export 
Processing Zone (EPZ) Administration of the MoEA, and 61 industrial parks
under the IDB of the MoEA. There are different technology requirements 
for tenant ¼rms in these zones with the required level of innovation and 
R&D being highest in science parks and lowest in industrial parks. The 
National Science Council, through its Science Park Administration, supervises
13 science-based parks. Among them, Hsinchu Science Park (HSP), estab-
lished in 1980, was the ¼rst and most successful. It has become the central 
location for Taiwan’s ICT industry with high international reputation. EPZs,
¼rst established in Kaohsiung in 1966, have been home to Taiwan’s vibrant 
industrial activities and contributed greatly to its export drive. Re½ecting 
Taiwan’s economic transformation, the sectoral distribution of tenant ¼rms 
in EPZs shifted overtime from low-tech labor-intensive manufacturing to 
high-end OEM and high-tech electronics. Meanwhile, industrial parks focus 
on light industry, basic consumer goods, petrochemical, and so on, with 
regional specialization and local regulatory differences. Unlike science parks 
and EPZs which only rent land and factories, industrial parks can sell land 
to investors. However, industrial parks are not required to provide one-stop 
investor service as others. There is a plan to merge the administration of 
 













Taiwan: policy drive for innovation 201 
EPZs with industrial parks. Besides centrally managed industrial estates, 
Taiwan also has 18 industrial parks developed by local governments and 93 
industrial parks developed by the private sector as of 2010. 
7.2.3 Drafting of the industrial statute 
Taiwan’s industrial policy is strongly guided by the MoEA. A think tank 
provides supporting functions such as providing secretariat service, conducting
studies and reports, running a related center, and organizing committees, 
seminars, and hearings. Consultation with concerned ministries and the pri-
vate sector is an important component of the policymaking process. However,
the traditionally strong leadership of the MoEA and the passive attitudes of 
other ministries and organizations makes this process somewhat unilateral 
and lopsided. Another unique aspect of Taiwan is intervention by the power-
ful legislature which may upset the picture painted by technocrats. Interest 
groups often lobby the legislature to in½uence policy outcome. 
As an example, let us examine the drafting process of the Statute for
Industrial Innovation of 2010 mentioned above. In anticipation of expiration
of the previous industrial law, a task force was created by the IDB under 
the MoEA three years in advance to draft a new law. MoEA Minister Yen-
Shiang Shih led brainstorming sessions and provided the vision and key ideas
for this law. These sessions were conducted by the Chung-Hua Institution for
Economic Research, a think tank chosen for supporting the MoEA in drafting
the new law. The proposed vision and ideas were conveyed to the private 
sector through public hearing meetings with six sectoral business associations
representing steel, IT, and so on. The main purpose of these meetings was 
for the ministry to persuade the private sector and make it agree with its 
policy direction rather than receiving substantive comments for revision. 
Sometimes private ¼rms had divided opinions. 
In addition, a small number of inter-ministerial meetings were also held
with the MoEA minister presiding and ministers of other related ministries 
attending. Interventions by other ministries were few and no objections were 
raised against the MoEA’s visions and ideas. While the MoEA has histori-
cally dominated industrial promotion, other ministries in charge of services, 
agriculture, health care, education, culture, etc., which are now included as 
targeted sectors, are unfamiliar with industrial promotion measures and 
remained passive on the listening side. After these consultations, the Industrial
Policy Division of the IDB drafted the law with the support of law ¼rms for 
wording. 
However, the draft law prepared by the MoEA was substantially revised 
in the legislative process. Taiwan’s National Assembly is powerful and there-
fore attracts lobbying by interest groups. The law drafted by technocrats 
originally proposed lowering the corporate income tax from 25 percent to 20
percent and kept four incentive schemes for R&D, branding, human-resource
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to Taiwan. The National Assembly, backed by the industrial and SME lobby,
slashed the proposed corporate income tax rate further to 17 percent despite 
the fact that the Ministry of Finance was concerned about revenue loss, and 
eliminated all incentive measures except for R&D. According to one industrial
expert, this legislative action was too aggressive but must be accepted as a 
compromise in democracy. Finally, an “island tour” was conducted in the 
North, Middle, and South of Taiwan to disseminate the new law. 
It is worth noting that the consultative policymaking procedure as described
above was established in the late 1980s when the previous industrial statute 
was formulated. Prior to that, policymaking was dominated by a few elite 
leaders and technocrats who drafted policies with limited help of research 
institutes that produced internal studies without public review and comments. 
Regarding this policymaking process, there are different voices among 
local experts outside government. According to one expert, private ¼rms 
often complain that government does too much R&D which competes with 
and crowds out private R&D. However, another expert argued that govern-
ment must be more proactive than before in pushing innovation in the 
twenty-¼rst century. One expert said that private ¼rms, especially SMEs, are 
still willing to listen to and follow government because government-backed 
R&D and technology transfer greatly bene¼t them. One scholar stated that 
“embedded autonomy,” or government with close interaction with businesses
without being hijacked by vested interests, was possible in Taiwan because 
of such historical factors as social mobility, fair competition without class 
discrimination, and leadership paranoia over external threats (previously 
from Communism and now from integration pressure). While most experts 
appreciate proactive policy guidance, some express mild doubts about the 
prospects and effectiveness of the current innovation drive. For example,
the biotech industry targeted by government is slow to emerge and grow.5 
7.3 Research institutes 
In Taiwan there are 19 research institutes created by the MoEA which play 
vital roles in designing and implementing national industrial and technology 
policy. Some of them received seed money at establishment but they now all 
operate as NPOs competing for funds for TDPs commissioned by govern-
ment and industrial services and projects requested by private ¼rms without 
receiving any regular budget allocation from the state. Taiwan’s research 
institutes can be classi¼ed into policy think tanks which assist policy drafting
and technology support institutes which play key roles in policy implementa-
tion. We will describe the functions of four of them, two from each category. 
7.3.1 Policy research institutes 
Among policy research institutes, the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research
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the two applied economic research think tanks strongly supporting the policy-
making of the MoEA. With overlapping research capabilities and support 
functions, they are also competitors in bidding for government research 
projects. 
TIER was founded in 1976 with private funding. It boasts over 100 scholars,
maintains a databank of Taiwanese industries, conducts domestic and global
economic forecasts, and acts as a secretariat to the Industrial Development 
Advisory Council as well as several cross-strait economic cooperation projects.
It also conducted the impact study of the Economic Cooperation Framework
Agreement (ECFA, for increased trade with mainland China). TIER has 
seven research divisions, several service providing centers, the Tokyo of¼ce, 
and other departments and committees. Its revenue comes from undertaking 
government projects (about 70 percent) and private-sector projects (about 30
percent). The Industrial Development Advisory Council, to which TIER serves
as secretariat, is a platform for interaction among government, businesses, and
academics which was established in 1984 following the Japanese model of 
MITI’s Industrial Structure Council. The MoEA uses the Council to fathom 
the impact of its policies and hear the requests and problems of the business
community. The Council holds 15 meetings per year, two of which are organ-
ized by the IDB of the MoEA and others by other bureaus of the MoEA. 
CIER, established in 1982 with a (mostly of¼cial) endowment of NT$1 
billion, is located on the premises of the National Taiwan University. Like 
TIER, it conducts commissioned projects for the president, the Execu-
tive Yuan (Taiwan’s executive branch), and government ministries and
agencies. It has three research divisions that conduct applied research on 
mainland China, international issues, and domestic issues respectively. CIER
also produces economic forecasts and operates the WTO Center as well
as other ad hoc centers. CIER was the secretariat to the formulation of
the 2010 industrial statute as explained above, ECFA, and Taiwan’s WTO 
entry. For ECFA, for example, CIER spent two to three years for research 
and produced a report on the costs and bene¼ts of increased economic
interaction with mainland China which was circulated to the public and 
academia for critical review. The report was then discussed among con-
cerned ministries and agencies, businesses (through “seminars”), and ¼nally 
with legislators before it was sent to the Legislative Yuan (national assembly).
CIER feels that about 70–80 percent of what it proposes in its report makes 
to the ¼nal stage. 
7.3.2 Technology research institutes 
Among the 11 technology support institutes, the Industrial Technology
Research Institute (ITRI), founded in 1973, is Taiwan’s largest R&D organ-
ization in support of technology transfer and commercialization. Its supervising
agency is the MoEA. ITRI has 5,800 employees in its large building complex
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hold doctoral degrees. At ITRI there are three ways to disseminate R&D— 
technology licensing; spinning off a research team to form a start-up company;
and forming a joint venture to become a new section in an existing com-
pany (“spin-in”). Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) 
and United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC), the two world largest IC 
foundries, are ITRI’s most famous spin-offs. In total ITRI has produced 65 
ventures and 19,589 ITRI alumni. ITRI also offers open labs where domestic
and foreign companies can send staff to do joint research with ITRI researchers
using ITRI facilities. About half of ITRI’s revenue comes from fees charged 
to domestic and foreign ¼rms for industrial services such as system planning,
product design, intellectual property licensing, and intellectual assets and the
other half from state-funded research projects on a competitive bidding 
basis. ITRI is commissioned to plan, train, and formulate policies mainly 
for the MoEA but it also provides services to other ministries. Its location 
in Hsinchu, in proximity to science parks and two technology universities, 
allows active cooperation with private ¼rms and academia although ITRI 
also works with industrial and academic partners all over Taiwan. Many 
graduates from the two science and technology universities nearby join ITRI
for several years to learn industrial application and accumulate practical
experience, then start migrating between industry and ITRI. In this way, 
ITRI is the largest focal point for industry–government–academia cooperation
as well as for carrying out the MoEA’s technology development programs. 
ITRI is also a focal point for industrial network formation. Concrete 
ITRI-aided achievements in this area include enhancement of global com-
petitiveness of the Taiwanese bicycle industry by the two leading bicycle 
producers, Giant and Merida, forming an organization (“A-Team”) with 11 
bicycle-parts makers that adopted the Toyota Production System; horizontal
integration of machine tools companies to apply core technology to upgrade 
overall industry capability; R&D alliance among research institutes, academia,
and industry that integrated and strengthened 12 local companies that pro-
duced ½exible panel display manufacturing equipment; and the creation of 
a national brand saxophone, “Saxhome,” in the musical instrument cluster 
in Howli Township, Taichung. 
ITRI College, a new addition to ITRI, is a training provider for ITRI 
staff at all levels as well as for industry. It offers courses lasting from one 
day to three months on ¼ve innovation competencies and six technological 
domains.6 It also offers customized training programs for enterprises. ITRI 
College issues certi¼cates but no degrees because its courses are strictly
for actual use by industry to create value and not for academic merits. Of 
particular interest are its need-based programs for government of¼cials
and researchers from developing countries in such topics as national inno-
vation system, human resource development system, SME promotion, science
park development, and intellectual property management. In 2010, for
example, ITRI College received of¼cial delegations from Vietnam and
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each) for customized policy training. However, Taiwan is not conducting 
knowledge sharing with developing countries as a national project, and
the size of its intellectual assistance remains small compared with similar 
programs by Japan or South Korea. Political concern vis-à-vis mainland 
China is one reason for Taiwan to remain low-key in its international
assistance activities. 
The Metal Industries Research and Development Center (MIRDC),
established in 1963, is one of the sectoral technology institutes under the 
MoEA. It is headquartered in Kaohsiung with seven branches and centers 
across Taiwan. It supports the metal industry and industries of metal-
related technologies including automation. MIRDC has 612 employees, of 
which 51 are doctoral degree holders and 325 possess master’s degrees. Main
specializations of the professional staff are mechanical engineering (38 percent),
material and chemical science (11 percent), and electrical, opto-electronic, and
info-tech areas (8 percent). Its annual staff turnover is 10 percent and the 
average working period is ten years (at ITRI, they are 20 percent and six 
years respectively). MIRDC also hires staff on a contract base. It has ¼ve 
focused industries for support: metal material and fabricated metal products,
mold and die and micro parts, automotive technology, opto-electronics and 
energy equipment, and medical devices and care. MIRDC has over 50 R&D 
labs and can provide services to private ¼rms through industrial TDPs, 
transfer of technology project achievements, patent sale, application for 
governmental resources, as well as in management, e-automation, market 
survey, and industrial training. 
Speci¼cally, commercial applications of MIRDC-assisted R&D include 
the industrial innovative transformation and cluster value-added promotion 
program which supported 48 industrial clusters consisting of 230 companies 
leading to 117 product pilot developments; application of super thin slice 
motor technology to the production of micro heat dissipating fans, water 
cooling heat dissipating pumps, automobile internal air monitors, mobile 
phone vibration motors, and medical cosmetic products; and development 
of an integrated dental implant system that upgraded ten producers and 
created one spin-off company that replaced traditional OEM and entered 
the global market with a brand name. 
The annual revenue of MIRDC, amounting to NT$2 billion, comes from 
industrial services (25 percent directly from private sector and 35 percent 
commissioned by government) and from government’s technology develop-
ment programs discussed earlier (40 percent). A team is formed for each 
project undertaken. Teams may last for four to ¼ve years for big projects 
and three to six months for small ones. For a large DoIT-funded project, 
for example, about two years are spent for sounding local industry needs 
and working out a proposal jointly with the DoIT. After approval, imple-
mentation and monitoring will usually take three to four years. As with other
research institutes, MIRDC must bid competitively for government projects 
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of patents or companies assisted, new investments and technology applica-
tions generated, and so on. 
7.4 Hsinchu Science Park 
As noted above, there are three types of state-managed industrial estates in 
Taiwan, among which science parks, under the direct control of the National
Science Council, are most demanding in the requirement of R&D and its 
commercialization. Hsinchu Science Park (HSP), established in December 
1980 in Hsinchu City in Northern Taiwan, was the ¼rst such science park 
that contributed greatly to the development of Taiwan’s ICT industry. This 
location was chosen due to its proximity to ITRI and two engineering uni-
versities, Chiao Tung University and Tsing Hua University, that could
provide necessary technology support and human resource to the science 
park. The government additionally established several labs at HSP includ-
ing the National Center for High-performance Computing, the National 
Chip Implementation Center, and the National Nano Device Laboratories. 
Interacting with Silicon Valley in California, USA, industry structure,
entrepreneurship, R&D mechanism, and venture systems of HSP were built 
up. HSP currently generates 4.5 percent of Taiwan’s GDP, and many of the 
high-tech products dominating the global market mentioned earlier originate
in this park. Its enormous success attracts about 1,000 study missions
annually from around the world that hope to learn how high-tech industrial 
parks such as this can be created and managed. 
The number of tenant companies, their revenues, and park employees grew
steadily and signi¼cantly over the years. At the end of 2010, they stood at 
449 companies, US$40.9 billion, and 139,416 employees respectively. Park 
employees were predominantly Taiwanese but they also included 4,134
foreigners of which 1,074 were highly skilled. In the period of 1989–2008, 
the average R&D-to-sales ratio of tenant ¼rms at HSP was 6.0 percent
against the national manufacturing average of 1.1 percent. Land in HSP is 
state-owned and leased out on a 20-year contract at subsidized rates to 
domestic and foreign ¼rms with no intervention in corporate activities. 400 
standard rental factories with the size of 700–1,000 m2 are also available (a 
¼rm may rent more than one unit). The monthly rent is NT$53/m2 for land 
and NT$98–126/m2 for rental factory. As expected of a top-notch industrial 
estate of world fame, one-stop service, good infrastructure, and comfortable 
living conditions are all guaranteed. The average income per household in 
Hsinchu City is second highest in Taiwan, after Taipei. 
Measured by company revenues which recorded a total of US$40.9 billion 
in 2010, the largest industry by far at HSP is integrated circuits (67.5 percent)
followed by opto-electronics (20.7 percent), computers and peripherals
(6.4 percent), telecom (2.7 percent), and precision machinery (1.8 percent). 
Some of the park’s renowned tenants include TSMC, UMC, Acer, Foxconn,
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the tenants are Taiwanese, HSP is also host to 44 foreign ¼rms, of which 17 
are American and ten are Japanese. 95 companies were set up by overseas 
Chinese. 
More than 30 years after establishment, HSP is still growing. Although 
HSP’s land of 653 ha has no plan for future expansion, there is a relatively 
high turnover of tenant companies whose number is continuously increasing.
Instead of enlarging the physical boundaries of HSP, ¼ve satellite parks such
as Jhunan Science Park and Longtan Science Park are created to accom-
modate more ¼rms. At HSP, about 30 companies move in and a considerable
but ½uctuating number of companies move out every year with the result 
that the number of park tenants is increasing and average space per factory 
is becoming smaller over time, which is the intended policy of the Science 
Park Administration. HSP is an attractive location for high-tech companies 
because of its accumulated talent, technology, and knowledge networks as 
well as subsidized rents and high reputation. There are about 60 companies 
waiting to enter HSP as of early 2011. Applicant companies are screened for 
their R&D activities, capital, environmental concern, and so on. Meanwhile,
tenant ¼rms which fail to spend at least 2.28 percent (twice the national 
average) of sales revenue on R&D, or those which miss monthly payments 
twice, are asked to leave HSP. 
Since its establishment, HSP has received state investments by the Science 
Park Administration amounting to NT$86 billion. In addition, HSP’s income
is supplemented by the collection of management fees and rental and
operational revenues. HSP began to make pro¼t around 2000 and currently 
enjoys stable revenue. Because HSP is the leading science park in Taiwan, 
it ¼nancially assists other science parks, including those in Taichung and 
Tainan, and monitors their operational performance. 
7.5 Export processing zones 
Export processing zones (EPZs), together with the strong SME sector backed
by appropriate policy support, discussed in the following section, were the 
two main drivers of Taiwan’s industrial growth in the past which were 
emulated by many other countries. Nowadays they have become standard 
policy tools for latecomer industrialization around the world. As Taiwan’s 
industrialization moved into the age of innovation and soft power, they no 
longer play the primary role in policy formulation as in the previous decades 
although they are still well-functioning and important for securing robust 
and shared growth. A great deal can be learned from the management of 
these two crucial policy instruments, from which Taiwan has realized so 
much economic and social gains, by developing countries of the twenty-¼rst 
century which have not yet installed them successfully. 
EPZs have a longer history than science parks. Combining the func-
tions of free trade zone and industrial park, Taiwan established an EPZ
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Administrative procedures were streamlined, one-stop service was installed, 
and tax incentives were provided. The Kaohsiung EPZ was the world’s ¼rst 
successful EPZ that became the model for other countries to follow.7 Since 
its space next to the harbor were quickly occupied by manufacturers of radios
and garments, two more such zones, the Taichung and Nantze EPZs, were 
subsequently added in 1969 and 1971, respectively. As demand for superior 
industrial land continued to outstrip the supply of space, the government 
began in 1997 to further develop the Linkuang, Chungkang and Pingtung 
EPZs and the Chengkung Logistics Park. The Software-based Technology 
Park was recently added to the list to stimulate development of the software 
industry in Southern Taiwan. The EPZ Administration of the MoEA, located
in Kaohsiung, oversees these EPZs and parks in Central and Southern
Taiwan. The total area of these estates is 532 hectares, which includes Kaoh-
siung EPZ (72.4 hectares), Nantze EPZ (97.8 hectares), and Taichung EPZ 
(26.2 hectares), which are the original three. 
Unlike science parks which were established for the pursuit of high tech-
nology from the beginning, industrial focus of EPZs shifted over time to 
trace the structural transformation of Taiwan, from clothing and hair dryers 
to cameras and sewing machines and ¼nally to integrated circuits (ICs) and 
liquid crystal displays (LCDs). This transition is visually displayed in a small
museum housed in the EPZ Administration. By the suggestion of Kuo-Ding 
Lee, the Commissioner of the International Economic Cooperation Council,
the Taiwanese government adopted the “labor-intensive light industry develop-
ment ¼rst” strategy to promote export in the early 1960s. Initially, the four 
objectives of the EPZs were attraction of industrial investment, develop-
ment of international trade, transfer of new technologies, and creation of 
employment. From 1966 to 1976, tenant ¼rms of EPZs were engaged mainly 
in traditional manufacturing as well as low-end original equipment manu-
facturing (OEM, or contract manufacturing for foreign brand products)
of general consumer electronics and components such as black-and-white 
TVs, transistor radios, calculators, and audio devices (56.7 percent); garment
such as trousers, jackets, leather coats, and knitwear (16.4 percent); plastic 
products (5.9 percent); and other miscellaneous goods (21.0 percent). From 
1977 to 1986, production in the EPZs gradually moved up to mid-end and 
high-end OEM of consumer electronics and components such as color TVs, 
car audio system, IC, variable resistors, memories, and ½uorescent displays 
(65.0 percent); garments (11.4 percent); precision products such as camera 
lens (5.7 percent); and others (17.9 percent). In these early days, foreign ¼rms
had high representation in the EPZs. Workers in the zones were pre-
dominantly female. Young women commuting on bicycles to EPZs was a 
common sight in the 1970s. All products made in EPZs had to be exported 
initially, a requirement that was subsequently relaxed in 1986 and eventually 
abandoned in 1997. 
From 1987 to 1996, industries in EPZs shifted further to high-tech and 
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also continued. The product mix became dominated by electronic components
such as IC packaging, LCDs, single-layer printed circuit boards, and so forth
(75.3 percent) followed by high-end garment (6.2 percent), precision products
(5.0 percent), and others (13.5 percent). The trend continued in 1997–2004 
while trading and warehousing industries and original design manufacturing 
(ODM) were added. Products continued to climb up the technological scale 
as follows: mid- and high-level electronic components (81.0 percent), preci-
sion products (7.0 percent); international trade (4.4 percent); and others (7.6 
percent). In 2005, the industrial cluster development strategy was launched 
by the government. 
The current focus industries at the EPZs include IC testing and packaging 
(Nantze EPZ), LCD modules (Kaohsiung EPZ), and opto-electronics (Tai-
chung EPZ). Gauged by distribution of corporate revenues which totaled 
US$8.66 billion in 2009, the currently dominant sector is electronic parts 
and components (64.2 percent) followed by non-metallic mineral products 
(8.8 percent), and computer, electronic, and optical products (8.6 percent). 
In 2009, new investments in the EPZs were made mainly by domestic ¼rms 
(42.1 percent) and joint ventures (45.8 percent) whereas the share of 100 
percent foreign investors was small (12.2 percent). Back in 1991, the latter 
had an investment share of 38.2 percent. 
Institutions and services offered by the EPZ Administration also changed 
as industrial competitiveness and structure were upgraded. As noted above, 
the requirement that all goods produced in the zones must be exported was 
dropped partially in 1986 and completely in 1997. As a result, about two-
thirds of the products are currently exported and the remaining one-third 
are sold domestically. Investor categories were also expanded from manu-
facturing only to trading and logistics. For ef¼ciency, the door management 
system of cargo handling was replaced by the account management system, 
and 24-hour automated customs clearance which takes only 30 minutes from
customs to port or airport was introduced. Trade permits were abolished, 
except for restricted high-tech products, in accordance with WTO rules. 
In absolute numbers, corporate revenues, investments and trade at EPZs 
have increased signi¼cantly over the decades. In the ¼rst 35 years, EPZ tenant
¼rms have generated about US$50 billion in foreign exchange. In relative 
terms, the zones’ contribution to Taiwan’s exports peaked in 1974 when they
accounted for 9 percent of Taiwan’s total exports of US$5.6 billion in that 
year. Their share of exports has shrunk steadily since then to stand at around
3.5 percent at present. In 2010, the number of tenant companies was 456 
which collectively recorded NT$380 billion in corporate revenue, NT$56 
billion in investment, and US$19.2 billion in export. 
As factors of long-term successful operation, the EPZ Administration cited
the right timing of establishment in the post-World War II high-growth 
period; excellent location in dynamic Asia with a deep sea port and an inter-
national airport; the perfect legal system to encourage and assure investors; 
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favorable living conditions; availability of skilled workers; and successful 
absorption of foreign technology and quali¼ed tenant companies.8 In fact, 
these are common requirements for successful industrial estates anywhere in 
the world, which must be ful¼lled from the viewpoint of tenant companies, 
but only a small number of industrial zones, high-tech parks, and special 
economic zones in the world can actually provide them. Since 1966, there 
have been 19 countries that requested planning, and 13 countries that
requested evaluation, consultancy, and ¼eld study, of their EPZs with the 
assistance of Taiwanese experts. For example, the Tan Thuan EPZ in Ho 
Chi Minh City, which is the ¼rst and most successful EPZ in Vietnam, was 
established and managed by a team of Taiwanese experts who earlier created
the Kaohsiung EPZ. 
Compared with science parks which require high R&D-to-sales ratios for 
entry and subsequent stay, EPZs are for more downstream manufacturing 
which does not necessarily require constant development of new technology 
with heavy capital investment. For ¼rms that wish to manufacture advanced 
products with a large and stable pool of skilled and well-educated workers 
rather than a few scientists and engineers with advanced degrees and high 
turnovers, EPZs may be an ideal location that can offer logistic ef¼ciency, 
reliable workers, and continued availability of good and cheap industrial 
land. Among the tenants of the EPZs are Advanced Semiconductor Engi-
neering, the world’s largest IC tester and packager which has 12 factories in 
the Nantze EPZ; Tai½ex Scienti¼c, a spin-off company of ITRI that produces
high-tech components for photo-voltaic modules; Emerging Display Tech-
nologies, an LCD company in the Linkuang EPZ; Arima Display, a maker 
of small- and medium-size ½at panel displays for mobile phones in the 
Linkuang EPZ; and Taiwan Brother Industries, a high-end sewing machine 
manufacturer in the Nantze EPZ. 
From around 2005, the EPZ Administration began to mediate industry– 
university linkage. The program consists of human exchange such as student 
internship and visiting professors at factories as well as research cooperation 
for technology transfer and commercialization. The EPZ Administration 
offers matching services, one-stop window, and database for the use of 
universities. Based on company needs, a team of students led by a professor 
is to conduct joint R&D—as is actively done at Nanyang Polytechnic
in Singapore (Chapter 6). While formation of such industry–university
collaboration was the very reason for the establishment of science parks such
as HSP, it is a policy measure introduced relatively recently at EPZs. 
7.6 Promotion of small and medium enterprises 
Historically, Taiwan has been an SME-driven economy par excellence.
Unlike most developing countries where SME promotion is always planned 
but continues to remain on paper, Taiwan’s dynamic SMEs were the true 
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zones, Taiwan’s SME-led industrialization has become a standard model 
referenced by many countries in the world. Although the remarkable struc-
tural transformation spearheaded by local semi-conductor giants in recent 
years makes SMEs look less important, decline is only relative and not 
absolute. Taiwan’s SME sector remains very strong by international standards
and continues to play key roles in generating output, employment, invest-
ment, and export. Under globalization and rapidly changing markets,
challenges faced by Taiwanese SMEs are basically the same as those for 
large companies or foreign competitors. They must grow out of their
traditional mode of operation and transform themselves for international 
competitiveness. New business strategies must be adopted to improve pro-
ductivity, accelerate innovation, conduct R&D, and explore new products, 
markets, and partners. Collaboration among industry, government, univer-
sities, and research institutes is also important for the survival and prosperity
of SMEs in the future. 
In the manufacturing, construction, mining, and quarrying sector, SMEs 
are de¼ned as establishments with less than NT$80 million (US$2.5 million) 
in paid-in capital or less than 200 persons. In the service and commerce sector,
they are establishments with less than NT$100 million (US$3.2 million) in
paid-in capital or less than 100 persons. Micro businesses are de¼ned as 
establishments with less than ¼ve persons for all sectors. In 2010, the number
of SMEs in Taiwan was 1.24 million, or 97.77 percent of all enterprises. The 
SME sector accounts for 76.7 percent of total employment, 29.8 percent of 
total sales, and 17.9 percent of total export.9 The number of start-up com-
panies is 88,531 annually, amounting to 7.1 percent of total SMEs. 
Promotion of SMEs is the responsibility of the SME Administration under
the MoEA. It has ¼ve divisions which are policy planning, management 
consulting, business start-up and incubation, information technology, and 
¼nancing. Taiwan’s SME service network consists of the SME Administration
headquarters in Taipei which houses a one-stop service center, two regional 
of¼ces in Central and Southern Taiwan, and 24 local service centers. The 
SME Administration also cooperates with the National Association of SMEs,
the China Youth Career Development Association, and 23 industrial asso-
ciations and 24 chambers of commerce at central and municipal levels. SMEs
located in industrial estates can receive services from zone administrations. 
Taiwan’s SME promotion is composed of many programs covering a wide
ground (Table 7.2). Support is organized in three layers according to existing
management and technological capabilities of SMEs. The “award strategy” 
is adopted for top SMEs (1–3 percent of all SMEs in number) by which 
national, rising star, and R&D awards are given. The “guidance strategy” 
is used for the middle layer of SMEs (27–34 percent of total) where 11 guidance
systems are available which are industrial safety, R&D, pollution prevention,
production technology, marketing, management, ¼nance, quality upgrading,
information management, business start-up and incubation, and mutual
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Table 7.2 Components of small and medium enterprise policies 
I Enhancing business management 
1. e-services Promoting digital applications and bridging divital divice 
Industry-speci¼c e-commerce business 
e-Service Corp Project 
Supply chain connectivity and competitiveness 
Knowledge management and competitiveness 
Value chain information for manufacturing 
Value-added ICT for traditional manufacturing 
Quality of business services, healthy business development 
Logistics niche and supply chain management 
Intelligent display shelf sales service and brand 
competitiveness 
RFID technology 
2. Quality and SME clusters with innovation and integration 
management Quality management and new quality image 
Quality and competitiveness for high-value industries 
New image via the promotion of Qualia 
System supply chain collaboration 
International green supply chain 
Energy conservation and reduced carbon emissions 
Manufacturing sector energy conservation and carbon 
reduction 
Sustainable development under international environmental 
standards 
Knowledge-intensive service-oriented clusters 
Improving working environment 
3. Technology Real-time technology 
upgrading Traceability in food processing industry 
Business innovation and internet development for new 
markets 
4. R&D Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR) 
capabilities Industrial Technology Development Program (ITDP) 
Innovative Technology Application and Service (ITAS) 
Conventional Industry Technology Development (CITD) 
Leading Product Development Guidance Project 
Technology development in service sector 
5. Business Assessing intellectual property innovation value 
management Brand blueprints for innovative products and service values 
Training for management consultant capabilities 
SME awards and recognition events 
II. Strengthening ¼nancing and investment capabilities 
1. SME ¼nance SME Financing Service Contact Windows 
diagnostic SME Troubleshooting Centers 
guidance Financing Services Team 
Assistance to help obtain working capital 
Using intellectual property to obtain ¼nancing 
2. SME ¼nancing SME Financing Service Platform 
and credit Policy loans for special projects 
guarantees Increasing loans to SMEs by domestic banks 
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Table 7.2 (cont’d ) 




Reconstruction & ¼nancial assistance after Typhoon Morakot 
Assistance after the 2010 Kaohsiung Earthquake 
SME Development Corporations 
SME Start-up Investment Trust Account 
National Development Fund’s plan for promoting SME 
investment 













One-stop guidance integrating existing sub-plans 
SME Entrepreneurship and Innovation Service Centers 
Support and direct operation of incubation centers 
Industry-speci¼c incubation networks 
Resource integration platform for industry-university 
collaboration 
SME innovative service certi¼cation subsidies and grants 
Assistance to SME technology development by universities 
Commercialization of award-winning start-up projects 
Information and consulting services 
SME Entrepreneurship and Innovation College 
Entrepreneur Lab 
Business start-up awards 
Free consulting service & resources handbook 
Training, awards, subsidies, Flying Goose Program, Phoenix 
Plan, etc. 
Mutual assistance networks 
Information exchange platforms 
Financing support 
IV. Local economies and new business opportunities 
1. Stregthening 
local industries 
2. Local Industry 
Development 
Fund 







One Town One Product (OTOP) with innovation and 
marketing 
Guidance for regional/thematic cultural industries 
The ICT747 Plan to revitalize regional economies 
Local industrial cluster development 
Creative Lifestyle Industry Development Plan 
Local Industry Innovation Engine Plan 
Local Small Business Innovation Research (Local SBIR) Plan 
Local Business District Branding Development Plan 
Individual funding support 
Integrated funding support 
Central government inter-regional subsidy 
Local industry service teams 
Needs survey through local concern hotline, on-site 
interviews, etc. 
SME service network 
Assisting market development with 14 sub-programs 
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Table 7.2 (cont’d ) 
V. International relations and other resources 
1. International OECD, APEC, ICSB, GEM, bilateral exchanges 
SME meetings 
and events 
2. Manpower Digital learning, business incubation, technology training 
training R&D and management technology talent training 
Professional training for speci¼c industries 
Fostering international trade and business talent 
Entrepreneurial incubation for women 
3. Legal rights Survey, analysis and amendments of SME legal rights 
adaptation adaptation 
Improving SME knowledge of regulations 
Analysis of SME-related laws and regulations 
Source: The author’s summary from Small and Medium Enterprise Administration, White Paper
on Small and Medium Enterprises in Taiwan, 2010. 
foundation SMEs (65–70 percent of total), the “grouping strategy” comprising
mutual cooperation, industry clusters, local cultural industry, and ¼nancing 
programs is offered. The SME Administration works closely with IDB, DoIT,
the Bureau of Foreign Trade, and the Department of Commerce, all under the
MoEA, to provide integrated support. Four pillars of SME promotion
policy are described in more detail below. Under each policy pillar there are 
numerous programs and mechanisms to support that pillar. 
The ¼rst policy pillar is management and technical support. SMEs are 
provided with courses, enterprise consultancy (which is connected to bank 
loans), technology, and linkage. The support topics include guidance on
e-service; guidance in quality and management; technology upgrading services;
R&D capabilities; and guidance on business management. A large number 
of programs, up to 34, are available according to the White Paper on SMEs 
in 2010. Providers of SME consultation service are private ¼rms and indi-
vidual consultants selected through open bidding for government procurement.
Unlike Malaysia today or Thailand in the past, Taiwanese SME consultants 
are all private agents with no government of¼cials involved in direct provi-
sion of services. SMEs receive consultation free of charge. However, if new 
investment or additional training becomes necessary, that must be ¼nanced 
by SMEs themselves. Japanese terms such as kaizen and shindan are not 
well known although standard productivity tools such as 5S and QCC are 
widely recognized and used. 
The second policy pillar is ¼nance and investment. Under this pillar,
diagnostic guidance, SME ¼nancing and credit guarantees, support for SMEs
affected by natural disasters, and investment promotion are offered in 16 
different programs. The SME Administration has arranged for the establish-
ment of SME Financing Service Contact Windows in the branches of 34 
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information including low-interest loans available from the government. The
SME Administration also has SME Troubleshooting Centers with consulting
services in ¼nancial and loan matters. Resources for SME loans are provided
by the SME Development Fund and the National Development Fund. These
funds are on-lent by commercial banks to SMEs and start-up companies. In 
addition, 15 percent of funding from the SME Development Fund goes
to target companies through SME investment companies. Separately, the 
SME Credit Guarantee Fund guarantees 80–90 percent of commercial bank 
loans to SMEs and offers a large number of credit guarantee programs. The 
Incubation Fund Account and various of¼cial rewards given to excellent 
SMEs are additional facilitators of SME ¼nance. These government-funded 
¼nancial measures are expected to pump-prime greater SME ¼nance by 
private funds, capital markets, and venture capital. 
The third policy pillar is strengthening of business start-up capabilities. 
In 2009, the SME Administration launched a newly enhanced approach 
called the Start-up Guidance Plan which integrated 16 sub-plans to improve 
the start-up incubation environment, build start-up knowledge information 
platforms, and help new businesses to obtain funding. It set the goal of 
cultivating 800 core innovation-oriented SMEs in 2009–2011. The Plan is 
implemented through the SME Entrepreneurship and Innovation Service 
Centers located in Northern, Central, Southern, and Eastern Taiwan. These 
centers serve as one-stop service windows for guiding potential and existing
new entrepreneurs through the entire process toward becoming innovative 
SMEs. For this purpose, the sub-plans include incubation centers, industry-
speci¼c incubation networks, resource integration platform for industry–university
collaborative research, Business Start-up Awards, commercialization of 
award-winning projects, information and consulting services, SME Entre-
preneurship and Innovation College, Entrepreneur Lab, various mechanisms
for providing services to female entrepreneurs, and many others. 
The fourth policy pillar supports local economies and establishment
of local cultural industries. It aims to leverage distinctive features of Taiwan’s
local communities and help rural areas upgrade and transform themselves. 
The most important tool for this pillar is the Taiwan One Town One Product
(OTOP) program, adopted from Japan’s One Village One Product Move-
ment,10 which aims to develop local specialty industries with township or 
city as units and targeting both domestic and tourism markets. Starting from
1989, the SME Administration has supported local SMEs with management,
design, packaging, technology, space arrangement, and so on; participation 
in exhibitions and training courses; and creation of publications, websites, 
and Taiwan OTOP shops. Specialist guidance teams are organized to
collaborate with business enterprises in identi¼ed potential local industries. 
Two important supplementary programs to OTOP are the ICT747 Plan that 
uses information and communications technology to upgrade traditional 
industries and the Creative Lifestyle Industry Development Plan that pro-
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programs a total of 96 featured towns have successfully generated their 
distinctive local products (information as of August 2011 on the OTOP 
website). 
This concludes our brief tour of “Silicon Island.” Overall, it can be said 
that Taiwan’s industrial capability and supporting policies are highly
advanced. Industrial policy has a relatively simple structure and its objectives
are clearly de¼ned in a law while each of the policy instruments has developed
into a comprehensive and elaborate system which cannot be easily imitated 
by developing countries with low policy capability and at a lower stage of 
industrialization. Obviously, policy learning from Taiwan must start with 
selecting, simplifying, and modifying the lessons to ¼t the local capabilities 



















Trapped in upper middle income 
Malaysia is a country in Southeast Asia comprising Peninsula Malaysia and 
the northern part of Borneo Island. By Asian standards, it has a relatively small
population of 28.3 million that breaks down to three main ethnic groups: the
indigenous Malays who are dominant (two-thirds of the population) and Islamic,
the Chinese, and the Indians. The latter two are migrants or the posterity of 
former migrants to Malaysia. Maintaining peace among ethnicities and pro-
moting economic prosperity are two overarching, intertwined, and sometimes
con½icting goals of Malaysia to which all policies must contribute. Striking 
an appropriate balance between the two goals is a great challenge for the coun-
try, with each administration adjusting its position on this delicate question. 
From the end of the eighteenth century to the nineteenth century, Britain 
occupied and controlled Malaysia in steps viewing it as a strategic sea route 
as well as a supplier of primary commodities. After British Malaya was estab-
lished in 1874, Chinese labor was imported to engage in commerce and tin mining
while Indian labor was imported to work on rubber plantations. Dependence
on natural resources and ethnic division of labor in productive sectors were 
the characteristics of Malaysia inherited from the days of British rule. 
Since independence in 1957, Malaysia has successfully transformed its 
economic structure from a resource-based to a manufacture-based one. In 
1960 the export share of primary commodities such as rubber, tin, timber, 
palm oil, and crude oil was as high as 80 percent. Through the 40 years of 
industrialization effort that followed, the share of manufactured exports rose
steadily from 25.4 percent in 1970 to 27.2 percent in 1980, 53.6 percent in 1990,
and 77.4 percent in 2000 although it then declined to 64.8 percent in 2009 
(Department of Statistics data). In the late twentieth century Malaysia 
emerged as one of the world’s largest exporters of consumer and industrial 
electronic products which still dominate its manufactured exports. In 2010, 
Malaysia’s per capita GDP stood at US$7,900 (World Bank Atlas method) 
which puts the country comfortably in the upper-middle-income group. However,
despite brilliant structural transformation in the past and reasonably competent
policies and bureaucrats, the country feels entrapped in average achievement
without reaching high income. This chapter explores the nature and possible 
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8.1 Policy evolution 
As with other high-performing economies in East Asia, the industrial policy 
of Malaysia has gone through several stages as illustrated in Figure 8.1.
In the early years of independence the main objective was diversi¼cation
of economic structure to escape from heavy reliance on a small number of 
traditional primary commodities. In its 1955 report on the economic develop-
ment of Malaysia, the World Bank advised diversi¼cation through the
development of additional primary commodities and new industrial products.
To carry out this strategy, pioneer industries status was invented in 1958, 
which exempted corporate income taxes for two to ¼ve years for eligible 
¼rms. Most of the approved pioneer industry ¼rms at that time belonged
to the import-substituting consumer goods sector. During this early period, 
the free-market principle was upheld with little of¼cial intervention into 
private-sector activities. 
In the 1970s two major changes were made in economic policy. First, policy
focus shifted from import substitution, which was deemed unsuccessful due 
to the limited size of the domestic market, to export orientation based on 
attraction of manufacturing FDI which engaged in assembly and processing 
for export. A series of laws were promulgated to expertise this policy, such 
as the Investment Incentive Act (1968), which gave the pioneer status and 
other incentives to export-oriented industries, and the Free Trade Zone Act 
(1971), which exempted tariffs on imported inputs and allowed ten-year tax 
breaks (12 years for electronics) for ¼rms in free trade zones exporting 80 
percent or more of their products. In addition, the Licensed Manufacturing 
Warehouse system was introduced by which these privileges were extended 
even to companies located outside free trade zones. Armed with these incentives,
Penang Island on the western coast of Malay Peninsula started to attract 
global semi-conductor giant ¼rms while Klang Valley in the vicinity of Kuala
Lumpur, the capital city, saw the arrival of foreign electronics ¼rms many 
of which were Japanese. The high-wage policy of nearby Singapore also 
pushed labor-intensive foreign manufacturers to relocate to Malaysia. 
The second important policy shift of the 1970s was triggered by the May 
1969 ethnic riot between the economically powerful Chinese and the poorer 
but more populous Malays. A national election that increased the seats of 
Chinese resident-friendly parties prompted a victory march of elated Chinese
citizens and a counter-march of Malay youths, which ended up in a bloody 
crash. This was a big shock to Malaysia, shaking the foundation of the multi-
racial society and forcing the national leaders to give up laissez-faire policy 
for more engineered social equity. The Bumiputra (indigenous residents) policy,
previously in place, was greatly strengthened and formalized by setting ad-
ministrative quotas for public positions, business ownership and management,
and worker employment in favor of ethnic Malays. The second Malaysia 
Plan 1971–1975 (equivalent to the ¼ve-year plan), which was also called the 
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In the 1980s, under the leadership of Mahathir bin Mohamad, who served 
as prime minister from 1981 to 2003, heavy industrialization was initiated 
along with continued export orientation. Look East Policy (learning from 
Japan and South Korea) was also launched. Heavy industrialization was
carried out with strong of¼cial intervention. The Heavy Industries Corporation
of Malaysia (HICOM), a state-owned conglomerate, was established in 1980.
Proton, a national car maker, was set up as a joint venture with Japan’s 
Mitsubishi group in 1983 (section 8.5). The company began to produce Saga,
modeled after Mitsubishi Lancer, in 1985. Establishment of a national car 
company was driven by the economic motive of creating a broad industrial base
as well as a social motive of assisting Malay workers and Bumiputra ¼rms. 
National car production was heavily protected with import tariffs of 140–300
percent for passenger cars, 42–200 percent for commercial vehicles, 42–80 
percent for complete knockdown passenger cars, and 5–40 percent for com-
plete knockdown commercial vehicles. In 1988, the Proton Component Scheme
was introduced to increase parts procurement from Bumiputra supplier ¼rms,
which later developed into the Vendor Development Program. A mandatory 
local procurement program was installed in 1991 (which, however, had to be
abolished by 2004 in the process of WTO trade liberalization negotiation). 
The First Industrial Master Plan (IMP1) 1986–1995 recognized the weaknesses
of Malaysian industries such as excessive reliance on foreign semi-conductor 
giants for export and the lack of linkage between FDI and local ¼rms. The 
key thrusts of IMP1 included outward-looking industrialization which targeted
exports, modernization of “ancillary ¼rms” (part and component suppliers, 
also called “supporting industries”), and strengthening of industrial linkages.
A number of liberalization measures were undertaken such as allowance
of 100 percent foreign ownership to enterprises exporting at least 50 percent of
products (instead of previous 80 percent) or hiring at least 350 regular
employees. Sales to free trade zones and licensed manufactured warehouses 
were now counted as exports. Meanwhile, a sharp appreciation of the Japanese
yen starting in 1985 pushed up production costs in Japan and drove Japanese
manufacturing FDI to come to Southeast Asia to build new factories, an 
incident which greatly expanded the industrial base of Malaysia. The number
of Japanese ¼rms operating in Malaysia increased from 477 in 1986 to 1,070 
in 2005. Among them, Japanese ¼rms in the electronics sector increased from
30 to 244. In this way, heavy state intervention, practiced mainly in the 
automobile sector, and economic liberalization for absorbing FDI, adopted 
mainly in the electronics sector, proceeded in parallel. 
In 1991, Prime Minister Mahathir announced Vision 2020, an aspiration 
to become a fully-developed country by 2020 based on nine broad principles 
such as democracy and prosperity.1 Ever since, Vision 2020 has become the 
supreme national goal of Malaysia for which all policies and actions must 
strive. In ethnic balance policy, a new objective was added for the creation 
of the Bumiputra Commercial and Industrial Community, a concept that 
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privileges. As in previous years, promotion of supporting industries, especially
local automobile component suppliers, was pursued with two purposes: as 
a means of expanding industrial capability and as a component of Bumiputra
policy to strengthen Malay suppliers. 
The Second Industrial Master Plan (IMP2) 1996–2005 was guided by two 
overruling ideas of cluster-based industrial development and manufacturing 
plus plus. The ¼rst broadened the concept of an industry to include not just 
supporting industries (physical inputs) but also supporting services, R&D, 
human skills, infrastructure, institutions, and other elements that collectively
support the development of any industrial sector. The second expressed the 
desire to enhance capability of industries both horizontally and vertically, 
i.e., encompassing more processes, both upstream and downstream, and 
improving productivity of each process—hence two pluses—along the value 
chain as shown in Figure 8.2. These two ideas were uniformly applied to 
eight target sectors which are electronics and electrical, textiles and apparel, 
chemicals, resource-based industries, food processing, transport equipment, 
materials, and machinery and equipment. The fact that the background 
paper of IMP2 was drafted by a researcher at the Malaysian Institute of 
Economic Research, a prominent policy think tank, gave it a lucid style and 
mechanical consistency throughout the plan document unlike IMP1 or IMP3,
which were bottom-up collections of writings of various expert groups without
central instruction (Ohno 2006b). 
Since the late 1990s, several internal and external developments have
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Figure 8.2 Manufacturing plus plus 
Source: Drafted by the author based on the Second Industrial Master Plan 1996–2005, an inter-
view with Malaysian industrial planning of¼cials in 2006, and the website of the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry of Malaysia. 
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regional competitors in manufactured export and FDI attraction called for 
policy re-consideration. Malaysia also had to cope with economic downturns
associated with the Asian ¼nancial crisis of 1997–1998, the global semi-
conductor recession around 2001, and the severe global recessions caused 
by the Lehman shock of 2008–2009 and the Euro shock of 2011–2012.
The electronics sector dominated by foreign giants continued to be the
largest exporter of Malaysia whereas the results of two-pronged value creation
and development of broad-based industrial clusters, as envisioned in IMP2, 
were not very successful. As global and regional integration deepened, the
protected automobile sector faced an increasing challenge from foreign
competitors while its domestic market remained small (section 8.5). 
Meanwhile, policy interest in absorbing a large amount of manufacturing 
FDI to form the nation’s industrial base, strengthening supporting indus-
tries, and forging links between local and FDI ¼rms, a strategy vigorously 
pursued in the late 1980s and the 1990s, has waned. Although the elec-
tronics and automobile sectors remain the largest manufacturing activities 
in Malaysia, they are no longer the main concern of the Malaysian govern-
ment. The policy objective has shifted to the creation of innovative local 
SMEs which can operate competitively and independently from multi-national
corporations or government-linked companies. Instead of upgrading manu-
facturing skills and management for automobile part suppliers, terms like 
K-economy, ICT, e-commerce, bio-tech, and branding began to proliferate 
in policy documents. 
The Third Industrial Master Plan (IMP3) 2006–2020 seeks holistic develop-
ment. Services, especially high-value services and industry-supporting services,
have been added to the policy menu along with traditional manufacturing. 
Emphasis is placed on value-added, technology, knowledge, human resources,
and other cross-cutting functions. Unlike the previous IMP2 which lacked 
an effective review mechanism, IMP3 is equipped with explicit annual mon-
itoring and evaluation targets and procedure. The policy scope of IMP3, 
which is the last industrial policy document that will take the nation to
Vision 2020, is longer (15 years) and broader (25 chapters over 247 pages) 
than IMP2. It targets six non-resource based manufacturing industries, six 
resource-based manufacturing industries, eight service sub-sectors, the halal 
industry, and eight functional issues.2 
I led an international research team on a visit to Kuala Lumpur in 2006 
and again in 2010 to discuss industrial policy formulation with Malaysian 
industrial of¼cials. On both occasions we raised a question about the lack 
of policy focus as IMP2, and IMP3 even more so, seemed to cover virtually 
every industrial sector and aspect that could be thought of in Malaysia. 
While these plans look comprehensive and professionally prepared as far
as policy documents go, policy outcome is less than assured. This is the 
fundamental Malaysian dilemma, with a sharp contrast between constant 
progress in policy sophistication versus lagging private-sector response, that 
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8.2 Tackling the middle-income trap 
In 2009, the World Bank published a report on the Malaysian economy, 
prepared by Philip Schellekens, that warned that the country seemed trapped
in mediocre performance. 
The overriding medium-term challenge is for the Malaysian economy to 
join the select group of high-income countries. Malaysia has experienced
solid growth over the last decades, but has relied on an economic model 
predominantly based on capital accumulation . . . In spite of these past 
successes, Malaysia’s growth performance has lagged behind that of 
other regional economies. The economy seems to be caught in a middle-
income trap—unable to remain competitive as a high-volume, low-cost 
producer, yet unable to move up the value chain and achieve rapid 
growth by breaking into fast growing markets for knowledge- and
innovation-based products and services. 
(World Bank, 2009, pp. 52–53) 
Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, who assumed power in April 2009, takes 
this warning very seriously. He regards the overcoming of the middle-income
trap as the most important economic goal of his government and initiated 
a series of policy action for this purpose. Mr. Najib’s economic management 
stresses value creation backed by liberalization and open competition.
Although Bumiputra policy, as one of the principal pillars of Malaysia’s national
development, will certainly not be dismantled any time soon, emphasis is 
shifting from administrative quotas to market-guided equal opportunities 
among all ethnicities. 
To specify necessary actions, he formed the National Economic Advisory 
Board headed by Amirsham A. Aziz in May 2009 to draft the New Economic
Model, an ad hoc strategy that spelled out Mr. Najib’s policy concerns and 
solutions. In its mandate, the Council was required to “provide a fresh, 
independent perspective in transforming Malaysia from a middle income 
economy to a high income economy by Year 2020.” The New Economic 
Model was published in two parts, in March 2010 and December 2010, with 
the ¼rst part setting strategic directions and the second (concluding) part 
proposing additional policy measures. With the of¼cial completion of the 
Council’s mandate in May 2011, responsibility to execute its recommendations
was passed on to relevant ministries and agencies under the coordination of 
the Prime Minister’s Department. 
The New Economic Model echoes the pessimism and urgency of action 
expressed in the World Bank report. 
[T]he progress we have made over the past half-century has slowed and 
economic growth prospects have weakened considerably. We are caught 
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economies. We urgently need a radical change in our approach to eco-
nomic development which will be sustainable over the long-term, will 
reach everyone in the country and will enable Malaysia to reach high 
income status. 
(New Economic Model, executive summary, pp. 3–4) 
Malaysia’s shortcomings that prevent the overcoming of the middle-income 
trap, as portrayed by the New Economic Model, are as follows: 
DD Malaysia is a small open economy susceptible to external shocks and 
losing competitiveness; its place in the Global Competitiveness Index 
dropped from the previous 21st to 24th in 2010. 
DD Productivity grows too slowly and innovation is insuf¼cient; slow growth
is eroding Malaysia’s position among regional economies. 
DD The education system is inadequate; not enough high-wage jobs are 
created and talent is leaving the country. 
DD Investment as a share of GDP is declining and private investment is 
particularly stagnant. 
DD Exports are still strong but do not generate much value added. 
DD The rich and poor gap is widening; ethnic-based economic policy worked
but implementation issues raised the cost of doing business. 
DD Price control and subsidies have resulted in resource misallocations and 
focus on short-term pro¼ts. 
At the same time, the drafters of the Model notes that Malaysia also have 
some advantages, such as good infrastructure, a world-class manufacturing 
base centered on electronics and electrical, strategic location at the heart of 
a vibrant region, and a model of cultural, ethnic, and biological diversity. 
To take the country to high income by 2020, New Economic Model Part 
1 proposes to ensure bene¼ts to all citizens and businesses as a matter of 
principle, prepare “enabling actions” consisting of strong political leadership
and the citizens’ support for deep seated changes, then presents eight Strategic
Reform Initiatives (SRIs) as main required actions which further break down
to 38 policy purposes and 144 possible policy measures (see below). In New 
Economic Model Part 2, relationship among this model and other initiatives 
of the government is clari¼ed and ¼ve “recommendations on key focused 
and integrated policy actions” are advanced which overlap but are somewhat
different from the eight SRIs, namely, (i) transformation through reinvigorat-
ing the private sector, (ii) enhancing innovation, (iii) public sector transformation,
(iv) intensifying human capital development, and (v) narrowing disparities. 
These recommendations subdivide into 16 policy measures and 45 sub-measures,
some of which are given more details and sub-divisions.3 
Actually, Prime Minister Najib’s national transformation strategy is much
larger than just the New Economic Model. It speci¼es Vision 2020 fairly 
concretely, proclaims a three-part national slogan, and presents two new 
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programs that cover economic and government reforms which are supple-
mented by the ¼ve-year plans. The New Economic Model is the main component
of economic reform. Additionally, a mechanism is created to implement and 
monitor the progress of this strategy. The logical structure of Malaysia’s 
transformation strategy, completed in 2010, is quite complex and dif¼cult to 
grasp. Citing numerous of¼cial tables and diagrams, which contain a number
of parallel explanations, linkages, re-wordings, and re-groupings, may confuse
the reader as it did me. The structure shown in Figure 8.3 and the ensuing 
explanation are my interpretation with certain simpli¼cations and rephrases 
which may differ from the full of¼cial version. 
In this framework, the economic elements of Vision 2020 are explained 
more concretely in a diagram that explains ultimate goals and another list 
of desired national characteristics. The triple-oval diagram in the upper panel
of Figure 8.3 declares that (i) Malaysia wants to attain high-income status 
with per capita income of US$15,000–17,000 by 2020; (ii) growth should be 
inclusive and strike a balance between the special position of Bumiputra and 
legitimate interests of other groups; and (iii) economic and environmental 
sustainability must be assured. All these goals must be attained, with no one 
goal to be achieved at the expense of the others. It is also stressed that the 
ultimate bene¼ciaries of this strategy must be all Rakyat (ordinary citizens) 
and all businesses. Separately, the kind of country that Malaysia aspires to 
be by 2020 is presented in ¼ve adjective phrases: market led, well-governed, 
regionally integrated, entrepreneurial, and innovative. 
To achieve these goals, four pillars of national transformation are put 
forth. The ¼rst pillar is a slogan, “1Malaysia—People First, Performance 
Now,” which must be uttered together and in this order, and written with 
no space between numeral one and Malaysia. 
The second pillar is the Economic Transformation Program (ETP) that 
comprises the New Economic Model with its eight SRIs, mentioned above, 
and the 12 National Key Economic Areas. The eight Strategic Reform Initiatives
(SRIs) are (i) re-energizing the private sector, (ii) creating a competitive 
domestic economy, (iii) building the knowledge base infrastructure, (iv) ensuring
sustainability of growth, (v) enhancing the sources of growth, (vi) developing
a quality workforce and reducing dependency on foreign labor, (vii) strengthen-
ing of the public sector and ¼scal sustainability, and (viii) transparent and 
market friendly af¼rmative action. These are grouped into four “thrusts,” 
namely, creating a competitive investment environment (combining (i)–(v)), 
developing quality workforce (vi), transforming government (vii), and narrowing
disparity (viii).4 Separately, the 12 National Key Economic Areas (NKEAs), 
which include 11 sectors and one region, were launched by the government 
in October 2010 as engines of future growth that are expected to contribute 
to the achievement of high income. They are oil, gas and energy; palm oil; 
¼nancial services; tourism; business services; electronics and electrical; wholesale
and retail; education; healthcare; communications, content, and infrastructure;
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Vision 2020 (concretized) 
High income Characteristics of Malaysia in 2020
US$15,000–17,000 per head 
- Market led 
- Well-governed 
Rakyat - Regionally integrated 
Quality of life - Entrepreneurial 
Inclusiveness Sustainability - Innovative 
“1Malaysia – People First, Performance Now” 
Government Economic Transformation 
Transformation Program Program 
Seven National Key Result NEM’s eight Strategic 
Areas (NKRAs) Reform Initiatives (SRIs) 
Ministerial Key Result Areas Twelve National Key 
(MKRAs) Economic Areas (NKEAs) 
10 & 11 Malaysia Plan (5-year plan) Roll-out 
Macroeconomic growth targets & expenditure allocation 
Implementation framework 
Prime Minister 
Implementation Monitoring Feedback loop 
Performance Management &
Ministries Independent Evaluation
Delivery Unit (PEMANDU) Board 
Delivery Economic Delivery 
Management Office Unit 
Figure 8.3 Malaysia: a summary of national transformation strategy 
Note: Rakyat means ordinary citizens. See the main text for the de¼nitions of the eight SRIs, 
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the areas to which “enhancing the source of growth” (the ¼fth component 
of SRI) should be targeted. 
The third pillar of national transformation is the Government Transfor-
mation Program (GTP), which has identi¼ed priorities that matter most to the
Rakyat through surveys and intends to deliver fundamental changes on them
on a nationwide basis. The priorities are stated in the following seven National
Key Result Areas (NKRAs): (i) reducing crime, (ii) ¼ghting corruption, (iii) 
improving student outcomes, (iv) raising living standards of low-income 
households, (v) improving rural basic infrastructure, (vi) improving urban 
public transport, and (vii) addressing cost of living. Responsibility for each 
task is assigned to the minister of the relevant ministry. Under these seven 
NKRAs are 28 “expected big results” and 110 required actions which are 
presented very clearly in the government website. In addition, ministers and 
senior civil servants are instructed to de¼ne their Ministerial Key Result Areas
(MKRAs) and deliver Ministerial Key Performance Indicators (MKPIs) 
within those areas. 
The fourth pillar is the current and next ¼ve-year plans covering the period
up to 2020, which are called 10 Malaysia Plan (2011–2015) and 11 Malaysia 
Plan (2016–2020). They set macroeconomic targets and govern budgetary 
allocations for conducting the works stipulated above. The Malaysia Plan 
is a regular plan document compiled by the Economic Planning Unit of the 
Prime Minister’s Department since 1956. 
Implementation of all these actions is the responsibility of each assigned 
ministry. To oversee, assess, and facilitate the progress of the ETP and the 
GTP, the Performance Management and Delivery Unit (PEMANDU) was 
established under the Prime Minister’s Department in September 2009. In 
addition, an independent evaluation board was also set up to monitor and 
give feedback to the Malaysian government from the outside. 
This has been the sketch of how Malaysia tries to climb up to high income 
by the self-imposed deadline of 2020. It must be admitted that the policy 
universe that the Malaysian government has created is comprehensive, par-
ticipatory, and transparent with visions, programs, actions, and monitoring 
mechanisms all in place. Prime Minister Najib’s leadership is clear and decisive.
Malaysia has competent and competitive technocrats who can manage complex
policy processes such as this which would normally fail in other countries. 
They can work effectively with multiple decision-making layers involving a 
large number of ministries and agencies with complementary duties. It is not 
surprising, then, that such technocrats, propelled by a proactive prime minister,
have produced an elaborate policy system with a large number of internal 
linkages and key performance indicators. Documents they produce are colorful
and easy to follow, and their websites are interactive and user friendly. Malaysian
policies are not only well designed but actually implemented. They de¼nitely 
have the quality to which any professor in public policy would be inclined 
to give an A+ if they were a term paper in Policy Design and Implementation
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near perfection. Its policy documents can make good textbooks for other 
countries that want to follow. 
However, if the reader still feels uneasy with the Malaysian approach, he 
or she is not alone. There is something fundamentally missing in this sophis-
ticated policy package. The main reason why Malaysia is stuck in middle 
income is not because policy quality is low, but because private-sector response
to good policy remains weak. Improving policy to perfection, driven by a 
natural instinct of intelligent government of¼cials, will not solve the problem
and even run the risk of policy improvements becoming an end in itself with 
an increasing gap between the aspiration of the government and the behaviors
of local businesses and individuals. Transforming a sleepy private sector 
requires an entirely different set of policies which are less intricate but closer 
to the heart of the public (Chapter 3). Countries like Japan, Taiwan, and 
Thailand did not have a system of elaborate targets or key performance 
indicators in the past but could still achieve sustained high growth. In Japan,
“think while running” (starting action without detailed plans and create and 
adjust them as you go) is practiced commonly. Similarly in Thailand, policy-
making has been much simpler and more ½exible without spending too much
time in designing details in advance or reviewing past results. To overcome 
a middle-income trap and realize Vision 2020, Malaysia may need an entirely
different approach than the present technocratic one with lots of acronyms 
and in½ation of performance indicators. 
8.3 Small and medium enterprise promotion 
Nevertheless, the following two sections will examine good policy practices 
of Malaysia which should receive due credit. They take up SME promotion 
and FDI attraction as examples. Both policies are well developed and can 
be used as models for other countries to study and (selectively) follow. 
SME promotion is a policy adopted in almost all countries, but its effective-
ness varies greatly from one country to another. In some countries promotion
exists only on paper. In others it is only partially and imperfectly practiced. 
It is also an area covering a wide range of issues such as industry, agriculture,
trade, infrastructure, ¼nance, taxes and subsidies, education and training, 
and science and technology, and it therefore requires strong coordination 
among ministries and agencies, which is a dif¼cult assignment for countries 
with weak policy capability. Malaysia has established, over the years, a 
mechanism and a set of tools which are comprehensive and systematic for 
carrying out SME promotion. In recent years, the development of SMEs is 
an increasingly important national agenda as the hub of Malaysia’s Economic
Transformation Program that aims “to facilitate a quantum leap in SME 
growth and to achieve the aspirations of high income nation status by 2020” 
(National SME Development Council, 2011, p. 36). 
In 1996, the Small and Medium Industries Development Corporation 
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of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry to serve as a central 
coordinating agency for SME policy as well as a provider of grants and soft 
loans to eligible SMEs. A new policy instrument created at that time for 
SMIDEC was the Industrial Linkage Program to facilitate cooperation
between FDI and local ¼rms. The Small and Medium Industries Develop-
ment Plan 2001–2005 was prepared by SMIDEC as the ¼rst ¼ve-year plan 
document with clear focus on SME promotion. However, policy implement-
ation continued to be fragmented across 16 agencies, including SMIDEC, 
with signi¼cant overlaps. 
To further integrate SME policy and provide holistic support with strong 
political backing, the National SME Development Council chaired by the 
prime minister was established in 2004 as the highest body to direct Malaysia’s
SME policy. Fifteen ministries and 60 government agencies were brought 
under this Council. Initially serving as the secretariat to the Council, Bank 
Negara Malaysia (central bank) set three strategic thrusts (main policy areas),
which were enabling infrastructure, capacity building, and access to ¼nancing.
SMIDEC was elevated to become SME Corporation Malaysia (SME Corp 
for short) in 2009, providing central coordinating functions with greater 
authority, and also taking over the role of secretariat to the Council from 
Bank Negara (see Figure 4.6, in Chapter 4, for Malaysia’s SME policy organ-
ization). Under the new arrangement, the Annual SME Integrated Plan of 
Action became the key policy document and the Council’s Annual Report 
served as the vehicle for information dissemination. The common SME 
de¼nition was adopted across the country and improvements were made in 
SME information services which consisted of the National SME Database, 
SMEinfo Portal, technology road mapping, and the SME Competitiveness 
Rating for Enhancement (SCORE). 
In April and November 2011, the National SME Development Council 
endorsed the SME Masterplan 2012–2020 in two phases, with the ¼rst phase
approving the framework and the second deciding on initiatives and programs.
The Masterplan’s vision is to create globally competitive SMEs that enhance
wealth creation and contribute to the social well-being of the nation. Malaysia
will develop not only national champions but also micro enterprises in rural 
areas. From 2010 to 2020, macro targets are set to (i) increase the contribution
of SMEs to GDP from 32 percent to 41 percent, (ii) increase the employment
share of SMEs from 59 percent to 62 percent; and (iii) increase the export share
of SMEs from 19 percent to 25 percent. Additional numerical targets include
business formation (6 percent per annum), the growth of high growth and 
innovative ¼rms (10 percent per annum), labor productivity of SMEs (from 
RM47,000 to RM91,000), and formalization of the informal sector (informal
establishments to be reduced from 31 percent to 15 percent). To achieve 
these targets, 32 key initiatives, which include six High Impact Programs 
(HIPs), are determined.5 The National SME Development Council noted 
that growth of value added by SMEs was annual 6.8 percent during 2004–2010,






           
 
 







Malaysia: trapped in upper middle income 231 
also decided to establish a National Steering Committee for Incubation 
Programs and annual SME Week, beginning in 2012. 
As indicated above, SME support is directed to three policy areas—enabling
infrastructure, capacity building, and access to ¼nancing—which is programmed
and reported each year. According to SME Annual Report 2010/11, the total
number of SME development programs in 2010 was 226 at the cost of RM7.1
billion (about US$2.3 billion) bene¼ting a total of 614,242 SMEs. As in previous
years, the majority of programs in terms of number, as many as 165, were 
for capacity building of SMEs at the cost of RM718 million. This had four 
sub-areas: entrepreneur development, human capital development, marketing
and promotion, and product development. Another 38 programs provided 
access to ¼nancing with the biggest budget allocation of RM6.3 billion. The 
remaining 23 programs were for strengthening the enabling infrastructure at 
the cost of RM180 million (National SME Development Council, 2011, p. 38). 
Among the government agencies, several agencies under the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry deserve special mention. They provide various
functions for industrialization in general and SME promotion in particular: 
SME Corporation Malaysia (SME Corp)—one stop service for SME policy 
as mentioned above; 
Malaysian Investment Development Authority (MIDA)—investment promotion; 
Malaysia Productivity Corporation (MPC)—training, consultation, research, etc.; 
SME Bank—SME ¼nance and training; 
Malaysian Industrial Development Finance (MIDF)—policy ¼nance; 
Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation (MATRADE)—trade 
promotion. 
Although SME policy organizations have been restructured for effectiveness,
the system is still complex and overlapping functions among implementing 
agencies remain. However, All Malaysian agencies we interviewed stated that
cooperation among them was close and that any service desired by customers
but not offered by a particular agency would immediately be arranged and 
provided by others to minimize the customers’ trouble and delay. MIDA 
(see section 8.4), for example, boasts to be a one-stop center for investors 
as it has in-house of¼cials dispatched from six other agencies (immigration, 
customs, environment, energy, telecom, and labor) and has close service 
providing relations with eight more agencies. Similarly, SME Bank, whose 
vision is to become an SME Hub, not only offers ¼nance, training, consultation,
and rental factories but also collaborates tightly with other strategic partners
(public agencies, commercial banks, and academic institutions) to provide 
comprehensive support to SME customers. If this system works as it is 
claimed, any agency could serve as a one-stop center and SMEs could
approach any of them to get full information and support. Overlapping 
functions would then pose no problem as functions would be collectively 
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Regarding capacity building, a variety of training and consultation is
offered by SME supporting agencies. For SME participants in training, 
grants that cover 80 percent of the tuition fee are provided. There are 41 
skills training centers belonging to SME Corp and many others run by other 
ministries and agencies. At SME Corp, training courses are given by regis-
tered training providers (private consultancy or training companies) on such 
standard subjects as management, computer, technical skills, and accounting.
As of 2010, SME Corp were using 41 training providers whose list is constantly
revised. Prime Minister Najib instructs streamlining of programs and projects
as well as outcome-based awards rather than unmonitored grants. 
Among public-sector training organizations, the Malaysia Productivity 
Corporation (MPC) under the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
is the leading institution providing productivity and quality short-term training
and consultancy, as well as related services such as research, databanks, 
country ranking, systems development, best practices, and promotion. It was
established in 1962 and has nearly 200 management and professional staff. 
Training at MPC is centered on management rather than specialized technical
skills. In 2009, MPC trained 20,836 participants who came from the public 
sector (43 percent), SMEs (33 percent), other local ¼rms (15 percent), and 
multinational companies (9 percent). In that year, 155 short-term courses 
lasting one to three days were offered at its headquarters in Petaling Jaya 
and four regional of¼ces. Unlike SME Corp’s courses, MPC’s courses are 
basically taught by its own staff. The strategic focus of MPC expanded over 
time with the country’s development, starting from the core mission on 
management, training, and advisory services (1960s) to include research and 
systems development (1990s), productivity and ef¼ciency (mid-1990s), bench-
marking and best practices (2000s), and competitiveness and innovation 
(present). In productivity and quality management systems development, MPC
offers a broad menu of consultation ranging from ISO to 5S (called “Quality
Environment”), QC circles (called “Innovative and Creative Circle”), TQM, 
benchmarking, balanced scorecard, productivity measurement, productivity-
linked wage system, customer satisfaction measurement, and employee
satisfaction measurement. It is also the only institution in Malaysia that 
of¼cially certi¼es 5S practices at companies. 
Another public organization that actively offers advisory services to SMEs
is SME Bank, established in 2005 by merging two banks. It is 100 percent 
state owned and has over 1,000 employees and 19 branches all over the 
country. Its SME Bank Advisory Center is a platform to deliver structured 
and integrated programs with seven modules—performance and growth, 
human management, market development, business planning and ¼nancial 
management, resource planning and operations, branding and promotion, 
and customer management. These modules are taught by a network of ser-
vice providers including SME Bank’s in-house professionals, partners, and 
third-party experts (business consultants). The Center also provides business
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the remarkable things about Malaysia is that there seems to be an unknown 
but fairly large number of competent experts (“¼nancial planners” and “busi-
ness counselors”) in both public and private sectors who can offer business
consultation or management courses to SMEs. 
Regarding ¼nance, a variety of ¼nancial resources are available to SMEs 
in Malaysia, from both private and public sectors. Total ¼nancing resources 
outstanding to SMEs stood at RM164.5 billion (US$53.4 billion) at the end of
2010. By far the largest suppliers of funds to SMEs were banking institutions
(78.1 percent), followed by government funds and schemes (12.0 percent), 
development ¼nancial institutions (7.8 percent), venture capital (2.1 percent), and
factoring and leasing (0.06 percent). Development ¼nancial institutions, which
are specialized state-owned ¼nancial institutions to support strategic sectors, 
include SME Bank mentioned above, Malaysia Industrial Development Finance,
Agro Bank, and many others. SME Bank in particular provides ¼nancing 
and advisory support to SMEs in manufacturing, services, and construction 
sectors with emphasis on the development of the Bumiputra Commercial and
Industrial Community. It offers ¼ve categories of loan which are “start-ups,”
“professional,” “franchise,” “procurement” (for component suppliers), and “global”
covering both conventional and Islamic loans as well as equity and invest-
ment. Its funds come from various government and Bank Negara sources as well
as foreign assistance; it does not accept deposits or go to commercial markets.
It also provides business assessments, business matching, SME Advisory 
Center mentioned above, and entrepreneurial training. In its Factory Scheme,
over 400 rental factories are made available to Bumiputra SMEs across the 
country with subsidized rent and comprehensive business support. 
The central bank and the government are also directly involved in SME 
¼nance. Bank Negara has a number of special funds including New Entre-
preneur Fund, Fund for Small and Medium Industries, Fund for Food, 
Bumiputra Entrepreneur Project Fund, and Micro Enterprise Fund. Separately,
the government operates a large number of funds and schemes for SMEs 
which include grants, equity, soft loans, venture capital, etc. for encouraging 
innovation, technology upgrading, marketing, and strategy making (economic
purposes) as well as development of Bumiputra SMEs and providing jobs 
for the youth and new graduates (social purposes). Other ¼nancial institutions
and programs include the Credit Guarantee Corporation established in 1972,
the Small Debt Resolution Scheme established in 2003, the SME Credit 
Bureau established in 2008, the Micro¼nancing Scheme, government crisis 
funds, and venture capital funds. The landscape of SME ¼nancing in Malaysia
is comprehensive and always expanding. 
8.4 FDI policy 
Another exemplary policy of the Malaysian government is FDI attraction 
and related services. The Malaysian Investment Development Authority 
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Industry and renamed from the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority
in 2010, is a federal agency responsible for issuing investment licenses and 
providing investment incentives. It is also an agency that effectively conveys 
Malaysia’s country image and information to potential investors and offers 
one-stop trouble-free services to investors who have already come or decided
to come. In recent years, besides receiving manufacturing FDI, its mandate 
was expanded to promotion of services (other than ¼nance and utilities which
belong to other agencies) as well as “cross-border investments” (outward 
FDI) by Malaysian companies. With rising wages and the government’s 
orientation toward innovation and high skills, MIDA wants traditional labor-
intensive industries such as garment to leave the country and become global. 
Instead, Malaysia wishes to attract targeted high-tech FDI. 
The main incentive schemes of MIDA are (i) pioneer status, which provides
corporate income tax exemption ranging from 70 to 100 percent of statutory 
income for ¼ve to ten years, (ii) investment tax allowance, which offsets 60 
to 100 percent of qualifying capital expenditure against 70 to 100 percent of 
the statutory income for ¼ve to ten years, and (iii) reinvestment allowance, 
which offsets 60 percent of qualifying capital expenditure against 70 to 100 
percent of the statutory income. Initial investors can choose either (i) or (ii), 
which are the main incentives offered by MIDA, but not both. In addition, 
import duty and sales tax exemptions are available for imported raw mater-
ials, components, and machinery and equipment vis-à-vis manufacturing 
¼rms but not for trading ones. In addition, MIDA can offer “pre-packaged
incentives” (customized deals) to attract targeted individual FDI ¼rms. 
Except for such special deals, incentives are given to domestic and foreign 
¼rms without discrimination. After the Asian ¼nancial crisis in 1997–98, 
Malaysia decided to accept 100 percent foreign-owned projects regardless of 
how much the company exports. Regionally, two levels of incentive are given,
the one for the developed areas of Kuala Lumpur, Johor Baru, and Penang, 
and the more generous one for the rest of the country. MIDA approves all 
FDI projects coming to Malaysia and provides various post-investment services.
Tax and tariff incentives are centrally administered by MIDA, but 13 states 
(local governments) can offer other incentives related to location, rent, lease,
water, and so on. If any problem arises between a company and a local 
authority, MIDA can intervene to solve it. 
MIDA’s investment incentives are given by the combination of the pub-
lished eligibility list and case-by-case organizational judgment. To receive 
any incentive, activities or products must not only be included in the list but 
also be approved by MIDA’s weekly committee. As for the eligibility list, 
MIDA publishes and updates it in its website as well as in the investment 
promotion package in ¼ve languages (English, Japanese, Chinese, Arabic, 
and Malay). The list is long and multiple, and eligible items are quite diverse.
For example, the list published in January 2011 of promoted activities and 
products in the manufacturing sector consists of ¼ve parts: (i) general, (ii) 
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linkage program, and (v) small scale companies. Among these, the list of 
“general” is subdivided into 26 groups with 256 promoted activities and 
products, many of which are further subdivided. When new products or com-
ponents emerge, or when existing products and components become obsolete,
MIDA adds or deletes them from the eligibility list through announcement 
in the of¼cial gazette. 
As for organizational judgment, manufacturing industry applications seeking
tax incentives are ¼rst reviewed by MIDA’s relevant industrial divisions,6 
whose results are reported to MIDA’s weekly Action Committee on Industry
headed by the director general for deliberation and decision on a case-by-case
basis. The approval is not automatic as the Committee places importance 
on whether the applicant is truly engaged in manufacturing and not just 
trading, whether the activity creates value, and whether it promotes technology
or industrial linkage. Licenses and tax incentives for manufacturers are issued
by this Committee while import licenses and service licenses are handled by 
other MIDA committees. 
MIDA works closely and effectively with concerned bodies such as the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Department of Statistics, several sister 
agencies under the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and foreign
chambers of commerce. Every Thursday, MIDA holds meetings to approve 
projects and incentives. A representative from MOF sits in these meetings 
and can approve proposed tax incentives on the spot. If there is any doubt, 
the proposal is reported to the higher level of MOF and the issue is resolved 
in the following week. Such quick decision making among economic ministries
is unimaginable in countries with poor inter-ministerial coordination. Another
proof of MIDA’s competence comes from the opinion of foreign organizations.
Our research mission asked the representative of the Japan External Trade 
Organization (JETRO) Kuala Lumpur to list main constraints for Japanese 
investors in Malaysia. He paused, and replied that he could not think of any 
as far as administrative obstacles were concerned. In a normal developing 
country, such an organization would have a long list of gripes against the 
host government. 
8.5 Proton, the national car company 
Proton, or Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional, is Malaysia’s national car
company. It was established in 1983 and started production in 1985. Its head
of¼ce is located in Shah Alam in the western suburb of Kuala Lumpur.
Its initial shareholders were Khazanah Nasional (government investment 
fund, 38.3 percent), the Employees Provident Fund (12.0 percent), Petronas 
(state-run oil and gas company, 7.9 percent), and other local and foreign 
investors (41.8 percent) which included Japan’s Mitsubishi group. Propelled 
by Prime Minister Mahathir’s passion for creating a Malaysian car, the 
project became the most important instrument for heavy industrialization 
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Mitsubishi Lancer. The company at ¼rst had a close relationship with Japan’s
Mitsubishi Motors though capital ownership and technical cooperation
but subsequently sought a more independent path. It gradually internalized
capability in styling and design, platforms, engines, logistics, marketing,
and so on. Cumulative car sales reached one million in 1996 and three
million in 2008. 
Unlike neighboring countries, Malaysia took a go-it-alone approach to 
automobile manufacturing. It hoped to build core capability and compete 
squarely in the world market instead of attracting foreign giants to form an 
automotive industrial base as done in most other developing countries. The 
Second Industrial Master Plan 1996–2005 targeted the automobile industry 
as a vital sector in which internal development of technology and engineer-
ing know-how was top priority. The government instructed Proton to adopt 
global orientation, enhance capacity, add value, create brand-name recogni-
tion, and improve management and skills. Acquisition of a controlling stake 
of Lotus, a British car maker, in 1996 also added to Proton’s engineering 
capabilities. The national car project has enjoyed generous incentives and 
supports including preferential tax and duty treatment, high tariff barriers 
on foreign competitors, and technical assistance for its suppliers. The existence
of Proton as a hub of domestic car production enabled the development
of local part and component makers through the Vendor Development Pro-
gram. By the end of 2005, there were 4,865 automobile parts and compon-
ents produced locally, and 286 suppliers in Malaysia producing parts and
components for Proton. Many key engine parts are locally produced and
a full range of R&D is conducted in Malaysia while other Southeast
Asian countries focus only on basic casting, machining, stamping, and ¼nal 
assembly—or at least this was the description given by a company of¼cial 
in our interview in 2006. 
In 2001, Proton’s share in the domestic car market was 53 percent, followed
by Perodua,7 another local company, with the share of 28 percent, and the 
rest of the domestic market supplied by foreign-brand manufacturers such 
as Toyota, Honda, Nissan, and Ford. Given its once strong domestic share, 
the quality of Proton cars seems acceptable to Malaysian consumers, at least
as popular vehicles. By 2011, however, Proton’s domestic market share shrank
to 27 percent, with Perodua maintaining 29 percent and foreign brands supplying
44 percent. The company frequently suffers from losses, and the weak ¼nancial
performance of Lotus, which it acquired earlier, has not helped to improve 
its pro¼tability. As of early 2012, it is reported that Khazanah Nasional, the
top shareholder of Proton, plans to sell its entire stake (43 percent) to DRB-
Hicom, a Malaysian conglomerate. 
Proton’s effort at internalizing core automotive capability was admirable 
but not good enough to compete with global giants. As trade barriers fall and
the average income of the citizens rises, it is losing domestic customers to 
foreign car makers while penetration into large export markets seems as remote as
ever. The company blames the small domestic market, about 500,000–600,000
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units per year, and the lack of brand recognition abroad for lackluster perfor-
mance. But the deeper cause of hardship must lie in the inability of Proton 
and its local suppliers to fully internalize and develop core technology. In the
global car market where ¼erce competition reigns, moderate achievement in
technology is tantamount to nothing. Malaysia’s approach was suf¼cient to 
sell cars in the heavily protected domestic market, but as protection is lifted, 
the fate of the company that does not possess cutting-edge technology is 
sealed. Although Proton boasts R&D and high engineering technology, its
local suppliers continue to learn “basic processes” through Japanese technical
assistance nearly 30 years after Proton’s establishment.8 
For survival, Proton desperately needs strategic alliance with one of
the big-name foreign producers. Under such alliance, products should be 
re-targeted to speci¼c components or car models to supply to particular 
markets, with the company becoming a crucial link in the global production 
network. However, negotiations for cooperation with Volkswagen, and then 
with GM, broke up in 2007, showing the dif¼culty for Proton to reconcile 
aspiration for national car production with the prospect of foreign dominance
and intervention in management. 
Meanwhile, the Malaysian government announced National Automotive 
Policy in 2006 which was revised and further elaborated in 2009. It sets 
Malaysia’s automobile strategy to cope with the limited size of the domestic 
market, deepening globalization and regional integration, and insuf¼cient 
competitiveness. Key policy directions are: (i) striving for volume by reducing
the number of models and platform portfolio; (ii) restriction of new entry; 
(iii) preservation of Proton brand name and ¼nancial support for Bumiputra
suppliers; (iv) conditional FDI policy in which foreign entry is welcome only 
if it contributes to the national policy objective; (v) an array of administrative
measures, incentives, and penalties; (vi) strengthened regulations on prices, 
standards, automobile life, etc.; and (vii) continued commitment to global 
and regional integration. These measures, except the last, collectively show 
Malaysia’s resolve to upgrade the automobile industry through a strong 
hand of the state instead of a market-guided approach. Questions may arise 
regarding weak private and foreign response to such interventionist policy, 
and wisdom of restricting the numbers of car models, component suppliers, 
and foreign ¼rms by administrative means at a time when liberalization of 
the market and introduction of more competition are required to achieve 
scale and ef¼ciency. 
In this regard, a sharp contrast is seen in the basic thrust of automobile indus-
try policy between Malaysia and Thailand. Thailand fully embraces market 
and globalization, tries to build an open and liberal business environment, 
welcomes foreign multinational corporations to form the industrial base, and
does not entertain a desire to create national brand cars. The automobile 
industry is the leading manufacturing sector in Thailand, and Thailand is 
the largest automobile producer in Southeast Asia. Thai automobile produc-
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1997–1998, global recessions of 2008–2009 and 2011–2012, and local ½ood-
ing of 2011. But each time production recovered strongly and relatively 
quickly. In 2010, production of passenger cars and trucks was 1.64 million 
units of which domestic sales were 0.80 million units and exports were 0.84 
million units. In the same year, the country exported automobiles and their 
components worth 584 billion baht (US$18.4 billion). 
At the end of 2009, Thailand had 17 car-assembly companies (foreign and 
joint venture), 648 ¼rst-tier component suppliers (both foreign and local), 
and 1,641 second- and third-tier component suppliers (local). With this strong
development of automobile supporting industries, Thailand is now regarded 
as not only an export base of passenger cars and pickup trucks but also a 
global production base of parts and components. The Thai Ministry of In-
dustry continues to support the industry strongly, bolstering competitiveness
in general and strengthening and broadening the supporting industries in 
particular. Unlike Malaysia where policy interest has moved to fostering 
new and independent SMEs with innovative capability, Thailand is still 
learning the Japanese production model, promoting automotive technical 
education and training, expanding technical consultancy, and strengthening 
linkage with FDI ¼rms. Policy interest in engineering capacity in die and 
mold, machining, welding, and other “basic processes” is still alive and well 
among Thai industrial of¼cials and local companies. 
Malaysia developed the automobile industry by internalizing core capabil-
ity quickly with strong of¼cial support and protection. But it has hit a thick 
wall due to limited scale and severe international competition. Thailand 
created a free business environment for foreign car makers to achieve scale, 
quality, and even exports. Its problem, however, is the slow pace of domestic
capacity building and continued dominance of foreign design and technology.
Both paths are fraught with dif¼culties, but the key question is which path 
is more likely, under appropriate policy, to establish a competitive automobile
industry with suf¼cient domestic value creation in the long run. The fact 
that discriminatory measures are no longer permitted under WTO, FTAs, 
and EPAs must also be take into account when a nation decides on a basic 
orientation of its automobile industry policy. 
8.6 Concluding remarks 
To conclude the chapter on Malaysia, three related thoughts can be raised 
for future contemplation. 
First, Malaysia’s economic success in the future depends not so much on 
policy quality, which is already high, but on whether domestic investors and 
producers, especially Bumiputra ones, respond strongly to good policy in 
the globalization age. Without conjuring up private dynamism, there is a 
risk of policy perfection becoming an end in itself with a broadening gap 
between what policymakers want and what the private sector can deliver. 
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policies but a new strategy to wake up Malaysian businesses which are quite 
inactive by East Asian standards. This is a problem of an entirely different 
dimension from policy inadequacy. For this purpose, a simple, down-to-earth
approach is perhaps more appropriate than a sophisticated but mechanical 
approach which is logically consistent but fails to win the heart of the Ryakiat.
A solution calls for a breakthrough in spiritual dimension through hope, 
pride, and excitement. The dif¼culties of individual local ¼rms must be felt 
and understood by sharing their experiences on the ground—at farms and 
on factory ½oors—rather than just producing procedural frameworks such 
as key performance indicators, results-based awards, independent review, 
and the like. 
Second, there may arise a tension between the government’s desire to 
continue to guide the market, on the one hand, and increasing emphasis on 
innovation, SMEs, private investment, and globalization on the other. True, the
Najib government is more friendly to market forces than its predecessors. Even
so, the country remains more interventionist than its regional neighbors such
as Thailand, especially in the automobile sector. This does not mean that the
government should revert to a laissez-faire stance. But it must reconsider the 
scope and means of policy intervention so that it supports rather than irritates
private investors. The high policy capability of Malaysia should be re-directed
to building solid, productive, and arm’s-length partnership with local and foreign
entrepreneurs instead of pursuing internal consistency and transparency in 
policy documents. Proactive industrial policy is a very subtle thing that must 
be designed and implemented with utmost care, balance, and sensitivity. 
Third, the leapfrogging approach, where entirely new industries, products,
and actors are targeted rather than building on the existing industrial base, 
is risky because the possibility of success for each project starting from scratch
is usually slim and the gestation period is long even if it is successful. In this 
regard, it is worrisome that Malaysia no longer pays special attention to its 
large export base of electronics and electrical and treats it equally with all 
other sectors. The bulk of current policy attention is directed to the creation 
of innovative and independent local entrepreneurs who can carry national 
brands. As far as policy documents are concerned, large foreign electronics 
manufacturers already belong to the past and serious intention to create 
industrial linkages between FDI and local ¼rms or build supporting industries
has evaporated. A more balanced approach would be to pursue two tracks 
by expending a suf¼cient amount of the nation’s wisdom and resources on 
the existing industrial base for enhanced competitiveness while promot-
ing and experimenting on new industries. If Malaysia does not succeed in 
creating new engines of growth as rapidly as the old industries shrink, it will 
face the danger of de-industrialization and falling income. The Second In-
dustrial Master Plan 1996–2005 did not produce spectacular results in value 
creation of the targeted eight industrial clusters which included electronics 
and electrical and automobiles. Malaysia should not abandon this path 
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9 Vietnam 
Growth without quality 
9.1 A latecomer in East Asia 
Despite an ideal location in the heart of dynamic East Asia, a long coastline, 
and hard-working people, Vietnam’s industrialization was signi¼cantly
delayed in comparison with its neighbors due to prolonged wars and legacies
of planning. Although independence was declared by President Ho Chi Minh
in September 1945, it took nearly a decade of ¼ghting to drive out the French
colonialists in the decisive battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Despite this 
military victory, Vietnam was split into the communist north and the capitalist
south. The north was aided by China and, later, the Soviet Union, and
the south was supported by the US which regarded it as a fortress against 
communist advances. In the 1960s, the Cold War turned hot in Vietnam. In 
1960, the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) was formed in the south
to initiate a guerrilla war against the southern government. In 1965, the US 
marines landed in Danang, in the central coast of the country, and the US started
bombing northern cities and industries which gradually escalated. The northern
government and Viet Cong fought back with surprise attacks and sudden 
offensives. The US sprayed dioxin-laden “orange agent” extensively to destroy
forests in which enemies hid, causing serious health and genetic effects on 
humans even to this date. This devastating war was in progress while many 
other East Asian economies were graduating from the initial import substitu-
tion phase to the export orientation phase or even trying heavy industrialization.
Eventually, the rise of anti-war feeling in the US and the world, withdrawal 
of US troops following the 1973 Paris Agreement, and the weak and unpopular
southern government led to the Fall of Saigon in the face of communist 
onslaught from the north, in April 1975. In the following year, Vietnam was 
reunited and Saigon was renamed Ho Chi Minh City. 
After reuni¼cation, the communist government in the north imposed
socialist planning in the south and harsh persecution and “re-education” of 
southern of¼cials and intellectuals, which generated a ½ow of 560,000 “boat 
people” ½eeing the country. The direct and immediate consequence of this 
suppression was a collapse of the Vietnamese economy. Collectivized farmers
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state subsidies, and rationing. The problem associated with planning was 
recognized early but it took many years to of¼cially revise the policy, and 
the market mechanism was restored only gradually and in steps. Beginning 
in the late 1970s, partial and secret liberalization of agriculture, price system,
and trade was attempted at local levels. By the early 1980s, many technocrats
were supportive of the idea of introducing market incentives. Finally, Doi 
Moi (renovation) policy that af¼rmed the market mechanism was promulgated
in December 1986 at the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party. However, 
the immediate economic challenge of the late 1980s was macroeconomic 
crisis centering on hyperin½ation. Macroeconomic control was restored 
around 1989, private enterprises were legalized in 1990, and prices were 
signi¼cantly liberalized in the early 1990s (Tran Van Tho, 2010). Policies 
and institutions supporting the market mechanism, such as the dismantling 
of collective farms, introduction of land use rights, state-owned enterprise 
reform, ¼nancial sector reform, and global integration, were also started in 
the 1990s. Many of them are still underway into the twenty-¼rst century. 
After the disappearance of the Soviet Union and its aid for communist 
allies in 1991, Vietnam turned decisively to the West.1 Around 1993, Vietnam
opened its doors to the global market economy through trade, investment, 
and ODA which began to transform the Vietnamese society and economy 
enormously. After many years of ¼ghting and economic mismanagement, 
Vietnam ¼nally reached a point where serious effort for economic develop-
ment, which most other developing countries had been expending for decades,
could be initiated. Surrounded by its dynamic neighbors, Vietnam found 
itself a low-income agrarian country with outdated technology and infrastructure.
Driven by nationalism and the shame of backwardness, the Vietnamese 
government turned to the task of economic development under globalization
and systemic transition with the slogan of “Industrialization and Modernization”
by the year 2020. With basically the same governing structure as before, 
namely the power monopoly of the Communist Party supported by the old 
administrative machinery, Vietnam belatedly introduced policies to train 
people, build infrastructure, and create new industries from around the mid-1990s. 
9.2 Remarkable results 
The ¼rst two decades of Vietnam’s industrialization and modernization, 
under the pressure of systemic transition and globalization, brought high 
and relatively stable growth to Vietnam. Starting from a very low level, the 
Vietnamese economy grew rapidly with the average growth rate of 7.4 percent
during 1991–2010. In 1990, Vietnam was among the world’s poorest countries
with GDP per capita of US$98 (Asian Development Bank data, in current 
dollars). By 2008, Vietnam reached the income threshold of US$1,000 per 
capita and joined the rank of lower-middle-income countries by the World 
Bank classi¼cation method.2 Average foreign visitors to Vietnam are stunned at
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the streets of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. The growth up to the recent 
past was broad-based, touching virtually everyone and generating profound 
social changes in the entire country. Vietnam’s shared growth was impressive
and quite different from the historical experiences of many countries in Latin
America, the Middle East, or Sub-Saharan Africa, where growth occurred 
in limited sectors and bene¼ted only few people while poor farmers and 
ethnic minorities saw little improvement in their livelihood. 
Vietnam is one of the early achievers of the Millennium Development Goals,
a set of social goals to be achieved by 2015 by all low-income countries.3 
Population below the poverty line, as de¼ned by the General Statistics Of¼ce
and the World Bank, fell dramatically from 58.1 percent in 1993 to 14.5 
percent in 2008. Pockets of poverty still remain for three groups, namely 
poor households in the coastal regions of the Red River Delta and the Mekong
Delta; minority households in the northern mountains, central highlands, 
and other remote areas; and urban poor with low education and low skill 
(Ketels et al., 2010). But even for these groups, living conditions have gradually
improved thanks to labor migration, public support in health, education, 
and disaster relief, af¼rmative actions for minority people, and activities of 
aid donors and NGOs. According to the United Nations Human Develop-
ment Indicator 2010 which covers income, health, and education, Vietnam’s 
ranking in overall “quality of life” was the 113th which was above India, 
Laos, Cambodia, and Bangladesh but below China, Thailand, Philippines, 
and Indonesia. Vietnam scored relatively high in the health component but 
relatively low in the education component, which does not auger well for 
human-capital accumulation. As for the rich–poor gap, which sometimes 
emerges with rapid economic growth, the same United Nations data, for 
2007, show that Vietnam’s level of income inequality is lower than those of 
China, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, and Cambodia and on a par with 
those of Indonesia and Laos (however, see the next section for rising inequality). 
Structural transformation has also been observed. The share of manufac-
turing in GDP rose from 12 percent in 1990 to 19 percent in 2000 then 
hovered around 20–21 percent throughout the 2000s. The ratio of manufac-
turing exports to total merchandise exports was 18 percent in 1991 (Asian 
Development Bank data), rising to 44 percent in 1997 and continuing to rise 
to 55 percent in 2008 (World Bank data). Much of this apparent structural 
shift was attributable more to the large in½ow of FDI than the dynamism 
of domestic enterprises. In Vietnam, FDI is an important source of capital 
accounting for 24.1 percent of gross capital formation in 2008 with a cumu-
lative stock of US$164 billion with about 11,000 projects (UNCTAD data). 
FDI is also a bringer of foreign management, technology, brands, markets, 
and industrial inputs, though production linkage with local ¼rms is weak and
technology transfer is limited and far from automatic—which is the general 
case with almost all developing countries. It should also be noted that manu-
facturing FDI, which is the main driver of structural transformation, is only 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































    
244 Country studies 
FDI is mostly in the service and real-estate sectors. With the volume of FDI 
already high, the Vietnamese government no longer welcomes FDI uncon-
ditionally and wholeheartedly; it is worried about low technological content, 
the low implementation rate of 30–40 percent, and negative impacts of real 
estate FDI such as the loss of agricultural land and property bubbles (see 
below). Additionally, concentration of FDI projects that hire a large number
of unskilled workers is creating labor shortage, wage pressure, labor migration,
and labor disputes in certain localities such as Dong Nai, near Ho Chi Minh 
City, a trend which is spreading to the rest of the country. 
Domestic savings have risen gradually from a dismally low 2.9 percent of 
GDP in 1990 to about 30 percent of GDP in recent years, a level which is 
normal for a rapidly growing economy in East Asia. However, gross capital 
formation is always higher than domestic savings with the result that the 
savings–investment gap averaging 7–8 percent of GDP but widening to over 
10 percent of GDP more recently must be ¼lled by capital imports. Foreign 
savings are supplied in the forms of ODA, FDI, private remittances, and 
portfolio investment. This has enabled Vietnam to invest in private businesses
and public infrastructure beyond its own means. The supply of infrastructure
services has greatly increased since the early 1990s but their quality and 
quantity are still insuf¼cient to support rapidly expanding industrial activities
and compete with regional rivals. In 1996, the road connecting Hanoi to the 
port city of Haiphong was in disrepair requiring cars to queue up to cross 
a river one by one on an old railroad bridge when trains were not visible. 
Existing hydraulic and coal-¼red power plants could not guarantee enough 
electricity for incoming FDI. By now the situation has improved greatly with
ODA-built highways connecting major cities with ODA-aided ports. New 
power generation and transmission capability has been installed nationwide, 
similarly with foreign assistance. But these improvements can hardly catch 
up with strong infrastructural demand generated by an even faster pace of 
industrialization. Shortages in infrastructure continue to be among the top 
concerns of foreign investors interested in Vietnam. 
Institutional reforms have progressed albeit at a slower speed than expected
by some donors and businesses. Many laws and regulations have been revised
to conform to international standards. Among them, revisions of the enter-
prise law, especially in 2000, prompted formation of new private ¼rms and 
registration of informal business operations and created a more level playing
¼eld for all businesses regardless of size and nationality. Previously common 
discrimination between domestic and foreign businesses and between state-
owned and private enterprises has largely vanished, at least on paper. It can 
safely be said that Vietnam today is a far more business-friendly place than 
20 years ago although it is not yet as business-friendly as competitor countries
in the region. Vigorously pursued integration through accession to the WTO,
regional free trade agreements (FTAs), and bilateral FTAs and economic 
partnership agreements (EPAs) were certainly behind Vietnam’s unwavering 
commitment to liberalization and conformity to global standards in principle.
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Gross capital formation 
Gross domestic saving 
Figure 9.1 Savings and investment balance 
Source: Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators, 2010. 
However, one area in which progress seems to have stalled or even reversed 
is state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform. Equitization (privatization) of small 
SOEs has largely been accomplished, but that of the remaining large SOEs 
is behind schedule. Not only that, recent years have seen large SOE groups 
(“conglomerates”) backed by of¼cial loans and guarantees expand into non-core
business areas such as ¼nance, insurance, telecom, and real estate brokerage 
which in some cases ended up in severe ¼nancial dif¼culties with mounting 
bad debt. Nevertheless, generally and overall, Vietnam’s institutional reforms
from plan to market have been slow but steady. Progress has been substantial
although the road ahead is still long and winding. 
These more or less exemplary achievements were generated by a growth 
model based on low labor cost and intensive capital investment rather than 
on productivity and competitiveness (Ketels et al., 2010, p. 16). Growth 
impetus came from the restoration of suppressed domestic private activities 
to a normal level and introduction of powerful foreign in½uences. To sustain
this model, no sophisticated industrial policy was required beyond liberal-
izing and opening markets carefully and gradually, adopting international 
rules and standards, and coping with the problems that might arise on the 
way. It was essentially reactive adaptation to the new reality rather than 
proactive creation of new value and industries. Such a strategy was appropriate
for a country starting from devastation of war and planning and without 
strong administrative capacity. Compared with other developing countries, 
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gain due to its good location, unskilled but diligent workers, and political 
stability. But the validity of this model has already been diminished because 
of the successful execution of the ¼rst stage of industrialization. 
9.3 Arrival of a new era 
Vietnam’s growth has been more quantitative than qualitative—or what Paul
Krugman once called “growth based on perspiration rather than inspiration”
in his controversial article on the myth of Asia’s Miracle (Krugman, 1994). 
From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, growth was stimulated by incentive 
and re-allocation effects associated with Doi Moi reform. Subsequently, from
the mid-1990s to present, growth has additionally been driven by new trade 
opportunities and large in½ows of foreign funds associated with global and 
regional integration. Despite impressive growth records and less impressive 
but still signi¼cant reform efforts in the last two decades, local ¼rms remain 
generally uncompetitive, much of manufacturing value is created by foreigners,
and policies and institutions remain very weak by East Asian standards. 
What is critically important for the purpose of this book in general and 
for the next step of Vietnamese policymakers in particular is the fact that 
institutional reforms undertaken in the past, centering on the judicious man-
agement of economic liberalization and opening, were adequate for systemic 
transition from plan to market but not suf¼cient as the basis of a growth 
strategy for creating internal value and overcoming a developmental trap. 
Now that Vietnam is nearing the ¼nal stage of systemic transition and global
and regional integration, productivity breakthrough is needed to climb further.
Future growth must be fueled by skill and technology rather than a mere 
injection of purchasing power or capital accumulation. 
In the 1990s, external competitive pressure on Vietnam was still partial 
and indirect. By the early 2000s, however, global and regional integration 
began to bite with Vietnam’s accession to the WTO in 2007 as well as
substantive steps that had to be taken to ful¼ll the obligations of the ASEAN
Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN–China Free Trade Agreement 
(ACFTA), and other FTAs and EPAs. Protection of weak domestic industries
behind high walls of tariffs and non-tariff barriers was no longer allowed, 
and policies to enhance competitiveness were called for. Freer transaction 
in international remittances and direct and indirect investments generated 
large in½ows of foreign funds relative to GDP and brought new instabilities 
such as in½ation, property bubbles, and a gaping asset gap between haves 
and have-nots to the Vietnamese economy. The lack of progress in political and
administrative reform resulted in slow response to these policy challenges, 
emergence of large public corporation groups, environmental and social 
problems generated by fast growth, and a continuing culture of corruption 
and insider trading. 
It is now evident that Vietnam needs a fundamentally different growth 
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in order to continue to grow and reach a higher level of prosperity in the 
future. This view is already widely shared by Vietnamese leaders and
government of¼cials as a result of extensive policy debate in recent years. A 
large number of studies have been undertaken by Vietnamese researchers 
and research institutions on the quality and sources of growth. Comprehen-
sive hearings of domestic and foreign experts were conducted prior to the
drafting of the Five-year Socio-economic Development Plan 2011–2015 and 
the Ten-year Socio-economic Development Strategy 2011–2020. Domestic 
and foreign experts generally speak in one voice. Ohno (2009a) warned of
a future middle-income trap unless Vietnam’s policy formulation was radi-
cally improved. The World Bank (2010) also studied the possibility of a 
middle-income trap in Vietnam and recommended a six-step solution crafted
by its chief economist, Justin Lin. A joint report on Vietnam’s competitive-
ness by the Central Institute for Economic Management of Vietnam and the 
Asia Competitiveness Institute of Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Sin-
gapore, supervised by Michael Porter and the Harvard Business School, 
states that 
the economic logic behind this [old] growth model ultimately has limited
potential ... Vietnam’s future growth has to move beyond providing 
access to and leveraging existing economic fundamentals. It needs to be 
based on a consistent upgrading of these fundamentals and creating new
advantages. 
(Ketels, et al., 2010, p. 19) 
Tran Van Tho (2010), a Vietnamese economist who teaches at Waseda 
University, Tokyo, shows that Vietnamese industrialization is still at a low 
level and argues for the creation of new and higher-quality institutions, which
he terms as “New Doi Moi,” that can stimulate and sustain internal sources 
of growth. 
Some argue that a middle-income trap is still a remote risk for a country 
like Vietnam which just recently graduated from the status of a low-income 
country and joined the lower-middle-income group. However, the concept 
of middle-income trap is used in Vietnam as a political device to alarm its 
government and businesses, which are prone to complacency due to high 
growth in the past, into hard thinking about the future. Although it will be some
years before Vietnam’s developmental trap becomes a reality, as encountered
in Malaysia, local of¼cials and researchers are already fully aware of this 
risk. General awareness is already attained, but what is lacking is the govern-
ment’s ability to design and implement concrete strategies and action plans 
to avoid this risk. Policy learning in this direction has barely started. 
Starting in the early 2000s, many signs of ending initial prosperity and 
emerging new challenges have appeared. One worry is absence of statistical 
evidence that Vietnam’s productivity and competitiveness are improving. 
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deepening (increase in machinery and equipment) which does not re½ect 
overall ef¼ciency. Structural transformation is proceeding rapidly but the 
main drivers of manufacturing exports are large foreign-af¼liated ¼rms with 
little participation of local companies. Although the products of Intel and 
Canon operating in Vietnam may be “high-tech,” most value is created by 
foreigners, including product design, brand name, and marketing, while 
Vietnam, which offers cheap labor and industrial land, contributes relatively 
little to the value chains of these products. Surveys of foreign ¼rms continue 
to reveal the severe shortage of managers and engineers with needed skills 
and experience. The lack of internal value creation in FDI-led industrial-
ization is now widely recognized as a serious problem among Vietnamese 
policymakers. 
Two indicators frequently cited to underscore this problem are total factor
productivity (TFP) and the incremental capital–output ratio (ICOR). TFP 
is a measure of overall ef¼ciency which is calculated as residual growth after 
increases in factor inputs such as labor and capital are accounted for. ICOR 
is a measure of capital ef¼ciency computed as the ratio of the investment 
rate (investment in percentage of GDP) to the real GDP growth rate. It 
shows how much physical capital has to be invested to produce an additional
1 percent growth. While results differ somewhat due to data inaccuracy 
prevalent in developing countries and according to each researcher, general 








TFP change (%) 
Figure 9.2 Investment-driven growth without productivity increase 
Source: The incremental capital–output ratio (ICOR) was computed by the author using Gen-
eral Statistical Of¼ce (GSO) data. For TFP, Tran Tho Dat et al. (2005) for 1990–2004 and 
unof¼cial calculation by GSO’s SNA Department for 2005–2007 were used. Continuity between
the two is not guaranteed. 
Note: ICOR is computed as investment ratio (I/Y) divided by real growth (ΔY/Y). The higher 
the ICOR, the more capital formation is required for growth (i.e., investment is inef¼cient). 
Total factor productivity (TFP) is a broad de¼nition of productivity calculated as residual 
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and the contribution of TFP to growth was high, which indicates that growth
was achieved through improved ef¼ciency without much investment—albeit 
from a very low level under planning and market suppression. In the more 
recent period, however, ICOR rose and TFP’s contribution to growth declined
as capital’s contribution increased signi¼cantly. This is a clear sign of investment-
driven growth with low ef¼ciency in capital use. 
The same problem can be stated from another angle as the problem of 
wage increase which is faster than the increase in labor productivity. If a 
large number of labor-intensive foreign manufacturers pour into Vietnam 
by the attraction of low wages, the labor market for unskilled workers will 
tighten as demand for such workers outstrips supply. Because Vietnam is 
much smaller than China in population size, such tightening can occur much
faster in Vietnam than in China—as already seen in acute labor shortage 
and wage pressure in and around Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi. When this 
happens, labor-intensive manufacturers will leave Vietnam for another coun-
try with even cheaper labor while no skill- or technology-intensive foreign 
¼rms will come to replace them if competent managers, engineers, and op-
erators are hard to ¼nd. De-industrialization will proceed as old industries 
shrink and no new industries emerge. The country will be stuck in a develop-
mental trap. Among Japanese manufacturers, Sony and Daihatsu have
already left Vietnam and decided to supply their products through imports 
rather than local production. As tariff barriers and logistic costs decline, it 
becomes more ef¼cient for multi-national corporations to produce any product
in one location with scale merit and distribute it throughout the world rather
than producing it in every country. 
Put in still another way, Vietnam’s challenge is whether it can take
advantage of “demographic bonus” to climb further (United Nations Popu-
lation Fund, 2010). Demographic bonus is a situation where the working 
population aged 15 to 64 is at least double the size of the dependent popu-
lation aged 0 to 14 or 65 and above. Vietnam’s demographic bonus has just 
begun around 2010 and is expected to last about three decades. During this 
period, Vietnam will have a large supply of workers entering the labor market
as a basis of industrialization and supporters of the young and the old. If 
everyone has good access to education and training whose quality is greatly 
improved and closely linked with shifting industrial needs, Vietnam will 
enjoy a golden age of human-capital accumulation and rapid improvement 
in income and welfare. If industrialization fails, however, few managers, 
engineers, and high-skill workers will be demanded, and opportunities will 
turn to threats as the problems of unemployment, lost generation, wasted 
education and training, and social instability will arise. 
Another phenomenon heralding a new era of Vietnam’s development is 
sharply increased macroeconomic instabilities as a result of deepening inter-
national integration. Until the end of the 1990s, macroeconomic crises were 
mostly home-grown and caused by excessive ¼scal de¼cits and monetary 
issue in the face of weak supply response. Hyperin½ation and the collapse 
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of the Vietnamese dong in the late 1980s were such cases. After successful 
macroeconomic stabilization, economic performance throughout the 1990s 
was characterized by high growth coupled with low in½ation. In those days 
Vietnam was largely detached from global economic cycles. Even the Asian 
¼nancial crisis of 1997–1998, which wrecked the economies of neighboring 
countries, touched Vietnam relatively lightly thanks to the low degree of 
¼nancial integration of the Vietnamese economy. Real growth declined only 
moderately to 5.8 percent in 1998 and 4.8 percent in 1999. The Vietnamese 
dong was not targeted by currency speculators, and most shocks were felt 
indirectly through reduced demand for Vietnamese goods and less investment
into Vietnam by crisis-hit countries. 
However, the situation changed signi¼cantly around the turn of the millen-
nium. In the 2000s, FDI in½ows became much larger to the tune of US$6–9 
billion rather than US$1–2 billion as before (actual implementation basis). 
Private remittances from overseas Vietnamese, including permanent residents
(“boat people”) and temporary workers, also increased to about US$7 billion
per year. Meanwhile, ODA grants are about US$0.5 billion annually. Fur-
thermore, new ¼nancial in½ows were generated as the Vietnamese stock 
exchanges, established in 2000, started to grow and attract foreign investors. 
However, such investments are highly unstable and speculative. Portfolio 
capital in½ows rose from virtually zero in the early 2000s to US$6.2 billion 
in 2007 as the Vietnamese stock market soared. But when the market declined
subsequently a net out½ow of US$0.6 billion was recorded in 2008. Other 
capital in½ows, which include ODA loans as well as private property invest-
ments, are a few to several billion dollars per year. All this was happening 
in a country with GDP growing from US$50 billion to US$100 billion in 
the late 2000s. The macroeconomic impact of the combined in½ow of foreign
funds was overwhelming. 
With greater trade and ¼nancial integration, the Vietnamese economy is 
more synchronized with global boom–bust cycles. In the periods of 2007–2008
and 2010–2011 (intervened by the Lehman shock), the world experienced 
commodity in½ation and high capital mobility in search of speculative gain. 
In both periods, Vietnam experienced highest in½ation in East Asia with 
consumer price in½ation peaking at 23.1 percent in 2008 and 18.1 percent in 
2011. In½ation was accompanied by urban property bubbles in both periods 
and a stock market bubble in the ¼rst instance. Vietnam was not alone to 
suffer from overheating caused by excessive in½ows of purchasing power in 
these periods. Countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Nigeria, 
Zambia, South Africa, Botswana, Mauritania, and Angola also experienced 
economic booms as export earnings from extractive resources shot up in a 
classical phenomenon known as “Dutch Disease.” But overheating can also 
occur by other in½ows as experienced by Vietnam (FDI, ODA, remittances, 
and portfolio money), China (export earnings and FDI), the United Arab 
Emirates (portfolio and construction money), and the United Kingdom (oil 
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similar: consumption and construction booms, asset bubbles, in½ation, trade
de¼cits, and currency overvaluation. 
In Vietnam, a large portion of incoming funds amounting to 20–30 percent
of GDP feeds asset bubbles, especially urban property in½ation, which
further accelerates booms in the real sector. This asset ampli¼er mechanism 
creates a perverse situation where Hanoi’s properties are as expensive as 
those in the suburbs of Tokyo despite the fact that Vietnam’s per capita income
is less than 3 percent of Japan’s. Asset speculation has become the main 
mover of purchasing power in Vietnam, not corporate pro¼ts or workers’ wages.
Naturally, the best minds are attracted to short-term real estate transactions 
rather than long-term investment in technology, skills, and management. 
This is hardly an ideal situation to promote accumulation of industrial
human capital. 
Vietnam is rapidly becoming unequal. Vietnam’s Gini coef¼cient, an index
of inequality in income and expenditure, has long been stable at about 
0.35–0.40 and lower (more equal) than China’s which is about 0.5 and rising.
In 2010, the General Statistics Of¼ce reported a Gini coef¼cient of 0.43 with 
a moderate widening of the income gap between richest and poorest groups. 
However, these data do not capture the greatest cause of the rich–poor gap 
in Vietnam which lies in asset markets rather than in the annual ½ows of 
income. Disparity is most visible—though statistically not yet captured—
between haves and have-nots in urban areas. If you happen to own a house 
or land in Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh City, you are a winner. You can buy an 
expensive car, open a business, or send your sons and daughters abroad to 
study. Meanwhile, people without appreciating assets, including urban renters
and migrant workers from rural areas, are losers. Their rents and living and 
education costs are skyrocketing and their real income is falling sharply. 
Vietnamese large cities now have these two very different groups living side-
by-side. This is a political time bomb that may someday explode as hope 
for better future is dashed for the majority of people and their children. 
In fast-growing Asia, some economies such as Japan, Taiwan, and South 
Korea succeeded in raising everyone’s income during the high-growth era. 
But other countries such as China, Thailand, and the Philippines were unable
to narrow huge income and wealth gaps as they grew fast. After many happy
years of shared growth, Vietnam is standing at a crossroads. Policy must 
quickly catch up with the reality and begin to solve this problem. First, 
relevant income and asset statistics must be collected and analyzed.
Second, new taxes must be introduced in reasonable steps to narrow the 
asset gap, including property tax, real estate transaction tax, and inheritance 
tax as some Chinese cities are trying to do. Third, there must be a continued 
battle against corruption, non-transparency, and insider trading in asset 
transactions. Finally and most important, industrial policies must be im-
proved greatly to strengthen the competitiveness of Vietnamese companies 
and improve education and training for students and workers so that the 
general public can participate in growth through higher skills and better 
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jobs. Otherwise, Vietnam may be stuck at middle income with an aging 
population and rising political instability. 
9.4 The glass ceiling in East Asia 
Vietnam’s growth pattern has basically followed the past experiences of East 
Asian neighbors whose features include acceptance of openness and regional 
integration as an initiator of growth; deepening intra-regional trade and
FDI; high savings and investment; dynamic transformation of industrial 
structure; urbanization and rural–urban migration; and growth-generated 
problems such as income and wealth gaps, congestion, pollution, and
¼nancial bubbles which became highly visible around 2008. At the same 
time, unique features of Vietnam, such as much delayed but faster global 
and regional integration than the neighboring countries, must be acknowl-
edged. Within this dynamic East Asian context, Vietnam must successfully 
conduct three crucial policies to sustain growth, namely: (i) generation of 
internal value; (ii) coping with new social problems caused by rapid growth; 
and (iii) effective macroeconomic management under ¼nancial integration. 
The ¼rst produces sources of growth while the second and the third ensure 
political stability and social support without which industrialization and 
modernization cannot be sustained. Capability to manage industrialization 
in this broad sense must be acquired or the industrialization process may 
stall (Murakami 1992, 1994). 
A low-income country just out of war, political mayhem, ethnic con½ict, 
or severe economic mismanagement is often characterized by a fragile eco-
nomic structure. It relies heavily on extractive resources, monoculture export,
subsistence agriculture, or foreign aid. Productivity is low and innovation 
hardly occurs. Internal value created by traditional industries such as mining
and agriculture is small, but the absence of a vibrant manufacturing sector 
makes them loom large in output and export structure. This is stage zero on 
a long road to industrialization. 
Economic take-off in East Asian countries starts typically with the arrival 
of a critical mass of manufacturing FDI performing simple assembly or 
processing of light industry products for export such as garment, footwear, 
foodstuff, and other household goods. Electronic devices and components 
may also be produced in this way. In this early stage of industrialization 
(stage one), management, design, technology, production, and marketing are
all directed by foreigners, key materials and parts are imported, and the 
country contributes only unskilled labor and industrial land. While this 
generates jobs and income for the poor, internal value remains small as value
created by foreigners dominates. Vietnam’s industrialization up to now is 
basically characterized by this situation. Myanmar may be entering this stage
from the status of international isolation. 
In the second stage, as FDI accumulates and industrial output expands, 
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partly by the in½ow of foreign suppliers and partly by the emergence of
local suppliers. As quicker and cheaper supply of local parts and components
is realized, assembly ¼rms become more competitive and a virtuous circle 
between assemblers and suppliers sets in. The industry grows quantitatively 
and internal value creation rises moderately, but production basically remains
under foreign management and guidance. Obviously, local wage and income 
cannot rise very much if important tasks that contribute greatly to value 
creation continue to be performed by foreign hands. Thailand and Malaysia 
have already reached this stage. 
The next challenge is to internalize knowledge, skills, and technology by 
accumulating industrial human capital. Localization must expand from hard-
ware to software of production processes. Locals must replace foreigners
in all areas of production including management, product design, factory 
operation, quality control, logistics, and marketing. As foreign dependence 
is reduced, internal value rises dramatically. The country emerges as a dynamic
exporter of high-quality manufactured products challenging more advanced 
competitors and re-shaping the global industrial landscape. South Korea 
and Taiwan are such producers trying to join the most advanced group. 
In the ¼nal stage, the country acquires the capability to create new products
and lead global market trends, not just copying frontline technology developed
by others to produce new products faster and more cheaply. Japan, the United
States, and a number of European countries have been such industrial innovators. 
However, progress is not guaranteed for all. A large number of countries 
that receive too little manufacturing FDI stay at stage zero. Low-income 
countries may receive FDI in mining, telecom, power, tourism, or property 
development. While such projects based on locational advantages are lucrative
for investors, can generate jobs for the poor, and provide basic infrastructure for
the nation, these alone cannot put the country on a dynamic path of structural
transformation as manufacturing does. 
Even after reaching the ¼rst stage, climbing up the ladders becomes
increasingly dif¼cult. Another group of countries are stuck in the second 
stage because they fail to upgrade human capital. It is noteworthy that none 
of the ASEAN4 countries (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philip-
pines) which began industrialization before Vietnam has succeeded in breaking
through the invisible “glass ceiling” in manufacturing between the second 
and the third stage. This phenomenon is essentially the same as what we 
called a developmental trap in general and a middle-income trap in particular,
in Chapter 1. 
Starting from a very low level, Vietnam is currently in the ¼rst stage of 
industrialization trying to reach the second in Figure 9.3. Large FDI in½ows,
a necessary condition for this transition, have already happened and are 
continuing to the extent that neighboring ASEAN countries even fret about 
losing FDI to Vietnam. While Vietnam’s short-term goal is attainment of 
physical expansion of the industrial base (stage 2 ), it should also simultane-
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next stage (stage 3). For this, front-loaded and well-targeted policy action 
for upgrading industrial human resources is the key. 
Even without policy effort, Vietnam is likely to continue to grow at reason-
able speed and can reach the per capita income of US$4,000 by around 
2025—this is a Goldman Sachs forecast with which Tran Van Tho (2010) 
agrees. However, Tran Van Tho warns of two risks associated with such a 
scenario. The ¼rst is the problem of low quality of growth regarding capital 
ef¼ciency, social justice, and environment. The second is the possibility of 
being trapped in middle income without soaring to high income in the long 
run. According to Tran Van Tho, solution of the latter problem depends on 
whether Vietnam can overcome two barriers, the one associated with the 
Lewisian “turning point” of moving from a labor-surplus to a labor-shortage
economy and the other associated with transition from growth driven by 
factor inputs to TFP-based growth. Tran Van Tho emphasizes ¼ve necessary
ingredients of New Doi Moi, which are: (i) restraint on state-owned enter-
prises and promotion of private enterprises; (ii) ef¼cient use of investment 
funds; (iii) strengthening of industrial competitiveness; (iv) improving education;
and (v) democratization and establishment of the rule of law. 
9.5 Policymaking procedure and organization 
Proposing a solution is one thing. Carrying it out is quite another. This 
caution is particularly relevant in the case of Vietnam where failure to pro-
duce effective industrial strategies comes mainly from structural weaknesses 
in the policymaking process rather than not knowing which way to go. 
Vietnam does not follow the standard policymaking process discussed in 
Chapter 4. Its policy formulation is saddled with the legacies of planning 
days and cannot cope effectively with problems in the age of global com-
petition. Vietnam has reached the point where further progress towards 
higher income is increasingly dif¼cult without a radical reform in policy 
formulation procedure and organization. 
The problems associated with Vietnam’s industrial policymaking are many.
However, instead of presenting a long list of problems, I will highlight two 
procedural problems and two organizational problems which are interre-
lated and constitute the main sources of formalism and the general lack of
creativity and responsiveness in policymaking. These four problems are unique
to Vietnam in the sense that they are not observable in East Asia’s other 
high-performing economies. 
The two serious procedural problems are the lack of involvement of the 
business community and the lack of inter-ministerial coordination in designing 
and executing industrial strategies and action plans, which together render 
approved policies ineffective and unimplementable. In any developing country,
policy implementation is a big challenge due to shortages of funds, human 
resources, and proper mechanisms for execution and monitoring. However, 
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not only in industrial areas but also in all other areas. It can even be said 
that very few policies are actually implemented as stipulated in Vietnam 
because of delays in preparing implementation details; non-provision of 
necessary budget, staf¼ng, or equipment; the lack of support from the business
community; and the lack of ability or interest among responsible ministries 
to solve these problems. On one occasion, an of¼cial who drafted an industrial
master plan and faced angry protestation by FDI ¼rms regarding certain 
parts of it reassured them that there was no need to worry because master 
plans in Vietnam were not implemented. 
The policymaking process in Vietnam is largely closed within government 
with little substantive involvement of other stakeholders. Within each min-
istry, the order to draft a master plan is handed down to a drafting team, 
which normally consists of a few experts headed by a middle-ranking of¼cial.
The team collects internal data and data from other ministries, and may 
commission additional analyses to experts in other ministries or government 
research institutes. The structure of chapters of all master plans is standardized
by a circular issued by the Ministry of Planning and Investment.4 The budgets
for different types of master plan are also ¼xed by an inter-ministerial circular
and used mainly for obtaining external data and analyses as well as conducting
domestic travel, interviews, and hearings. A master plan drafted by the 
ministerial team is submitted to the minister or vice minister for internal 
review. After that, it is circulated among relevant ministries for comment 
(which is usually cosmetic) and submitted to the prime minister for ¼nal 
approval. Signi¼cant delay may occur at any stage of review and approval. 
Demand for revision is also common. The drafting team is routinely over-
worked with a large number of master plans to ¼nish each year, which does 
not allow suf¼cient time (or money) to think creatively, interact with non-
government stakeholders, or publicize the ¼nal result. Approved master plans
are neither translated into English nor uploaded or printed for dissemination
although executive summaries edited for the prime minister’s approval, in 
the Vietnamese original, are usually available on the web. 
If an enterprise wants to raise its voice, it must invent its own way since the
current procedure does not allow meaningful involvement of the business com-
munity. Although enterprise hearings are becoming more popular, suf¼cient 
details of the master plan draft are not revealed at such hearings and enterprises
therefore can only make general requests. If a ¼rm later ¼nds certain points 
in the master plan objectionable, it needs to seek special meetings with respon-
sible ministries, use symposiums and media to protest, or write a letter to 
the prime minister to request a change in the already approved policy. This 
is in sharp contrast to Malaysia where private sector participation is institu-
tionalized in the steering committee and task forces that draft the Industrial 
Master Plan; Thailand where automobile producers decide targets and action
plans and the government merely accepts them; Taiwan where committees 
and seminars are routinely organized for public hearing (Chapter 7); or Japan
where business decisions are basically left to individual ¼rms and government
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provides only support functions such as trade negotiation and setting standards
for quality, safety, environment, and industrial property (Ohno, 2006b). 
Another procedural problem is the absence of inter-ministerial coordination
on policy substance as well as budgeting, staf¼ng, and other implemen-
tation details, which in turn comes from the lack of mechanism to force 
different ministries to work together. Compartmentalization of the govern-
ment along ministerial lines is a common problem around the world, but 
most governments manage to somehow ameliorate it (Chapter 4). One solution
is to have a strong top leader with a good economic mindset who directs 
various ministries and becomes the hub of policymaking. As a result, policy 
components become mutually consistent even though ministries still fail to 
talk to each other (Thailand under Thaksin Shinawatra, 2001–06; Ethiopia 
under Meles Zenawi, 1991–). Another way is to establish a powerful techno-
crat team directly serving the top leader and making key decisions while 
ministries become executing agents of plans emanating from this team (South
Korea’s Economic Planning Board, 1961–1994; also see below). Still another
way is to let a super ministry, with suf¼cient policy authority and instruments
at its disposal, lead industrial policymaking and be responsible for it (Japan’s
Ministry of International Trade and Industry in the 1960s; Taiwan’s Ministry
of Economic Affairs). Finally, it is also possible to install a mechanism
to guarantee representation of all relevant ministries and non-government 
stakeholders in the of¼cial drafting process as well as in informal exchange
(Malaysia’s drafting of the Industrial Master Plan). In Vietnam, while every 
policy document speci¼es a leading ministry and a list of related ministries, 
a mechanism to make them work as one is entirely missing. 
We can go deeper to see why it is dif¼cult to ensure involvement of non-
government stakeholders and inter-ministerial coordination. Behind these 
problems lie fundamental issues in policymaking organization. The most 
serious ones in this regard are the lack of clear directives from the top
and the distorted incentive mechanism among government of¼cials that causes 
brain drain. 
It is well known that Vietnam’s decision making is consensus-based. Checks
and balances are in place horizontally (across ministries and depart-
ments), vertically (between central and local levels), and regionally (north, 
south, middle, large cities, and remote areas). There are three top leaders— 
party general secretary, president, and prime minister—and the Communist 
Party and the government interact in a complex manner. This system can 
produce stability and continuity but it is not suitable for staging bold reforms
or responding quickly to the changing world. Policies remain mostly reactive
rather than proactive. Development effort centered on a clear roadmap 
towards a national vision with concrete strategies and action plans, which 
is the hallmark of East Asian industrialization, is entirely missing in the 
Vietnamese policy process. 
The Vietnamese government copes with urgent issues—be it in½ation
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leadership or responsibility. When a serious problem is identi¼ed, an inter-
ministerial committee is called and its chair is appointed. Each ministry 
proposes solutions from its perspective, which are collected into general 
policy recommendations without execution details. Bureaucracy can supply 
broad ideas touching every aspect of the problem, but it is not very good at 
prioritization or selectivity for real action. It is said that there are more than 
1,000 research institutes attached to various ministries and levels of the 
government in Vietnam producing mediocre reports and proposals. This 
diffused approach must be replaced by a focal person or organization that 
decides on a shortlist of actions and measures and is responsible for it. There
should be interaction between high and implementing levels of the govern-
ment to produce policies which are both realistic and sharply focused. 
Another problem which is common in many countries and also becoming 
increasingly serious in Vietnam is the decline of quality and morale of govern-
ment of¼cials, which prompts an exodus of talented people to other sectors. 
Vietnam’s public service faces cumulative problems of overstaf¼ng, low
salary, prevalence of second and third jobs, formalism, rigidity, nepotism, 
corruption, relation-based promotion, and aid-related bene¼ts such as foreign
travel, free training opportunities, and other personal gains associated with 
supervising or participating in ODA projects. These were the legacies of the 
subsidy system existing up to the late 1980s, where the public sector was
the guarantor of jobs, minimum income, and social security for all and where
no alternative employment opportunities were available in the private or 
foreign sectors with far more attractive salaries and rewarding duties. Under 
the present circumstance of open market and global integration, however, the
public sector only attracts people who want stability, people who genuinely 
believe in public service despite low salary, or people who want to take 
advantage of of¼cial privileges to study abroad or receive training as a step-
ping stone to a better-paying job in the future. As a result, highly-quali¼ed 
and motivated people are becoming dif¼cult to recruit or retain. Donor-
funded training programs of government of¼cials may only worsen the brain
drain without raising the average quality of public service. 
This problem cannot be solved by minor repairs or ad hoc adjustments. 
To reverse the exodus of talent from the Vietnamese government, far-reaching
reforms to remake the public administration is needed as soon as possible. 
This should encompass, among others, a signi¼cant downsizing of the public
sector through organizational reform; forced retirement and outsourcing of 
non-essential services; a competitive and transparent recruitment system; a 
higher and performance-based salary scale and promotion linked to objective
personnel evaluation; and clear rules regarding the conduct of public servants
and their interaction with citizens, businesses, and service providers. Obviously,
these are not easy because of the magnitude of required tasks and political 
resistance. But they are also absolutely necessary for Vietnam to move forward.
No East Asian country has overcome a middle-income trap without installing
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such reforms must come from the top rather than the bottom. No bureau-
cracy can transform itself radically without an order from a strong leader. 
9.6 How to break a solidi¼ed system 
According to comparative institutional analysis, a branch of institutional 
economics that relies heavily on evolutionary game theory, a society may 
get stuck in bad equilibrium owing to institutional complementarity, strategic
complementarity, and path dependence (Aoki 1995a, 2001a, 2001b). Insti-
tutional complementarity means that any social system has resilience to 
shocks because its institutional components enhance each other. For
example, Vietnam’s education, recruitment, salary, and promotion systems 
are mutually complementary to produce relation-based rent sharing. Strategic
complementarity means that individuals in such an institutionally solidi¼ed 
society are under strong pressure to follow the existing rules and have little 
incentive to deviate from them. Finally, path dependence stresses the impor-
tance of the beginning. Once installed by chance or design, any social system 
requires a large amount of political and social energy to change it. Together, 
these concepts point to institutional inertia and dif¼culty of reforming any 
established system. 
Policy impasse arises when an ineffective method of policy formulation is 
set up and then solidi¼ed, and institutional components and people’s attitude
to support it have formed. Removing one person or reforming one organ-
ization does not improve the situation because of institutional and strategic 
complementarities mentioned above. Changing policy formulation in a fun-
damental way in Vietnam, as proposed in this chapter, will surely require 
enormous energy and meet ¼erce resistance. 
However, this does not mean that there is no way out. There are times 
when a social system jumps to another social system despite enormous
inertia. Comparative institutional analysis suggests the following occasions 
and agents of change: 
(i) Collective mutation: a large number of people residing in a society may 
mutate simultaneously, as if their genes have transformed. If only a few 
people behave differently, they are simply called “crazy” or “silly” and 
the system remains unchanged. But a suf¼ciently large mass begin to 
behave differently, institutional and strategic complementarities of the 
old type stop working and rules and customs start to change. This is a 
spontaneous and internally driven movement, which may occur when 
the majority of people feel suppressed or victimized under the existing 
system. In a rapidly growing economy, this may also happen when a 
generation with new values and behavioral patterns grow up, or when 
people begin to have new demands and expectations from the govern-
ment as a result of high income brought by successful development. A 
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public discontent or demand to come to the open. In recent years the 
use of personal digital communication devices may have increased
the odds of spontaneous popular movement. 
(ii) Foreign in½uence: foreign governments, ¼rms, and individuals follow 
different systems and are not bound by the dominant behavioral code 
of the domestic society. They bring and sometimes even force new elements,
which cause friction, resistance, and inconsistency with the indigenous 
system. In low-income countries, bilateral donors and international
organizations often exercise powerful in½uence. Foreign ¼rms and investors
as well as international migration and other human exchange may also 
produce foreign pressure on a society. If this prompts a change in a direction
that generates healthy development, such pressure is highly welcome. 
However, not all foreign in½uences are good from the viewpoint of social
evolution or economic development. For this reason, the government 
must guide and coordinate foreign pressure to prevent undesirable results. 
(iii) Policy: even without domestic or foreign pressure, the government as 
deus ex machina (detached commander)5 can start a change from inside 
the system by introducing policies that upset existing calculations and 
complementarities. Here the key question is who will activate such pol-
icies. Government itself is submerged in existing connections. As noted 
before, it is also extremely dif¼cult for lower bureaucrats to initiate a
fundamental reform. Their power within the government is minuscule 
compared with enormous institutional and strategic inertia they face. 
Drastic policy breaks are usually introduced when a strong top leader 
comes to power and a new government is formed. Leadership equipped 
with strong will and economic literacy is crucial for this to succeed. 
When such leadership skillfully and strategically aligns with foreign part-
ners who want to go in the same direction and offer necessary technical 
and ¼nancial assistance, even a very bold reform becomes possible. 
Following these theoretical considerations, let us identify three players 
that may make institutional reforms possible in the Vietnamese context. They
are leadership, a technocrat team combined with a national council, and 
foreign partnership. 
9.6.1 Leadership 
The crucial importance of leadership is made suf¼ciently clear in the discus-
sions above as well as in Chapter 4. Leadership is the prime force of social 
change while other necessary conditions can be created or reshaped by the 
leader if they do not already exist. In countries with advanced political
systems, policy initiative can also emerge from various domestic groups such
as civil society organizations, intellectuals, interest groups, and political parties
because legal mechanisms to capture and re½ect their opinions are ¼rmly in 
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developed, only a few channels of effective participation are available. For 
all practical purposes, initiative for bold change in these circumstances must 
come from the top leader. When such leadership is combined constructively 
with the aspiration of domestic groups and foreign support, reform becomes 
possible. For the leader to play a proper role in development, it is not always
necessary to change the existing political regime or expending social energy 
to change it. Vietnam’s political regime at present is ½exible enough to allow 
a strong leader with political savvy to emerge and orchestrate policies. 
However, this point is often disputed by domestic analysts. Many young 
Vietnamese of¼cials have confessed to me that they saw little possibility
of change in their government. It is argued that Vietnamese politics is
based on collective decision-making rather than charismatic leadership. Non-
government stakeholders are weak while there are many powerful persons 
and groups in the Communist Party, parliament, government, military, state-
owned businesses, municipalities, and regions, hidden from the eyes of the 
general public, who can block any initiative and make trouble for any leader.
Anyone, even those at the top, wanting to start a new initiative must consult 
and convince all others in the governing mechanism, which is nearly impos-
sible. As a result, leaders often play defensive and pursue only obvious goals 
and well-established policies without launching new ones that may rock
the boat in the ocean of complex political interests. In most countries, it is 
customary that a person just elected (or selected) as the head of the state 
would announce a new policy initiative to distinguish his or her administra-
tion from the previous one and take full advantage of the honeymoon period
to re-set policies. However, such an announcement is rarely heard in recent 
Vietnam. The prime minister’s hands are tied from day one. 
Be that as it may, we can still debate how permanent the current political 
arrangement is and whether it completely shuts out the possibility of effective
developmental leadership or it just takes more charisma, skills, and patience 
than in other countries to make a difference in Vietnam. It should be recalled
that Doi Moi reform in the 1980s was realized only after a long preparation 
period and its implementation also took many years. Launching New Doi Moi
in the twenty-¼rst century may equally take a long time. At any rate, action to
break the impasse and change history ultimately belongs to the will and choice
of the Vietnamese leaders and people, not foreign of¼cials or academics. 
9.6.2 A technocrat team and a national council 
In high-performing economies of East Asia, a technocrat team directly under
the top leader has frequently played a crucial role (Chapter 4). The team is 
summoned from the brightest of¼cials from various ministries as well as the 
smartest returnees who have studied, taught, or ran businesses abroad. 
Prominent domestic business leaders with strong policy mindset may also 
be mobilized. The team receives full con¼dence and responsibility from the 
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the command post for all ministries which are obliged to implement the 
policies that this team drafts. It is the nation’s brain for development without
which even excellent leaders cannot function. The Economic Planning Board
in South Korea, the Kuomintang technocrats in Taiwan, the Economic 
Planning Unit (EPU) in Malaysia, the National Economic and Social Develop-
ment Board (NESDB) in Thailand, the so-called Berkeley Ma¼a in Indonesia,
the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) in the Philippines, 
and the Planning Commission in India all aimed to ¼ll this need at certain 
critical points in their economic development with varying degrees of success.
Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), although
being one ministry among many, had broad functions and operated effectively
to strengthen the competitiveness of Japanese manufacturing industries in 
the high-growth period of the late 1950s and the 1960s. The Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs in Taiwan also functions this way. 
Vietnam also had the Prime Minister’s Research Commission (PMRC) in 
the past, but it was an advisory group rather than a central policymaking 
body entrusted with the power to lead the entire government. Its responsibility
was too weak and its members were experienced but perhaps too old. A new 
advisory team for the prime minister with younger economists and of¼cials 
was formed in 2011, but it is still without authority to make policies. Nor 
does Vietnam have a super-ministry such as Japan’s MITI or Malaysia’s 
EPU to centrally coordinate development effort. The Ministry of Planning 
and Investment is not strong enough in terms of authority, capability, and 
policy instruments to undertake this task. It is urgently suggested that Vietnam
create a new dynamic technocrat team within the government as a focal 
point of policymaking authority and responsibility. Vietnam needs such a 
team at least for the next few decades to climb to higher income and cope 
with growth-generated problems and instabilities along the way. 
Besides the technocrat team, Vietnam could also adopt the national council
model, which is a standard mechanism in many developed and developing 
countries (Chapter 4). Many industrial policies, such as the fostering of SMEs
and supporting industries, formation of industrial clusters, and linking of 
technical training with industrial needs, are mutually related and require 
coordinated promotion. They must also be supported by various policy tools
that belong to different ministries and agencies. Assigning one ministry to 
lead and other ministries to follow, as is regularly stipulated in Vietnamese 
policy documents, cannot work in reality because no one ministry can instruct
or overrule others which have equal standing in the government. For multi-
ministerial policies to work, an overarching mechanism, above all ministries 
and agencies and headed by a person with appropriate clout, is necessary to 
supervise and coordinate different policy components. A national competi-
tiveness council chaired by the prime minister, which meets monthly or 
quarterly, to monitor the progress of key industrial policies, identify problems
that may arise, and assign relevant ministers to solve them and report the 
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The problem with Vietnam is that there are already too many ad hoc govern-
ment committees and councils. Most of them meet one or two times and are 
forgotten or continue to exist only formally without producing substantive 
results. They cannot function well because suf¼cient and consistent policy atten-
tion is not given from the top. These meetings are often chaired by the minister
of a designated ministry rather than the prime minister or deputy prime minister,
with an inability to solve issues touching more than one ministry. These councils
and committees should be merged into a small number of more powerful and
permanent mechanisms covering, for example industrial and trade issues
and macroeconomic management respectively. Top leaders should use these 
mechanisms effectively and intensively to concretize policy visions, accelerate
implementation, and remove obstacles (see section 4.5 in Chapter 4 for a 
more concrete proposal for a national competitiveness council in Vietnam). 
Establishment of a technocratic team and a national competitiveness council
is an issue where policy learning based on international best policy practices is
very effective because East Asia abounds in such practices. Experiences of 
other countries should be referenced in designing their functions and structure,
with necessary modi¼cations as usual. 
9.6.3 Foreign partnership 
Vietnam’s foreign policy shifted dramatically in the early 1990s when close ties
with the Soviet bloc were replaced by multi-directional diplomatic relations and
re-integration into the global (Western) economy. Since then, interaction with
foreign actors has exerted indirect and subtle in½uences on Vietnam’s develop-
ment orientation although the Vietnamese government never allows foreigners
to take the driver’s seat in policy formulation (Izumi Ohno, 2005). Bilateral and
multilateral donors have registered their desire to see faster reforms and more
administrative transparency and ef¼ciency on such occasions as the semi-annual
consultative group meetings, comments on the ¼ve-year plan and the ten-year
strategy, and policy dialogue associated with the Comprehensive Poverty Reduc-
tion and Growth Strategy (CPRGS) and the Poverty Reduction Support Credit
(PRSC) led by the World Bank. Foreign businesses also have pressed the 
Vietnamese government to improve the legal and policy framework, tax and 
import duty system, and other business-related matters through the Vietnam
Business Forum, government–business dialogue, and numerous trade fairs 
and symposiums. 
Among leading economies in East Asia, Japan in particular has contributed
signi¼cantly to Vietnam’s development since the early 1990s through trade, 
investment, aid, and human exchange. The Japanese business and of¼cial 
communities are greatly interested in bolstering Vietnam’s industrial com-
petitiveness, and have implemented a large number of bilateral programs to 
this end. They include the building of physical infrastructure (especially
in power and transportation), education and training of industrial human 
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Japan is the largest foreign partner that engages in bilateral industrial policy 
dialogue with Vietnam. 
These programs aim to improve Vietnamese policies in the areas where Japan
has strong business concerns or comparative advantage. There is no denying 
that they are used to pursue Japan’s national interests. At the same time, 
they have the additional purpose of institutionally correcting the weaknesses 
of Vietnam’s policy formulation by introducing new procedures and organ-
izations as well as jointly drafting and implementing industrial actions. 
Japanese of¼cials and businesses are well aware of the structural shortcomings
of Vietnam’s policymaking. They are willing to invest time and resources to 
work with the Vietnamese side to solve them, without which they know their 
dialogue will not lead to meaningful results. 
The objectives and contents of bilateral industrial policy dialogue have 
evolved over time. Initial programs emphasized joint study by Vietnamese 
and Japanese researchers, which greatly contributed to academic exchange and
mutual learning, but lacked the mechanism to put what was recommended 
into policy action (Ishikawa Project, JICA–NEU Joint Research, and Joint 
Work). In order to overcome this problem, a formal and transparent mech-
anism for implementing and monitoring agreed actions was introduced, which
gradually but greatly improved Vietnam’s overall business climate by repealing
or revising undesirable laws and procedures one by one (New Miyazawa 
Initiative and consecutive phases of Vietnam–Japan Joint Initiative). For 
example, under the Vietnam–Japan Joint Initiative, concrete action plans 
were bilaterally agreed and rigorously monitored in two-year cycles. Inter-
ministerial cooperation was enforced by making the Ministry of Planning 
and Investment responsible for the participation of all other ministries. This 
can be considered as an institutional device, with the participation of a 
foreign partner, to ensure positive results even before the government of
a developing country learns effective policymaking. 
Subsequently, Japan started more dif¼cult cooperation of improving
Vietnam’s policy capability by jointly drafting policies, but so far with
limited success ( joint drafting of motorcycle master plan, and drafting and 
implementation of supporting industry development action plan). For ex-
ample, with the motorcycle master plan, strong involvement of non-government
stakeholders (especially major FDI manufacturers) was secured throughout 
the joint drafting process—perhaps for the ¼rst time in the history of Vietnam’s
master plan drafting. However, policy learning of the Vietnamese govern-
ment was harder to induce than expected and slower than other countries
in the region such as Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and Thailand. Even
so, the Japanese government decided to carry out proposed actions on the 
Japanese side without waiting for the Vietnamese side to ful¼ll their re-
quirements. The latest bilateral policy initiative (Vietnam Industrialization 
Strategy) goes to the heart of industrial policy, namely policy-aided creation 
of new industrial clusters with selective and intensive promotion, by stress-
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Vietnamese government will pick up some ideas from the concrete demon-
stration of how this is done. 
9.7 Concluding remarks 
While Vietnam’s past achievements as a developing and transition country 
are great and many, this chapter has focused on current problems and future
challenges. With reference to policy methods and industrial achievements of 
neighboring high-performing countries, it offered candid assessment and 
advice so that Vietnam might develop its industrial potential to the fullest 
extent. It is evident that the Vietnamese people and government are not 
satis¼ed with merely achieving the Millennium Development Goals or stop-
ping at middle income. Their aspiration is high, which is to ultimately join 
the rich-country club with continued industrialization and modernization 
beyond 2020. This should be attainable if the nation clearly recognizes its 
present shortcomings, sets ambitious but realistic goals, and overcomes
institutional barriers through persistent and systematic policy learning. The 
key message of this chapter can be summed up as follows. 
Vietnam has reached the point where further progress towards higher 
income is possible only if internal value creation is enhanced. This calls for 
proactive government action, rather than laissez-faire, to guide and comple-
ment private dynamism and avoid being caught in a middle-income trap. To 
improve policy quality, Vietnam needs to overhaul its policy-formulation 
process. This in turn requires a radical organizational change in the public 
administration system. The task is daunting but it must be done to avoid 
stagnation. Enlightened and strong leadership, establishment and effective 
use of a technocrat team and a national competitive council, and strategic 
partnership with foreigners are proposed as appropriate entry points for this 
national endeavor. 
 













The Growth and Transformation Plan 
10.1 A poor country with strong resolve 
Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world with a per capita income
of US$390 in 2010 (World Bank Atlas method). Recently it has also been 
one of the world’s fastest-growing economies with the average growth rate 
of 11.0 percent in the ¼ve-year plan period of 2005/06–2009/10. Historically, 
Ethiopia is host to one of the oldest civilizations of the world. With the 
population of over 80 million, it is also the second most populous country 
in Sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria. 
Ethiopia has long struggled with a series of hardships including famines 
and hunger, suppression under a communist regime, civil war and war of 
separation, and regional instability. However, it is not accurate to describe 
the country today as a destitute aid-receiver with little hope of development. 
Ethiopia largely overcame these internal and external dif¼culties and turned 
seriously to the task of economic development around 2003. While structural
fragilities and the risk of instabilities remain, policy focus is no longer famine
relief or controlling insurgents. Ethiopia’s current policy attention is directed
to enhancement of productivity and competitiveness by spreading good practices
in agriculture, promoting micro and small enterprises, and strengthening 
eight designated industrial sectors. 
Ethiopia is also unique in other ways among low-income countries. The 
federal government, led by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi for over 20 years, 
is strong and action-oriented. The country has established a developmental 
vision and related strategies which are embodied in the concepts of Democratic
Developmentalism (DD) and Agricultural Development Led Industrialization
(ADLI), with the following characteristics. 
First, there is a very strong policy ownership. Despite the fact that Ethiopia
is a country heavily dependent on foreign aid and having only a small traditional
export base,1 the Ethiopian government has a clear development strategy 
which is homemade. Unlike many other “donors’ darling” countries in Africa,
Ethiopia does not allow bilateral donors or international organizations to 
dictate its policy affairs through aid harmonization, general budget support, 
loan conditionalities, or imposition of “international best practices” from the
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not by donors themselves. ODA and FDI are welcomed only when they align
closely with the national development plan. Donors and investors interested 
in industrial or infrastructure projects are requested to transfer technology, 
provide training, and increase local procurement as much as reasonably 
possible. WTO accession is being sought, but only on the condition that its 
membership would leave suf¼cient policy room for Ethiopia to catch up 
rapidly as a latecomer country. From the East Asian perspective, these strong
attitudes toward development and international cooperation are highly com-
mendable in a latecomer country without which industrial catch-up can hardly
be started. Strong policy ownership is a necessary—though not suf¼cient— 
condition for sustained economic growth. It may be added that Ethiopia’s 
strong policy ownership hinges heavily on the governing style and intellectual
ability of its top leader, Meles Zenawi.2 Maintaining strong policy ownership
into the future will require institutionalization of good policy practices which
make them less dependent on the quality of a top leader. 
Second, a strong state is to guide the private sector. The Ethiopian govern-
ment rejects neo-liberal economic philosophy from Washington and vigorously
studies policy methods from East Asian high-performing economies. While 
the Industrial Development Strategy of 2002 states that it is private ¼rms, 
not state-owned enterprises, which must be the main engine of production 
and investment, it also contends that the state must use its power to guide 
private ¼rms away from rent seeking and toward productive investment, 
technology acquisition, and global competition. The Ethiopian government 
does not believe that the free market, left to its own, will spontaneously raise 
productivity or learn technology. It also asserts that, if the state’s capability 
is initially weak, it must be enhanced to ful¼ll its assigned role in guiding 
and supervising the market. According to this view, the state should not 
form an unconditional alliance with “capitalists” who may or may not behave
productively. The Ethiopian government wants to maintain arm’s length 
relations with both local and foreign enterprises by preparing both carrots 
and sticks for different behaviors. 
Third, internalization of skills and technology is top priority. This is of 
course highly welcome and appropriate for a country determined to catch 
up economically from a very low level. Ethiopian leaders admit that natural 
resource-based growth is unsustainable and that knowledge, skills, and tech-
nology to upgrade agriculture and industry must be the central concern. The 
requirement of training, technology transfer, and maximum local procurement
to foreign contractors of industrial and infrastructure projects is similarly 
motivated. Keen interest in building engineering universities in large numbers,
urgent expansion of the technical and vocational education and training 
(TVET) system, and proposed institutionalization of kaizen (factory improvement
methods developed in Japan—see section 3.4.1) is also manifestations of the 
same orientation. This policy focus seems to come partly from the proactive 
attitude of the current administration and partly from the fact that Ethiopia 
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Fourth, policy scope expands as policy learning proceeds. Several years 
ago when Ethiopia began to seriously implement economic development 
policies, the government had little practical knowledge or experience of
industrial policy formulation and had to start with a simple strategy of giving
generous incentives and disproportionate policy attention to a few selected 
export-oriented sectors including leather and leather products, textile and 
garment, and agro products (½oriculture was later added as the private sector
discovered its potential). Donor support for industry was also concentrated 
in these sectors. At the same time, Ethiopia learned East Asian policy methods
by studying literature, sending young of¼cials to South Korea, and conduct-
ing policy dialogue with Japan, among other means. It also learned from 
other donors that provided industrial support such as Germany, Italy, and 
UNIDO. By around 2010, the government felt ready to move on to the next 
phase of policy formulation with the knowledge accumulated in the imple-
mentation of previous development plans. The current industrial policy features
promotion of import-substituting industries in addition to export-oriented 
ones, institutionalization of kaizen as a new productivity tool to supplement 
benchmarking and institutional twinning, promotion of micro and small 
enterprises, expansion of the TVET system, creation of new industrial zones,
and general speeding up of industrialization. 
While Ethiopia’s industrial policy is still primitive and its private sector 
is very weak by the standards of East Asian high-performing economies, 
emerging correlation between policy learning and policy scope expansion is 
an encouraging sign that gives hope for further progress. To realize its develop-
ment vision, the Ethiopian government is trying to absorb and mix any 
useful ideas and tools from around the world. Nevertheless, it is evident that 
main policy inspiration comes from the East rather than the West. 
10.2 Steps toward development policy formulation 
Recognizing that predatory states and rent seeking culture have been the 
major obstacles to African development, the Ethiopian leaders are determined
to build a developmental state—a state that promotes skills, technology, and
productive investment for all citizens and businesses in place of patronage 
and bene¼ts for a few—and has taken a number of steps for its realization 
ever since the present government assumed power in 1991. 
The Ethiopian attempt to build a developmental state in the current form 
dates back to the early 1990s when an interim regime of the Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was established after 
ousting the previous socialist dictatorship by military force. The EPRDF 
was an association of ethnic political groups led by the Tigray People’s 
Liberation Front (TPLF) which spearheaded the anti-government ¼ght from
1975 onward (Ishihara, 2001). With the coming of the interim government 
in July 1991, Ethiopia abandoned economic planning and adopted a market-
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verge of collapse. The radical shift in policy orientation was necessary because
of the failure of the previous socialist government to realize economic growth
and improve living standards; the need to secure ¼nance and cooperation 
from donors and international ¼nancial institutions; and pressing economic 
issues in transiting from civil war to peace. This policy shift opened the door 
for the private sector to play an important role as opposed to the previous 
hostile environment that kept the private sector and market forces at bay 
and in a very rudimentary state. 
During the transition period from 1991 to 1995, new policies were adopted
and incorporated into key policy documents. The policy thrust of the interim
government was proclaimed in Economic Policy for the Transitional Period 
in 1992 which contained a shift toward market orientation, removal of most 
restrictions on private-sector activities, and liberalization and reforms in 
sectoral, investment, and public enterprise laws. Meanwhile, the interim 
government retained some features of the previous regime such as the state 
ownership of land and development centered on agriculture and rural areas. 
Between 1992 and 1994 the idea of Agricultural Development Led Industri-
alization (ADLI) took its concrete shape as an overarching economic strategy.
An Economic Development Strategy for Ethiopia in February 1994 highlighted
the concept of ADLI and de¼ned its strategic direction. On the political 
front, the Charter of the Interim Government in July 1991 upheld peace and 
democracy as guiding principles and introduced federalism based on ethnic 
autonomy. The Communist Military Junta (Derg) of the previous regime 
was replaced by a multi-party political system. These changes were incorporated
in the new constitution which established the Federal Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia in August 1995. Additionally, the ¼rst phase of the structural 
adjustment program of the international ¼nancial institutions was also put 
in place during the transition period. 
The motivation behind ADLI was the recognition that Ethiopia was an 
agrarian society in which the bulk of the population (84 percent in the 2007 
census) resided in rural areas earning a livelihood from land. Agriculture 
had long dominated the economy in terms of output, employment, and 
export earnings. The government emphasized that structural transformation 
should be initiated through robust agricultural growth, and that peasants 
and pastoralists should be the main agents of agricultural transformation 
and economic growth. It was argued that labor and land were the main—and
most abundant—factors of production in Ethiopia and that their effective 
use should generate rapid and sustainable development. These arguments 
were contained in An Economic Development Strategy for Ethiopia of 1994 
mentioned above. 
Beginning in 1995, the concept of ADLI was incorporated in the ¼rst and 
the second national development plans which were published only in Amharic.
The subsequent development plan, the Sustainable Development and Poverty
Reduction Program (SDPRP) 2002/03–2004/05, which further concretized 
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form of a poverty reduction strategy paper in order to solicit cooperation 
of the international community. SDPRP promoted agricultural development
and poverty reduction in rural areas by: (i) strengthening agricultural extension
services; (ii) training of extension agents at TVET institutions; (iii) training 
of farmers at Farmers Training Centers; (iv) water harvesting and irrigation; 
(v) improved marketing opportunities; (vi) restructuring peasant cooperatives;
and (vii) supporting micro-¼nance institutions. 
The initial application of ADLI targeted smallholder farmers, especially 
crop producers, so as to achieve rapid growth in agricultural production, 
raise income for rural households, attain national food self-suf¼ciency, and 
produce surpluses which could be marketed to urban or industrial sectors. 
A rise in agricultural output was expected to stimulate industrial production 
by providing food and industrial materials, thus establishing a link between 
the rural and urban sector. The industrial sector, in turn, could produce inputs
to agriculture such as fertilizers and farming tools and equipment as well as 
consumer goods for rural households. Such dynamic linkage, which can be 
called Core ADLI (see below), was supposed to ignite the ¼rst stage of in-
dustrialization until the economy moved into a higher stage. 
However, policymakers gradually came to realize the limitations of SDPRP
during its implementation. By the time the following national development 
plan, A Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty 
(PASDEP) 2005/06–2009/10, was prepared, there was suf¼cient recognition 
of the problems associated with an agricultural development strategy exclusively
targeted to smallholder agriculture in rural areas. The productivity of the 
agricultural sector did not show signi¼cant improvement and output remained
volatile due to heavy dependency on the amount and timing of rainfall. In 
the 2002/03 season, the output of the crop sub-sector contracted by 16.5 
percent following the decline of 3.7 percent in 2001/02. It was only in 2003/04
that growth in the agricultural sector in general and the crop sub-sector in 
particular started to recover signi¼cantly. From a long-term perspective, how-
ever, labor productivity in agriculture has been on a declining trend (World 
Bank, 2007). Although agriculture has shown strong performance in recent 
years thanks to favorable weather, this did not herald a signi¼cant structural 
change such as crop diversi¼cation or productivity breakthrough. 
PASDEP 2005/06–2009/10 broadened the policy scope from smallholder 
agriculture to other sectors, especially industry and the urban sector. In what
may be called Enhanced ADLI, strong emphasis was placed on growth acceler-
ation which was to be attained through commercialization of agriculture and
private-sector development (PASDEP, English, p. 46). In the ¼rst three years
of the PASDEP period of 2005/06–2009/10, good performance was recorded
in agricultural and industrial production as well as export. Subsequently, 
however, the Ethiopian economy experienced a slowdown accompanied by 
in½ation, balance-of-payments pressure, and a severe shortage of foreign 
exchange. Several causes were cited for this boom-and-bust cycle such as 
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(including aid) relative to economic size, unfavorable weather, speculation 
and hoarding, and external shocks such as commodity in½ation and global 
¼nancial crisis. 
Performance of the productive sector, such as agriculture and industry,
is dependent on long-term trends in productivity and economic structure
as well as external shocks in the global economy. The three-year boom start-
ing around 2005 and the less spectacular results in the remaining two
years of PASDEP seem to have re½ected short-term disturbances rather
than long-term trends produced by policy effort or private dynamism. The
sign of signi¼cant structural change was not yet visible. The share of
industry in GDP stagnated at 13–14 percent and export continued to be 
dominated by unprocessed commodities (Table 10.1). Although exports of 
leather products and cut ½owers have shown remarkable growth, they are still
tiny and without a clear breakthrough in competitiveness and productivity 
(Table 10.2). 
10.3 Democratic Developmentalism3 
Ethiopia intends to radically transform the state-management paradigm from
the system in which rent seeking is the dominant behavioral pattern to the 
system in which value creation is central. This drive comes from Ethiopian 
leaders’ deep disappointment with the two paradigms which have ruled in 
Africa: the paradigm of predatory state which was the root cause of rent 
seeking and the neo-liberal paradigm introduced in the 1980s and 1990s from
the West for the purpose of eradicating rent seeking but, according to Ethi-
opian leaders, failed miserably in that attempt. To replace these paradigms, 
an alternative state-management paradigm consistent with multi-party demo-
cracy, market-orientation, and international integration is proposed. 
Ethiopia’s Democratic Developmentalism can be de¼ned as “a political 
regime in which a developmental party remains in power for a long time by 
consecutively winning multi-party elections, under which policies that punish
rent seeking and encourage productive investment and technology absorption
are implemented under strong state guidance.” This is a political regime 
which Ethiopia is trying to build rather than an already established and well-
functioning regime. It is a model different from East Asia’s authoritarian 
developmentalism which postponed democracy for the sake of development 
(see below) or the Western-style “good governance” that forces adoption of 
advanced governing principles in latecomer countries. As such, it is a new 
political model for low-income countries that has not been tested by history. 
It contains many potential problems associated with state leadership, fragile 
democracy, and formation of political coalition with farmers that must be 
overcome before the Ethiopian developmental vision is realized. These issues
will be discussed in turn below. 
The ¼rst issue is concerned with the merits and demerits of a strong state. 
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Table 10.2 Export performance of targeted industrial products (unit: million US$) 
2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
Total export 597 819 1,008 1,185 1,481 1,450 
Leather and leather 43 67 75 89 101 76 
products 
Semi-¼nished leather 42 56 58 49 67 . . . 
Finished leather – 3 8 27 12 . . . 
Leather shoes 0.8 0.8 2 6 10 . . . 
Agro products 20 34 36 43 52 48 
Textile and garment 9 7 11 13 15 14 
Cut ½owers 12 21 63 111 130 . . . 
(Memorandum items) 
Sum of above four 14.1% 15.8% 18.4% 21.6% 20.1% . . . 
(% of total export) 
Sum of above four 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.3% 1.1% . . . 
(% of GDP) 
Source: Ministry of Trade and Industry. 
institutional analysis shows that it is not easy to transform a “system” (a 
collection of institutions) which has already solidi¼ed (Aoki, 1995a, 2001a, 
2001b). Different types of inertia work to defend the existing system such 
as institutional complementarity (mutual dependence of institutions in which
removal of only one institution hardly changes the system), strategic comple-
mentarity (strong incentive for individuals to follow the existing rules and 
play the existing game), and path dependency (dif¼culty of deviating from 
the system which was chosen ¼rst and subsequently solidi¼ed). On the other 
hand, there are con¼gurations of forces that can lead to systemic transformation
despite such inertia. They include collective mutation of internal agents (for 
example, revolt of disgruntled citizens), policy launched by the government 
who acts as a destroyer of an old regime, foreign pressure, and a combination
of the above three. 
Using this framework, Democratic Developmentalism can be interpreted 
as appointing government as the primary driver for installing developmentalism
(i.e., replacement of rent seeking with value creation) and additionally solicit-
ing foreign investors, bilateral donors, and international organizations to 
enhance this effort through technology transfer and ¼nancial resources. This 
endeavor must eliminate patronage, zero-sum games, and dependency culture
associated with the old system and at the same time create new institutions, 
human resources, and incentive structure to support the coming system. Either
effort will require enormous social energy to surmount political resistance. 
That is why a strong government is needed. Laissez-faire policy that lets the 
market operate freely is unlikely to generate such social energy.4 
According to the Ethiopian leaders, the neo-liberal paradigm failed to 
uproot the rent seeking system because it denied the role of government as 
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government is bad” could hardly prepare a systemic change in a latecomer 
country. The Ethiopian government contends that the policy mix of liberal-
ization, privatization, decentralization, and global integration generates a 
horde of new rent seekers such as mining companies, foreign investors, 
NGOs, and ODA consultants who rally for budgets and subsidies without 
contributing to a systemic change. More generally, the strategy of giving power
to people and local communities has not succeeded in installing development-
alism in Africa, either. 
In Ethiopia, a government led by a strong leader allocates incentives and 
punishments to steer economic actors such as farmers, workers, merchants, 
entrepreneurs, and foreign investors away from rent seeking and toward 
value creation. The strategy to combine carrots and sticks is most clearly 
seen in the leather and leather product industry. The goal of this industry set
by the government is to supply ¼nished leather or leather products for export
and domestic sales by improving management and technology to process 
what has hitherto been sold as raw or semi-¼nished leather. For sticks, the ban
on raw-material export and the high tax on semi-¼nished leather have
been introduced. For carrots, a large number of supporting measures have been
offered to the industry including (i) establishment of the Leather Industry 
Development Institute (LIDI) that provides training, technical support, test-
ing, and some production processes; (ii) donor assistance, foreign advisors, 
and twinning with an Indian textile institute to strengthen LIDI; (iii) privilege
in land allocation, bank ¼nance, and foreign-currency allocation; (iv) business
matching between domestic leather shoe producers and European buyers; 
and (v) monthly government–business meetings to monitor export performance
and solve any problems that may arise. 
What will guarantee that Democratic Developmentalism will not repeat 
the same mistake as the neo-liberal paradigm—that it will not become a new 
playground for rent seekers? Experiences of other developing countries show
that strong states are not immune to patronage and collusion among politicians,
bureaucrats, and businesses. At present, Ethiopia is led by a strong and 
intelligent leader who is determined to avoid such political capture. This is 
a source of strength for the moment but may become a source of weakness 
when the time for power transition arrives. 
The second issue related to Democratic Developmentalism is the effective-
ness of democracy in low-income countries. Why should a country in an early
stage of economic development adopt democracy instead of authoritarianism?
One reason is for enjoying the inherent and universal value of democracy 
itself, such as freedom, human rights, empowerment, and participation.
Another reason, from the perspective of the ruling authority, would be to 
use democratic procedure to secure legitimacy, maintain national unity, and 
gain popular support for developmental policies. Additionally, it must be 
noted that no country at present, regardless of its development stage, can
be accepted as a valid member of the international community and receive
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This is an international environment sharply different from the one in which,
for instance, Taiwan or South Korea faced during the Cold War era. 
However, the kind of democracy that can be introduced in a poor country
with a limited popular mindset and institutional set-up is not an ideal type 
equipped with full conditions and features. It must be a variation of democracy
which is relatively simple, manageable, and consistent with the developmental
goals of a low-income country that faces many constraints and problems. The
core elements of this democracy are an election-based transition mechanism 
in the presence of opposition parties and protection of most basic human 
rights. These are formal requirements that must be adopted by all developing
countries of today. But even this limited version of democracy is subject to 
many challenges which prevent its smooth operation. The true spirit and 
substance of democratic rule—acceptance of diverse views and interests, major-
ity rule, tolerance, compromise, and solution of disputes through non-violent
means—may be harder to come by. 
Based on extensive qualitative research, Paul Collier concludes that
democracy has not produced accountable and legitimate governments and 
has rather increased political violence in many developing countries, especially
in the societies of the “Bottom Billion” (Collier, 2009). This is because
governing rules are yet to be institutionalized and authority has not been ¼rmly
established and universally accepted. If there is no consensus regarding how 
democratic procedure should be applied in practice and in detail, the incumbent
government can exercise much discretion in handling election, human rights,
budgetary allocation, and relationship with the parliament. Equally, opposition
groups can readily criticize and challenge any action by the government. 
Election itself becomes a complicated political game, and victory in it can 
hardly confer full legitimacy. Vendetta politics is repeated as former leaders 
are prosecuted and their policies are reversed by incoming governments. 
Arrests and bombs are preferred weapons rather than telecast debates and 
peaceful demonstrations. Irregularities such as these are fairly common in 
developing countries that have accepted the form of democracy. In Ethiopia,
the violence following the 2005 national election showed that the country 
was also not free from the risks associated with developing country politics. 
In the 2010 national election, however, the ruling party won a landslide victory
and regained urban votes without major violence. 
Under Democratic Developmentalism, a legal procedure for election-based
political transition must be in place while the ruling party is determined to 
stay in power for a long time. This may be regarded as contradictory require-
ments. If the possibility of power change is real, it is highly unthinkable that 
one party will consecutively win elections for a number of decades. Every 
time a new government comes into power, previous policies are repealed or 
at least greatly modi¼ed, damaging credibility and time consistency of policies
which are considered necessary for sustained growth. On the other hand, if 
there is a hidden mechanism which prevents the opposition from winning 
elections, there is no true democracy or political competition. The only way 
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for the EPRDF to stay very long in power legitimately is to consistently 
produce high growth and distribute its fruits to everyone so that people will 
happily vote for it even without coercion or election gimmicks. This is a real 
challenge for any government, especially those in developing countries. 
Third, there is the question of political support base of a democratic develop-
mental state. In the past national elections the EPRDF enjoyed solid support
from poor farmers in rural areas who are recognized as the political coalition
partner of the ruling party. It is natural that a political party intending to 
win an election every ¼ve years chooses small farmers, which occupy 80 
percent of the population, as its support base. In addition, the ruling party 
also counts on the future support of micro and small entrepreneurs in urban 
areas although their number is still small. The current ¼ve-year plan targets 
micro and small enterprises as the generator of income and employment for 
poverty eradication as well as a new political support base for the incumbent
government. 
Generally speaking, poor farmers on subsistence living are characterized 
by conservatism, low levels of education and knowledge, and submissiveness 
to authority. They are often passive followers rather than mature and inde-
pendent forgers of national politics. The situation is not very different in 
Ethiopia where farmers live a meager and highly unstable life. In Central 
Highlands where the majority of the Ethiopians reside, small farmers are 
scattered across vast mountainous terrains with dif¼cult road access. They 
live on what they produce with little external sale or purchase. The supply 
of electricity, drinking water, and hygiene is severely limited. Agriculture 
basically depends on the whims of rainfall, the use of fertilizer is inadequate, 
and the arable plot of each family is very small and being further subdivided 
under population pressure. Eastern Tigray, Eastern Amhara, and Eastern 
Oromia are particularly vulnerable to drought due to unstable rainfall and 
soil erosion. Land division has gone to extremes in some parts of Southern 
Region such as Gurage and Wolayita. In Eastern and Southeastern Ethiopia,
especially Somali and Afar Regions, pastoralists lead nomadic lives on 
sparsely populated dry land. 
The problem faced by smallholder farmers is not only a supply-side problem
but also a demand-side problem of ¼nding markets as well as a quality-of-
life problem that requires social-sector policies. In Ethiopia, many assistance
programs are already in place. A nationwide food-aid program with large 
donor assistance has been established to improve food security.5 Expenditure
on agriculture and rural development is relatively high by international standards.6 
Productive support to agriculture has consistently been prioritized in the 
past and current national development plans. Ethiopian farmers with limited
and unstable income will probably continue to support the ruling party 
because of bene¼ts they receive from the government or for fear of losing 
them. But such vote buying which perpetuates passivity and dependency among
poor farmers is hardly consistent with the grand objective of Democratic 
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farmers as the engine of national development. Can Ethiopia create such 
dynamic farmers with the existing support measures? If agricultural produc-
tivity remains stagnant, the state will eventually face ¼scal crisis and foreign 
aid dependency. While the Ethiopian government remains con¼dent and 
optimistic, many foreign experts are pessimistic about this. 
The view of Ethiopian leaders on this issue is very clear. They consider 
productivity breakthrough and commercialization of smallholder farmers as 
the central pillar of national development. They feel that a large number of 
policies and institutions have been introduced to support agricultural growth
in the last several years and some positive results are already obtained. 
Among the mechanisms installed recently, the most important is the nation-
wide agricultural extension network that is tasked to scale up the best prac-
tices of excellent farmers to other farmers. In the previous plan period of 
2005/06– 2009/2010, agricultural production grew 8.4 percent per annum on 
average. In the current plan period of 2010/11–2014/15, it is projected to 
grow 14.9 percent per annum if best practices spread to all farmers (higher-
case scenario) and 8.6 percent per annum if the scaling up remains partial 
(base-case scenario). Diverse strategies will be applied according to crops 
and regions, and potentially most productive areas with stable water supply 
are targeted as leading regions. Surplus commodities will be exported with 
policy support. Agricultural commodity exchanges have been set up, and 
further upgrading of distribution and exchange mechanisms will be imple-
mented and more commodities will be supplied to domestic manufacturers 
for processing. The government is hopeful that, backed by these measures, 
Ethiopian agricultural revolution is just around the corner. This will produce
a large number of af½uent and independent farmers in support of the current
government. 
The expansion of agricultural extension services in the last several years 
is shown in Tables 10.3 and 10.4. By 2010 Ethiopia had ¼nished training 
Table 10.3 Numbers of farmers training centers and agricultural extension workers 
Established or trained in each year Cumulative
as of 
2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 Jan. 2010 
Farmers 1,500 2,200 2,000 1,782 . . . 9,265 
training 
centers 
Agricultural 9,368 13,899 13,383 15,095 9,404 636 61,785 
extension
workers 
Source: Agricultural Extension Department, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. 
Note: As of January 2010 the number of trained agricultural extension workers exceeded the 
of¼cial target of 60,000. However, the number of actually allocated extension workers was less
than those trained (Table 10.4). The number of operational farmers training centers as of 
January 2010 was 6,543. 
 
 
      
  
 








280 Country studies 
Table 10.4 Numbers of extension workers and service delivery stations (allocated or 
established) 
2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 
Agricultural 
extension workers 
































Sources: Education Management Information System; Health Management Information System;
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Annual Performance Review, various issues; 
Ministry of Health, Health Sector Development Plan-III Annual Performance Review, June 2008;
and Agricultural Extension Department, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. 
Note: The table shows cumulative assignments. Agricultural extension workers count only those
actually assigned which numbered 46,451 in January 2010. 
Table 10.5 Agricultural production (unit: 1000 quintals) 
2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 Average growth
per year 
Cereals 90,062 100,308 116,242 128,798 137,170 144,964 10.0% 
Edible oil 3,129 5,264 4,866 4,971 6,169 6,557 15.9% 
Pulses 10,373 13,496 12,712 15,786 17,827 19,646 13.6% 
Vegetables 3,879 4,320 4,502 3,451 4,720 5,989 9.1% 
Root crops 16,055 16,152 13,375 14,095 15,309 12,136 -5.4% 
Fruits 2,495 2,634 4,283 4,600 4,621 3,513 7.1% 
Coffee 1,262 1,562 1,716 2,415 2,734 2,602 15.6% 
Source: Ethiopia Central Statistical Agency, agricultural sample surveys. 
and assigning three agricultural specialists responsible respectively for agri-
cultural technology, livestock management, and resource utilization in every 
village (kebele) of the country. A farmers training center has also been established
in every village. Additionally, two female health workers are being stationed in
every village. Comprehensive national extension networks such as this are 
relatively rare in Africa. The next challenge is to fully utilize these human-
resource and service-delivery networks to realize the objective of improving 
agricultural productivity and livelihood of rural residents. 
According to the sample surveys conducted by the Central Statistical 
Agency, agricultural production in recent years showed an upward trend 
and land productivity of major crops also rose (Tables 10.5 and 10.6). This 
fact seems inconsistent with the pessimism expressed in the foregoing paragraphs,
but there are a few catches. First, the period covered in Tables 10.5 and 10.6 
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Table 10.6 Land productivity of major crops (unit: quintal/ha) 
2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
Barley 11.7 12.1 12.7 13.3 13.8 15.5 
Maize 18.6 17.2 21.9 22.3 21.2 22.2 
Teff 8.4 9.5 9.7 10.1 11.7 12.2 
Wheat 14.7 15.6 15.2 16.7 16.3 17.5 
Sesame 6.7 8.5 7.3 7.1 10.1 7.8 
Broad beans 11.2 11.9 11.2 12.6 13.2 12.9 
Source: Ethiopia Central Statistical Agency, agricultural sample surveys. 
which cannot be sustained inde¼nitely in the future. Second, more seriously, 
Ethiopian agricultural data are unreliable and may not re½ect true trends.7 
This is caused partly by inadequate statistical technique and shortage of 
personnel and partly by the incentive to overstate output relative to targets 
when local of¼cials report the results. For this reason, it must be concluded 
that recent agricultural performance is unknown and no basic data on which
policy discussion can depend exists in Ethiopia. 
The government is action-oriented and ambitious, which is commendable, 
but the harsh reality of Ethiopian agriculture may not allow a quick achieve-
ment of Green Revolution. Ethiopia must continue to tackle many issues 
before its agriculture becomes highly productive and commercialized. Never-
theless, it is an interesting feature of Democratic Developmentalism of Ethiopia
that this goal is proclaimed to be the top national priority and that small 
farmers are regarded as the political ally of the ruling party whose voting 
behavior will legitimize the incumbent government. 
How does this Democratic Developmentalism compare with authoritarian
developmentalism observed in East Asia in the post-World War II period? 
The typical authoritarian developmental states were Taiwan and South Korea
in the 1960s and 1970s whose outstanding features included: (i) emergence 
of the regime in response to a national security crisis (communist threat was 
the most common external crisis in East Asia); (ii) strong leadership exercised
by a charismatic (male) leader; (iii) an elite technocrat group that supported 
and concretized the leader’s policies; (iv) prioritization of developmental 
ideology and postponement of transition to democracy; (v) legitimacy through
economic performance rather than democratic procedure; (vi) persistence of 
the same regime for two to three decades and social transformation that it 
generated (Watanabe 1995; Ohno and Sakurai 1997; Banno and Ohno 2010).
Given this pro¼le, the past experience of authoritarian developmental states 
in East Asia differed from the current Ethiopian model in the following 
ways. 
First, East Asian economic development is a historically proven model 
with remarkable achievements in income generation and structural trans-
formation in many countries. By contrast, the Ethiopian model remains to 
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strong political alliance with domestic capitalists while refusing to adopt a 
multi-party system with free election. By contrast, Ethiopia embraces a more
open political system in the early stage of industrialization. The East Asian 
model was justi¼ed by rising living standards for all while the legitimacy of 
Democratic Developmentalism will depend on both economic performance 
and democratic procedure. Third, social transformation triggered by high 
income, especially the emergence of an urban middle mass with new mindset 
and demands, eventually led to the end of strong states and democratic 
transition in East Asia in what Watanabe (1995) calls a “successful dissolu-
tion” of authoritarianism through its developmental achievements. This
pattern has already run its course in Taiwan and South Korea while it is in 
progress in other countries. Meanwhile, how Democratic Developmentalism,
with strong emphasis on producing wealthy farmers and urban small mer-
chants and industries, will transform the society remains an open question 
in Ethiopia. 
10.4 Agricultural Development Led Industrialization 
Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) as envisioned by 
the Ethiopian government can be de¼ned as the development strategy which 
aims to achieve initial industrialization through robust agricultural growth 
and its close linkage with domestic industry. This strategy was formulated 
in the early 1990s and has been implemented in stages, especially from the 
early 2000s, in Ethiopia. ADLI is considered to be an evolving strategy subject
to pragmatic experimentation and adjustments rather than an immutable principle.
The revisions and expansion of policy space from the past ¼ve year plans
(SDPRP 2002/03–2004/05 and PASDEP 2005/06–2009/10) to the current 
¼ve-year plan (GTP 2010/11–2014/15), as discussed below, exempli¼es the 
evolving nature of ADLI that responds to changing circumstances, evaluation
of past policies, and rising policy capability of the Ethiopian government. 
An early exposition of ADLI was given in An Economic Development 
Strategy for Ethiopia in 1994 as follows: 
The long term objective of development in Ethiopia is structural 
transformation of the economy in which the relative weight of agriculture,
industry and service changes signi¼cantly towards the latter two. Espe-
cially, the objective is to raise appreciably the share of the industrial 
sector in the economy both in output and employment. This structural 
transformation is envisaged to occur with a high growth of agriculture 
which is superseded by growth of industry and services. 
In essence the development strategy revolves around productivity
improvement of smallholder agriculture and industrialization based on 
utilization of domestic raw materials with labor-intensive technology. The
strategy is akin to what is known in economic literature as agricultural-
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context. It visualizes export-led growth which feeds into an interdepen-
dent agricultural and industrial development. Exports, be it agricultural 
and mineral, initiates growth thereby creating space for a process of an 
interdependent agricultural and industrial development (or ADLI), which
increasingly becomes a self-generating process of development. Here the 
strategy has two layers; an outer crust of export-led growth and an inner
core of ADLI . . . 
The strategy of ADLI in Ethiopia focuses primarily on agricultural 
development. This is to be attained through improvement of product-
ivity in smallholdings and expansion of large-scale farms, particularly 
in the lowlands. The contribution of agriculture to economic develop-
ment is conceived in two ways. On one side, agriculture will supply 
commodities for exports, domestic food market and industrial output, 
and on the other side, it will expand the market for domestic manufac-
ture. At present, the importance of agriculture lies as a source of supply 
rather than demand. As industrialization picks up pace, over the long 
term the signi¼cance of agriculture as a source of demand will also rise. 
(Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1994, pp. 8–9) 
If ADLI is interpreted narrowly and strictly as the strategy to achieve 
early industrialization through direct material interaction between domestic 
agriculture and domestic industry as the main engine of growth with exports 
providing initial markets, the situation can be depicted as in Figure 10.1. 
Let us call this domestic input–output dependency Core ADLI. In this
interdependence, highlighted industrial sectors are agro processing (including
leather products) that uses domestic agricultural inputs as well as sectors that
produce goods for rural demand such as agricultural tools and machinery, 
fertilizers and pesticides, construction materials, and basic consumer goods such
as processed food and beverages, clothes, and simple household goods pur-
chased by rural population. 
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The Industrial Development Strategy of 2002 lists the following conditions
under which industrialization must proceed: (i) the leading role of the private
sector; (ii) parallel development of agriculture and industry through mutual 
dependence (i.e., Core ADLI); (iii) export orientation; (iv) focus on labor-
intensive industries; (v) proper roles of local and FDI enterprises; (vi) strong 
state guidance; and (vii) mobilization of all social relations among govern-
ment, capitalists, small farmers, labor, and management. The requirements 
of export orientation and labor-intensiveness should be particularly noted. 
Moreover, the second condition (Core ADLI) can be re-interpreted as the 
requirement for the maximum use of domestic resources. These three conditions
are the main requirements on industry in establishing bi-sectoral interdepen-
dence. As noted above, this linkage is not a permanent one but something 
that can evolve into a new pattern in which industry will take the lead
once the initial stage of industrialization is completed. As the Industrial
Development Strategy clearly states, “When we say that we follow agricul-
ture development led industrialization this does not mean that it will be so
forever . . . if agricultural development led industrialization strategy is
successfully applied it will be changed to industry led development strategy” 
(Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2002, English, p. 8). 
The question concerning Core ADLI is whether this strategy is powerful 
enough to signi¼cantly propel early industrialization in Ethiopia. True, we 
do have historical examples in which agriculture grew relatively strongly 
prior to the period of full-scale industrialization and provided resources for 
industrialization through taxation and foreign exchange earnings (for example,
silk and tea exports in late-nineteenth-century Japan, rice and sugar production
in Taiwan up to the 1960s, and the rice export tax of Thailand up to the 
1980s). There are also cases in which robust agro and ¼shery exports ameliorated
the immiserization of rural communities often associated with globalization 
(for example, ¼sh and shrimp exports of Southeast Asia). Agro and ¼shery 
products may even become leading exports (for example, Chilean wine and 
salmon). Agriculture can also serve as an income and employment buffer at 
the time of economic crisis (for example, Japan immediately after World 
War II, and absorption of laid-off workers caused by privatization of state-
owned enterprises in Vietnam in the early 1990s). 
Despite all this, a historical example in which an industry which uses 
domestic materials as its main physical input has expanded dramatically to 
become the industrial pillar of that nation and contributed greatly to the 
structural transformation is dif¼cult to ¼nd. Agricultural development and 
industrial development are usually more distinct and separable than envisaged
in Core ADLI. Japanese industrialization was not based on silk and tea, and 
neither the Taiwanese electronics industry nor the Thai automotive industry 
relied heavily on the domestic supply of rice or tropical fruits. 
In Ethiopia, the implementation of Core ADLI is most clearly seen in the 
leather and leather-product industry in which domestic animal hides and 
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or ¼nal products such as leather jackets and shoes for domestic sales and 
export. However, even with signi¼cant expansion in recent years, this industry
still remains small. In 2008/09, the export value of leather and leather products
was US$76 million amounting to 5.2 percent of total export or 0.2 percent 
of GDP (Table 10.2). Whether this industry will grow robustly to lead broader
Ethiopian industrialization is an open question. 
However, the current thinking of Ethiopian leaders is no longer con¼ned 
to the framework of Core ADLI. While continuing to attach importance to 
Core ADLI, other strategic options and relations are also explored to promote
industrialization. As noted above, PASDEP 2005/06–2009/10 highlighted 
growth acceleration through commercialization of agriculture and private-
sector development, which is a departure from Core ADLI. Policy targets 
in this Enhanced ADLI were not limited to smallholder farmers in rural 
areas. Large-scale commercial agriculture8 (including ½ower farms), urban micro
and small producers, medium and large manufacturers, and foreign-invested 
¼rms all came within the purview of Ethiopian industrial policy. Many of 
these producers operate without much reliance on domestic agriculture–
industry linkage. 
The present scope of Ethiopian industrial policy is already suf¼ciently 
½exible so that all policy options for industrial development, including those 
not covered by Core ADLI, are freely studied and adopted. In the expanded 
framework of sectoral interaction, agriculture can offer surplus labor, agri-
cultural or land taxes, cheap food (“wage goods”), and foreign exchange 
and export earnings for the promotion of industrialization. In turn, resources
and technology can be transferred from urban sectors to agriculture through
production support, supply of processed food and services, agricultural pro-
tection, or public investment (Figure 10.2). These transfers may be made 
(1) Labor supply 





(3) Agri. price control 
(4) F/X & export earnings 
(1) Production support 
(2) Food & service delivery 
(3) Agricultural protection 
(4) Public investment 
Figure 10.2 Resource transfers between agriculture and industry (other than linkages
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directly as well as through ¼scal and ¼nancial mechanisms of the government.
Furthermore, industrial policies unrelated to agriculture, such as production 
of steel, cement, chemicals, and other basic materials, FDI attraction, quality
and productivity improvements at factories, and establishment of industrial 
zones, are also being promoted. 
Although policy scope was thus broadened, at least conceptually and in 
theory, the Ethiopian government could not immediately introduce a large 
number of non-Core ADLI measures. Due to the lack of policy capability 
and experience, additional measures had to be introduced in steps and through
trial-and-error. In practice, during the period of PASDEP 2005/06–2009/10, 
what the Ethiopian government did mainly was to select a few export-oriented
sectors and provided them with generous policy attention and ¼nancial
incentives. The Industrial Development Strategy of 2002 chose meat, leather,
and leather products; agro processing; and textile and garment as three 
export-oriented priority sectors (in addition to the promotion of construction
and micro and small enterprises). Later, ½oriculture, an industry which 
emerged spontaneously from the private sector to produce cut roses in large 
scale for export, was added to the list. 
One remaining question is regarding the meaning of ADLI when its
policy scope is enlarged as much as this. The current policy scope is no
different from that of any developing country in Africa or elsewhere. What 
is the remaining signi¼cance of ADLI, a concept which is supposed to guide 
the unique developmental path of Ethiopia? One possibility is that ADLI is 
a political statement of assurance that the interests of farmers and rural 
communities will not be sacri¼ced or forgotten no matter what industrial 
strategy may be adopted by the government. This may be similar to the use 
of the slogan of the “Socialist Market Economy” by the Chinese government
in which capitalism and globalization are embraced economically while com-
munist power monopoly is ensured politically and effort to improve the 
livelihood of workers and farmers are maintained nominally. 
10.5 Policy learning 
10.5.1 Learning from East and West 
To build a developmental state with strong government guiding the private 
sector, Ethiopia turned to the East. Prime Minister Meles himself studied 
the industrial policies of South Korea and Taiwan seriously and even drafted
a monograph that explained his policy stance based on the experiences
of these economies. He has actively participated in research projects on 
Democratic Developmentalism organized by Egyptian and South African 
scholars as well as a series of the African Task Force meetings of the
Initiative for Policy Dialogue hosted by Joseph Stiglitz of Columbia Univer-
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industrial policy such as Dani Rodrik, Justin Lin, and Mushtaq Khan. Moreover,
the Ethiopian government sent several young of¼cials to the Korea Develop-
ment Institute (KDI) in Seoul to study policy formulation where they were 
required to copy all materials they encountered and send them back to 
Ethiopia. However, South Korea after the Asian currency crisis of 1997–98 
“shifted to the Washington Consensus” and Ethiopia could gain little from 
the new teaching of KDI.9 In addition, the Ethiopian government aggressively
sought pragmatic industrial support from Western donors such as Germany,
Italy, and UNIDO. In particular, at the request of Prime Minister Meles, 
Germany implemented the Engineering Capacity Building Program, a large-
scale joint program with Ethiopia with the aims of enhancing enterprise 
competitiveness with benchmarking, constructing new engineering univer-
sities, building infrastructure for quality control, and strengthening business 
associations. 
In this way, new policy tools and organizational arrangements were
introduced to Ethiopia through self-learning, dispatch of students abroad, 
consultation with foreign experts, and technical and ¼nancial assistance of 
donors. These included compilation of policy documents for priority sectors;
the monthly export steering committee chaired by the prime minister (copied
from the South Korean model from the mid-1960s to the 1970s); productivity-
enhancing tools such as benchmarking, business process re-engineering (BPR),
and kaizen; establishment of sectoral institutes for priority sectors; creation 
of new engineering universities and TVET institutions; installation of federal
and local public–private dialogue mechanisms; public administration reform;
building of power and transport infrastructure; technique of scaling up of a 
pilot project; and strategic mobilization of ODA and FDI for these purposes.
It can be said that the years after 2003 were a period of vigorous policy 
learning and experimentation by the Ethiopian government. 
In 2008, the World Bank invited Dani Rodrik of Harvard University to 
Ethiopia to advise an expansion of policy scope. In the note prepared for the
Ethiopian government, Rodrik argues that, while Ethiopia’s “¼rst-generation”
industrial policies had achieved some success, especially in ½ower export, 
there was a need to move towards “second-generation” industrial policies 
aiming at both home and export markets. The existing industrial policy
of Ethiopia consists of a shortlist of priority sectors which receive a variety of
incentives. According to Rodrik, this narrow approach to industrialization 
has two limits: 
One is that many potentially successful sectors are almost certainly not 
on the list. There are potentially hundreds of different products in which
Ethiopia can be competitive; yet it is hard to think of all of them ex 
ante. The most successful sector to date, ½oriculture, is a case in point. 
This is a sector that was brought to the government’s attention—and 
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initial discovery and had come to the government for assistance. It is 
easy to imagine that there are many such industries that government 
policy fails to target simply because they are not in its list. At present, 
there is no mechanism in place to actively solicit “new” investment 
projects that may lie outside the priority list. 
Second, the assistance needed by investors may be highly speci¼c to 
the needs of the project in a way that makes it impossible to specify ex
ante. Cheap land and holidays on pro¼ts taxes may suit some investors 
just ¼ne; but others may have different needs. One ¼rm may need relief 
on payroll taxes, another from tariffs on inputs, and a third may want 
the relaxation of some regulation or legislation. In at least one instance, 
the prime minister has helped a large pioneer investor by agreeing to 
change a regulation (on quali¼cation for DBE [Development Bank of 
Ethiopia] loans). But problems such as these are common at all levels, 
and it is unrealistic to expect that the PM himself can attend to them 
all. There is currently no mechanism in place to respond to such needs 
systematically. 
(Rodrik, 2008, pp. 5–6) 
Rodrik proposes the following six revisions to Ethiopian industrialization 
strategy: (i) broadening policy scope to include more sectors; (ii) supporting 
“new” activities for Ethiopia rather than exports; (iii) recognition that mis-
takes are both unavoidable and necessary; (iv) broadening the list of policy 
instruments; (v) giving incentives and subsidies to “pioneers” only and not 
emulators; and (vi) enhancement of lines of communication and coordination
with the private sector. He also adds that success depends on the change in 
mindset in which industrial policy is regarded as a process of collaboration 
and problem-solving with the private sector rather than increasing the number
of incentives or the volume of exports. 
Most of Rodrik’s recommendations are reasonable.10 However, it is
important to recognize the fact that the proper timing of policy expansion 
depends on the amount of policy learning. The proposed shift from the 
“¼rst-generation” to “second-generation” industrial policies was hardly
possible several years ago when the Ethiopian government had just begun to
promote industries with limited policy capability. At that time, selection of 
only a few export-oriented sectors and using simple incentive measures was 
natural because the government did not have suf¼cient knowledge to conduct
sophisticated policies. By now, additional policy tools and insights have been
acquired through hands-on experimentation, donor support, and interaction
with foreign experts. An Ethiopian minister revealed that the expansion of 
policy scope was already in discussion within the government two years 
before the counsel of Rodrik was received. Additionally, it is also interesting 
to note that import substitution, which used to be summarily discredited by 
the Washington institutions, is now strongly recommended to Ethiopia by the
World Bank through a number of US-based economists. 
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10.5.2 Industrial policy dialogue with Japan 
Ethiopia’s most systematic policy learning from the East has been through 
industrial policy dialogue with Japan. In July 2008, the African Task Force 
meeting of the Initiative for Policy Dialogue was organized in Addis Ababa 
by Joseph Stiglitz supported by the Japan International Cooperation Agency
(JICA), where Prime Minister Meles participated in most sessions of this two-
day conference. Researchers from the GRIPS Development Forum discussed
East Asian industrialization (Ohno and Ohno, 2012) and offered a book to 
the prime minister which contained a chapter on JICA’s kaizen project in 
Tunisia (GRIPS Development Forum, 2008b). In the following week, the 
prime minister requested the Japanese government to initiate bilateral cooper-
ation with two components: a kaizen project modeled after Tunisia by JICA 
and policy dialogue with the GRIPS Development Forum. After a preparation
period, a two-year project between Ethiopia and Japan was implemented 
from June 2009 to May 2011 which included eight sessions of policy dialogue
together with JICA’s kaizen project that aimed to improve the productivity 
of 30 local manufacturing companies in agro-processing, textile and garment,
leather, chemical, and metal industries (Figure 10.3). These two project com-
ponents were interlinked and conducted with regular and close consultation. 
After the completion of the ¼rst phase in 2011, both components were extended
into the second phase at the request of the Ethiopian government. 
Industrial policy dialogue was held at three levels: (i) prime minister, (ii) 
ministers and state ministers, and (iii) heads of directorates and institutes and
Industrial policy dialogue 






July 2008 June 2009 May 2011 Jan. 2012 
Kaizen pilot project (30 firms) 
Industrial support 
projects 
Institutionalization of kaizen: 
second phase 
Basic metal & 
engineering study 
(With ECBP) 
Figure 10.3 GRIPS–JICA industrial policy dialogue and industrial support projects 
Note: Black squares indicate policy dialogue sessions in Addis Ababa with the prime minister, 
concerned ministers and state ministers, and of¼cials and experts at operational levels. IPD 
stands for the Initiative for Policy Dialogue, policy oriented meetings on various topics hosted 
by J. Stiglitz of Columbia University. ECBP stands for the Engineering Capacity Building 
Program, a large-scale program run jointly by Ethiopia and Germany. 
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other of¼cials and advisors in charge of project formulation and implement-
ation on the ground. The Japanese team met with Prime Minister Meles ten 
times in the preparatory and ¼rst phase for substantive discussions that 
clari¼ed his policy intention and de¼ned areas of bilateral cooperation11. The
prime minister raised various issues regarding comparison of Ethiopia’s state
building with East Asian developmental states, as well as East Asian experiences
in technology transfer, vocational training, steel and metal engineering, agri-
cultural breakthrough, national productivity movements, and industrial policy
method and organization. Information packages on these issues were requested
by the prime minister12. The progress of JICA’s kaizen project was reported 
and problems encountered in its implementation were raised and solved. 
At the level of ministers and state ministers, high level forums (HLFs) 
were organized quarterly to deliberate concrete and pragmatic issues relevant
to the formulation of Ethiopian industrial policy at each point. They lasted 
either half day or full day and were co-chaired by the senior economic advisor
to the prime minister, the minister or state minister of industry, and the 
Japanese ambassador. The topics of HLFs, which sometimes overlapped 
with the discussions with the prime minister, included the concept and practice
of kaizen, basic metal and engineering industries, industrial sector orientation
in the next ¼ve-year plan, methods of drafting industrial master plans and 
action plans, national productivity movements in East Asia and Africa, inter-
national best practices in industrial policy procedure and organization, and 
so on (Table 10.7). Ministers, state ministers, and heads of industrial projects
from related ministries were regularly invited to HLFs or visited individually
by the Japanese team in case they were unable to attend the HLF meeting. 
Beside these, Ethiopian of¼cials, researchers, and business leaders were invited
to Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Botswana for policy study 
or kaizen training, and their ¼ndings were also reported at HLFs. 
At the operational level, the Japanese team held numerous meetings with 
of¼cials of the Ministry of Trade and Industry (the Ministry of Industry after
the reorganization of government in October 2010) and other ministries, 
sectoral institutes and government agencies, universities and research institutions,
international NPOs, and bilateral and multilateral donors. It traveled outside
Addis Ababa to visit regional governments, tanneries, shoe and garment 
factories, metal engineering ¼rms, food processors, agricultural cooperatives,
½ower farms, coffee growers, tourist establishments, and Japanese cooperation
project sites. 
The policy dialogue team supported the kaizen pilot project which was 
implemented in parallel with the policy dialogue which followed the standard
format of Japanese kaizen assistance. The team monitored the progress of 
the kaizen pilot project and hosted open seminars on the concept and adapt-
ability of kaizen, produced reports to introduce kaizen to Africa and review 
necessary ingredients for kaizen national movements (GRIPS Development 
Forum 2009, JICA and GRIPS 2011b), and organized internal meetings to 
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of the kaizen project. The kaizen pilot project eventually produced six “high”
achievers and four “good” achievers among 28 companies that completed 
kaizen consultation, a result quite satisfactory by international standards.
It also trained six “level 3” local kaizen consultants who could provide 
consultancy services on kaizen and two “level 2” assistant kaizen consultants
who could guide kaizen activities. A kaizen manual, kaizen videos, and the 
dissemination plan for kaizen were also prepared. 
Bilateral policy dialogue which is tailor-made to the urgent policy needs of
Ethiopia, conducted at various levels, and linked with the implementation 
of concrete industrial projects, has proven to be highly effective. Since the
style of Japan’s policy dialogue is ½exible and responsive to the needs of
the student, the learning country can ask any questions related to its burning
concerns instead of receiving general explanations and instructions only. Japan
can also compare the best policy practices of different East Asian countries 
in addition to its own development experience13. 
10.6 The Growth and Transformation Plan 
10.6.1 The content 
In November 2010, the Ethiopian parliament approved the Growth and 
Transformation Plan (GTP) 2010/11–2014/15. This plan is the successor to 
evolving concepts, documents, and plans of the past. It incorporates the 
ideas of ADLI and DD and the positive and negative lessons from the past 
development plans while adding new issues and sectors to work with. Setting
ambitious targets and calling for nationwide mobilization, the GTP aims to 
bring national development to a higher and more dif¼cult stage. As the highest
national policy framework, the GTP will govern Ethiopia’s developmental 
policies, budgets, and government organizations, as well as actions of develop-
ment partners and foreign investors, in the coming ¼ve years. Unlike similar 
plan documents in many other developing countries where much is said but 
little is implemented, the Ethiopian GTP is unlikely to remain merely on paper.
The top leader’s resolve and the government’s readiness to carry out this 
plan and take the country to the next level of development are clearly visible.
It is highly probable that the performance of every ministry, agency, or
institution in Ethiopia will be judged by its contribution to the realization 
of the GTP. 
The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) has the 
overall responsibility for preparing, implementing, and monitoring the GTP 
as with the previous national development plans. The drafting process took 
about 15 months and was managed by the Macro Economic Team of MoFED.
The system of visions, objectives, and strategic pillars in the GTP is summarized
in Table 2.1. 
The main text of the GTP (volume I, 127 pages in the English edition) 
has ten chapters. Chapters 5–8 are the core chapters that contain strategic 
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Table 10.8 GTP’s visions, objectives, and strategic pillars 
Ethiopia’s vision “To become a country where democratic rule, good-governance
to guide GTP and social justice reign, upon the involvement and free will of 
its peoples, and once extricating itself from poverty to reach 
the level of a middle-income economy as of 2020–2023.” 
Vision on “Building an economy which has a modern and productive 
economic sector agricultural sector with enhanced technology and an industrial 
sector that plays a leading role in the economy, sustaining 
economic development and securing social justice and 
increasing per capita income of the citizens so as to reach 
the level of those in middle-income countries.” 
Objectives 1. Maintain at least 11% growth and attain MDGs 
2. Education and health services for achieving social sector MDGs 
3. Nation building through a stable democratic and 
developmental state 
4. Stable macroeconomic framework 
Strategic pillars 1. Rapid and equitable economic growth 
2. Maintaining agriculture as major source of economic growth 
3. Creating conditions for the industry to play key role in 
the economy 
4. Infrastructure development 
5. Social development 
6. Capacity building and good governance 
7. Gender and youth 
Source: Summarized from Chapter 2 of the Growth and Transformation Plan, 2010/11– 2014/15. 
direction, objectives, major targets, and implementation strategies for eco-
nomic sectors (agriculture, industry, trade, mining, and infrastructure),
social sectors (education and training and health), capacity building and 
governance, and cross-cutting sectors. Under a separate cover (volume II, 
38 pages in the English edition), a policy matrix gives each sector’s annual 
targets, implementing agencies, and means of veri¼cation in a large-table 
format. Among the core chapters, economic sectors take up 32 percent of 
the main text while social sectors occupy only 8 percent. Though volume is
only a partial indicator of importance, it is suggestive of the direction of 
policy attention. It is evident that the Ethiopian government intends to 
generate concrete sources of growth in the agriculture and industrial sectors 
under state guidance rather than con¼ning itself to general provision of 
primary education, health care, and good business environment, and letting 
the market do the rest. 
Industry is expected to grow strongly and play a key role in the economy 
by the end of the GTP period (2014/15). In the previous plan period of 
2005/06–2009/10, industrial performance was less than expected. Real GDP 
grew an impressive 11.0 percent per annum but this was a result of over-
achievement of agriculture (8.4 percent against the base-case target of 6.0 
percent) and services (14.6 percent against the base-case target of 7.0 percent)
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and underachievement of industry (10.0 percent against base-case target of 
11.0 percent). The share of industry in GDP remained a relatively stagnant 
13–14 percent rather than rising to 16.5 percent as targeted. The exports of 
the three targeted sub-sectors (leather and leather products, textile and garment,
and agro-processing) did grow, but were still small at US$115 million (3.8 
percent of total export) as of 2009/10. 
In the current ¼ve-year plan period, industry is targeted to grow 20.0 
percent per annum (base case) or 21.3 percent per annum (higher case), which
is much faster than the targets for agriculture, so that it will become a major
engine of growth rather than a small part of the economy as it has been. 
Industry is expected to be the major source of employment and foreign 
exchange with strengthened ADLI linkage between agriculture and industry.
This is to be attained by broadening policy scope from only a few export-
oriented industries to both export-oriented and import substituting industries,
and introducing new measures for promoting micro and small enterprises and
developing eight selected medium- and large-scale industries (textile and garment,
leather and leather products, sugar, cement, metal and engineering, chemical,
pharmaceutical, and agro-processing). Additional policy instruments such as
institutionalization of kaizen, enhancement of the TVET system, and industrial
zones will be mobilized. 
10.6.2 Remaining concerns 
In the last session of the ¼rst phase of Ethiopia–Japan industrial policy dialogue
in May 2011, the Japanese side raised four issues concerning the GTP. 
The ¼rst issue was the lack of focus on quality, productivity, and com-
petitiveness. The sectoral performance indicators of the GTP are quantities 
measured in tons, millions of birrs or dollars, the number of workers employed
or factories established, and the like, rather than indicators of human-capital
accumulation or international competitiveness. This is odd because Ethiopian
policymakers always stress the critical importance of agricultural and industrial
skills, engineering education, technology transfer, TVET system, and other 
measures to enhance industrial human capital. Similarly, previous sessions 
of industrial policy dialogue with Japan featured how East Asian economies 
raised productivity, absorbed technology, and trained workers and engineers
with concrete facts and numbers. The gap between this national obsession with
knowledge, skills, and technology and the absence of targets related to them 
in the GTP must be explained. A related puzzle is the fact that the term kaizen
(factory-improvement method developed in Japan) is entirely missing from 
the text of the GTP, together with other productivity and ef¼ciency tools such
as benchmarking, twinning, and BPR, which will be Ethiopia’s main instru-
ments for improving industrial ef¼ciency. This may have been because the 
drafting of the GTP followed the routine process where quantitative indicators
were regularly adopted rather than qualitative. If that was the case, the drafting
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The second concern was related to how numerical targets are used. Inclusion
of numerical targets is normal and even indispensable in national develop-
ment plans. However, the number and scope of numerical targets must be 
selected judiciously and the levels at which they are set must be arrived at 
in a rational way that allows analysis and assessment. In the GTP, the target
for real GDP growth for 2010/11–2014/15 is set at 11.2 percent per annum 
in the base case scenario and 14.9 percent per annum in the higher case 
scenario. The main difference between the two scenarios is whether agriculture
would rise strongly as technology and practices of model farmers were scaled
up to all other farmers (high case) or the scaling up will remain partial (base 
case). Either way, these are ambitious targets. Moreover, industrial targets 
at sector and sub-sector levels are also quite bold.14 These growth targets may
be an expression of political will and national aspiration. However, an appro-
priate analytical framework is needed to explain growth scenarios for logical 
clarity and operational ½exibility so that falling short of growth targets should
not lead to undesirable policy reactions that may cause allocative distortion 
or macroeconomic imbalance. 
Growth performance is a joint product of private dynamism, policy qual-
ity, and uncontrollable shocks. While growth was higher in the ¼rst half of 
the previous plan period than the second half, it was not clear whether this 
slowdown was caused mainly by exogenous shocks (such as global recession 
and weather conditions) or by deterioration of policy quality or private
effort. Ethiopia does not have an analytical framework to identify the main 
cause(s) of growth shifts and ½uctuations and thus cannot address growth-
related problems with appropriate policy response. 
The third issue was weak policy capability. Ethiopia’s industrial policy
is still on a learning curve and the lack of suf¼cient policy capability can be 
a serious impediment in the implementation of the GTP. To put it more 
positively, clear recognition of this problem and strong resolve to overcome 
it in proper steps will provide Ethiopia with an excellent opportunity for 
further policy learning. Industrial policy dialogue with Japan identi¼ed two 
problems with Ethiopia’s policymaking. First, Ethiopia drafts policies in great
haste at the cost of quality and implementability. East Asian high-performing
economies typically spend one year to revise an existing policy and two to 
three years to draft a new one. As a new learner of industrial policy, it would
not be improper for Ethiopia to spend at least a few solid years studying 
international best practices, devise local adaptation, and create an appropriate
policy mechanism before it adopts a new important policy such as kaizen,
micro and small enterprise promotion, and industrial clusters. Second, Ethiopia
needs a simple and well-designed mechanism in the central government to 
coordinate, monitor, and adjust priority policies. In the last several years, 
the country has created committees, boards, and teams more or less randomly
to deal with the expanding policy scope.15 Instead of endlessly adding new 
mechanisms, a central coordination mechanism comprising a national com-
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that specializes in making development plans, and a policy think tank that 
supports these two bodies with action-oriented surveys, studies, seminars, 
and other intellectual inputs is suggested. 
The fourth issue is how to kindle private dynamism. Will the Ethiopian 
private sector respond strongly to the industrial policy measures of the GTP?
Apart from improving policy quality, latecomer countries often face the 
problem of a weak private sector characterized by short-terminism, job
hopping, foreign-product worship, real-estate speculation, dependency on 
subsidies and protection, and unwillingness to explore new products, technol-
ogy, and markets. In policy dialogue sessions with Japan, Prime Minister 
Meles asked why the Ethiopians with large sums of money invested in urban 
properties instead of building factories. He also inquired how East Asian 
governments steered the private sector away from rent seeking and into 
manufacturing and technology. He requested literature explaining concretely
how Meiji Japan and post-World War II South Korea absorbed technology 
so quickly from foreign-assisted industrial projects. In partial response, the 
Japanese team proposed a national movement for mindset change, which is 
a comprehensive program of aspiration, philosophy, mass campaign, factory
projects, training, certi¼cates and awards, and institution-building that lasts 
for at least a decade until it becomes self-sustaining and an integral part of 
popular mindset (Chapter 3). A comparative study of such movements in 
East Asia and Africa was presented where common success factors and 
country-speci¼c factors were distilled (JICA and GRIPS, 2011b). In Ethiopia,
the institutionalization of kaizen will be the country’s core activity for a 
national movement toward higher quality and productivity. Proper steps should
be taken to institutionalize kaizen based on the full knowledge of international
best practices. 
10.7 Concluding remarks 
There is much to be learned from Ethiopia’s unwavering pursuit of DD and 
ADLI. Although the country is in a very early stage of industrialization, many
weaknesses remain in its policy formulation, and the success of the GTP is 
not yet guaranteed, strong policy ownership and aggressive policy learning 
are something that all latecomer countries should study and replicate. Three 
¼nal remarks are in order. 
First, DD and ADLI can be understood as an Ethiopian adaptation of 
political and economic regimes to the reality of the early twenty-¼rst century.
The menu of development strategies is mostly common across ages and 
countries. It should include education and training, skills and technology, 
enterprise and industry promotion, agriculture and rural development, trade 
and investment, and power and transport infrastructure. Laws, institutions, and
monetary and ¼scal mechanisms that support these policies must also be 
established. On the other hand, international environment surrounding develop-
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country belonging to one of the two ideological camps could receive a
large sum of economic and military aid without intervention in the manage-
ment of domestic affairs. But today, all countries are required to embrace 
democracy, market, and globalization. Ethiopia must also adjust to the reality
of the twenty-¼rst century so that it can secure a respectable position in the 
world and suf¼cient cooperation from investors, donors, and international 
organizations. The combination of DD and ADLI is innovative in that it is 
a proactive attempt to ignite growth with the rejection of the Washington 
Consensus and without counting on a large in½ow of manufacturing FDI 
as in Southeast Asia. As a poor, landlocked, and resource-less country, 
Ethiopia’s initial conditions are unfavorable. But policy learning started by 
Ethiopia and its outcome may offer important inspiration for other countries
in Africa. 
Second, the success of Ethiopian development critically depends on the 
concrete and pragmatic steps that the country will take toward the goals 
de¼ned in the GTP. Among these goals, productivity breakthrough and 
commercialization of smallholder farmers in the agricultural sector and emer-
gence of a strong and broad manufacturing base driven by productivity and 
technology in the industrial sector are crucial. Fostering of a vibrant and com-
petitive private sector is the essence of economic development for which two 
inputs are required. The ¼rst is decisive and effective leadership, which 
Ethiopia seems to possess at the moment. However, a developmental state 
heavily dependent on one top leader will become vulnerable at the time
of power transition. Learned policy processes and organizations must be 
institutionalized as much as possible to diminish this problem. The second 
requirement is accumulation of practical and detailed policy knowledge
by ministries and agencies in charge of agricultural and industrial policies. 
Proactive industrial policy calls for far greater knowledge than either laissez-
faire or socialist planning. To interact effectively with the private sector, of¼cials
must share up-to-date industrial information with producers and investors. 
They must also be well informed about the pros and cons of concrete measures
adopted in other countries. Systematic policy learning must continue for 
years to upgrade Ethiopian policy capability toward the best international 
practices. 
Third, policy learning and expansion of policy scope are dynamically linked
in Ethiopia. This is a highly commendable feature which may be called 
dynamic capacity development (Chapter 3; also Ohno and Ohno, 2012). In 
most developing countries, problems are many while policy capability is 
limited. This makes it dif¼cult to decide where to start development effort, 
and in which sequence and at what speed various policies should be introduced.
International organizations used to demand a long list of dif¼cult policy 
actions that must be implemented in a short time as a condition of a ¼nancial
rescue package. Meanwhile, some economists argued against trying any indus-
trial policy because the risks of policy mistake and political capture were too 
great. However, neither advice proved to be very constructive in breaking the
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poverty trap. The World Bank’s 1997 World Development Report proposed 
a two-part strategy in which constant effort should be made to improve 
policy capability while adopting dif¼cult policies gradually to match the acquired
policy capability (World Bank, 1997). Ethiopia is practicing exactly what 
this report preached. The only difference is that the World Bank emphasized 
general improvements in “rules and restraints,” “competitive pressure,” and 
“voice and participation,” while Ethiopia prefers to improve its policy
capability through concrete problem-solving such as export promotion of 
leather products and establishment of a national mechanism that oversees 
institutionalization of kaizen. This hands-on approach is much closer to 
dynamic capacity development frequently observed in East Asia than the 































1 The developmental trap 
1 The closed-door policy of the Tokugawa shogunate which started in the early
seventeenth century was terminated by the military threat of the American gun
ships which forced Japan to sign “friendship” treaties with the US, the UK, the
Netherlands, and Russia in 1854. Commercial treaties with the ¼ve Western powers,
including France, were concluded in 1858, and virtually free trade began in the
following year. Under these treaties, Japan did not have the right to set import
tariffs unilaterally or judge foreign criminals in Japanese courts. A uniform tariff
rate of 5 percent was imposed from 1866 until Japan regained tariff rights partially
in 1899 and completely in 1911. Domestic sugar and cotton industries were the ¼rst
victims of the in½ow of Western imports. 
2 Industrial policy in the age of globalization 
1 Repulsion to industrial policy is often visible among conservative elites in Anglo-
Saxon countries. For example, in July 2010 The Economist magazine hosted an e-
debate on the motion that “This house believes that industrial policy always fails,”
with Josh Lerner defending the motion and Dani Rodrik against it. After ¼ve days of
voting, 28 percent of participants supported the motion while 72 percent rejected it.
However, it is not evident whether a debate of such an abstract kind adds anything
useful to our knowledge on the desirability and feasibility of industrial policy. 
2 Another reason to avoid it is the fact that, for ordinary students of economists, the
term is strongly associated with the Ricardian theory of comparative costs, which is
static. A call for sticking to one’s comparative advantage can therefore easily be
misunderstood as the suggestion that developing countries should forever stay with
the export of energy, minerals, food, and other primary commodities. 
3 As already noted in Chapter 1, a Western economist with limited knowledge of
East Asia strongly protested to the statement made at a conference that Thai work-
ers were less diligent and productive than Korean workers even under the same
management. However, this proposition is supported by the majority of general direc-
tors of multinational corporations operating in East Asia and always corroborated
in two separate annual surveys of Japanese manufacturing ¼rms with overseas
production conducted by the Japan External Trade Organization since 1987 and
by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation since 1989. 
4 It can be said that the neo-liberal paradigm failed to establish a developmental state
because it denied the role of government as a leading agent for national transforma-



































       
 




agent powerful enough to destroy the petri¼ed rent seeking system in a developing
country. In some cases, a policy package consisting of liberalization, privatization,
decentralization, and international integration have generated a horde of new do-
mestic and foreign rent seekers including mining companies, foreign ¼rms, voluntary
organizations, and ODA contractors and consultants who rallied for budgets, sub-
sidies and foreign aid. 
3 Ingredients of proactive industrialization 
1 Apart from the technical aspect of policy methodology, the other important per-
spective needed to understand and promote developmental states is comparative
political analysis, a topic which is beyond the present volume. For those interested
in this topic, the best places to start would be Leftwich (2000, 2009); Brady and
Spence (2010); and the works produced by the Developmental Leadership Program
(www.dlprog.org) managed by Adrian Leftwich (York University) and Chris
Wheeler (AusAid) and supported by the Australian government; and the African
Power and Politics Program (www.institutions-africa.org) led by the Overseas
Development Institute and funded by the UK Department for International Develop-
ment and the Advisory Board of Irish Aid. 
2 The exact phrase used in the World Bank report was the two-part strategy of “match-
ing the state’s role to its capability” and “raising state capability by reinvigorating
public institutions.” The latter included ¼ve “fundamental tasks” of (i) establishing
the foundation of law; (ii) nondistortionary policy environment including macro-
economic stability; (iii) social services and infrastructure; (iv) protecting the
vulnerable; and (v) protecting the environment (World Bank, 1997, pp. 3–4). 
3 The Korean endeavor to teach policymaking is conducted through two channels
of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (supported by the Exim Bank and the
Korean Development Institute) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(supported by the Korean International Cooperation Agency). These channels are
not integrated, however. The term Knowledge Sharing Program is associated with
the former while the latter uses various other terms. Another potential problem
with the Korean approach is a trade-off between rapid quantitative expansion and
assurance of quality and depth. For the policy consultation component, the num-
ber of target countries (which include both priority countries for three-year con-
sultation and others for one-year consultation) is expanding from 11 countries in
2009 to sixteen in 2010, 26 in 2011, and 32 in 2012 (planned). For the policy
module component, 100 modules are expected to be created by 2012. As the vol-
ume of knowledge-sharing activities increases, most works, which were initially
managed by the Korean government, are now delegated to consultants and
consultant ¼rms. 
4 The GRIPS Development Forum plans to compile documents that compare
international best practices of some of the policy measures in the list and draw
general lessons, such as the Handbook on East Asian Industrial Policy and a report
on Industrial Policy Dialogue. The Vietnam Development Forum, a research unit
located in Hanoi and associated with the GRIPS Development Forum, conducts
similar research for the purpose of informing Vietnamese policymakers (Ohno,
2006b; Vietnam Development Forum and Goodwill Consultant, 2011). Separately,
as part of the Knowledge Sharing Program of the Korean government, the Korea
Development Institute is creating over 100 policy modules that explain the prag-
matic details of individual industrial policy measures. 
5 Studies in kaizen invariably note that, in both Japan and abroad, leadership of
the general director is the single most important factor for successful implementation
of kaizen (Imai, 1986; Kaplinsky, 1995). This is echoed by many kaizen experts
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and Japanese factory managers engaged in kaizen instructions in developing coun-
tries (Vietnam Development Forum, 2007). 
6 The ¼rst batch of TNI students counted 296 at entry and 225 at graduation. Among
them, 166 (74 percent at graduation) had already secured jobs by the time of 
graduation, in September 2011, a rate quite high for Thai students. Their largest 
employers were IT (21 percent), auto parts (19 percent), auto assembly (17 percent),
and electronics and electrical (8 percent). Japanese ¼rms in Thailand hired 54 per-
cent of them. Among the graduates without jobs at graduation (26 percent), 12 
percent proceeded to higher education, 6 percent were in search of work, and the
remaining 8 percent had other destinations (Japan–Thailand Economic Coopera-
tion Society, 2011). 
7 Interview with an executive of¼cial of the Vietnam–Singapore Technical Training
Center in March 2007. 
8 Interviews with the general manager and other high of¼cials of PSDC in June 2005
and January 2006. 
9 AMATA Corporation, established by Thai initiative with Japanese help but now
wholly Thai owned, also operates AMATA City in Rayong Province, adjacent to
Eastern Seaboard Development, and AMATA Bien Hoa in Dong Nai Province
of Vietnam. One project of interest in the seventh phase of AMATA Nakorn is
Ota Techno Park (OTP), a collection of small rental factory space for Japanese SME
suppliers initially from Ota City of Tokyo but now accepting any Japanese SMEs
with high technology. In 2006 OTP built six units of rental space (320m2 each) with
administrative support in Japanese language. It is now in the second-phase expansion
with the total units of 17. Ota City of Tokyo provided enterprise matching but no
¼nancial support. OTP is intended to offer temporary factory space for Japanese
SMEs which are expected to move out once initial success is attained. This
information was obtained in an interview with executive advisor and managers of
AMATA Corporation in November 2009. 
10 Interview with senior of¼cials of the Foreign Investment Promotion Division
and the Cross Border Investment Promotion Division of MIDA in January
2010. 
11 Interview with the deputy secretary general and other of¼cials of the Thai BOI in
March 2005. 
12 I would like to thank Akio Hosono, the director of the JICA Research Institute,
for providing information about El Salvador where he played an instrumental role
as a Japanese ambassador to that country in strategic implementation of Japanese
ODA from 2002 to 2007. 
13 Due to data problems, Korea’s provincial incomes prior to 1985 are dif¼cult to
estimate consistently. The gap ratios cited in the text were calculated by Huh (1995).
Some of the income gap indicators using provincial data reported by Huh, which
support regional income convergence, are as follows: the max/min ratio, 2.0471
(1971), 2.0143 (1981), 1.7531 (1991); the coef¼cient of variation weighted by eco-
nomic size, 0.2873 (1971), 0.1643 (1981), 0.1572 (1991); and the Gini coef¼cient,
0.1597 (1971), 0.0846 (1981), 0.0644 (1991). 
4 Policy procedure and organization 
1 From East Asia, Banno and Ohno (2010) contributed a detailed analysis of coalition
formation and re-formation among political leaders of Meiji Japan, which we called
the ½exible structure of politics, for the period of 1858–1881. Part of Chapter 5 
of this volume is based on this study. 
2 The full sentence of Vision 2011 says that “Thailand is the automotive production


























parts industry.” This vision remains unchanged from the previous Master Plan 
2002–2006. 
3 There are also examples outside East Asia. In India, the Planning Commission 
has been in existence since 1950 to produce consecutive ¼ve-year plans whose 
focus shifted over the years from massive public investments to indicative planning.
In Chile, policy support was provided by Chicago Boys, or Chilean economists 
trained at the University of Chicago under Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger,
to the military junta which carried out free-market reforms starting in 1973. 
4 Following the Korean model of the 1960s and 1970s, Ethiopia has established a 
monthly Export Steering Committee presided by the prime minister and attended 
by relevant ministers and of¼cials. The Committee seems to work well in monitoring
export performance and solving problems that may arise. However, the Ethiopian
committee is narrower in operational scope than the original Korean model or 
other approaches explained in this section as it is not accompanied by designation
of a lead ministry or agency, a secretariat, or working groups that perform various
functions. Its members are con¼ned to government ministers and of¼cials. More-
over, it remains an implementing body rather than a policymaking body. 
5 In 2001, MITI was renamed to the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry 
(METI). 
6 For more discussion on policy document structure, see Chapter 6 of GRIPS 
Development Forum (2010). 
7 Targets are also called goals, objectives, strategies, action plans (different from 
“action plans” in section 4.4.1 below), and so forth. We regard all of these as 
“targets” as long as they set some qualitative or quantitative aims to be achieved. 
8 An interview with Mr. Vallop Tiasiri at the Thailand Automotive Institute on 
November 5, 2009. 
9 This section is based on my presentation at the Symposium on Quality of Vietnam’s
Economic Growth in the Period of 2001–2010 and Direction toward 2020, co-
organized in Hanoi, February 2011, by the National Assembly’s Economic
Committee, the National Economic University, and the National Graduate
Institute for Policy Studies. Fuller discussion of Vietnam’s policy problems is found
in Chapter 9. 
10 UNIDO supports “cluster development” but targeted industries are small in size 
and closer to “trade villages” rather than the one proposed by the Vietnam 
Competitiveness Report 2010, which is essentially regional development featuring
the electronics cluster in the Northern Delta, the textile and footwear cluster near 
Hochiminh City, and the tourism cluster in the Middle Region. 
5 Meiji Japan: from feudalism to industrialization 
1 The Bakufu ordered all daimyo to reside in Edo in one year and in their domain 
in the following year alternately. This perpetual bi-annual commuting of the han 
lord, accompanied by a large number of retainers, entailed a huge cost in travel 
and residence and strained the budget of every han. The Bakufu also imposed ad 
hoc public works and ¼nancial contributions to han including building and repairing
roads, moats, reservoirs, and the like, and celebratory money for the birth of the 
shogun’s son. Construction of more than one castle per han and possession of naval
force were prohibited. There were other rules and regulations issued by Bakufu 
at will. 
2 After the Edo period, Japanese calendar years coincide with the reign of each 
emperor. For example, the Meiji period was the years of Emperor Meiji, and 
similarly with Taisho (1912–1926), Showa (1926–1988) and Heisei (1988–). As 






      
 
  












practices were not in place until the end of the Edo period. Until then, the Japanese
calendar could be changed at any time and emperors could retire while alive. 
3 Data on population and agriculture in the Edo period are fragmentary. Accord-
ing to the estimates of Hayami and Miyamoto (1988), the population grew from 
12 million in 1600 to 32 million in 1720, then stabilized for the subsequent 150 years.
In the same period, farmland expanded from 2.07 million cho to 2.93 million cho,
then less slowly to 3.23 million cho by 1872 (cho is almost equivalent to hectare). 
Meanwhile, land productivity grew from 0.955 koku per tan in 1600 to 1.094 koku
per tan in 1720, with continued improvement to 1.447 koku per tan in 1872 (koku is
about 180 liters of rice and tan is about 0.1 hectare). 
4 Gosho is a pre-modern rich merchant family in the Edo period with only one or 
a few lines of business. Zaibatsu is a conglomerate formed during and after the 
Meiji period, which was often family owned, with a holding company controlling 
a large number of subsidiaries such as banking, trade, mining, shipping, shipbuild-
ing, and chemicals. As zaibatsu was disbanded after World War II by the US 
occupation force, new business groups without a holding company, called keiretsu, 
emerged. It was characterized by mutual holding of stocks, frequent information 
exchange, and business cooperation. Another type of keiretsu is a pyramidal 
production linkage between a large assembly ¼rm such as Toyota, Honda, and 
Panasonic and multi-layers of companies that produce parts and components. 
5 Arguments in this section are derived from Banno and Ohno (2010) and its partial
English translation. 
6 The plan entertained by Satsuma Han Lord Shimazu Nariakira (1809–1858) was 
the earliest endeavor of this kind. He had the vision of han-based fukoku kyohei
as well as the conference of several powerful han lords as a national decision 
making organ although he did not reach the idea of institutionalizing a feudal 
assembly. His plan began to be implemented in Satsuma Han from around 1862. 
7 Detailed phased accounts of coalition formations and break-ups, of which Figure 
5.1 is a summary, are given in Banno and Ohno (2010). 
8 Shimazu Hisamitsu (1817–1887), the de facto leader of Satsuma Han, is regarded 
as a han lord. Iwasaki Yataro (the founder of Mitsubishi group, 1834–1885) who 
was a low-level samurai close to peasantry, and Ito Hirobumi (the ¼rst prime 
minister, 1841–1909), a peasant’s son who was given the title of lowest samurai 
together with his father, are counted as samurai, and similarly with Sakamoto 
Ryoma (1835–1867) and Nakaoka Shintaro (1838–1867) who abandoned the 
position of a han retainer of Tosa. Sons of han retainers who were still young at 
the time of the Meiji Restoration are also classi¼ed as samurai. 
9 It may be argued, theoretically, that leaders selected by the author interested in 
the political role of samurai and han are biased. As a practical matter, however, 
it would hardly be possible to construct a list of prominent leaders of this period 
which excludes the people I have selected or which does not largely coincide with 
them. A minor re-shuf½ing of candidates would not change the conclusion that 
the samurai class was the main source of leaders. 
10 Shibusawa Eiichi (1840–1931), one of the ¼rst of¼cials of the Ministry of Finance
of the Meiji government and later a powerful business coordinator who helped 
to establish hundreds of joint stock companies and economic and social institu-
tions, came from a rich farming family in Saitama. 
11 Even after the opening of ports, foreigners were con¼ned to limited areas around 
the designated foreign settlements and could not travel beyond these boundaries 
without an of¼cial permit. For this reason, independent Japanese merchants 
emerged to work with foreigners to collect local products for export and distribute
imported products in domestic markets. The largest among the designated foreign
settlements was Yokohama, a newly reclaimed port city, and such merchants were









             
 
 














12 Another prominent feature of Japanese industrialization in the Meiji period, which
has been omitted due to lack of space, was the co-existence of traditional and 
modern industries and their parallel growth and interaction. The existing industries
from the Edo period such as mining, civil engineering, silk spinning, wood printing,
and textiles, as well as small-holder agriculture, were not wiped out by the invasion
of superior Western technology. Since Japan and the West belonged to entirely 
different cultural spheres, the daily lives of people—food, clothing, housing, etc.— 
did not appreciably change even with the Western impact. To satisfy household 
consumption which accounted for 70–80 percent of estimated national output, 
many traditional industries continued to expand and occupy a major position 
during the Meiji period. There was also a strong tendency to selectively adopt 
new technology to improve and scale up existing industries. By 1910, factory 
production systems had spread even to rural traditional industries. Studies that 
examine the parallel development of traditional and modern industries in this 
period include Nakamura (1997), Odaka (2000), and Uchida (1990). 
13 Technology transfer in state-run businesses under turnkey projects in reality pro-
ceeded on a trial-and-error basis rather than as a well-planned endeavor. Masahide
Yoshida, a former Bakufu samurai, recounted that he had been recruited as one 
of the ¼rst Japanese staff of the Telegraphic Bureau in 1869 simply because he 
was studying English in Yokohama. On the third day he was asked to send and 
receive telegrams for which he had no previous knowledge. He somehow learned 
the skill but eventually chose to become an interpreter of the foreign advisor who 
laid telegraphic cables between Tokyo and Nagasaki. As he later admitted, “any 
applicants were accepted and put to work immediately as there was no training 
institution or work procedure to instruct them. Interpretation was virtually impossible
for such workers” (Uchida, 1990: 268) 
14 In 1880, the Japanese returnees were working in the following government ministries
(number of of¼cials in parentheses): the Agricultural Promotion Bureau (1) and the
Civil Engineering Bureau (1) of the Home Ministry; the Bureau of the Mint (2) of
the Ministry of Finance; the Department of the Army (2); the Department of the Navy
(14); Minister (1), the Bureau of Mining (4), the Bureau of Railways (3), Lighthouse
Service (1), Telegraphic Service (2), the Bureau of Construction (3) and the Bureau
of Maintenance and Repairs (1) of the Ministry of Industry; and the Hokkaido 
Settlement Agency (3) (Uchida, 1990). In addition to returnees, ministries also hired
former Dutch scholars and domestically educated engineers. See also Table 5.3. 
15 The destinations of overseas engineering students, as identi¼ed by Uchida (1990), 
with the number of students in parentheses, were as follows: in Britain, Royal 
Naval College (6), University of Glasgow (3), University of Edinburgh (2), Royal School
of Mines (2), University College, London (2), and Owens College (1); in France, 
École d’application du génie maritime (5), École centrale des arts et manufactures
(2), École polytechnique (1), and École des mines (1); in Germany, Bergakademie 
(3) and Technische Hochschule (1); in the United States, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (3), Rennselaer Polytechnic Institute (3), Columbia College (2), 
Rutgers College (1), Stevens College (1), Rose Polytechnic Institute (1), Worcester
Polytechnic School (1), and Lafayette College (1). 
16 In 1871, Kogaku Ryo (School of Engineering) was created within the Ministry of 
Industry, which was upgraded to a university in 1873. The university was renamed
Kobu Daigakko in 1877. 
6 Singapore: national productivity movement 
1 In the ¼rst few years of the bilateral cooperation between Singapore and Japan in 




   





















the movement in full scale. Japanese experts wanted to begin with such basics
as philosophy toward productivity and waste reduction while Singaporean coun-
terparts demanded quick and tangible results. This discrepancy between teacher 
and student is a common—and not-so-serious—issue observed in many countries
receiving Japanese assistance in quality and productivity improvement. See section
6.4.3 for more details. 
2 In other countries, triangular cooperation often consists of slightly different 
groups—for example, san-kan-gaku (industry, government, academics) alliance is 
routinely stressed in Japan, and teamwork among government, businesses, and 
experts is emphasized in Thailand. These are perhaps the more common tripartite 
for industrialization than the Singaporean one which includes labor unions. 
3 In Vietnam, the same phenomenon as the Queen Bee effect is called the “Canon 
effect” in which establishment of large printer factories by Canon attracted many 
supplier companies to come to Northern Vietnam. 
4 This section is based on the information provided by Mr. Low Hock Meng, the 
Executive Director of the Singaporean Productivity Association and the former 
counterpart of the JICA-supported Productivity Development Project, supplemented
by additional information gathered by our research team. 
5 In January 2008, obligatory military service was replaced by voluntary military 
service in Singapore. 
6 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regional cooperation 
framework established in 1967. Its current members are Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore,
Malaysia, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar. The ¼rst 
¼ve are founding members. 
7 The original statement came from Kohei Goshi, the former Chairman of the Japan
Productivity Center, who wrote in his letter to Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in 
September 1986, “The transformation of mankind’s way of thinking can be compared
to a marathon with no ¼nish line.” 
8 In Singapore, an SME is de¼ned as a company with less than S$15 million in ¼xed 
asset investment for manufacturing and a company with less than 200 workers for 
non-manufacturing and services. The government plans to revise these de¼nitions 
to align with international norms which use revenue-based de¼nition. 
7 Taiwan: policy drive for innovation 
1 Japan’s per capita income in 2010 was US$42,325 but Japanese prices are much 
higher than Taiwan’s. As a result, living standards in the two economies are 
similar. Using the historical real income comparison of Maddison (2003) and 
updating with IMF data, Japan’s price-adjusted per capita income in 2010 was 
estimated at US$21,900 while Taiwan’s was US$22,227. 
2 The effective corporate tax rate in East Asian competitor countries are as follows:
Japan (about 40 percent), China (25 percent), Korea (24.2 percent, to be lowered 
to 22 percent in 2012), and Singapore (17 percent). 
3 Previously, tax incentives amounted to about NT$70 billion per year, of which 
tax holidays, mainly bene¼ting large ¼rms, were about NT$20 billion, automation
tax credits were about NT$30 billion (both of which are now abolished), and IT tax
credits were about NT$20 billion (which is now halved). Under the new industrial
statute, only NT$10 billion of incentives remains. 
4 The DOIT is the main department of the MoEA for technology development 
program funding although the IDB and the SME Administration, also under the 
MoEA, also have budgets for industrial support. The MoEA has bureaus, departments,
and administrations as shown in Figure 7.1. It seems that bureaus are larger than 





















5 These opinions were collected during the policy research mission to Taiwan in 
March 2011 organized by the GRIPS Development forum which contained 
Japanese, Vietnamese, and Ethiopian researchers. 
6 The ¼ve innovation competencies are creative thinking, industrial analysis, R&D 
management, business development, and intellectual property management. The 
six technology domains are information and communication, materials and chemical
engineering, electronics and optoelectronic, biomedical technology and device re-
search, mechanical and system research, and energy and environment management. 
7 The Kaohsiung EPZ was the ¼rst export processing zone in the world according 
to information provided by the EPZ Administration, but this claim was informally
disputed by an MoEA of¼cial in Taipei. It is at least the ¼rst EPZ in the Asia-
Paci¼c region. 
8 It must also be added that land rents in Taiwan’s EPZs are reasonable. Even 
compared with the subsidized land and factory rental fees at science parks, they 
are much cheaper at around NT$9–12/m2 per month. The exceptions are the 
monthly land rent of only NT$1.33/m2 at the remotely located Pingtung EPZ, 
that of the Kaohsiung Software-based Technology Park which is much higher at 
NT$39.2/m2 (reduced to NT$19.6/m2 after three years of plant construction), and 
that of the Chengkung EPZ which is set at 6.25 percent of declared land price. 
9 In 1986, the share of manufacturing SMEs in total manufacturing was as follows: 
96.0 percent in number, 47.9 percent in employment, 33.8 percent in production, 
and 31.0 percent in value-added (Industry and Commerce Census 1988 as quoted 
in Sumiya et al., 1992, p. 143). However, this cannot be directly compared with 
the current situation in the text because of different de¼nitions (enterprises with 99
or less employees in manufacturing only). According to estimates with certain 
assumptions by Sumiya et al. (1992), the share of SME exports, combining exports
by small and medium producers and trading houses, in total exports was 68.1 
percent in 1981 which fell to 61.2 percent in 1985. 
10 Japan’s One Village One Product (OVOP) Movement originated in Oita Prefecture.
The local development strategy, the New Plum and Chestnut Movement, started 
by Oyama Town in 1961 with the slogan “Let’s plant plums and chestnuts and 
go to Hawaii” succeeded greatly in improving local income and invigorating the 
rural community. Based on this experience, Morihiko Hiramatsu, the Governor 
of Oita Prefecture during 1979–2003, launched the OVOP Movement in 1979 
that featured local initiative in creating high-value specialty products while govern-
ment supported it from the sideline. The OVOP model spread from Oita to the 
rest of Japan and by now has become a standard rural development tool for 
Japan’s economic assistance in many developing countries including Malawi, 
Peru, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
8 Malaysia: trapped in upper middle income 
1 The nine central strategic challenges of Vision 2020 are national unity, con¼dence, 
democracy, moral and ethics, tolerance, science and technology, caring culture, 
economic justice, and prosperity. These are promulgated as long-term general 
principles details of which must be de¼ned and continue to be modi¼ed by plan 
documents, budget processes, and policy actions of ministries and agencies. 
2 In IMP3, the six non-resource-based manufacturing industries are electronics and 
electrical, medical devices, textiles and apparel, machinery and equipment, metals, 
and transport equipment. The six resource-based manufacturing industries are 
petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, wood products, rubber products, palm oil products,
and food processing. The eight service sub-sectors are ICT, construction, education and




























The eight functional issues are external trade, investments, small and medium 
enterprises, branding, enhancing domestic capabilities, human resource, ICT and 
other technology developments, and logistics. In addition, the halal (Islamic food) 
industry is also featured as a target. 
3 The exact relationship between New Economic Model Part 1’s SRIs and Part 2’s 
“recommendations” remains unclear to me. 
4 Quoted from the presentation of Amirsham A. Aziz, the chairman of the National 
Economic Advisory Council, at the inaugural seminar on the New Economic Model
on March 3, 2011, Kuala Lumpur. The wording and ordering of the SRIs sometimes
differ from one document or website to another. 
5 The six High Impact Programs 2012–2020 are (i) one-stop registration, (ii) com-
mercialization of technology, (iii) early stage investment ¼nancing, (iv) assistance in
export (GoEx Program), (v) creation of homegrown champions, and (vi) empowering
the poor and micro enterprises in rural areas. Other key initiatives include govern-
ment procurement, resource pooling, reducing information asymmetry, building 
capacity of SMEs, speci¼c measures for East Malaysia, etc. 
6 MIDA has the following industrial divisions: ICT and electrical, electronics, transport
industry, machinery and engineering supporting industries, textiles and non-metallic
minerals, food, chemical, life sciences industry, wood and paper, and metal and 
fabrication. 
7 Perodua was also established by the government in 1993 with Japan’s Daihatsu 
as a partner. Unlike Proton, it undertakes assembly without acquiring design
capability. Initially, there was a market division between Proton (over 1,000cc) and
Perodua (below 1,000cc). But this division was broken and the two companies 
have become competitors in the domestic market. Additionally, Malaysia’s local 
car companies include Naza which has cooperative relation with Kia, and Inokom 
in partnership with Hyundai. 
8 The Malaysia–Japan Automotive Industry Cooperation (MAJAICO) 2006–2011 
was a comprehensive of¼cial ¼ve-year support package for the automobile in-
dustry consisting of ten components, including production improvement at local 
vendors (part suppliers) for national car companies. In this component, called A1, 
15 Japanese technical experts, mostly from Toyota, coached about 20 participating
companies on lean production every six months. From 2009, 13 ¼rst-tier local 
suppliers were trained as model producers to teach second- and third-tier suppliers.
MAJAICO was one of the cooperation projects agreed in the Japan–Malaysia 
Economic Partnership Agreement which took effect in 2006. 
9 Vietnam: growth without quality 
1 Another reason behind re-linking with the West was the withdrawal of the Viet-
namese troops from Cambodia in 1989. This greatly improved diplomatic relations
with China, Japan, ASEAN neighbors, and the Western countries. 
2 The World Bank revises country classi¼cation annually. Based on the 2010 gross 
national income per capita data using the World Bank Atlas method, the classi¼cation
is as follows: low-income countries (US$1,005 or less); lower-middle-income coun-
tries (US$1,006–US$3,975), upper-middle-income countries (US$3,976–US$12,275);
and high-income countries (US$12,276 or more). Separately, the World Bank de¼nes
IDA-only countries to be those with per capita income of less than US$1,175 (us-
ing 2010 data) and lacking the ¼nancial ability to borrow from IBRD. IDA loans 
are deeply concessional but IBRD loans are non-concessional. 
3 The Millennium Development Goals set by the United Nations Group for low-
income countries include the following eight targets: poverty reduction, universal 
















    





combating infectious diseases, environmental sustainability, and global partnership.
These goals are to be achieved by 2015 and progress is monitored for each country
as well as regionally and globally. 
4 A Vietnamese master plan must be structured as follows: (i) signi¼cance and relevance
of the sector, (ii) analysis of domestic situation, (iii) review of international market 
and rival countries; (iv) development strategy including perspectives, objectives, and
production and investment plans, (v) solutions and steps, (vi) conclusion and policy
proposals. Solutions and policy proposals are long lists of statements without 
backing in resources, personnel, or organization. 
5 Deus ex machina is a Latin phrase for “god out of machine” in ancient Greek plays.
This god arrives suddenly and out of context on a crane-like machine to give a 
forceful solution to an entangled situation. 
6 Establishment of a national competitiveness council was proposed by Vietnam 
Competitiveness Report 2010 which was presented by Michael Porter to the prime 
minister (Ketels et al., 2010) as well as the present author (Ohno, 2011). In response,
the prime minister instructed the Central Institute for Economic Management 
under the Ministry of Planning and Investment to set up this council on a trial 
basis with the minister of planning and investment chairing. However, this attempt
is likely to fail because the key point of creating this council is to drastically reduce 
the number of national councils and giving highest authority to the few remaining 
ones. Adding one more ministerial-level council without consolidating others will 
aggravate the problem rather than solving it. 
10 Ethiopia: the Growth and Transformation Plan 
1 In 2009, Ethiopia’s receipt of ODA on net disbursement basis was equivalent to 
12.4 percent of GDP and 60.9 percent of gross capital formation (World Bank 
Development Indicators). Merchandise export, dominated by food (75 percent), 
especially coffee, and agricultural raw materials (14 percent), was only US$1.5 
billion or 5 percent of GDP in 2008 (national data). 
2 Among national leaders of the world, Mr. Meles is a unique personality. Arising 
from a leader of the rural guerilla ¼ghters which toppled the previous regime, he 
has ruled Ethiopia for over two decades. Without notes or advisors, his lucid 
mind and strong memory can handle economic theory, policy debates, and technical
numbers over such diverse topics as agriculture, industry, education and training, 
technology transfer, infrastructure, spatial development and connectivity, macro-
economy, climate change, and politics. He often represents Africa at G-20 meetings,
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and other inter-
national events. He even wrote a PhD dissertation on developmental doctrine for 
a British university which he, however, did not ¼nish. He spends long hours with 
foreign investors, academics, and organizations for substance and action, asks 
for technical papers and policy documents for his reading, and exchanges long 
letters and emails when necessary. Joseph Stiglitz of Columbia University is among
his personal advisors. My Japanese team has also had the privilege of having long
policy discussion with him every time we visit Ethiopia. 
3 This section is based on Ethiopian policy documents noted in the text, speeches, 
and unpublished writings of Prime Minister Meles, and a series of discussion and 
an exchange of letters that the author had with Mr. Meles between October 2008 
and November 2009. 
4 Many studies con¼rm that economic liberalism does not necessarily generate 
growth momentum in low-income countries. Ishikawa (1990) presents evidence 
from China in the 1980s on the failure of liberalization policies to produce pro-





   
  
   
 
 





       
 







(1995b) show that rapid privatization in Russia created new gigantic rents and 
their seekers; Khan (2008) argues that capability to direct rents to productive 
purposes such as investment and technology absorption, rather than to eliminate 
rents, is needed in a country that lacks market supporting institutions; and Ohno 
(2009a, 2009b) contends that Washington Consensus policies can take a country 
to a level of income dictated by given advantages but climbing further would 
require a combination of more proactive policies and private dynamism. 
5 After the severe drought of 2003/04, the Ethiopian government introduced the 
Productive Safety-net Program targeted to the most vulnerable areas and actively 
mobilized international aid amounting to about US$300 million annually. However,
the number of farmers who have graduated from this program is limited. As
of 2009, 7.57 million rural residents were in need of continued support from this 
program. 
6 According to World Bank estimates in 2008, the ratio of agriculture-related
expenditure to total government expenditure in Ethiopia is 6.7 percent, which is 
higher than the corresponding ratios in Vietnam (6.0 percent), Mozambique (2.2 
percent), Tanzania (2.1 percent), Kenya (2.0 percent), Pakistan (1.2 percent), and 
Indonesia (0.2 percent). 
7 Dercon et al. (2009), as well as many donor agencies in Ethiopia, stress the need 
to check data reliability on agricultural production and land productivity. 
8 An Economic Development Strategy for Ethiopia discussed policies for large-scale
commercial agriculture and policies for small farmers separately (Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia, 1994). However, initial focus was on the latter while concrete
measures for the former were not activated until the early 2000s. 
9 My discussion with Prime Minister Meles in January 2011. However, in its Knowledge
Sharing Program (KSP), Korea still teaches the “old” industrial policies it practiced
from the 1960s to the mid-1990s as the country’s major intellectual contribution 
to the developing world. The two pillars of KSP are policy dialogue which includes
seminars, visits, and reports, and policy modules that systematically explain Korea’s
developmental experiences in over 100 topics—see Chapter 3. 
10 One thing that may not receive universal acceptance is Rodrik’s regular insistence
that only pioneer ¼rms which take risks in “self-discovery” should be given incentives
and subsidies and not copycats who come late with no risks taken (recommenda-
tion (v)). However, in reality, such selectivity is administratively cumbersome and 
even unfair. New activity with business risk may be undertaken not by the ¼rst 
nominal producer in the sector but by the tenth or the 99th. Generally, it is hard 
for developing-country governments to identify the producer who brought some-
thing truly new to the industry (“pioneers”). It is more reasonable and practical 
that any investor who satis¼es certain sectoral and activity criteria, whether the 
¼rst or the ninety-ninth, should be given the same incentives while they last. 
11 In the preparatory and ¼rst phase of bilateral policy dialogue, the Japanese deleg-
ation met with the prime minister for substantive discussion in July, October, and 
December 2008; June, September, and November 2009; March and October 2010;
and January and May 2011. Average length of meetings was from one-and-half 
to two hours. Long letters from the prime minister were received in June and July 
2009. 
12 At the request of the Ethiopian prime minister, the GRIPS Development Forum 
compiled information packages on Japanese technical education, rural life improve-
ment movements in East Asia, information on basic metal and engineering
industries, international comparison of industrial policy formulation methods, 
technical absorption of Japan and Korea through foreign-aided industrial projects,
and basic information on the chemical industry. Separately, Introducing Kaizen 
to Africa, a booklet explaining the concept of kaizen as well as how it took root 
in Japan and how it was applied to the developing world with Japanese assistance,
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was produced as an introductory reference material for those unfamiliar with the 
concept (GRIPS Development Forum, 2009). Handbook of National Movements
for Quality and Productivity Improvement was also produced for the bilateral 
policy dialogue (Japan International Cooperation Agency and National Graduate
Institute for Policy Studies, 2011b). 
13 In the second phase of bilateral policy dialogue which started in January 2012, 
three-level discussions are to be held every six months in a format similar to the 
¼rst phase but with more action-oriented contents. Revamping of export promotion
policy and study of technology transfer are two topics that are likely to receive 
great attention. Meanwhile, the second phase of Japanese kaizen cooperation was
initiated in late 2011 where capacity building of the newly created Ethiopia Kaizen
Institute and training of Ethiopian kaizen experts through hands-on enterprise 
consultation would be the two main pillars. 
14 For example, during the GTP period, garment export is set to expand 46 times 
to US$1 billion, leather and leather product export is to jump 6.6 times to nearly 
US$500 million, sugar production is expected to increase 7.2 fold to 2.25 million 
tons, cement production is to rise 10 times to 27 million tons, and sales of steel 
and engineering are expected to increase 17 times to over 100 million birr. 
15 The prime minister personally chairs monthly committees on export, power, railroads,
sugar, roads, and technical and vocational education and training. In addition, 
he presides over the macroeconomic committee which meets twice a month. There
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